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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-4-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20180920162315.n2v_GWfhcayIazSI-O6SuwkpCVH0N3KPV_9Q27GTv-U@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org>

In preparation for switching from initcall to just a regular set of
pointers in a section, rename the internal section name.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 10 +++++-----
 include/linux/init.h              |  4 ++--
 security/security.c               |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index 934a45395547..5079a969e612 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -787,14 +787,14 @@
 		__con_initcall_end = .;
 
 #define SECURITY_INITCALL						\
-		__security_initcall_start = .;				\
-		KEEP(*(.security_initcall.init))			\
-		__security_initcall_end = .;
+		__start_lsm_info = .;					\
+		KEEP(*(.lsm_info.init))					\
+		__end_lsm_info = .;
 
 /* Older linker script style for security init. */
 #define SECURITY_INIT							\
-	.security_initcall.init : AT(ADDR(.security_initcall.init) - LOAD_OFFSET) { \
-		SECURITY_INITCALL					\
+	.lsm_info.init : AT(ADDR(.lsm_info.init) - LOAD_OFFSET) {	\
+		LSM_INFO						\
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index 2538d176dd1f..77636539e77c 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static inline initcall_t initcall_from_entry(initcall_entry_t *entry)
 #endif
 
 extern initcall_entry_t __con_initcall_start[], __con_initcall_end[];
-extern initcall_entry_t __security_initcall_start[], __security_initcall_end[];
+extern initcall_entry_t __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[];
 
 /* Used for contructor calls. */
 typedef void (*ctor_fn_t)(void);
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ extern bool initcall_debug;
 	static exitcall_t __exitcall_##fn __exit_call = fn
 
 #define console_initcall(fn)	___define_initcall(fn,, .con_initcall)
-#define security_initcall(fn)	___define_initcall(fn,, .security_initcall)
+#define security_initcall(fn)	___define_initcall(fn,, .lsm_info)
 
 struct obs_kernel_param {
 	const char *str;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4cbcf244a965..892fe6b691cf 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
 	initcall_t call;
 	initcall_entry_t *ce;
 
-	ce = __security_initcall_start;
+	ce = __start_lsm_info;
 	trace_initcall_level("security");
-	while (ce < __security_initcall_end) {
+	while (ce < __end_lsm_info) {
 		call = initcall_from_entry(ce);
 		trace_initcall_start(call);
 		ret = call();
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-20 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 23:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-20 16:23   ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:04   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:04     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:37     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:37       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:10   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:10     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:14     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:14       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:12   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:12     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:40     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:40       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:25     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  0:45     ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  0:45       ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  1:10       ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  1:10         ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21  1:39         ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  1:39           ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  2:05           ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  2:05             ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  2:14             ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  2:14               ` John Johansen
2018-09-21  3:02               ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21  3:02                 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19                 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 13:19                   ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 14:57                     ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 20:14   ` Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55   ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 21:55     ` Kees Cook

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