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From: riel@redhat.com (riel at redhat.com)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] random, stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 17:26:32 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170519212636.30440-2-riel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170519212636.30440-1-riel@redhat.com>

From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>

Introduce the get_random_canary function, which provides a random
unsigned long canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64
bit architectures, in order to mitigate non-terminated C string
overflows.

Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches,
and the current PaX/grsecurity code base.

Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
 include/linux/random.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index ed5c3838780d..765a992c6774 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/*
+ * On 64 bit architectures, protect against non-terminated C string overflows
+ * by zeroing out the first byte of the canary; this leaves 56 bits of entropy.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffffffff00UL
+#else /* big endian 64 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0x00ffffffffffffffUL
+#endif
+#else /* 32 bits */
+#define CANARY_MASK 0xffffffffUL
+#endif
+static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
+{
+	unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+
+	return val & CANARY_MASK;
+}
+
 unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 
 u32 prandom_u32(void);
-- 
2.9.3

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-19 21:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-19 21:26 stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:26 ` riel at redhat.com [this message]
2017-05-24  8:30   ` [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function Ingo Molnar
2017-05-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 2/5] fork, random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86: ascii armor the x86_64 boot init stack canary riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 " riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:26 ` [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 " riel at redhat.com
2017-05-19 21:32 ` stackprotector: ascii armor the " Kees Cook
2017-05-24 11:57   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2017-05-19 23:57 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-24 15:57 [PATCH v2 0/5] " riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 15:57 ` [PATCH 1/5] random, stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function riel at redhat.com
2017-05-24 16:15   ` Kees Cook

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