From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: "Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
"Sergey Senozhatsky" <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
"Helge Deller" <deller@gmx.de>, "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
Date: Thu, 9 Mar 2017 13:32:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c10289bb-e72b-b7b5-f02b-d8cab49f372c@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170309012456.5631-1-thgarnie@google.com>
On 03/09/2017 02:24 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> This patch ensures a syscall does not return to user-mode with a kernel
> address limit. If that happened, a process can corrupt kernel-mode
> memory and elevate privileges.
>
> For example, it would mitigation this bug:
>
> - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990
>
> If the CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION option is enabled, an incorrect
> state will result in a BUG_ON.
>
> The CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE option is also
> added so each architecture can optimize this change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
> ---
> Based on next-20170308
> ---
> include/linux/syscalls.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> init/Kconfig | 7 +++++++
> kernel/sys.c | 8 ++++++++
> 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> index 980c3c9b06f8..78a2268ecd6e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> @@ -191,6 +191,22 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
> SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
> __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
>
> +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void);
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
> +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) {
> + bool ret = segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS);
> + // Prevent re-ordering the call
> + barrier();
> + return ret;
> +}
Can you please disable that for s390? (e.g. by setting
CONFIG_ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE for s390)
We have a separate address space for kernel/user so the logic will
be slightly different and is already handled in
commit b5a882fcf146c87cb6b67c6df353e1c042b8773d
Author: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Date: Fri Feb 17 08:13:28 2017 +0100
s390: restore address space when returning to user space
> +#else
> +static inline bool has_user_ds(void) {
> + return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +
> #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
> #define __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...) \
> asmlinkage long sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__)) \
> @@ -199,7 +215,10 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
> asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)); \
> asmlinkage long SyS##name(__MAP(x,__SC_LONG,__VA_ARGS__)) \
> { \
> + bool user_caller = has_user_ds(); \
> long ret = SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_CAST,__VA_ARGS__)); \
> + if (user_caller) \
> + verify_pre_usermode_state(); \
> __MAP(x,__SC_TEST,__VA_ARGS__); \
> __PROTECT(x, ret,__MAP(x,__SC_ARGS,__VA_ARGS__)); \
> return ret; \
> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> index c859c993c26f..c4efc3a95e4a 100644
> --- a/init/Kconfig
> +++ b/init/Kconfig
> @@ -1929,6 +1929,13 @@ config PROFILING
> config TRACEPOINTS
> bool
>
> +#
> +# Set by each architecture that want to optimize how verify_pre_usermode_state
> +# is called.
> +#
> +config ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
> + bool
> +
> source "arch/Kconfig"
>
> endmenu # General setup
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 196c7134bee6..411163ac9dc3 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -2459,3 +2459,11 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
> return 0;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
> +
> +/* Called before coming back to user-mode */
> +asmlinkage void verify_pre_usermode_state(void)
> +{
> + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS),
> + "incorrect get_fs() on user-mode return"))
> + set_fs(USER_DS);
> +}
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-09 12:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-09 1:24 [PATCH v2 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 1:24 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 1:24 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 1:24 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 12:23 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-09 15:56 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 16:05 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-09 16:19 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 16:26 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-09 16:35 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 17:05 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-09 8:42 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 15:48 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-09 17:41 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 10:39 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-03-09 12:09 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-09 13:44 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-09 15:21 ` Mark Rutland
2017-03-09 15:54 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 15:52 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-09 12:32 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2017-03-09 15:53 ` Thomas Garnier
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