From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>,
Jim Cadden <jcadden@ibm.com>,
Daniele Buono <dbuono@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2021 15:36:25 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YWgyWeoreYusT9/s@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211014130848.592611-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
On Thu, Oct 14, 2021 at 01:08:47PM +0000, Dov Murik wrote:
> When efi-stub copies an EFI-provided confidential computing (coco)
> secret area, reserve that memory block for future use within the kernel.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 +
> drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 2 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 4 ++++
> include/linux/efi.h | 3 +++
> 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/coco.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> index 147c30a81f15..35e082e5f603 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
> @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
> &efi.mokvar_table,
> #endif
> + &efi.coco_secret,
Shouldn't this depend on CONFIG_EFI_SECRET?
Why build all of this code if that option is not enabled?
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-14 13:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-14 13:08 [PATCH v3 0/3] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area Dov Murik
2021-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy " Dov Murik
2021-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] efi: Reserve " Dov Murik
2021-10-14 13:36 ` Greg KH [this message]
2021-10-20 6:51 ` Dov Murik
2021-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets Dov Murik
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