[PATCH v5 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation

[PATCH v5 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation

[Ard Biesheuvel]

This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<cipher>,<shash>'
(or '<aead>,<cipher>,<shash>' for the AEAD case). It exposes the
encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by passing through all operations,
while using the cipher/shash pair to transform the input IV into an ESSIV
output IV.

This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #4.

This code has been tested using the fscrypt test suggested by Eric
(generic/549), as well as the mode-test script suggested by Milan for
the dm-crypt case. I also tested the aead case in a virtual machine,
but it definitely needs some wider testing from the dm-crypt experts.

The consensus appears to be that it would be useful if the crypto API
encapsulates the handling of multiple subsequent blocks that are
encrypted using a 64-bit LE counter as IV, and makes it the duty of
the algo to increment the counter between blocks. However, this is
equally suitable for non-ESSIV transforms (or even more so), and so
this is left as a future enhancement to  be applied on top.

Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
  cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
  complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
  cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
  make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
  methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
  (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)

Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
  enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
  the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated

Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
  testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
  to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
  derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine

Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)

Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v5

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly
  md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
  crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 +++++--
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 +-
 crypto/Kconfig                |   4 +
 crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c                | 636 ++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c              |   6 +
 crypto/testmgr.h              | 213 +++++++
 drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 229 ++-----
 fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  88 +--
 14 files changed, 1111 insertions(+), 325 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c

-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v5 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
(aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |   4 +
 crypto/Makefile |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c  | 636 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 641 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 3d056e7da65f..1aa47087c1a2 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1917,6 +1917,10 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
 config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	bool
 
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+	tristate
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+
 source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
 source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
 source "certs/Kconfig"
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 266a4cdbb9e2..ad1d99ba6d56 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fddf6dcc3823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher_spawn	skcipher_spawn;
+		struct crypto_aead_spawn	aead_spawn;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_spawn			essiv_cipher_spawn;
+	struct crypto_shash_spawn		hash_spawn;
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher	*skcipher;
+		struct crypto_aead	*aead;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_cipher		*essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash		*hash;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist		sg[4];
+	u8				*iv;
+	struct aead_request		aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+				 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+				crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+						    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+				   req->iv);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+				      essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+	return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+		     crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (rctx->iv)
+		kfree(rctx->iv);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	gfp_t gfp = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ? GFP_KERNEL
+								 : GFP_ATOMIC;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	/*
+	 * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+	 * we have to copy the converted IV into the source scatterlist before
+	 * we pass it on. If the source and destination scatterlist pointers
+	 * are the same, we just update the IV copy in the AAD region in-place.
+	 * However, if they are different, the caller is not expecting us to
+	 * modify the memory described by the source scatterlist, and so we have
+	 * to do this little dance to create a new scatterlist that backs the
+	 * IV slot in the AAD region with a scratch buffer that we can freely
+	 * modify.
+	 */
+	rctx->iv = NULL;
+	if (req->src != req->dst) {
+		int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+		u8 *iv;
+
+		if (ssize < 0 || sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize) != 1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (enc) {
+			rctx->iv = iv = kmemdup(req->iv, ivsize, gfp);
+			if (!iv)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * On the decrypt path, the ahash executes before the
+			 * skcipher gets a chance to clobber req->iv with its
+			 * output IV, so just map the buffer directly.
+			 */
+			iv = req->iv;
+		}
+
+		sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+		sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize, req->src->offset);
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+			sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+		sg = rctx->sg;
+	} else {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+					 crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+		sg = req->src;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+				  essiv_aead_done, req);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, sg, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+		    crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+	if (rctx->iv && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		kfree(rctx->iv);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+			  struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+	int err;
+
+	essiv_cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+	hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+		goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+
+	tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+	tctx->hash = hash;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+	int err;
+
+	skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				         crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned int subreq_size;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+		     sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+		      crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx,
+					      aead_req) + subreq_size);
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_aead(aead);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.aead = aead;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg,
+				       struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+				       int ivsize)
+{
+	if (hash_alg->digestsize < essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+	    hash_alg->digestsize > essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (ivsize != essiv_cipher_alg->cra_blocksize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	const char *inner_cipher_name;
+	const char *essiv_cipher_name;
+	const char *shash_name;
+	struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+	struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+	struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+	struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg;
+	struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+	struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+	int ivsize;
+	u32 type;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+	inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+	essiv_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher_name);
+
+	shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]);
+	if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+	type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+		skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+					sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!skcipher_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+		base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* Block cipher, e.g. "cbc(aes)" */
+		crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+					   inner_cipher_name, 0,
+					   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+								algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+		block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+		ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		break;
+
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+		aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+				    sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!aead_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+		base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* AEAD cipher, e.g. "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+		crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+				       inner_cipher_name, 0,
+				       crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							    algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+		block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+		ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, essiv_cipher_name,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	essiv_cipher_alg = ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn.alg;
+
+	/* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+	_hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+		goto out_drop_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+	hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+	err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_hash;
+
+	/* Check the set of algorithms */
+	if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(essiv_cipher_alg, hash_alg, ivsize)) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s,%s)\n",
+			block_base->cra_name,
+			essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+			hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	}
+
+	/* Instance fields */
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+		     block_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     essiv_cipher_alg->cra_driver_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	base->cra_flags		= block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	base->cra_blocksize	= block_base->cra_blocksize;
+	base->cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+	base->cra_alignmask	= block_base->cra_alignmask;
+	base->cra_priority	= block_base->cra_priority;
+
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+		skcipher_inst->alg.setkey	= essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt	= essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt	= essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.init		= essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+		skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.walksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+		skcipher_inst->free		= essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+		err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+	} else {
+		aead_inst->alg.setkey		= essiv_aead_setkey;
+		aead_inst->alg.setauthsize	= essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+		aead_inst->alg.encrypt		= essiv_aead_encrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.decrypt		= essiv_aead_decrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.init		= essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+		aead_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+		aead_inst->alg.ivsize		= crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize	= crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+		aead_inst->free			= essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+		err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+	return 0;
+
+out_drop_hash:
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+out_put_hash:
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+		crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	else
+		crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+	kfree(skcipher_inst);
+	kfree(aead_inst);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(inner_cipher_name, essiv_cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+	.name	= "essiv",
+	.create	= essiv_create,
+	.module	= THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
-- 
2.20.1


