From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 09:04:48 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <996db75c-5648-17b1-5bae-f3b10d72c110@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9b9b682f-297e-9ebd-4d67-43c3ed9ad8c5@amd.com>
Hi Tom,
On 28/06/2021 23:40, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 6/28/21 1:34 PM, Dov Murik wrote:
>> When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing secret area,
>> reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +-
>> drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
>> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 5 +++
>> include/linux/efi.h | 4 ++
>> 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
>> index 4f647f1ee298..e9740bd16db0 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
>> @@ -551,6 +551,8 @@ extern struct efi {
>> unsigned long tpm_log; /* TPM2 Event Log table */
>> unsigned long tpm_final_log; /* TPM2 Final Events Log table */
>> unsigned long mokvar_table; /* MOK variable config table */
>> + unsigned long confidential_computing_secret; /* Confidential computing */
>> + /* secret table */
>
> If there is any possibility that someone could reuse a form of this
> confidential computing secret table in a bare metal system, then this
> table needs to be added to the efi_tables[] array in
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c. Otherwise, it will be mapped improperly on a
> system with SME active.
Good catch, thanks. I see that all existing table addresses from
struct efi are added to the efi_tables[] array, so for completeness it
makes sense to add efi.confidential_computing_secret as well (even
though currently bare metal firmware doesn't have this table).
Thanks,
-Dov
>
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>>
>> efi_get_time_t *get_time;
>> efi_set_time_t *set_time;
>> @@ -1190,6 +1192,8 @@ extern int efi_tpm_final_log_size;
>>
>> extern unsigned long rci2_table_phys;
>>
>> +extern int efi_confidential_computing_secret_area_reserve(void);
>> +
>> /*
>> * efi_runtime_service() function identifiers.
>> * "NONE" is used by efi_recover_from_page_fault() to check if the page
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-06-29 6:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-06-28 18:34 [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2021-06-28 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy " Dov Murik
2021-06-28 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve " Dov Murik
2021-06-28 20:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-06-29 6:04 ` Dov Murik [this message]
2021-06-28 18:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
2021-06-28 19:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-29 7:23 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-29 22:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-06-28 19:28 ` [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area Borislav Petkov
2021-06-29 7:16 ` Dov Murik
2021-06-29 17:33 ` Borislav Petkov
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