From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 07:57:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <78fc6ba1-881a-9c82-ebc1-64311279050c@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <915ba7e5-0e10-87ef-f0a9-1d8db2e6de90@canonical.com>
On 9/21/2018 6:19 AM, John Johansen wrote:
> On 09/20/2018 08:02 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 7:14 PM, John Johansen
>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>> On 09/20/2018 07:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 6:39 PM, John Johansen
>>>> <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I like CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE if "empty" means "enable all". Should
>>>> CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE replace all the other CONFIG-based LSM
>>>> enabling/disabling?
>>> I don't particularly like "empty" being "enable all". With that
>>> how would I disable all builtin lsms so that I just boot with
>>> capability.
>>>
>>> An option of all or even * is more explicit and leaves the empty
>>> set to mean disable everything
>> Okay, that works. I prefer "all" FWIW.
>>
> me too, I was just trying to throw out options.
I'll buy that. "all" is fine by me, although it means we
can't have an LSM named "all". :) We should also allow "none"
to mean no LSMs. I know lots of people who love using security=none.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-21 14:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 20:14 ` Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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