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Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation

[Ard Biesheuvel]

On Wed, 26 Jun 2019 at 22:40, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
> (aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
> in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
> in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
> cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
> robustness of the API against misuse.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
>  crypto/Kconfig  |   4 +
>  crypto/Makefile |   1 +
>  crypto/essiv.c  | 636 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 641 insertions(+)
>
...
> diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..fddf6dcc3823
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/essiv.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,636 @@
...
> +static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> +{
> +       struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
> +       struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> +
> +       if (rctx->iv)
> +               kfree(rctx->iv);
> +       aead_request_complete(req, err);
> +}
> +
> +static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
> +{
> +       gfp_t gfp = (req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ? GFP_KERNEL
> +                                                                : GFP_ATOMIC;
> +       struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
> +       const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
> +       struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
> +       struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
> +       struct scatterlist *sg;
> +       int err;
> +
> +       crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
> +
> +       /*
> +        * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
> +        * we have to copy the converted IV into the source scatterlist before
> +        * we pass it on. If the source and destination scatterlist pointers
> +        * are the same, we just update the IV copy in the AAD region in-place.
> +        * However, if they are different, the caller is not expecting us to
> +        * modify the memory described by the source scatterlist, and so we have
> +        * to do this little dance to create a new scatterlist that backs the
> +        * IV slot in the AAD region with a scratch buffer that we can freely
> +        * modify.
> +        */
> +       rctx->iv = NULL;
> +       if (req->src != req->dst) {
> +               int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
> +               int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
> +               u8 *iv;
> +
> +               if (ssize < 0 || sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize) != 1)
> +                       return -EINVAL;
> +
> +               if (enc) {
> +                       rctx->iv = iv = kmemdup(req->iv, ivsize, gfp);

This allocation is not really needed - I'll enlarge the request ctx
struct instead so I can incorporate it as an anonymous member.

