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* [Bluez PATCH v4] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack
@ 2020-02-14  5:50 Howard Chung
  2020-02-14  7:45 ` Marcel Holtmann
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Howard Chung @ 2020-02-14  5:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-bluetooth, marcel
  Cc: chromeos-bluetooth-upstreaming, Howard Chung, David S. Miller,
	Johan Hedberg, netdev, linux-kernel

Attack scenario:
1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
   Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
   B).
2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
   Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
   be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
   (technically, doing Page Scan).
4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
   (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
   connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
   same as device B's address.
5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
   profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
   encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
   But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
   model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
   notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
   new different link key, common between device A and C.
6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
   connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
   speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.

Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
- the pairing is initialized by peer
- the authorization method is just-work
- host already had the link key to the peer

Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com>
---

Changes in v4:
- optimise the check in smp.c.

Changes in v3:
- Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
- Fix coding style (declaration order)

Changes in v2:
- Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
- Fix the added code in classic
- Add a similar fix for LE

 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c       | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
 			goto confirm;
 		}
 
+		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+		 * legitimate or malicious.
+		 */
+		if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
+			bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");
+			confirm_hint = 1;
+			goto confirm;
+		}
+
 		BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
 		       hdev->auto_accept_delay);
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 2cba6e07c02b..bea64071bdd1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2192,6 +2192,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		/* May need further confirmation for Just-Works pairing  */
+		if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
+			goto mackey_and_ltk;
+
+		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
+		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
+		 * legitimate or malicious.
+		 */
+		if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				 hcon->role)) {
+			err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+							hcon->type,
+							hcon->dst_type, passkey,
+							1);
+			if (err)
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		}
 	}
 
 mackey_and_ltk:
-- 
2.25.0.265.gbab2e86ba0-goog


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [Bluez PATCH v4] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack
  2020-02-14  5:50 [Bluez PATCH v4] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack Howard Chung
@ 2020-02-14  7:45 ` Marcel Holtmann
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Marcel Holtmann @ 2020-02-14  7:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Howard Chung
  Cc: Bluez mailing list, chromeos-bluetooth-upstreaming,
	David S. Miller, Johan Hedberg, netdev, linux-kernel

Hi Howard,

> Attack scenario:
> 1. A Chromebook (let's call this device A) is paired to a legitimate
>   Bluetooth classic device (e.g. a speaker) (let's call this device
>   B).
> 2. A malicious device (let's call this device C) pretends to be the
>   Bluetooth speaker by using the same BT address.
> 3. If device A is not currently connected to device B, device A will
>   be ready to accept connection from device B in the background
>   (technically, doing Page Scan).
> 4. Therefore, device C can initiate connection to device A
>   (because device A is doing Page Scan) and device A will accept the
>   connection because device A trusts device C's address which is the
>   same as device B's address.
> 5. Device C won't be able to communicate at any high level Bluetooth
>   profile with device A because device A enforces that device C is
>   encrypted with their common Link Key, which device C doesn't have.
>   But device C can initiate pairing with device A with just-works
>   model without requiring user interaction (there is only pairing
>   notification). After pairing, device A now trusts device C with a
>   new different link key, common between device A and C.
> 6. From now on, device A trusts device C, so device C can at anytime
>   connect to device A to do any kind of high-level hijacking, e.g.
>   speaker hijack or mouse/keyboard hijack.
> 
> Since we don't know whether the repairing is legitimate or not,
> leave the decision to user space if all the conditions below are met.
> - the pairing is initialized by peer
> - the authorization method is just-work
> - host already had the link key to the peer
> 
> Signed-off-by: Howard Chung <howardchung@google.com>
> ---
> 
> Changes in v4:
> - optimise the check in smp.c.
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - Change confirm_hint from 2 to 1
> - Fix coding style (declaration order)
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove the HCI_PERMIT_JUST_WORK_REPAIR debugfs option
> - Fix the added code in classic
> - Add a similar fix for LE
> 
> net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 10 ++++++++++
> net/bluetooth/smp.c       | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> index 2c833dae9366..e6982f4f51ea 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> @@ -4571,6 +4571,16 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
> 			goto confirm;
> 		}
> 
> +		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> +		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> +		 * legitimate or malicious.
> +		 */
> +		if (hci_find_link_key(hdev, &ev->bdaddr)) {
> +			bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Local host already has link key");

I would turn this into bt_dev_dbg actually.

> +			confirm_hint = 1;
> +			goto confirm;
> +		}
> +
> 		BT_DBG("Auto-accept of user confirmation with %ums delay",
> 		       hdev->auto_accept_delay);
> 
> diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> index 2cba6e07c02b..bea64071bdd1 100644
> --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
> @@ -2192,6 +2192,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
> 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
> 			     smp->prnd);
> 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
> +
> +		/* May need further confirmation for Just-Works pairing  */

This comment is misleading and has two spaces at the end. My proposal would be this:

		/* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
> +		if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
> +			goto mackey_and_ltk;
> +

> +		/* If there already exists link key in local host, leave the
> +		 * decision to user space since the remote device could be
> +		 * legitimate or malicious.
> +		 */
> +		if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
> +				 hcon->role)) {
> +			err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
> +							hcon->type,
> +							hcon->dst_type, passkey,
> +							1);
> +			if (err)
> +				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
> +			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
> +		}
> 	}

Rest looks good. Either you send me a v5 or tell me to fix it up before applying the patch.

Regards

Marcel


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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2020-02-14  5:50 [Bluez PATCH v4] bluetooth: secure bluetooth stack from bluedump attack Howard Chung
2020-02-14  7:45 ` Marcel Holtmann

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