From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v25 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to include vma anonymous
Date: Mon, 26 Apr 2021 09:40:56 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210426064056.bqbeekpsogd32yvm@box.shutemov.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210415221419.31835-30-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Thu, Apr 15, 2021 at 03:14:18PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
> for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
> anonymous VMA.
>
> To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
> is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().
>
> Another approach is passing vma_is_anonymous() to arch_validate_flags().
> To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHSTK, which creates a shadow stack
> mapping and can only be applied to an anonymous VMA, update arch_validate_
> flags() to include anonymous VMA information.
I would rather pass down whole vma. Who knows what else
arch_validate_flags() would need to know about the VMA tomorrow:
arch_validate_flags(vma, newflags);
should do the trick.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-26 6:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-15 22:13 [PATCH v25 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:13 ` [PATCH v25 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-23 10:13 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-23 10:19 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-23 10:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-23 10:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-23 10:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-23 15:59 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-26 6:31 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to include vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-26 6:40 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2021-04-26 11:11 ` Catalin Marinas
2021-04-26 17:56 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-15 22:14 ` [PATCH v25 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-26 6:52 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-26 18:00 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
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