[PATCH 0/4] KVM/arm64: Enable PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM

[PATCH 0/4] KVM/arm64: Enable PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM

[Marc Zyngier]

Not having PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM (for whatever reason VHE is not
enabled on a v8.3 system) has always looked like an oddity. This
trivial series remedies it, and allows a non-VHE KVM to offer PtrAuth
to its guests.

In the tradition of not having separate security between host-EL1 and
EL2, EL2 reuses the keys set up by host-EL1. It is likely that, should
we switch to a mode where EL2 is more distrusting of EL1, we'd have
private keys there.

The last patch is just an optimisation which I've lobbed with the rest
of the series in order not to forget it.

Marc Zyngier (4):
  KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available
  KVM: arm64: Allow ARM64_PTR_AUTH when ARM64_VHE=n
  KVM: arm64: Allow PtrAuth to be enabled from userspace on non-VHE
    systems
  KVM: arm64: Check HCR_EL2 instead of shadow copy to swap PtrAuth
    registers

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                   |  4 +---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S            | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c               | 21 ++++++++++-----------
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

-- 
2.27.0


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[PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available

[Marc Zyngier]

While initializing EL2, switch Pointer Authentication if detected
from EL1. We use the EL1-provided keys though.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
index 6e6ed5581eed..81732177507d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
@@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	 */
 	mov_q	x4, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | (SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS & ~SCTLR_ELx_A))
 CPU_BE(	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE)
+alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
+	b	1f
+alternative_else_nop_endif
+alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
+	b	2f
+alternative_else_nop_endif
+1:
+	orr	x4, x4, #(SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB)
+	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDA
+	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
+2:
 	msr	sctlr_el2, x4
 	isb
 
-- 
2.27.0


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[PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Allow ARM64_PTR_AUTH when ARM64_VHE=n

[Marc Zyngier]

We currently prevent PtrAuth from even being built if KVM is selected,
but VHE isn't. It is a bit of a pointless restriction, since we also
check this at run time (rejecting the enabling of PtrAuth for the
vcpu if we're not running with VHE).

Just drop this apparently useless restriction.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 31380da53689..d719ea9c596d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1516,7 +1516,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
 config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
 	default y
-	depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
 	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
 	# GCC 9.1 and later inserts a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
 	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
@@ -1543,8 +1542,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 
 	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
 	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
-	  be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
-	  CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature.
+	  be enabled.
 
 	  If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then
 	  the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have
-- 
2.27.0


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[PATCH 3/4] KVM: arm64: Allow PtrAuth to be enabled from userspace on non-VHE systems

[Marc Zyngier]

Now that the scene is set for enabling PtrAuth on non-VHE, drop
the restrictions preventing userspace from enabling it.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
index d3b209023727..2a929789fe2e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ static u32 kvm_ipa_limit;
 #define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC	(PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \
 				 PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT)
 
+static bool system_has_full_ptr_auth(void)
+{
+	return system_supports_address_auth() && system_supports_generic_auth();
+}
+
 /**
  * kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension
  *
@@ -80,8 +85,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS:
 	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC:
-		r = has_vhe() && system_supports_address_auth() &&
-				 system_supports_generic_auth();
+		r = system_has_full_ptr_auth();
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = 0;
@@ -205,19 +209,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_reset_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static int kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	/* Support ptrauth only if the system supports these capabilities. */
-	if (!has_vhe())
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!system_supports_address_auth() ||
-	    !system_supports_generic_auth())
-		return -EINVAL;
 	/*
 	 * For now make sure that both address/generic pointer authentication
-	 * features are requested by the userspace together.
+	 * features are requested by the userspace together and the system
+	 * supports these capabilities.
 	 */
 	if (!test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, vcpu->arch.features) ||
-	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features))
+	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features) ||
+	    !system_has_full_ptr_auth())
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_GUEST_HAS_PTRAUTH;
-- 
2.27.0


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[PATCH 4/4] KVM: arm64: Check HCR_EL2 instead of shadow copy to swap PtrAuth registers

[Marc Zyngier]

When save/restoring PtrAuth registers between host and guest, it is
pretty useless to fetch the in-memory state, while we have the right
state in the HCR_EL2 system register. Use that instead.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
index 6301813dcace..f1830173fa9e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
 	b	1001f
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 1000:
-	ldr	\reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
+	mrs	\reg1, hcr_el2
 	and	\reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
 	cbz	\reg1, 1001f
 	add	\reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
 	b	2001f
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 2000:
-	ldr	\reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
+	mrs	\reg1, hcr_el2
 	and	\reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
 	cbz	\reg1, 2001f
 	add	\reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
-- 
2.27.0


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Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available

[Andrew Scull]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:51AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> While initializing EL2, switch Pointer Authentication if detected

                                ^ nit: on?

