From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
<linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
<gary.hook@amd.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>, <cl@linux.com>,
<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <aarcange@redhat.com>,
<sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <piotr.luc@intel.com>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<msalter@redhat.com>, <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
<bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<jroedel@suse.de>, <keescook@chromium.org>, <arnd@arndb.de>,
<toshi
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2017 10:17:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit__15248.3931779445$1488470014$gmane$org@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
The patch adds initial support required to integrate Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
ASID management:
- Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained through
CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any asid outside the SEV
asid range.
- SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained through CPUID.
- SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush is required
if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 62651ad..fcc4710 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -719,6 +719,12 @@ struct kvm_hv {
HV_REFERENCE_TSC_PAGE tsc_ref;
};
+struct kvm_sev_info {
+ unsigned int handle; /* firmware handle */
+ unsigned int asid; /* asid for this guest */
+ int sev_fd; /* SEV device fd */
+};
+
struct kvm_arch {
unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages;
unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages;
@@ -805,6 +811,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
bool x2apic_format;
bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
+
+ struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
};
struct kvm_vm_stat {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 8d8fe62..fb63398 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -211,6 +212,9 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
*/
struct list_head ir_list;
spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+ /* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */
+ bool last_cpuid;
};
/*
@@ -490,6 +494,64 @@ static inline bool gif_set(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return !!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_GIF_MASK);
}
+/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+
+static bool kvm_sev_enabled(void)
+{
+ return max_sev_asid ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static inline struct kvm_sev_info *sev_get_info(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_arch *vm_data = &kvm->arch;
+
+ return &vm_data->sev_info;
+}
+
+static unsigned int sev_get_handle(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm);
+
+ return sev_info->handle;
+}
+
+static inline int sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return sev_get_handle(kvm);
+}
+
+static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm);
+
+ if (!sev_info)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sev_info->asid;
+}
+
+static inline int sev_get_fd(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm);
+
+ if (!sev_info)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sev_info->sev_fd;
+}
+
+static inline void sev_set_asid(struct kvm *kvm, int asid)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev_info = sev_get_info(kvm);
+
+ if (!sev_info)
+ return;
+
+ sev_info->asid = asid;
+}
+
static unsigned long iopm_base;
struct kvm_ldttss_desc {
@@ -511,6 +573,8 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+
+ struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs; /* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -764,7 +828,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
sd->asid_generation = 1;
sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
- sd->min_asid = 1;
+ sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
native_store_gdt(&gdt_descr);
gdt = (struct desc_struct *)gdt_descr.address;
@@ -825,6 +889,7 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL;
__free_page(sd->save_area);
+ kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
kfree(sd);
}
@@ -842,6 +907,14 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
if (!sd->save_area)
goto err_1;
+ if (kvm_sev_enabled()) {
+ sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc((max_sev_asid + 1) * sizeof(void *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+ goto err_1;
+ }
+
per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
return 0;
@@ -1017,6 +1090,61 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
return 0;
}
+static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ int ret, error, nguests;
+ struct sev_data_init *init;
+ struct sev_data_status *status;
+
+ /*
+ * Get maximum number of encrypted guest supported: Fn8001_001F[ECX]
+ * Bit 31:0: Number of supported guest
+ */
+ nguests = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+ if (!nguests)
+ return;
+
+ init = kzalloc(sizeof(*init), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!init)
+ return;
+
+ status = kzalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!status)
+ goto err_1;
+
+ /* Initialize SEV firmware */
+ ret = sev_platform_init(init, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err("SEV: PLATFORM_INIT ret=%d (%#x)\n", ret, error);
+ goto err_2;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
+ sev_asid_bitmap = kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(nguests),
+ sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (IS_ERR(sev_asid_bitmap)) {
+ sev_platform_shutdown(&error);
+ goto err_2;
+ }
+
+ /* Query the platform status and print API version */
+ ret = sev_platform_status(status, &error);
+ if (ret) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: PLATFORM_STATUS ret=%#x\n", error);
+ goto err_2;
+ }
+
+ max_sev_asid = nguests;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: SEV enabled\n");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SEV API: %d.%d\n",
+ status->api_major, status->api_minor);
+err_2:
+ kfree(status);
+err_1:
+ kfree(init);
+}
+
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
{
int cpu;
@@ -1052,6 +1180,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
+ sev_hardware_setup();
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
if (r)
@@ -1094,10 +1225,25 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
return r;
}
+static __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ int ret, err;
+
+ ret = sev_platform_shutdown(&err);
+ if (ret)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "failed to shutdown PSP rc=%d (%#0x10x)\n",
+ ret, err);
+
+ kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
int cpu;
+ if (kvm_sev_enabled())
+ sev_hardware_unsetup();
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
@@ -1157,6 +1303,11 @@ static void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->vcpu.arch.apicv_active = true;
}
+static void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
+}
+
static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
@@ -1271,6 +1422,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (avic)
avic_init_vmcb(svm);
+ if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ sev_init_vmcb(svm);
+
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
enable_gif(svm);
@@ -2084,6 +2238,11 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
default:
error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+ /* In SEV mode, the guest physical address will have C-bit
+ * set. C-bit must be cleared before handling the fault.
+ */
+ if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ fault_address &= ~sme_me_mask;
trace_kvm_page_fault(fault_address, error_code);
if (!npt_enabled && kvm_event_needs_reinjection(&svm->vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(&svm->vcpu, fault_address);
@@ -4258,12 +4417,40 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
load_TR_desc();
}
+static void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+ int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+
+ /* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */
+ svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
+
+ /* Flush guest TLB:
+ * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the
+ * same host CPU
+ * or
+ * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs.
