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From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH mm v11 06/42] kasan: rename KASAN_SHADOW_* to KASAN_GRANULE_*
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 21:07:30 +0100
Message-ID: <939b5754e47f528a6e6a6f28ffc5815d8d128033.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1606161801.git.andreyknvl@google.com>

This is a preparatory commit for the upcoming addition of a new hardware
tag-based (MTE-based) KASAN mode.

The new mode won't be using shadow memory, but will still use the concept
of memory granules. Each memory granule maps to a single metadata entry:
8 bytes per one shadow byte for generic mode, 16 bytes per one shadow byte
for software tag-based mode, and 16 bytes per one allocation tag for
hardware tag-based mode.

Rename KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, and KASAN_SHADOW_MASK
to KASAN_GRANULE_MASK.

Also use MASK when used as a mask, otherwise use SIZE.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
Change-Id: Iac733e2248aa9d29f6fc425d8946ba07cca73ecf
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst |  2 +-
 lib/test_kasan.c                  |  2 +-
 lib/test_kasan_module.c           |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c                 | 39 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 mm/kasan/generic.c                | 14 +++++------
 mm/kasan/generic_report.c         |  8 +++----
 mm/kasan/init.c                   |  8 +++----
 mm/kasan/kasan.h                  |  4 ++--
 mm/kasan/report.c                 | 10 ++++----
 mm/kasan/tags_report.c            |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
index b3e489064a18..2d55d788971c 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full
 page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would
 therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings
 use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to
-``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
+``KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``.
 
 Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate
 a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
index 662f862702fc..2947274cc2d3 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
 
-#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
+#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
 
 /*
  * We assign some test results to these globals to make sure the tests
diff --git a/lib/test_kasan_module.c b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
index 2d68db6ae67b..fcb991c3aaf8 100644
--- a/lib/test_kasan_module.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan_module.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 #include "../mm/kasan/kasan.h"
 
-#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
+#define OOB_TAG_OFF (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ? 0 : KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
 
 static noinline void __init copy_user_test(void)
 {
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 6adbf5891aff..80dd71e88ef8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
 
 /*
  * Poisons the shadow memory for 'size' bytes starting from 'addr'.
- * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE.
+ * Memory addresses should be aligned to KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE.
  */
 void poison_range(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 {
@@ -151,13 +151,13 @@ void unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
 
 	poison_range(address, size, tag);
 
-	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
+	if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
 			*shadow = tag;
 		else
-			*shadow = size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+			*shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
 {
 	poison_range(object,
-			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
+			round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
 			KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
 }
 
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
 {
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
 		return shadow_byte < 0 ||
-			shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+			shadow_byte >= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 
 	/* else CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS: */
 	if ((u8)shadow_byte == KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 		return true;
 	}
 
-	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	rounded_up_size = round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	poison_range(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
 
 	if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine) ||
@@ -464,9 +464,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 		return (void *)object;
 
 	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS))
 		tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ void * __must_check kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
 
 	page = virt_to_page(ptr);
 	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
-				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+				KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
 
 	unpoison_range(ptr, size);
@@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ static int __meminit kasan_mem_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb,
 	shadow_size = nr_shadow_pages << PAGE_SHIFT;
 	shadow_end = shadow_start + shadow_size;
 
-	if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) ||
-		WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
+	if (WARN_ON(mem_data->nr_pages % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) ||
+		WARN_ON(start_kaddr % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT)))
 		return NOTIFY_BAD;
 
 	switch (action) {
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
 	if (!is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(start))
 		return;
 
-	size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	poison_range(start, size, KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID);
 }
 
@@ -880,22 +880,22 @@ void kasan_release_vmalloc(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 	unsigned long region_start, region_end;
 	unsigned long size;
 