> +                       if (!iv)
> +                               return -ENOMEM;
> +               } else {
> +                       /*
> +                        * On the decrypt path, the ahash executes before the
> +                        * skcipher gets a chance to clobber req->iv with its
> +                        * output IV, so just map the buffer directly.
> +                        */
> +                       iv = req->iv;
> +               }
> +
> +               sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
> +               sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize, req->src->offset);
> +               sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
> +               sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
> +               if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
> +                       sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
> +               sg = rctx->sg;
> +       } else {
> +               scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
> +                                        req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
> +                                        crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
> +               sg = req->src;
> +       }
> +
> +       aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
> +       aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
> +       aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
> +                                 essiv_aead_done, req);
> +       aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, sg, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
> +
> +       err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
> +                   crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
> +
> +       if (rctx->iv && err != -EINPROGRESS)
> +               kfree(rctx->iv);
> +
> +       return err;
> +}
> +
...

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[PATCH v5 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
ESSIV skcipher which does all of this under the hood.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |  1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          |  5 --
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  9 --
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 88 +-------------------
 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index 24ed99e2eca0..b0292da8613c 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 335a362ee446..c53ce262a06c 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -136,9 +136,6 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
 }
 
 int fscrypt_do_page_crypto(const struct inode *inode, fscrypt_direction_t rw,
@@ -492,8 +489,6 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 		destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
-
-	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 7da276159593..59d0cba9cfb9 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
 
-	/*
-	 * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation.  Only set for CBC contents
-	 * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
-	 */
-	struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
-
 	/*
 	 * Encryption mode used for this inode.  It corresponds to either
 	 * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -166,9 +160,6 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	int keysize;
 	int ivsize;
 	bool logged_impl_name;
-	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
-extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
-
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index dcd91a3fbe49..82c7eb86ca00 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
-
 /* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
@@ -144,10 +142,9 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
-		.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
+		.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
 		.keysize = 16,
-		.ivsize = 16,
-		.needs_essiv = true,
+		.ivsize = 8,
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
@@ -377,72 +374,6 @@ fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
-
-	/* init hash transform on demand */
-	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
-		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
-
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			fscrypt_warn(NULL,
-				     "error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
-				     PTR_ERR(tfm));
-			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-		}
-		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
-		if (prev_tfm) {
-			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-			tfm = prev_tfm;
-		}
-	}
-
-	{
-		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-		desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
-	}
-}
-
-static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
-				int keysize)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-
-	ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
-
-	err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
-	 * used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
-	 * configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
-	 */
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-out:
-	memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
-	return err;
-}
-
-void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
-{
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
  * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
@@ -454,7 +385,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 {
 	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
-	int err;
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
 		mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
@@ -470,19 +400,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	ci->ci_master_key = mk;
 	ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
 
-	if (mode->needs_essiv) {
-		/* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
-		WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
-
-		err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
-		if (err) {
-			fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
-				     "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
-				     inode->i_ino, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -495,7 +412,6 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
 	} else {
 		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
-		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
 	}
 	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
 }
-- 
2.20.1


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Re: [PATCH v5 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling

[Eric Biggers]

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 10:40:42PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
> index dcd91a3fbe49..82c7eb86ca00 100644
> --- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
> +++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
> @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
>  #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
>  #include "fscrypt_private.h"

Can you remove the includes that become unused as a result of this patch?

#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>

> @@ -495,7 +412,6 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
>  		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
>  	} else {
>  		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
> -		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
>  	}
>  	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);

Nit: should remove the curly braces here.

