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* [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
@ 2017-03-23 17:25 Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini
  Cc: linux-s390-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r,
	kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8

This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
memory and elevate privileges.

For example, it would mitigation this bug:

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990

The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
added so each architecture can optimize this change.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
Based on next-20170322
---
 arch/s390/Kconfig        |  1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/Kconfig             |  7 +++++++
 kernel/sys.c             |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index a2dcef0aacc7..b73f5b87bc99 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ config S390
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ
 	select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_SAVE_PAGE_KEYS if HIBERNATION
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 980c3c9b06f8..f9ff80fa92ff 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+
+/*
+ * Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
+ * address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
+ */
+static inline void verify_pre_usermode_state(void) {
+	BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER() \
+	bool user_caller = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS)
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE() \
+	if (user_caller) verify_pre_usermode_state()
+#else
+#define __CHECK_USER_CALLER()
+#define __VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE()
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
+#endif
+
+
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)					\
 	asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))	\
@@ -199,7 +220,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 	asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__))	\
 	{								\
-		long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		long ret;						\
+		__CHECK_USER_CALLER();					\
+		ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__));	\
+		__VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE();				\
 		__MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__);				\
 		__PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__));	\
 		return ret;						\
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c859c993c26f..c4efc3a95e4a 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1929,6 +1929,13 @@ config PROFILING
 config TRACEPOINTS
 	bool
 
+#
+# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
+# is called.
+#
+config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+	bool
+
 source "arch/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu		# General setup
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 196c7134bee6..4ae278fcc290 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2459,3 +2459,10 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
+asmlinkage void asm_verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
+{
+	verify_pre_usermode_state();
+}
+#endif
-- 
2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
  2017-03-23 17:25 [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-03-23 17:25 ` Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 20:36   ` Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel,
	Kees Cook, Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for x86.
---
Based on next-20170322
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                 |  3 +++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S               |  8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h        | 11 -----------
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0e1bdadc8222..f48c96b834b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC		if ACPI
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING	if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index cdefcfdd9e63..76ef050255c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -183,6 +184,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 	u32 cached_flags;
 
+	verify_pre_usermode_state();
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()))
 		local_irq_disable();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d2b2a2948ffe..c079b010205c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -218,6 +218,14 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
 	jnz	1f
 
+	/*
+	 * If address limit is not based on user-mode, jump to slow path for
+	 * additional security checks.
+	 */
+	movq	$TASK_SIZE_MAX, %rcx
+	cmp	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%r11)
+	jnz	1f
+
 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
 	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
 
 #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES	64
 
+/*
+ * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
+ * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
+ * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
+ * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
+ * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
+ * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
+ * at the maximum canonical address.
+ */
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
 #define KSTK_ESP(task)		(task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
 
 #else
-/*
- * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
- * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
- * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
- * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
- * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
- * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
- * at the maximum canonical address.
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
  * space during mmap's.
  */
-- 
2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
  2017-03-23 17:25 [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-03-23 17:25 ` Thomas Garnier
       [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-3-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
       [not found] ` <20170323172515.27950-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel,
	Kees Cook, Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for arm.
---
Based on next-20170322
---
 arch/arm/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index fcbc5ef1ec69..10c6dc3dfff9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM
 	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX if ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
 	select ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT if CPU_V7
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index eb5cd77bf1d8..88c72c4e44ad 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <asm/ftrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
 #ifdef CONFIG_AEABI
 #include <asm/unistd-oabi.h>
 #endif
@@ -27,7 +28,6 @@
 
 #include "entry-header.S"
 
-
 	.align	5
 #if !(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING))
 /*
@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.fnstart	)
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	fast_work_pending
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_fail
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
 	arch_ret_to_user r1, lr
@@ -66,6 +69,7 @@ ret_fast_syscall:
  UNWIND(.cantunwind	)
 	str	r0, [sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF]!	@ save returned r0
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]		@ re-check for syscall tracing
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK | _TIF_WORK_MASK
 	beq	no_work_pending
@@ -82,6 +86,7 @@ slow_work_pending:
 	mov	r2, why				@ 'syscall'
 	bl	do_work_pending
 	cmp	r0, #0
+	ldreq   r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	beq	no_work_pending
 	movlt	scno, #(__NR_restart_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
 	ldmia	sp, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
@@ -99,9 +104,12 @@ ret_slow_syscall:
 	disable_irq_notrace			@ disable interrupts
 ENTRY(ret_to_user_from_irq)
 	ldr	r1, [tsk, #TI_FLAGS]
+	ldr	r2, [tsk, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
 	tst	r1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	bne	slow_work_pending
 no_work_pending:
+	cmp	r2, #TASK_SIZE
+	blne	addr_limit_fail
 	asm_trace_hardirqs_on save = 0
 
 	/* perform architecture specific actions before user return */
@@ -125,6 +133,12 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
 	b	ret_slow_syscall
 ENDPROC(ret_from_fork)
 
+addr_limit_fail:
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0, lr}
+	bl	asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0, lr}
+	ret     lr
+
 /*=============================================================================
  * SWI handler
  *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
  2017-03-23 17:25 [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-03-23 17:25 ` Thomas Garnier
       [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-4-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
       [not found] ` <20170323172515.27950-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini
  Cc: linux-s390, linux-kernel, linux-api, x86, linux-arm-kernel,
	kernel-hardening

