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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:18:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181011001846.30964-6-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 include/linux/init.h      |  2 --
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 include/linux/module.h    |  1 -
 security/integrity/iint.c |  1 +
 security/security.c       | 14 +++++---------
 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index 77636539e77c..9c2aba1dbabf 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -133,7 +133,6 @@ static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry)
 #endif
 
 extern initcall_entry_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[];
-extern initcall_entry_t __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
 
 /* Used for contructor calls. */
 typedef void (*ctor_fn_t)(void);
@@ -236,7 +235,6 @@ extern bool initcall_debug;
 	static exitcall_t __exitcall_##fn __exit_call = fn
 
 #define console_initcall(fn)	___define_initcall(fn,, .con_initcall)
-#define security_initcall(fn)	___define_initcall(fn,, .lsm_info)
 
 struct obs_kernel_param {
 	const char *str;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 97a020c616ad..d13059feca09 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2039,6 +2039,18 @@ extern char *lsm_names;
 extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
 				char *lsm);
 
+struct lsm_info {
+	int (*init)(void);	/* Required. */
+};
+
+extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
+
+#define security_initcall(lsm)						\
+	static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm				\
+		__used __section(.lsm_info.init)			\
+		__aligned(sizeof(unsigned long))			\
+		= { .init = lsm, }
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 /*
  * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index f807f15bebbe..264979283756 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ extern void cleanup_module(void);
 #define late_initcall_sync(fn)		module_init(fn)
 
 #define console_initcall(fn)		module_init(fn)
-#define security_initcall(fn)		module_init(fn)
 
 /* Each module must use one module_init(). */
 #define module_init(initfn)					\
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 5a6810041e5c..70d21b566955 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include "integrity.h"
 
 static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 41a5da2c7faf..e74f46fba591 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -43,16 +43,12 @@ char *lsm_names;
 static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
 	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
-static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
+static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
 {
-	initcall_t call;
-	initcall_entry_t *ce;
+	struct lsm_info *lsm;
 
-	ce = __start_lsm_info;
-	while (ce < __end_lsm_info) {
-		call = initcall_from_entry(ce);
-		call();
-		ce++;
+	for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+		lsm->init();
 	}
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +78,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	/*
 	 * Load all the remaining security modules.
 	 */
-	do_security_initcalls();
+	major_lsm_init();
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-11  0:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 109+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-11  0:18 [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-11  0:18   ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 18:13     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49     ` Kees Cook
2018-11-02 20:49       ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-05 14:13         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11  3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11  3:45   ` James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:14     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52     ` James Morris
2018-10-11 15:52       ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 17:57   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58   ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 22:58     ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:09       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48       ` John Johansen
2018-10-11 23:48         ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  0:11         ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  0:11           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  1:19           ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  1:19             ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31             ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 11:31               ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24               ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 18:24                 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-12 19:01                   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 16:48                     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 18:50                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 19:05                       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-24  8:56                         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-24 20:12                           ` Kees Cook
2018-11-14 21:04                             ` Casey Schaufler
2018-11-20 23:36                               ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-11 23:53       ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:53         ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  0:26         ` John Johansen
2018-10-12  0:26           ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 11:31             ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11             ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 18:11               ` John Johansen

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