Re: [PATCH RFC v8 32/56] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support

[Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>]

On Mon, 20 Feb 2023 12:38:23 -0600
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:

> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> 
> The next generation of SEV is called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested Paging).
> SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality  while adding new
> hardware based security protection. SEV-SNP adds strong memory encryption
> integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks
> such as data replay, memory re-mapping, and more, to create an isolated
> execution environment.
> 
> The SNP feature is added incrementally, the later patches adds a new module
> parameters that can be used to enabled SEV-SNP in the KVM.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 +++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  8 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 9e9efb42a766..51db01b282eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
>  #define sev_es_enabled false
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
>  
> +/* enable/disable SEV-SNP support */
> +static bool sev_snp_enabled;
> +
>  #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NONE		0
>  #define AP_RESET_HOLD_NAE_EVENT		1
>  #define AP_RESET_HOLD_MSR_PROTO		2
> @@ -2306,6 +2309,7 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
>  	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
> +	bool sev_snp_supported = false;
>  	bool sev_es_supported = false;
>  	bool sev_supported = false;
>  
> @@ -2385,12 +2389,16 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>  	if (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count))
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	pr_info("SEV-ES supported: %u ASIDs\n", sev_es_asid_count);
>  	sev_es_supported = true;
> +	sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
> +
> +	pr_info("SEV-ES %ssupported: %u ASIDs\n",
> +		sev_snp_supported ? "and SEV-SNP " : "", sev_es_asid_count);
>  
>  out:
>  	sev_enabled = sev_supported;
>  	sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
> +	sev_snp_enabled = sev_snp_supported;
>  #endif
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 5efcf036ccad..8eb1b51e92f5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ enum {
>  struct kvm_sev_info {
>  	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
>  	bool es_active;		/* SEV-ES enabled guest */
> +	bool snp_active;	/* SEV-SNP enabled guest */
>  	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
>  	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
>  	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
> @@ -323,6 +324,13 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
>  #endif
>  }
>  
> +static inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +
> +	return sev_es_guest(kvm) && sev->snp_active;
> +}
> +

Maybe also use __always_inline like sev_es_guest() above?

It seems solved some warnings before:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210624095147.880513802@infradead.org/

>  static inline void vmcb_mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
>  {
>  	vmcb->control.clean = 0;