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From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Sergey Senozhatsky" <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	"Helge Deller" <deller@gmx.de>, "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"John Stultz" <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Stanislav Kinsburskiy" <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tych>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2017 17:13:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJcbSZF5Ya6jhh+bweL1r5o7ajK70VRUyRB0U7WjnbSxN_kEsQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJw2XW30NUnoNOMunZMhZ5V-3K9rspOFTOnyt5bxnkA+A@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:57 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 8, 2017 at 1:38 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
>> This patch prevents a syscall to modify the address limit of the
>> caller. The address limit is kept by the syscall wrapper and restored
>> just after the syscall ends.
>>
>> For example, it would mitigation this bug:
>>
>> - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>>
>> By default, this change warns if the segment is incorrect while
>> returning to user-mode and fix it. The
>> CONFIG_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG option can be enabled to halt
>> instead if needed.
>
> Instead of this new config, please reuse the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
> test instead, which already controls very similar WARN vs BUG
> behavior. Example below...
>
>>
>> The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
>> added so each architecture can optimize how the
>> verify_pre_usermode_state function is called.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
>> ---
>> Based on next-20170308
>> ---
>>  include/linux/syscalls.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
>>  init/Kconfig             | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>  kernel/sys.c             | 11 +++++++++++
>>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> index 980c3c9b06f8..78a2268ecd6e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>> @@ -191,6 +191,22 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
>>         SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)                 \
>>         __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
>>
>> +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
>> +
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
>> +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) {
>> +       bool ret = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS);
>> +       // Prevent re-ordering the call
>> +       barrier();
>> +       return ret;
>> +}
>> +#else
>> +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) {
>> +       return false;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +
>>  #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
>>  #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)                                        \
>>         asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))       \
>> @@ -199,7 +215,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
>>         asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));      \
>>         asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))       \
>>         {                                                               \
>> +               bool user_caller = has_user_ds();                       \
>>                 long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));  \
>> +               if (user_caller)                                        \
>> +                       verify_pre_usermode_state();                    \
>>                 __MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);                         \
>>                 __PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));       \
>>                 return ret;                                             \
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index c859c993c26f..ab958b59063f 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1929,6 +1929,22 @@ config PROFILING
>>  config TRACEPOINTS
>>         bool
>>
>> +#
>> +# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
>> +# is called.
>> +#
>> +config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
>> +       bool
>> +
>> +config VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG
>> +       bool "Halt on incorrect state on returning to user-mode"
>> +       default n
>> +       help
>> +         By default a warning is logged and the state is fixed. This option
>> +         crashes the kernel instead.
>> +
>> +         If unsure, say Y.
>> +
>>  source "arch/Kconfig"
>>
>>  endmenu                # General setup
>> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
>> index 196c7134bee6..cc2ebf7fae55 100644
>> --- a/kernel/sys.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
>> @@ -2459,3 +2459,14 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
>>         return 0;
>>  }
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
>> +
>> +/* Called before coming back to user-mode */
>> +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
>> +{
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE_BUG
>> +       BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
>> +#else
>> +       if (WARN_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)))
>> +               set_fs(USER_DS);
>> +#endif
>
> I would just make this:
>
> if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS))
>     set_fs(USER_DS);
>

Make sense, I will remove my custom CONFIG and use that one instead
(still doing inline assembly if not set).

> -Kees
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security



-- 
Thomas

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-09  1:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-08 21:38 [PATCH v1 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
2017-03-08 21:38 ` [PATCH v1 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
2017-03-08 21:38 ` [PATCH v1 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-03-08 21:49   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-08 22:05   ` Nicolas Pitre
2017-03-08 22:33     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-08 21:38 ` [PATCH v1 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-03-08 21:57 ` [PATCH v1 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Kees Cook
2017-03-09  1:13   ` Thomas Garnier [this message]
2017-03-08 21:58 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-08 22:20   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-08 22:27     ` Thomas Garnier

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