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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:18:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181011001846.30964-25-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=selinux", the enable
variable defaults to true.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 security/selinux/Kconfig | 15 ---------------
 security/selinux/hooks.c |  5 +----
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8af7a690eb40..55f032f1fc2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -22,21 +22,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
-	int "NSA SELinux boot parameter default value"
-	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
-	range 0 1
-	default 1
-	help
-	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
-	  'selinux', which allows SELinux to be disabled at boot.  If this
-	  option is set to 0 (zero), the SELinux kernel parameter will
-	  default to 0, disabling SELinux at bootup.  If this option is
-	  set to 1 (one), the SELinux kernel parameter will default to 1,
-	  enabling SELinux at bootup.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 	bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0f8d7bb88197..14c120842ab4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -120,9 +120,8 @@ __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 #endif
 
+int selinux_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init = 1;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
-int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-
 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enabled;
@@ -131,8 +130,6 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
-#else
-int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-11  0:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 109+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-11  0:18 [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 18:13     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49     ` Kees Cook
2018-11-02 20:49       ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-05 14:13         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-11  0:18   ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11  3:45   ` James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:14     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52     ` James Morris
2018-10-11 15:52       ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 17:57   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58   ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 22:58     ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:09       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48       ` John Johansen
2018-10-11 23:48         ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  0:11         ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  0:11           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  1:19           ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  1:19             ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31             ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 11:31               ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24               ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 18:24                 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-12 19:01                   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 16:48                     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 18:50                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 19:05                       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-24  8:56                         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-24 20:12                           ` Kees Cook
2018-11-14 21:04                             ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-20 23:36                               ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-11 23:53       ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:53         ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  0:26         ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  0:26           ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 11:31             ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11             ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 18:11               ` John Johansen

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