From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2022 19:15:27 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e44bb6b11573838417b5d561173c27a1571c94b6.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220512070123.29486-4-coxu@redhat.com>
On Thu, 2022-05-12 at 15:01 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
> MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
> rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
> restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
>
> This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
> contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.
From the git history it's clear that .platform keyring was upstreamed
during the same open window as commit 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file:
add kernel signature verification support"). Loading the MOK keys
onto the .platform keyring was upstreamed much later. For this reason,
commit 732b7b93d849 only used keys on the .builtin_trusted_keys
keyring. This patch is now addressing it and the newly upstreamed
.machine keyring.
Only using the .builtin_trusted_keys is the problem statement, which
should be one of the first lines of the patch description, if not the
first line.
>
> This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
> .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys
> keyring.
Please remember to update this to include the .machine keyring.
>
> Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Since the MOK keys weren't loaded onto the .platform keyring until much
later, I would not classify this as a fix.
thanks,
Mimi
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-09 23:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-12 7:01 [PATCH v8 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 21:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:21 ` Baoquan He
2022-06-09 22:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:47 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 23:15 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2022-06-16 1:22 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 9:34 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-05-12 7:01 ` [PATCH v8 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
2022-05-18 11:29 ` Heiko Carstens
2022-05-19 0:39 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-19 11:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-19 14:22 ` Baoquan He
2022-05-19 17:11 ` Michal Suchánek
2022-06-16 1:46 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-20 17:04 ` [PATCH v8 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Mimi Zohar
2022-05-25 9:59 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-25 13:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-05-27 13:43 ` Coiby Xu
2022-05-27 16:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:15 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 3:57 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 11:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-20 13:14 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-09 15:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-06-16 1:21 ` Coiby Xu
2022-06-17 12:06 ` Mimi Zohar
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