-	region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
-	region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	region_start = ALIGN(start, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(end, PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	free_region_start = ALIGN(free_region_start,
-				  PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+				  PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	if (start != region_start &&
 	    free_region_start < region_start)
-		region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		region_start -= PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 
 	free_region_end = ALIGN_DOWN(free_region_end,
-				     PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+				     PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	if (end != region_end &&
 	    free_region_end > region_end)
-		region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		region_end += PAGE_SIZE * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_start);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)region_end);
@@ -921,7 +921,8 @@ int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size)
 	unsigned long shadow_start;
 
 	shadow_start = (unsigned long)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
-	scaled_size = (size + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	scaled_size = (size + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1) >>
+				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
 	shadow_size = round_up(scaled_size, PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!PAGE_ALIGNED(shadow_start)))
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index cdc2d8112f3e..754217c258a8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_1(unsigned long addr)
 	s8 shadow_value = *(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
 
 	if (unlikely(shadow_value)) {
-		s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK;
+		s8 last_accessible_byte = addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
 		return unlikely(last_accessible_byte >= shadow_value);
 	}
 
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_2_4_8(unsigned long addr,
 	 * Access crosses 8(shadow size)-byte boundary. Such access maps
 	 * into 2 shadow bytes, so we need to check them both.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) < size - 1))
+	if (unlikely(((addr + size - 1) & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) < size - 1))
 		return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
 
 	return memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + size - 1);
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_16(unsigned long addr)
 	u16 *shadow_addr = (u16 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr);
 
 	/* Unaligned 16-bytes access maps into 3 shadow bytes. */
-	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)))
+	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)))
 		return *shadow_addr || memory_is_poisoned_1(addr + 15);
 
 	return *shadow_addr;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned_n(unsigned long addr,
 		s8 *last_shadow = (s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)last_byte);
 
 		if (unlikely(ret != (unsigned long)last_shadow ||
-			((long)(last_byte & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
+			((long)(last_byte & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) >= *last_shadow)))
 			return true;
 	}
 	return false;
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache)
 
 static void register_global(struct kasan_global *global)
 {
-	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	size_t aligned_size = round_up(global->size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	unpoison_range(global->beg, global->size);
 
@@ -275,10 +275,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__asan_handle_no_return);
 /* Emitted by compiler to poison alloca()ed objects. */
 void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
 {
-	size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	size_t rounded_up_size = round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	size_t padding_size = round_up(size, KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE) -
 			rounded_up_size;
-	size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	size_t rounded_down_size = round_down(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 
 	const void *left_redzone = (const void *)(addr -
 			KASAN_ALLOCA_REDZONE_SIZE);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
index 6bb3f66992df..7d5b9e5c7cfe 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
 	void *p = addr;
 
 	while (p < addr + size && !(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p)))
-		p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 	return p;
 }
 
@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
 	shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
 
 	/*
-	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
+	 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) we can look
 	 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
 	 */
-	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
+	if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
 		shadow_addr++;
 
 	switch (*shadow_addr) {
-	case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
+	case 0 ... KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1:
 		/*
 		 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
 		 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
index 9ce8cc5b8621..dfddd6c39fe6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/init.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
@@ -442,8 +442,8 @@ void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
 	end = addr + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
 
 	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
-			(KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
-	    WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
+			(KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
+	    WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
 		return;
 
 	for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size)
 	shadow_end = shadow_start + (size >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
 
 	if (WARN_ON((unsigned long)start %
-			(KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
-	    WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
+			(KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)) ||
+	    WARN_ON(size % (KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = kasan_populate_early_shadow(shadow_start, shadow_end);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 42ab02c61331..53b095f56f28 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
 
-#define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
-#define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK       (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
+#define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE	(1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+#define KASAN_GRANULE_MASK	(KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1)
 
