From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-audit@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2021 09:14:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e03dedaf6f3fc439d1d2240e6c6d5e66301441fd.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ab6d635-53af-6dd9-fc29-482723c80c6a@schaufler-ca.com>
On Mon, 2021-02-22 at 15:58 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/20/2021 6:41 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 19, 2021 at 8:49 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >> On 2/19/2021 3:28 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> As discussed briefly on the list (lore link below), we are a little
> >>> sloppy when it comes to using task credentials, mixing both the
> >>> subjective and object credentials. This patch set attempts to fix
> >>> this by replacing security_task_getsecid() with two new hooks that
> >>> return either the subjective (_subj) or objective (_obj) credentials.
> >>>
> >>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/806848326.0ifERbkFSE@x2/T/
> >>>
> >>> Casey and John, I made a quick pass through the Smack and AppArmor
> >>> code in an effort to try and do the right thing, but I will admit
> >>> that I haven't tested those changes, just the SELinux code. I
> >>> would really appreciate your help in reviewing those changes. If
> >>> you find it easier, feel free to wholesale replace my Smack/AppArmor
> >>> patch with one of your own.
> >> A quick test pass didn't show up anything obviously
> >> amiss with the Smack changes. I have will do some more
> >> through inspection, but they look fine so far.
> > Thanks for testing it out and giving it a look. Beyond the Smack
> > specific changes, I'm also interested in making sure all the hook
> > callers are correct; I believe I made the correct substitutions, but a
> > second (or third (or fourth ...)) set of eyes is never a bad idea.
>
> I'm still not seeing anything that looks wrong. I'd suggest that Mimi
> have a look at the IMA bits.
Thanks, Casey, Paul. The IMA changes look fine. IMA policy rules are
normally written in terms of a file's LSM labels, the obj_type, so
hopefully this change has minimal, if any, impact.
Mimi
--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-23 14:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-19 23:28 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants Paul Moore
2021-02-19 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants Paul Moore
2021-02-20 2:55 ` James Morris
2021-02-20 14:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-04 10:04 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2021-03-04 23:43 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-10 8:21 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2021-03-11 1:56 ` Paul Moore
2021-02-21 12:51 ` John Johansen
2021-02-21 22:09 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-04 0:44 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-10 0:28 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-10 3:09 ` John Johansen
2021-02-24 16:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-08 19:25 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-03-10 0:23 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-10 1:03 ` John Johansen
2021-03-11 1:55 ` Paul Moore
2021-02-19 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials Paul Moore
2021-02-21 12:55 ` John Johansen
2021-03-08 19:26 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-03-10 3:05 ` John Johansen
2021-03-11 4:32 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-17 22:56 ` Paul Moore
2021-02-19 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials Paul Moore
2021-02-21 12:56 ` John Johansen
2021-03-08 19:26 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-03-10 1:04 ` John Johansen
2021-02-19 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] apparmor: " Paul Moore
2021-02-21 12:57 ` John Johansen
2021-02-21 22:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-02-20 1:49 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants Casey Schaufler
2021-02-20 14:41 ` Paul Moore
2021-02-22 23:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-23 14:14 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2021-02-24 0:03 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-04 0:46 ` Paul Moore
2021-03-04 2:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-03-04 23:41 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=e03dedaf6f3fc439d1d2240e6c6d5e66301441fd.camel@linux.ibm.com \
--to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-audit@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).