> from EL1. We use the EL1-provided keys though.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 11 +++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> index 6e6ed5581eed..81732177507d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> @@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>  	 */
>  	mov_q	x4, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | (SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS & ~SCTLR_ELx_A))
>  CPU_BE(	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE)
> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
> +	b	1f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
> +	b	2f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +1:
> +	orr	x4, x4, #(SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB)
> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDA
> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDB

mm/proc.S builds the mask with ldr and ors it in one go, would be nice
to use the same pattern.

> +2:
>  	msr	sctlr_el2, x4
>  	isb

Acked-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>

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Re: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Allow ARM64_PTR_AUTH when ARM64_VHE=n

[Andrew Scull]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:52AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> We currently prevent PtrAuth from even being built if KVM is selected,
> but VHE isn't. It is a bit of a pointless restriction, since we also
> check this at run time (rejecting the enabling of PtrAuth for the
> vcpu if we're not running with VHE).
> 
> Just drop this apparently useless restriction.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 +---
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 31380da53689..d719ea9c596d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -1516,7 +1516,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
>  config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>  	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
>  	default y
> -	depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
>  	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
>  	# GCC 9.1 and later inserts a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
>  	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
> @@ -1543,8 +1542,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>  
>  	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
>  	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
> -	  be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
> -	  CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature.
> +	  be enabled.
>  
>  	  If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then
>  	  the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have

...and we just got the patch to let EL2 use the ptrauth instructions for
the save restore in hyp/entry.S!

Acked-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>

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Re: [PATCH 3/4] KVM: arm64: Allow PtrAuth to be enabled from userspace on non-VHE systems

[Andrew Scull]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:53AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Now that the scene is set for enabling PtrAuth on non-VHE, drop
> the restrictions preventing userspace from enabling it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> index d3b209023727..2a929789fe2e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ static u32 kvm_ipa_limit;
>  #define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC	(PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \
>  				 PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT)
>  
> +static bool system_has_full_ptr_auth(void)
> +{
> +	return system_supports_address_auth() && system_supports_generic_auth();
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension
>   *
> @@ -80,8 +85,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
>  		break;
>  	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS:
>  	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC:
> -		r = has_vhe() && system_supports_address_auth() &&
> -				 system_supports_generic_auth();
> +		r = system_has_full_ptr_auth();
>  		break;
>  	default:
>  		r = 0;
> @@ -205,19 +209,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_reset_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  static int kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> -	/* Support ptrauth only if the system supports these capabilities. */
> -	if (!has_vhe())
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
> -	if (!system_supports_address_auth() ||
> -	    !system_supports_generic_auth())
> -		return -EINVAL;
>  	/*
>  	 * For now make sure that both address/generic pointer authentication
> -	 * features are requested by the userspace together.
> +	 * features are requested by the userspace together and the system
> +	 * supports these capabilities.
>  	 */
>  	if (!test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, vcpu->arch.features) ||
> -	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features))
> +	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features) ||
> +	    !system_has_full_ptr_auth())
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_GUEST_HAS_PTRAUTH;

That was easy. Let EL2 use ptrauth and it can save and restore the
guest's state and done.

Acked-by: Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>

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Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available

[Mark Rutland]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:51AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> While initializing EL2, switch Pointer Authentication if detected
> from EL1. We use the EL1-provided keys though.

Perhaps "enable address authentication", to avoid confusion with
context-switch, and since generic authentication cannot be disabled
locally at EL2.

> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 11 +++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> index 6e6ed5581eed..81732177507d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
> @@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>  	 */
>  	mov_q	x4, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | (SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS & ~SCTLR_ELx_A))
>  CPU_BE(	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE)
> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
> +	b	1f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
> +	b	2f
> +alternative_else_nop_endif

I see this is the same pattern we use in the kvm context switch, but I
think we can use the ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH cap instead (likewise in the
existing code).

AFAICT that won't permit mismatch given both ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
and ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF are dealt with as
ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE.

> +1:
> +	orr	x4, x4, #(SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB)
> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDA
> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDB

Assuming we have a spare register, it would be nice if we could follow the same
pattern as in proc.S, where we do:

| ldr     x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \
|              SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
| orr     x0, x0, x2

... though we could/should use mov_q rather than a load literal, here and in
proc.S.

... otherwise this looks sound to me.

Thanks,
Mark.

