From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Baoquan He" <bhe@redhat.com>,
"Michal Suchánek" <msuchanek@suse.de>,
"Heiko Carstens" <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Chun-Yi Lee" <jlee@suse.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, "Philipp Rudo" <prudo@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Vasily Gorbik" <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
"Alexander Gordeev" <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
"Sven Schnelle" <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
"Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
"open list:S390" <linux-s390@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 09:46:50 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220616014650.wd6saed72breqeyb@Rk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220519171134.GN163591@kunlun.suse.cz>
Hi Mimi,
>> >
>> > This patch set could probably go through KEYS/KEYRINGS_INTEGRITY, but
>> > it's kind of late to be asking. Has it been in linux-next? Should I
>> > assume this patch set has been fully tested or can we get some "tags"?
>>
[...]
>>
>> IIRC, Coiby has tested it on x86_64/arm64, not sure if he took test on
>> s390. No, this hasn't been in linux-next.
For arm64, recently I did a new round of test and the patches works as
expected,
1. Build 5.19.0-rc2
2. generate keys and add them to .secondary_trusted_keys, MOK, UEFI
db;
3. sign different kernel images with different keys including keys
from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys keyring, UEFI db
key and MOK key
4. Without lockdown, all kernel images can be kexec'ed; with lockdown
enabled, only the kernel image signed by the key from
.builtin_trusted_key can be kexec'ed
Then I build a new kernel with the patches applied and confirm all
kernel images can be kexec'ed.
>
>I used the s390 code on powerpc and there it did not work because the
>built-in key was needed to verify the kernel.
>
>I did not really run this on s390, only ported the fix I needed on
>powerpc back to s390.
For 390, I commented out the code that skips signature verification
when secure boot is not enabled since I couldn't find a machine that
supports secure boot and confirm before applying the patch, kernel
images signed by keys from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys
couldn't be kexec'ed when lockdown is enabled; after applying the
patch, those kernel images could be kexec'ed.
>
>Thanks
>
>Michal
>
--
Best regards,
Coiby
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-16 1:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-12 7:01 [PATCH v8 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 21:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:21 ` Baoquan He
2022-06-09 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:47 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 23:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:22 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 9:34 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
2022-05-18 11:29 ` Heiko Carstens
2022-05-19 0:39 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-19 11:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-19 14:22 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-19 17:11 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-06-16 1:46 ` Coiby Xu [this message]
2022-05-20 17:04 ` [PATCH v8 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Mimi Zohar
2022-05-25 9:59 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-25 13:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-27 13:43 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-27 16:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:15 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 3:57 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 11:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-20 13:14 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 15:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:21 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 12:06 ` Mimi Zohar
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