- Eric

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[PATCH v5 3/7] md: dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Instead of allocating a crypto skcipher tfm 'foo' and attempting to
infer the encapsulated block cipher from the driver's 'name' field,
directly parse the string that we used to allocated the tfm. These
are always identical (unless the allocation failed, in which case
we bail anyway), but using the string allows us to use it in the
allocation, which is something we will need when switching to the
'essiv' crypto API template.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 35 +++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 1b16d34bb785..f001f1104cb5 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2321,25 +2321,17 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
  * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
  * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
  */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
+static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *alg_name)
 {
-	const char *alg_name = NULL;
 	char *start, *end;
 
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
 			alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
 			if (!alg_name)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		alg_name++;
-	} else {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
@@ -2434,6 +2426,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
 		cc->tfms_count = 64;
 
+	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
+		ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	       }
+	}
+
+	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
 
 	/* Allocate cipher */
@@ -2445,21 +2451,10 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 
 	/* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
 	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
 	} else
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
-	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v5 4/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 200 ++++----------------
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 165 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index 45254b3ef715..30ca87cf25db 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
 	depends on BLK_DEV_DM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	---help---
 	  This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
 	  transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index f001f1104cb5..e26a09c2d1a6 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
 		    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
 };
 
-struct iv_essiv_private {
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-	u8 *salt;
-};
-
 struct iv_benbi_private {
 	int shift;
 };
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 	const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
 	union {
-		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
 		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -165,8 +159,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	unsigned short int sector_size;
 	unsigned char sector_shift;
 
-	/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
-	void *iv_private;
 	union {
 		struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
 		struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -323,157 +315,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
-			    crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int r, err = 0;
-
-	memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-	r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
-	if (r)
-		err = r;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
-						struct dm_target *ti,
-						const u8 *salt,
-						unsigned int saltsize)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
-		return essiv_tfm;
-	}
-
-	if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
-		ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
-			    "not match IV size of block cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
-	if (err) {
-		ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-
-	return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
-	kzfree(essiv->salt);
-	essiv->salt = NULL;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	if (essiv_tfm)
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
-	cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
-			      const char *opts)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
-	u8 *salt = NULL;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!opts) {
-		ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Allocate hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
-		err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!salt) {
-		ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
-	essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
-				       crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-	}
-	cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
-	return 0;
-
-bad:
-	if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	kfree(salt);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 			      struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+	/*
+	 * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+	 * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+	 */
 	memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
 	*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -854,10 +704,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
 };
 
 static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
-	.ctr       = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
-	.dtr       = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
-	.init      = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
-	.wipe      = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
 	.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
 };
 
@@ -2397,7 +2243,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 				char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
-	char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+	char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2435,9 +2281,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	}
 
 	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto bad_mem;
+
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s,%s)",
+			       cipher_api, cc->cipher, *ivopts);
+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+			goto bad_mem;
+		cipher_api = buf;
 	}
 
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
@@ -2456,6 +2312,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
 	return 0;
+bad_mem:
+	ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
@@ -2515,9 +2374,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (!cipher_api)
 		goto bad_mem;
 
-	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			kfree(cipher_api);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s,%s)", chainmode, cipher,
+			       cipher, *ivopts);
+	} else {
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
 		kfree(cipher_api);
 		goto bad_mem;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v5 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes), aes, sha256)

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c |   6 +
 crypto/testmgr.h | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 228 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index ad78ab5b93cb..f990a209197e 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2327,6 +2327,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 				  0, speed_template_32);
 		break;
 