> +2:
>  	msr	sctlr_el2, x4
>  	isb
>  
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
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> kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
> https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

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Re: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Allow ARM64_PTR_AUTH when ARM64_VHE=n

[Mark Rutland]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:52AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> We currently prevent PtrAuth from even being built if KVM is selected,
> but VHE isn't. It is a bit of a pointless restriction, since we also
> check this at run time (rejecting the enabling of PtrAuth for the
> vcpu if we're not running with VHE).
> 
> Just drop this apparently useless restriction.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

I can't recall exactly why we had this limitation to begin with, but
given we now save/restore the keys in common hyp code, I don't see a
reason to forbid this, and agree the limitation is pointless, so:

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Mark.

> ---
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig | 4 +---
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 31380da53689..d719ea9c596d 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -1516,7 +1516,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
>  config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>  	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
>  	default y
> -	depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
>  	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
>  	# GCC 9.1 and later inserts a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
>  	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
> @@ -1543,8 +1542,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>  
>  	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
>  	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
> -	  be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
> -	  CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature.
> +	  be enabled.
>  
>  	  If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then
>  	  the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
> _______________________________________________
> kvmarm mailing list
> kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
> https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

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Re: [PATCH 3/4] KVM: arm64: Allow PtrAuth to be enabled from userspace on non-VHE systems

[Mark Rutland]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:53AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Now that the scene is set for enabling PtrAuth on non-VHE, drop
> the restrictions preventing userspace from enabling it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

Other than dropping the `has_vhe()` check this appears to be
functionally equivalent and easier to follow, so:

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Mark.

> ---
>  arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> index d3b209023727..2a929789fe2e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ static u32 kvm_ipa_limit;
>  #define VCPU_RESET_PSTATE_SVC	(PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC | PSR_AA32_A_BIT | \
>  				 PSR_AA32_I_BIT | PSR_AA32_F_BIT)
>  
> +static bool system_has_full_ptr_auth(void)
> +{
> +	return system_supports_address_auth() && system_supports_generic_auth();
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension
>   *
> @@ -80,8 +85,7 @@ int kvm_arch_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
>  		break;
>  	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS:
>  	case KVM_CAP_ARM_PTRAUTH_GENERIC:
> -		r = has_vhe() && system_supports_address_auth() &&
> -				 system_supports_generic_auth();
> +		r = system_has_full_ptr_auth();
>  		break;
>  	default:
>  		r = 0;
> @@ -205,19 +209,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_reset_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  static int kvm_vcpu_enable_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> -	/* Support ptrauth only if the system supports these capabilities. */
> -	if (!has_vhe())
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -
> -	if (!system_supports_address_auth() ||
> -	    !system_supports_generic_auth())
> -		return -EINVAL;
>  	/*
>  	 * For now make sure that both address/generic pointer authentication
> -	 * features are requested by the userspace together.
> +	 * features are requested by the userspace together and the system
> +	 * supports these capabilities.
>  	 */
>  	if (!test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_ADDRESS, vcpu->arch.features) ||
> -	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features))
> +	    !test_bit(KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH_GENERIC, vcpu->arch.features) ||
> +	    !system_has_full_ptr_auth())
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_GUEST_HAS_PTRAUTH;
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
> https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

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Re: [PATCH 4/4] KVM: arm64: Check HCR_EL2 instead of shadow copy to swap PtrAuth registers

[Mark Rutland]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:54AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> When save/restoring PtrAuth registers between host and guest, it is
> pretty useless to fetch the in-memory state, while we have the right
> state in the HCR_EL2 system register. Use that instead.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

It took me a while to spot that we switched the guest/host hcr_el2 value
in the __activate_traps() and __deactivate_traps() paths, but given that
this is only called in the __kvm_vcpu_run_*() paths called between
those, I agree this is sound. Given that:

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Mark.

> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
> index 6301813dcace..f1830173fa9e 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
> @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>  	b	1001f
>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>  1000:
> -	ldr	\reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
> +	mrs	\reg1, hcr_el2
>  	and	\reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
>  	cbz	\reg1, 1001f
>  	add	\reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>  	b	2001f
>  alternative_else_nop_endif
>  2000:
> -	ldr	\reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
> +	mrs	\reg1, hcr_el2
>  	and	\reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
>  	cbz	\reg1, 2001f
>  	add	\reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
> https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

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Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available

[Marc Zyngier]

Hi Andrew,

On 2020-06-15 09:48, Andrew Scull wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:51AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> While initializing EL2, switch Pointer Authentication if detected
> 
>                                 ^ nit: on?

