From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
To: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>, marc.zyngier@arm.com
Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
steven.price@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, ykaukab@suse.de,
dave.martin@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 16:22:16 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3af70b49-22e7-f394-1b35-ce3c86640bb7@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <575913854.422488.1547834735236@email.ionos.de>
On 01/18/2019 12:05 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote:
> Hi,
>
>> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 15. Januar 2019 um 22:21 geschrieben:
>>
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 01/15/2019 01:50 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote:
>>> Hi Jeremy,
>>>
>>>> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 10. Januar 2019 um 00:55 geschrieben:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
>>>> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
>>>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
>>>>
>>>> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
>>>> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
>>>> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
>>>> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
>>>> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
>>>> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
>>>> mitigated.
>>>>
>>>
>>> i applied this v3 series and Marc's v2 series.
>>>
>>> Now i'm getting the following on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ :
>>>
>>> meltdown:Not affected
>>> spec_store_bypass:Not affected
>>> spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization
>>>
>>> So the entries l1tf and spectre_v2 disappeared.
>>
>> Yes, the l1tf entry should be gone.
>>
>> I believe there is a problem with the "1/2 advertise.." patch in that
>> the 'arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |=' line needs to be hoisted to the top
>> of check_branch_predictor() and the '__spectrev2_safe = false' line
>> needs to be hoisted 6 lines immediately above "/* Fallback to firmware
>> detection*/"
>
> a snippet or a new version would be nice
Sure, I've got another version, to be posted soon (probably Tue of next
week).
In the meantime, Marc's tree should work with the following fix:
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index b44f87e7360d..7cfd34b2c0e5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -286,11 +286,15 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES)
+static bool __ssb_safe = true;
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
-static bool __ssb_safe = true;
static const struct ssbd_options {
const char *str;
@@ -569,6 +573,8 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
+ arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SPECTREV2;
+
/* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */
if
(cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
@@ -578,17 +584,17 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list))
return false;
+ __spectrev2_safe = false;
+
/* Fallback to firmware detection */
need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw();
if (!need_wa)
return false;
- __spectrev2_safe = false;
-
if (need_wa < 0)
pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from
firmware\n");
- arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |= VULN_SPECTREV2;
+
return (need_wa > 0);
}
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-18 22:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 23:55 [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Allow individual architectures to select vulnerabilities Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:02 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 15:46 ` Greg KH
2019-01-18 16:31 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2019-01-12 10:41 ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-14 11:32 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 16:35 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10 9:23 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-10 14:10 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10 14:16 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:15 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-14 16:37 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 17:05 ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-15 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren
2019-01-15 21:21 ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-18 18:05 ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-18 22:22 ` Jeremy Linton [this message]
2019-01-19 11:52 ` Stefan Wahren
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