[PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions

[PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions

[Dongsheng Yang]

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>

Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same
goes for both sanitize and secure erase.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
index 6350dd82b9a9..c4c4acb1f3b3 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description:
 		whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity,
 		or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means
 		is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires
-		the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges.
+		the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+		states.
 
 
 What            /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact:        linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org
 Description:
 		(WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to
 		secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for
-		all user data areas of the device.
+		all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires
+		the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any
+		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
+		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
+		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
+		states.
 
 
 What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported

[Dongsheng Yang]

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>

If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands,
hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can
never be attempted.

In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands
found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  6 ++--
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 19 +++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    | 15 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
index c4c4acb1f3b3..087f762ebfd5 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description:
 		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
 		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
 		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
-		states.
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What            /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description:
 		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
 		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
 		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
-		states.
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index d6d067fbee97..ca60bb8114f2 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_security_state *security,
+					 u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 #define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
@@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
+		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
+			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
 			dev_dbg(dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;
@@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
 			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode);
 
+		if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
index f99e7ec3cc40..14b547c07f54 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes,
 };
 
+static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+					   struct attribute *a, int n)
+{
+	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
+	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
+	struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds);
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	return a->mode;
+}
+
 static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = {
 	.name = "security",
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes,
+	.is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible,
 };
 
 static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index f3aca828fbec..706f8a6d1ef4 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
 	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
 };
 
+/* Device enabled security commands */
+enum security_cmd_enabled_bits {
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX
+};
+
 /**
  * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
  *
@@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  * struct cxl_security_state - Device security state
  *
  * @state: state of last security operation
+ * @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL
  * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support
  * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout
  * @poll_dwork: polling work item
@@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  */
 struct cxl_security_state {
 	unsigned long state;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);
 	bool poll;
 	int poll_tmo_secs;
 	struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH] drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device

[Dongsheng Yang]

From: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>

In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device
has a bus and has been probed.

This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where
the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference
to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example.

We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to
make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the
device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver.

This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres:
release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit
a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over
memory leaks concerns.

This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to
release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get
the best of both worlds.

Fixes: a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release")
Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-kunit-devm-inconsistencies-test-v3-3-6aa7e074f373@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/base/core.c                      | 11 +++++++++++
 drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c |  2 --
 drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c     |  2 --
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c
index 3dff5037943e..6ceaf50f5a67 100644
--- a/drivers/base/core.c
+++ b/drivers/base/core.c
@@ -3817,6 +3817,17 @@ void device_del(struct device *dev)
 	device_platform_notify_remove(dev);
 	device_links_purge(dev);
 
+	/*
+	 * If a device does not have a driver attached, we need to clean
+	 * up any managed resources. We do this in device_release(), but
+	 * it's never called (and we leak the device) if a managed
+	 * resource holds a reference to the device. So release all
+	 * managed resources here, like we do in driver_detach(). We
+	 * still need to do so again in device_release() in case someone
+	 * adds a new resource after this point, though.
+	 */
+	devres_release_all(dev);
+
 	bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_REMOVED_DEVICE);
 	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
 	glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c b/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c
index b6ebf1dcdffb..1ae5ce8bd366 100644
--- a/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c
+++ b/drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c
@@ -87,8 +87,6 @@ static void platform_device_devm_register_get_unregister_with_devm_test(struct k
 	struct test_priv *priv = test->priv;
 	int ret;
 
-	kunit_skip(test, "This needs to be fixed in the core.");
-
 	pdev = platform_device_alloc(DEVICE_NAME, PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE);
 	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, pdev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c b/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c
index 9a3e6cccae13..780d07455f57 100644
--- a/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c
+++ b/drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c
@@ -78,8 +78,6 @@ static void root_device_devm_register_get_unregister_with_devm_test(struct kunit
 	struct test_priv *priv = test->priv;
 	int ret;
 
-	kunit_skip(test, "This needs to be fixed in the core.");
-
 	priv->dev = root_device_register(DEVICE_NAME);
 	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, priv->dev);
 
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 2/3] cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc

[Dongsheng Yang]

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>

... as is the case with all members of struct cxl_memdev_state.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-3-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
---
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index 499113328586..f3aca828fbec 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {
  * @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset
  * @event: event log driver state
  * @poison: poison driver state info
+ * @security: security driver state info
  * @fw: firmware upload / activation state
  * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands
  *
-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH 3/3] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported

[Dongsheng Yang]

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>

If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands,
hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can
never be attempted.

In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands
found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  6 ++--
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 19 +++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    | 15 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
index c4c4acb1f3b3..087f762ebfd5 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description:
 		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
 		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
 		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
-		states.
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What            /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description:
 		HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache
 		management, relying instead for it to be done when a region
 		transitions between software programmed and hardware committed
-		states.
+		states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware
+		support for the operation.
 
 
 What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
index d6d067fbee97..ca60bb8114f2 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
@@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_security_state *security,
+					 u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK, security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
+		set_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+			security->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 #define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
@@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
+		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
+			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
 			dev_dbg(dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;
@@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
 			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&mds->poison, opcode);
 
+		if (cxl_is_security_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled(&mds->security, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
index f99e7ec3cc40..14b547c07f54 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c
@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = {
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes,
 };
 
+static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+					   struct attribute *a, int n)
+{
+	struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
+	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd = to_cxl_memdev(dev);
+	struct cxl_memdev_state *mds = to_cxl_memdev_state(cxlmd->cxlds);
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr &&
+	    !test_bit(CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE, mds->security.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	return a->mode;
+}
+
 static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = {
 	.name = "security",
 	.attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes,
+	.is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible,
 };
 
 static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
index f3aca828fbec..706f8a6d1ef4 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
+++ b/drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h
@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
 	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
 };
 
+/* Device enabled security commands */
+enum security_cmd_enabled_bits {
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
+	CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX
+};
+
 /**
  * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
  *
@@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  * struct cxl_security_state - Device security state
  *
  * @state: state of last security operation
+ * @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL
  * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support
  * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout
  * @poll_dwork: polling work item
@@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {
  */
 struct cxl_security_state {
 	unsigned long state;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);
 	bool poll;
 	int poll_tmo_secs;
 	struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
-- 
2.34.1