Yes.

> 
>> from EL1. We use the EL1-provided keys though.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 11 +++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> index 6e6ed5581eed..81732177507d 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> @@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>>  	 */
>>  	mov_q	x4, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | (SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS & ~SCTLR_ELx_A))
>>  CPU_BE(	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE)
>> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
>> +	b	1f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>> +	b	2f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +1:
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #(SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB)
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDA
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
> 
> mm/proc.S builds the mask with ldr and ors it in one go, would be nice
> to use the same pattern.

Do you actually mean kernel/head.S, or even __ptrauth_keys_init_cpu in 
asm/asm_pointer_auth.h?

If so, I agree that it'd be good to make it look similar by using the 
mov_q macro, at the expense of a spare register (which we definitely can 
afford here).

Thanks,

         M.
-- 
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...

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Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Enable Pointer Authentication at EL2 if available

[Marc Zyngier]

On 2020-06-15 11:03, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:51AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> While initializing EL2, switch Pointer Authentication if detected
>> from EL1. We use the EL1-provided keys though.
> 
> Perhaps "enable address authentication", to avoid confusion with
> context-switch, and since generic authentication cannot be disabled
> locally at EL2.

Ah, fair enough.

>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S | 11 +++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> index 6e6ed5581eed..81732177507d 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp-init.S
>> @@ -104,6 +104,17 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
>>  	 */
>>  	mov_q	x4, (SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | (SCTLR_ELx_FLAGS & ~SCTLR_ELx_A))
>>  CPU_BE(	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_EE)
>> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
>> +	b	1f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>> +	b	2f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
> 
> I see this is the same pattern we use in the kvm context switch, but I
> think we can use the ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH cap instead (likewise in 
> the
> existing code).
> 
> AFAICT that won't permit mismatch given both 
> ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
> and ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF are dealt with as
> ARM64_CPUCAP_BOOT_CPU_FEATURE.

That'd be a nice cleanup, as the two back to back alternatives are a bit 
hard to read.

> 
>> +1:
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #(SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB)
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDA
>> +	orr	x4, x4, #SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
> 
> Assuming we have a spare register, it would be nice if we could follow 
> the same
> pattern as in proc.S, where we do:
> 
> | ldr     x2, =SCTLR_ELx_ENIA | SCTLR_ELx_ENIB | \
> |              SCTLR_ELx_ENDA | SCTLR_ELx_ENDB
> | orr     x0, x0, x2
> 
> ... though we could/should use mov_q rather than a load literal, here 
> and in
> proc.S.

Looks like this code isn't in -rc1 anymore, replaced with a mov_q in 
__ptrauth_keys_init_cpu.

I'll switch to that in v2.

Thanks,

         M.
-- 
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...

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Re: [PATCH 0/4] KVM/arm64: Enable PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM

[Dave Martin]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:50AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Not having PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM (for whatever reason VHE is not
> enabled on a v8.3 system) has always looked like an oddity. This
> trivial series remedies it, and allows a non-VHE KVM to offer PtrAuth
> to its guests.

How likely do you think it is that people will use such a configuration?

The only reason I can see for people to build a kernel with CONFIG_VHE=n
is as a workaround for broken hardware, or because the kernel is too old
to support VHE (in which case it doesn't understand ptrauth either, so
it is irrelevant whether ptrauth depends on VHE).

I wonder whether it's therefore better to "encourage" people to turn
VHE on by making subsequent features depend on it where appropriate.
We do want multiplatform kernels to be configured with CONFIG_VHE=y for
example.


I ask this, because SVE suffers the same "oddity".  If SVE can be
enabled for non-VHE kernels straightforwardly then there's no reason not
to do so, but I worried in the past that this would duplicate complex
code that would never be tested or used.

If supporting ptrauth with !VHE is as simple as this series suggests,
then it's low-risk.  Perhaps SVE isn't much worse.  I was chasing nasty
bugs around at the time the SVE KVM support was originally written, and
didn't want to add more unknowns into the mix...

(Note, this is not an offer from me to do the SVE work!)

[...]

Cheers
---Dave

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Re: [PATCH 0/4] KVM/arm64: Enable PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM

[Marc Zyngier]

Hi Dave,

On 2020-06-15 13:59, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:50AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>> Not having PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM (for whatever reason VHE is not
>> enabled on a v8.3 system) has always looked like an oddity. This
>> trivial series remedies it, and allows a non-VHE KVM to offer PtrAuth
>> to its guests.
> 
> How likely do you think it is that people will use such a 
> configuration?

Depending on the use case, very. See below.