+	case 220:
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+				  DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		break;
+
 	case 300:
 		if (alg) {
 			test_hash_speed(alg, sec, generic_hash_speed_template);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 658a7eeebab2..23703f3e9cbb 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4253,6 +4253,12 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
 		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 1fdae5993bc3..cca3561b0135 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -33575,4 +33575,217 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
 			  "functions.",
 	},
 };
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.ctext	= "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+			  "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+		.len	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key    = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.ctext	= "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+			  "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+			  "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+			  "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+		.len	= 32,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen	= 24,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+			  "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+			  "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+			  "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+			  "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+			  "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+			  "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+			  "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+			  "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+			  "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+			  "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+			  "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+			  "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+			  "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+			  "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+			  "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+			  "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+			  "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+			  "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+			  "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+			  "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+			  "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+			  "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+			  "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+			  "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+			  "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+			  "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+			  "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+			  "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+			  "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+			  "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+			  "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+			  "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+			  "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+			  "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+			  "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+			  "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+			  "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+			  "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+			  "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+			  "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+			  "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+			  "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+			  "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+			  "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+			  "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+			  "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+			  "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+			  "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+			  "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+			  "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+			  "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+			  "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+			  "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+			  "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+			  "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+			  "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+			  "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+			  "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+			  "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+			  "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+			  "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+			  "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+			  "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+			  "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+			  "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+			  "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+			  "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+			  "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+			  "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+			  "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+			  "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+			  "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+			  "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+			  "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+			  "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+			  "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+			  "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+		.ctext	= "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+			  "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+			  "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+			  "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+			  "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+			  "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+			  "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+			  "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+			  "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+			  "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+			  "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+			  "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+			  "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+			  "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+			  "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+			  "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+			  "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+			  "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+			  "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+			  "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+			  "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+			  "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+			  "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+			  "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+			  "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+			  "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+			  "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+			  "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+			  "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+			  "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+			  "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+			  "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+			  "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+			  "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+			  "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+			  "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+			  "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+			  "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+			  "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+			  "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+			  "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+			  "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+			  "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+			  "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+			  "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+			  "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+			  "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+			  "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+			  "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+			  "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+			  "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+			  "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+			  "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+			  "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+			  "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+			  "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+			  "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+			  "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+			  "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+			  "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+			  "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+			  "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+		.len	= 496,
+	},
+};
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
-- 
2.20.1


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Re: [PATCH v5 5/7] crypto: essiv - add test vector for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)

[Eric Biggers]

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 10:40:45PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
> i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
>  crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
>  crypto/testmgr.c |   6 +
>  crypto/testmgr.h | 213 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 228 insertions(+)

Shouldn't there be an authenc test vector too?  Otherwise there will be no way
to test the AEAD support in essiv.c using the crypto self-tests.

- Eric

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[PATCH v5 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk

[Ard Biesheuvel]

The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index f0ceb545bd1e..11b85ce02d7a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -185,46 +185,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	unsigned int blocks;
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	unsigned int blocks;
+	int err;
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
 
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
 {
 	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -250,22 +268,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -315,22 +323,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-- 
2.20.1


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[PATCH v5 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

[Ard Biesheuvel]

Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
skcipher, which is used by fscrypt, and in some cases, by dm-crypt.
This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  29 ++++-
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 11b85ce02d7a..7097739e7cd9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		ce_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		neon_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -93,6 +98,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
 				int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
 				int first);
 
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+
 asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
 			       int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
 			       int enc_after);
@@ -108,6 +120,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
 };
 
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
 struct mac_tfm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
 	u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -145,6 +163,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+	crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -359,6 +402,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -502,6 +607,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt	= cts_cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 	.init		= cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey		= essiv_cbc_set_key,
+	.encrypt	= essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+	.decrypt	= essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+	.init		= essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+	.exit		= essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
 }, {
 	.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 4c7ce231963c..2ef3d7244ea8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -91,10 +91,25 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
 	 * aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
 	 */
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcencstart
+
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcencstart:
 	enc_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .Lcbcencloop4x:
@@ -126,13 +141,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	st1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* return iv */
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov		x29, sp
+
+	ld1		{v7.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v7, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcdecstart
 
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov		x29, sp
 
 	ld1		{v7.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
 	dec_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -168,6 +195,7 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	ldp		x29, x30, [sp], #16
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
 
 
 	/*
@@ -247,7 +275,6 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_cts_decrypt)
 	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
 	.previous
 
-
 	/*
 	 * aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 ctr[])
-- 
2.20.1


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Re: [PATCH v5 7/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode

[Eric Biggers]

On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 10:40:47PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
> skcipher, which is used by fscrypt, and in some cases, by dm-crypt.
> This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

This technically should say "in some cases by fscrypt and dm-crypt", since as
we've discussed previously, most of the time this is not what fscrypt uses.

- Eric

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