From: elver@google.com
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/39] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory
Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2020 19:29:32 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201001172932.GC4162920@elver.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b19896256a15051346c87a25d01cc73a7bd999ad.1600987622.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 12:50AM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
> tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.
>
> The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will reuse the same
> functions. Rename kasan_unpoison_shadow to kasan_unpoison_memory,
> and kasan_poison_shadow to kasan_poison_memory.
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> ---
> Change-Id: Ia359f32815242c4704e49a5f1639ca2d2f8cba69
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 6 +++---
> kernel/fork.c | 4 ++--
> mm/kasan/common.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
> mm/kasan/generic.c | 12 ++++++------
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/tags.c | 2 +-
> mm/slab_common.c | 2 +-
> 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 44a9aae44138..18617d5c4cd7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ extern void kasan_enable_current(void);
> /* Disable reporting bugs for current task */
> extern void kasan_disable_current(void);
>
> -void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size);
> +void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
>
> void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
>
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct kasan_cache {
> size_t __ksize(const void *);
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
> {
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
> }
> size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
>
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
>
> #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> -static inline void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) {}
> +static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
>
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 4d32190861bd..b41fecca59d7 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
> if (!s)
> continue;
>
> - /* Clear the KASAN shadow of the stack. */
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
> + /* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
>
> /* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
> memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 89e5ef9417a7..a4b73fa0dd7e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
> * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
> * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
> */
> -void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
> +void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
> {
> void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
>
> @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
> __memset(shadow_start, value, shadow_end - shadow_start);
> }
>
> -void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
> +void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
> {
> u8 tag = get_tag(address);
>
> @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
> */
> address = reset_tag(address);
>
> - kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
> + kasan_poison_memory(address, size, tag);
>
> if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
> u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
> @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
> void *base = task_stack_page(task);
> size_t size = sp - base;
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, size);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(base, size);
> }
>
> /* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
> @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
> */
> void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(base, watermark - base);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(base, watermark - base);
> }
>
> void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> @@ -186,13 +186,13 @@ void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> tag = random_tag();
> for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
> page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
> }
>
> void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> {
> if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
> - kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page),
> + kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page),
> PAGE_SIZE << order,
> KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> }
> @@ -284,18 +284,18 @@ void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
>
> for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
> page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
> - kasan_poison_shadow(page_address(page), page_size(page),
> + kasan_poison_memory(page_address(page), page_size(page),
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> }
>
> void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(object, cache->object_size);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(object, cache->object_size);
> }
>
> void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> {
> - kasan_poison_shadow(object,
> + kasan_poison_memory(object,
> round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> }
> @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> }
>
> rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> - kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
> + kasan_poison_memory(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
> unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
> @@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
>
> /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(set_tag(object, tag), size);
> - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
> + kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
>
> if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)
> @@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(ptr, size);
> - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> + kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
>
> return (void *)ptr;
> @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
> kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
> return;
> }
> - kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> + kasan_poison_memory(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> } else {
> __kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
> }
> @@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int kasan_populate_vmalloc(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> * // vmalloc() allocates memory
> * // let a = area->addr
> * // we reach kasan_populate_vmalloc
> - * // and call kasan_unpoison_shadow:
> + * // and call kasan_unpoison_memory:
> * STORE shadow(a), unpoison_val
> * ...
> * STORE shadow(a+99), unpoison_val x = LOAD p
> @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> return;
>
> size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> - kasan_poison_shadow(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
> + kasan_poison_memory(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
> }
>
> void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
> if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
> return;
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(start, size);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(start, size);
> }
>
> static int kasan_depopulate_vmalloc_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 37ccfadd3263..7006157c674b 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
> {
> size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(global->beg, global->size);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(global->beg, global->size);
>
> - kasan_poison_shadow(global->beg + aligned_size,
> + kasan_poison_memory(global->beg + aligned_size,
> global->size_with_redzone - aligned_size,
> KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
> }
> @@ -285,11 +285,11 @@ void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
>
> WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE));
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
> + kasan_unpoison_memory((const void *)(addr + rounded_down_size),
> size - rounded_down_size);
> - kasan_poison_shadow(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
> + kasan_poison_memory(left_redzone, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
> KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT);
> - kasan_poison_shadow(right_redzone,
> + kasan_poison_memory(right_redzone,
> padding_size + KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE,
> KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT);
> }
> @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ void __asan_allocas_unpoison(const void *stack_top, const void *stack_bottom)
> if (unlikely(!stack_top || stack_top > stack_bottom))
> return;
>
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(stack_top, stack_bottom - stack_top);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_allocas_unpoison);
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index ac499456740f..03450d3b31f7 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
> return (addr >= kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
> }
>
> -void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
> +void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
>
> /**
> * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> index 5c8b08a25715..4bdd7dbd6647 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
> @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_storeN_noabort);
>
> void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size)
> {
> - kasan_poison_shadow((void *)addr, size, tag);
> + kasan_poison_memory((void *)addr, size, tag);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_tag_memory);
>
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index f9ccd5dc13f3..53d0f8bb57ea 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
> * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
> * so we need to unpoison this area.
> */
> - kasan_unpoison_shadow(objp, size);
> + kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
> return size;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
> --
> 2.28.0.681.g6f77f65b4e-goog
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-01 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 88+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 22:50 [PATCH v3 00/39] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/39] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:18 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/39] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:19 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/39] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:27 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/39] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 05/39] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_memory Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:29 ` elver [this message]
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 06/39] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_* Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:30 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 07/39] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:31 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 08/39] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:32 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 09/39] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_PAGE Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:33 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 10/39] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:36 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 11/39] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:39 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:54 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 12/39] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:41 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 13/39] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:43 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 14/39] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 15/39] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 16/39] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 17/39] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:45 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 18/39] kasan: kasan_non_canonical_hook only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:47 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 19/39] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:48 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 20/39] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:54 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:56 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 21/39] kasan: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:55 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:57 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 22/39] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:57 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 23/39] arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:16 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 24/39] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:28 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 12:50 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 13:36 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 25/39] arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 26/39] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 10:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:26 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:52 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 12:35 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 27/39] arm64: kasan: Enable in-kernel MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:14 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 28/39] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 29/39] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:34 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:50 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-25 12:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 30/39] arm64: kasan: Enable TBI EL1 Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:37 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-25 11:47 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 31/39] arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 32/39] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE " Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:58 ` elver
2020-10-01 21:59 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 33/39] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 17:59 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 34/39] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 35/39] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:00 ` elver
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 36/39] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-25 11:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 37/39] kasan, slub: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
2020-10-01 22:00 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 38/39] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-09-24 22:50 ` [PATCH v3 39/39] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-10-01 18:03 ` elver
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