> The only reason I can see for people to build a kernel with 
> CONFIG_VHE=n
> is as a workaround for broken hardware, or because the kernel is too 
> old
> to support VHE (in which case it doesn't understand ptrauth either, so
> it is irrelevant whether ptrauth depends on VHE).

Part of the work happening around running protected VMs (which cannot
be tampered with from EL1/0 host) makes it mandatory to disable VHE,
so that we can wrap the host EL1 in its own Stage-2 page tables.
We (the Android kernel team) are actively working on enabling this
feature.

> I wonder whether it's therefore better to "encourage" people to turn
> VHE on by making subsequent features depend on it where appropriate.
> We do want multiplatform kernels to be configured with CONFIG_VHE=y for
> example.

I'm all for having VHE on for platforms that support it. Which is why
CONFIG_VHE=y is present in defconfig. However, we cannot offer the same
level of guarantee as we can hopefully achieve with non-VHE (we can
drop mappings from Stage-1, but can't protect VMs from an evil or
compromised host). This is a very different use case from the usual
"reduced hypervisor overhead" that we want in the general case.

> I ask this, because SVE suffers the same "oddity".  If SVE can be
> enabled for non-VHE kernels straightforwardly then there's no reason 
> not
> to do so, but I worried in the past that this would duplicate complex
> code that would never be tested or used.

It is a concern. I guess that if we manage to get some traction on
Android, then the feature will get some testing! And yes, SVE is
next on my list.

> If supporting ptrauth with !VHE is as simple as this series suggests,
> then it's low-risk.  Perhaps SVE isn't much worse.  I was chasing nasty
> bugs around at the time the SVE KVM support was originally written, and
> didn't want to add more unknowns into the mix...

I think having started with a slightly smaller problem space was the
right thing to do at the time. We are now reasonably confident that
KVM and SVE are working correctly together, and we can now try to enable
it on !VHE.

Thanks,

         M.
-- 
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Re: [PATCH 0/4] KVM/arm64: Enable PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM

[Dave Martin]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 02:22:19PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Hi Dave,
> 
> On 2020-06-15 13:59, Dave Martin wrote:
> >On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 09:19:50AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >>Not having PtrAuth on non-VHE KVM (for whatever reason VHE is not
> >>enabled on a v8.3 system) has always looked like an oddity. This
> >>trivial series remedies it, and allows a non-VHE KVM to offer PtrAuth
> >>to its guests.
> >
> >How likely do you think it is that people will use such a configuration?
> 
> Depending on the use case, very. See below.
> 
> >The only reason I can see for people to build a kernel with CONFIG_VHE=n
> >is as a workaround for broken hardware, or because the kernel is too old
> >to support VHE (in which case it doesn't understand ptrauth either, so
> >it is irrelevant whether ptrauth depends on VHE).
> 
> Part of the work happening around running protected VMs (which cannot
> be tampered with from EL1/0 host) makes it mandatory to disable VHE,
> so that we can wrap the host EL1 in its own Stage-2 page tables.
> We (the Android kernel team) are actively working on enabling this
> feature.
> 
> >I wonder whether it's therefore better to "encourage" people to turn
> >VHE on by making subsequent features depend on it where appropriate.
> >We do want multiplatform kernels to be configured with CONFIG_VHE=y for
> >example.
> 
> I'm all for having VHE on for platforms that support it. Which is why
> CONFIG_VHE=y is present in defconfig. However, we cannot offer the same
> level of guarantee as we can hopefully achieve with non-VHE (we can
> drop mappings from Stage-1, but can't protect VMs from an evil or
> compromised host). This is a very different use case from the usual
> "reduced hypervisor overhead" that we want in the general case.
> 
> >I ask this, because SVE suffers the same "oddity".  If SVE can be
> >enabled for non-VHE kernels straightforwardly then there's no reason not
> >to do so, but I worried in the past that this would duplicate complex
> >code that would never be tested or used.
> 
> It is a concern. I guess that if we manage to get some traction on
> Android, then the feature will get some testing! And yes, SVE is
> next on my list.
> 
> >If supporting ptrauth with !VHE is as simple as this series suggests,
> >then it's low-risk.  Perhaps SVE isn't much worse.  I was chasing nasty
> >bugs around at the time the SVE KVM support was originally written, and
> >didn't want to add more unknowns into the mix...
> 
> I think having started with a slightly smaller problem space was the
> right thing to do at the time. We are now reasonably confident that
> KVM and SVE are working correctly together, and we can now try to enable
> it on !VHE.

Cool, now I understand.

Cheers
---Dave

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