+ */
+ if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb ||
+ svm->last_cpuid != cpu)
+ svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
+
+ svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
+ sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb;
+
+ mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+}
+
static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ return pre_sev_run(svm);
+
/* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
if (svm->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
new_asid(svm, sd);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index fef7d83..9df37a2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1284,6 +1284,104 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
/* Memory Encryption Commands */
#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, unsigned long)
+/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
+enum sev_cmd_id {
+ /* Guest launch commands */
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START = 0,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
+ /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
+ /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
+ /* Guest status and debug commands */
+ KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
+ KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
+ KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
+
+ KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_cmd {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u64 data;
+ __u32 error;
+ __u32 sev_fd;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+ __u32 handle;
+ __u32 policy;
+ __u64 dh_cert_data;
+ __u32 dh_cert_length;
+ __u64 session_data;
+ __u32 session_length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data {
+ __u64 address;
+ __u32 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+ __u64 address;
+ __u32 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+ __u64 pdh_cert_data;
+ __u32 pdh_cert_length;
+ __u64 plat_cert_data;
+ __u32 plat_cert_length;
+ __u64 amd_cert_data;
+ __u32 amd_cert_length;
+ __u64 session_data;
+ __u32 session_length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_send_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_data;
+ __u32 hdr_length;
+ __u64 guest_address;
+ __u32 guest_length;
+ __u64 host_address;
+ __u32 host_length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
+ __u32 handle;
+ __u64 pdh_cert_data;
+ __u32 pdh_cert_length;
+ __u64 session_data;
+ __u32 session_length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_data;
+ __u32 hdr_length;
+ __u64 guest_address;
+ __u32 guest_length;
+ __u64 host_address;
+ __u32 host_length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+ __u32 handle;
+ __u32 policy;
+ __u32 state;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_addr;
+ __u64 dst_addr;
+ __u32 length;
+};
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-02 15:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <148846752022.2349.13667498174822419498.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/32] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:13 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/32] x86: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:15 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/32] x86: kvmclock: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/32] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface support Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 21/32] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) " Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:16 ` [RFC PATCH v2 22/32] kvm: svm: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 25/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:17 ` [RFC PATCH v2 27/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 28/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 31/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2017-03-02 15:18 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846777589.2349.11698765767451886038.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-02 17:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/32] crypto: ccp: Introduce the AMD Secure Processor device Mark Rutland
2017-03-02 19:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-03 13:55 ` Andy Shevchenko
[not found] ` <148846752953.2349.17505492128445909591.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-03 16:59 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/32] x86: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:01 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-04 10:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-06 20:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 20:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846759008.2349.8274808454274279039.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-03 20:42 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/32] x86/pci: Use memremap when walking setup data Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-03 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-07 0:03 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-03-13 20:08 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <148846756856.2349.18360437323368784256.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-07 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/32] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846757895.2349.561582698953591240.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-07 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/32] x86: Use encrypted access of BOOT related data with SEV Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 19:03 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <148846760142.2349.8522516472305792434.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-07 11:57 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/32] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846761276.2349.4899767672892365544.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-07 14:59 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/32] x86: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory page Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-17 14:55 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <148846763334.2349.9327692408737971533.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-08 8:46 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/32] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846766532.2349.4832844575566575886.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-08 10:56 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/32] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846754069.2349.4698319264278045964.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-07 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/32] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Borislav Petkov
2017-03-08 15:06 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846768878.2349.15757532025749214650.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-09 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/32] x86: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Borislav Petkov
2017-03-09 16:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-09 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 16:35 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 14:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 16:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-03-16 16:29 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846770159.2349.16863375000963463500.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-09 19:29 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/32] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE CPU feature Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846783136.2349.9362218518503742320.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 10:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 23/32] kvm: introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <148846784278.2349.17771314083820274411.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 24/32] kvm: x86: prepare for SEV guest management API support Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <148846793743.2349.8478208161427437950.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 10:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 32/32] x86: kvm: Pin the guest memory when SEV is active Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <453770c9-f9d7-4806-dbae-d19876f2a22e@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 18:17 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846786714.2349.17724971671841396908.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 10:48 ` [RFC PATCH v2 26/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <14021d2a-2a94-a0c8-88db-acbc04b4daac@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 18:20 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846789744.2349.167641684941925238.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 10:54 ` [RFC PATCH v2 29/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <4579cfdd-1797-8b47-8e00-254e3f6eb73f@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 18:41 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <d89ef60d-a97c-b712-fb0f-0242ebebb91a@amd.com>
2017-03-17 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <148846790758.2349.16768762953657853550.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 30/32] kvm: svm: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <05dbd756-e8e9-9384-2759-898e230a6909@redhat.com>
2017-03-16 18:34 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846773666.2349.9492983018843773590.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-16 11:06 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-28 18:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 15:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-29 15:32 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <148846771545.2349.9373586041426414252.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-10 11:06 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages Borislav Petkov
2017-03-10 22:41 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-03-16 13:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-03-16 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-03-16 12:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
[not found] ` <148846772794.2349.1396854638510933455.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-24 17:12 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/32] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Borislav Petkov
2017-03-27 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh
[not found] ` <148846776540.2349.3123530065053870721.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
2017-03-29 15:14 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Borislav Petkov
2017-03-29 17:08 ` Brijesh Singh
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