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From: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, marc.zyngier@arm.com
Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, julien.thierry@arm.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	steven.price@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org, ykaukab@suse.de,
	dave.martin@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 19:05:35 +0100 (CET)
Message-ID: <575913854.422488.1547834735236@email.ionos.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c99f5da9-259c-3fc5-6150-7327ba0ff429@arm.com>

Hi,

> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 15. Januar 2019 um 22:21 geschrieben:
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> On 01/15/2019 01:50 PM, Stefan Wahren wrote:
> > Hi Jeremy,
> > 
> >> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 10. Januar 2019 um 00:55 geschrieben:
> >>
> >>
> >> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> >> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> >> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
> >>
> >> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> >> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> >> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> >> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> >> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> >> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> >> mitigated.
> >>
> > 
> > i applied this v3 series and Marc's v2 series.
> > 
> > Now i'm getting the following on a Raspberry Pi 3 B+ :
> > 
> > meltdown:Not affected
> > spec_store_bypass:Not affected
> > spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization
> > 
> > So the entries l1tf and spectre_v2 disappeared.
> 
> Yes, the l1tf entry should be gone.
> 
> I believe there is a problem with the "1/2 advertise.." patch in that 
> the 'arm64_requested_vuln_attrs |=' line needs to be hoisted  to the top 
> of check_branch_predictor() and the '__spectrev2_safe = false' line 
> needs to be hoisted 6 lines immediately above "/* Fallback to firmware 
> detection*/"

a snippet or a new version would be nice

> 
> That should re-enable the spectre_v2 entry.

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Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-09 23:55 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] sysfs/cpu: Allow individual architectures to select vulnerabilities Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:02   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 15:46     ` Greg KH
2019-01-18 16:31       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: kpti: move check for non-vulnerable CPUs to a function Jeremy Linton
2019-01-12 10:41   ` Stefan Wahren
2019-01-14 11:32   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-01-18 16:35     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10  9:23   ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-10 14:10     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-10 14:16       ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 10:15   ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-14 16:37     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-14 17:05       ` Marc Zyngier
2019-01-09 23:55 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-01-15 19:50 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Stefan Wahren
2019-01-15 21:21   ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-18 18:05     ` Stefan Wahren [this message]
2019-01-18 22:22       ` Jeremy Linton
2019-01-19 11:52         ` Stefan Wahren

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