 #define KASAN_TAG_KERNEL	0xFF /* native kernel pointers tag */
 #define KASAN_TAG_INVALID	0xFE /* inaccessible memory tag */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index d500923abc8b..7b8dcb799a78 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -314,24 +314,24 @@ static bool __must_check get_address_stack_frame_info(const void *addr,
 		return false;
 
 	aligned_addr = round_down((unsigned long)addr, sizeof(long));
-	mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	mem_ptr = round_down(aligned_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	shadow_ptr = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)aligned_addr);
 	shadow_bottom = kasan_mem_to_shadow(end_of_stack(current));
 
 	while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr != KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
 		shadow_ptr--;
-		mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 	}
 
 	while (shadow_ptr >= shadow_bottom && *shadow_ptr == KASAN_STACK_LEFT) {
 		shadow_ptr--;
-		mem_ptr -= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		mem_ptr -= KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 	}
 
 	if (shadow_ptr < shadow_bottom)
 		return false;
 
-	frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
+	frame = (const unsigned long *)(mem_ptr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
 	if (frame[0] != KASAN_CURRENT_STACK_FRAME_MAGIC) {
 		pr_err("KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: %lu\n",
 		       frame[0]);
@@ -599,6 +599,6 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
 	else
 		bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
 	pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
-		 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
+		 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
index 5f183501b871..c87d5a343b4e 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size)
 	void *end = p + size;
 
 	while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
-		p += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
+		p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
 	return p;
 }
 
-- 
2.29.2.454.gaff20da3a2-goog


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  parent reply index

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-23 20:07 [PATCH mm v11 00/42] kasan: add hardware tag-based mode for arm64 Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 01/42] kasan: drop unnecessary GPL text from comment headers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 02/42] kasan: KASAN_VMALLOC depends on KASAN_GENERIC Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 03/42] kasan: group vmalloc code Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 04/42] kasan: shadow declarations only for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 05/42] kasan: rename (un)poison_shadow to (un)poison_range Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 07/42] kasan: only build init.c for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 08/42] kasan: split out shadow.c from common.c Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 09/42] kasan: define KASAN_MEMORY_PER_SHADOW_PAGE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 10/42] kasan: rename report and tags files Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 11/42] kasan: don't duplicate config dependencies Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 12/42] kasan: hide invalid free check implementation Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 13/42] kasan: decode stack frame only with KASAN_STACK_ENABLE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 14/42] kasan, arm64: only init shadow for software modes Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 15/42] kasan, arm64: only use kasan_depth " Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 16/42] kasan, arm64: move initialization message Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 17/42] kasan, arm64: rename kasan_init_tags and mark as __init Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 18/42] kasan: rename addr_has_shadow to addr_has_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 19/42] kasan: rename print_shadow_for_address to print_memory_metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 20/42] kasan: rename SHADOW layout macros to META Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 21/42] kasan: separate metadata_fetch_row for each mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 22/42] kasan, arm64: don't allow SW_TAGS with ARM64_MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 23/42] kasan: introduce CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 24/42] arm64: Enable armv8.5-a asm-arch option Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 25/42] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel MTE helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 26/42] arm64: mte: Reset the page tag in page->flags Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 27/42] arm64: mte: Add in-kernel tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-12-03 10:26   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-12-03 10:39     ` Vincenzo Frascino
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 28/42] arm64: kasan: Allow enabling in-kernel MTE Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 29/42] arm64: mte: Convert gcr_user into an exclude mask Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 30/42] arm64: mte: Switch GCR_EL1 in kernel entry and exit Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 31/42] kasan, mm: untag page address in free_reserved_area Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 32/42] arm64: kasan: Align allocations for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 33/42] arm64: kasan: Add arch layer for memory tagging helpers Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 34/42] kasan: define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE for HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:07 ` [PATCH mm v11 35/42] kasan, x86, s390: update undef CONFIG_KASAN Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 36/42] kasan, arm64: expand CONFIG_KASAN checks Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 37/42] kasan, arm64: implement HW_TAGS runtime Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 38/42] kasan, arm64: print report from tag fault handler Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 39/42] kasan, mm: reset tags when accessing metadata Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 40/42] kasan, arm64: enable CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 41/42] kasan: add documentation for hardware tag-based mode Andrey Konovalov
2020-11-23 20:08 ` [PATCH mm v11 42/42] kselftest/arm64: Check GCR_EL1 after context switch Andrey Konovalov

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