From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: "Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, jpoimboe@redhat.com, ardb@kernel.org,
jthierry@redhat.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, pasha.tatashin@soleen.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
live-patching@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Introduce stack trace reliability checks in the unwinder
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 18:53:18 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210521175318.GF5825@sirena.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <26c33633-029e-6374-16e6-e9418099da95@linux.microsoft.com>
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On Fri, May 21, 2021 at 12:47:13PM -0500, Madhavan T. Venkataraman wrote:
> On 5/21/21 12:42 PM, Mark Brown wrote:
> > Like I say we may come up with some use for the flag in error cases in
> > future so I'm not opposed to keeping the accounting there.
> So, should I leave it the way it is now? Or should I not set reliable = false
> for errors? Which one do you prefer?
> Josh,
> Are you OK with not flagging reliable = false for errors in unwind_frame()?
I think it's fine to leave it as it is.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-21 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <68eeda61b3e9579d65698a884b26c8632025e503>
2021-05-16 4:00 ` [RFC PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Stack " madvenka
2021-05-16 4:00 ` [RFC PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Introduce stack " madvenka
2021-05-21 16:11 ` Mark Brown
2021-05-21 17:23 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 17:42 ` Mark Brown
2021-05-21 17:47 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 17:53 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2021-05-21 18:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-21 18:59 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 19:11 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-21 19:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-21 19:41 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 20:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-25 21:44 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-16 4:00 ` [RFC PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Create a list of SYM_CODE functions, blacklist them " madvenka
2021-05-19 2:06 ` nobuta.keiya
2021-05-19 3:38 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-19 19:27 ` Mark Brown
2021-05-20 2:00 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 17:18 ` [RFC PATCH v4 0/2] arm64: Stack trace reliability checks " Mark Brown
2021-05-21 17:32 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2021-05-21 17:47 ` Mark Brown
2021-05-21 17:48 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
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