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for arm64.
---
Based on next-20170322
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig        |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index f2b0b528037d..0e86d87259f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
 	select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
 	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARM_AMBA
 	select ARM_ARCH_TIMER
 	select ARM_GIC
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 43512d4d7df2..6d598e7051c3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -744,6 +744,10 @@ ENDPROC(cpu_switch_to)
 ret_fast_syscall:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
 	str	x0, [sp, #S_X0]			// returned x0
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
+	cmp	x2, x1
+	b.ne	addr_limit_fail
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]	// re-check for syscall tracing
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
 	cbnz	x2, ret_fast_syscall_trace
@@ -771,6 +775,11 @@ work_pending:
  */
 ret_to_user:
 	disable_irq				// disable interrupts
+	ldr	x2, [tsk, #TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT]	// check addr limit change
+	mov	x1, #TASK_SIZE_64
+	cmp	x2, x1
+	b.ne	addr_limit_fail
+
 	ldr	x1, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS]
 	and	x2, x1, #_TIF_WORK_MASK
 	cbnz	x2, work_pending
@@ -779,6 +788,12 @@ finish_ret_to_user:
 	kernel_exit 0
 ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
 
+addr_limit_fail:
+	stp	x0, lr, [sp,#-16]!
+	bl	asm_verify_pre_usermode_state
+	ldp	x0, lr, [sp],#16
+	ret	lr
+
 /*
  * This is how we return from a fork.
  */
-- 
2.12.1.500.gab5fba24ee-goog

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
       [not found] ` <20170323172515.27950-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-03-23 20:15   ` Kees Cook
       [not found]     ` <CAGXu5jKbqOvb2TtfpXhjPQFxEShaBu=RbBQORtqhcF1bD3As6w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-03-23 20:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Thomas Garnier
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
> address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
> memory and elevate privileges.
>
> For example, it would mitigation this bug:
>
> - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
> added so each architecture can optimize this change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

Awesome. :) I've tested this on x86 and arm with the LKDTM patch I'll
post in a moment.

[   46.977823] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
[   46.978966] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
[   46.980302] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   46.981219] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:200!

Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>

(Also note, your Signed-off-by lines are missing in patches 2-4)

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
  2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
@ 2017-03-23 20:36   ` Thomas Garnier
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 20:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel,
	Kees Cook, Josh Poimboeuf, Borislav Petkov
  Cc: linux-s390, LKML, Linux API, the arch/x86 maintainers,
	linux-arm-kernel, Kernel Hardening

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
> returns for x86.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>

Not sure why it was not there anymore.

-- 
Thomas

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
       [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-4-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-03-23 20:37     ` Thomas Garnier
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 20:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini
  Cc: linux-s390, LKML, Linux API, the arch/x86 maintainers,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r,
	Kernel Hardening

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
> returns for arm64.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

Not sure why it was not there anymore.

-- 
Thomas

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
       [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-3-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-03-23 20:38     ` Thomas Garnier
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-23 20:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Thomas Garnier, Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar,
	H . Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini
  Cc: linux-s390, LKML, Linux API, the arch/x86 maintainers,
	linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r,
	Kernel Hardening

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
> returns for arm.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

Not sure why it was not there anymore.
-- 
Thomas

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
       [not found]     ` <CAGXu5jKbqOvb2TtfpXhjPQFxEShaBu=RbBQORtqhcF1bD3As6w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
@ 2017-03-31 15:34       ` Thomas Garnier
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Garnier @ 2017-03-31 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: Martin Schwidefsky, Heiko Carstens, David Howells, Arnd Bergmann,
	Dave Hansen, Al Viro, Thomas Gleixner, René Nyffenegger,
	Andrew Morton, Paul E . McKenney, Ingo Molnar, Oleg Nesterov,
	Pavel Tikhomirov, Stephen Smalley, Ingo Molnar, H . Peter Anvin,
	Andy Lutomirski, Paolo Bonzini, Rik van Riel

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 10:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
>> address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
>> memory and elevate privileges.
>>
>> For example, it would mitigation this bug:
>>
>> - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>>
>> The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
>> added so each architecture can optimize this change.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
>
> Awesome. :) I've tested this on x86 and arm with the LKDTM patch I'll
> post in a moment.
>
> [   46.977823] lkdtm: Performing direct entry CORRUPT_USER_DS
> [   46.978966] lkdtm: setting bad task size limit
> [   46.980302] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [   46.981219] kernel BUG at ./include/linux/syscalls.h:200!
>
> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>

Thanks Kees. Any additional feedback? Andy?

>
> (Also note, your Signed-off-by lines are missing in patches 2-4)
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security



-- 
Thomas

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2017-03-31 15:34 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-03-23 17:25 [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
2017-03-23 20:36   ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
     [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-3-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-23 20:38     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-23 17:25 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
     [not found]   ` <20170323172515.27950-4-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-23 20:37     ` Thomas Garnier
     [not found] ` <20170323172515.27950-1-thgarnie-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-23 20:15   ` [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Kees Cook
     [not found]     ` <CAGXu5jKbqOvb2TtfpXhjPQFxEShaBu=RbBQORtqhcF1bD3As6w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-03-31 15:34       ` Thomas Garnier

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