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* [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (6 more replies)
  0 siblings, 7 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

This series creates an ESSIV template that produces a skcipher or AEAD
transform based on a tuple of the form '<skcipher>,<shash>' (or '<aead>,<shash>'
for the AEAD case). It exposes the encapsulated sync or async skcipher/aead by
passing through all operations, while using the cipher/shash pair to transform
the input IV into an ESSIV output IV.

This matches what both users of ESSIV in the kernel do, and so it is proposed
as a replacement for those, in patches #2 and #3.

Changes since v8:
- Remove 'cipher' argument from essiv() template, and instead, parse the
  cra_name of the skcipher to obtain the cipher. This is slightly cleaner
  than what dm-crypt currently does, since we can get the cra_name from the
  spawn, and we don't have to actually allocate the TFM. Since this implies
  that dm-crypt does not need to provide the cipher, we can drop the parsing
  code from it entirely (assuming the eboiv patch I sent out recently is
  applied first) (patch #7)
- Restrict the essiv() AEAD instantiation to AEADs whose cra_name starts with
  'authenc('
- Rebase onto cryptodev/master
- Drop dm-crypt to reorder/refactor cipher name parsing, since it was wrong
  and it is no longer needed.
- Drop Milan's R-b since the code has changed
- Fix bug in accelerated arm64 implementation.

Changes since v7:
- rebase onto cryptodev/master
- drop change to ivsize in #2
- add Milan's R-b's

Changes since v6:
- make CRYPTO_ESSIV user selectable so we can opt out of selecting it even
  if FS_ENCRYPTION (which cannot be built as a module) is enabled
- move a comment along with the code it referred to (#3), not that this change
  and removing some redundant braces makes the diff look totally different
- add Milan's R-b to #3 and #4

Changes since v5:
- drop redundant #includes and drop some unneeded braces (#2)
- add test case for essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)
- make ESSIV driver deal with assoc data that is described by more than two
  scatterlist entries - this only happens when the extended tests are being
  performed, so don't optimize for it
- clarify that both fscrypt and dm-crypt only use ESSIV in special cases (#7)

Changes since v4:
- make the ESSIV template IV size equal the IV size of the encapsulated
  cipher - defining it as 8 bytes was needlessly restrictive, and also
  complicated the code for no reason
- add a missing kfree() spotted by Smatch
- add additional algo length name checks when constructing the essiv()
  cipher name
- reinstate the 'essiv' IV generation implementation in dm-crypt, but
  make its generation function identical to plain64le (and drop the other
  methods)
- fix a bug in the arm64 CE/NEON code
- simplify the arm64 code by reusing more of the existing CBC implementation
  (patch #6 is new to this series and was added for this reason)

Changes since v3:
- address various review comments from Eric on patch #1
- use Kconfig's 'imply' instead of 'select' to permit CRYPTO_ESSIV to be
  enabled as a module or disabled entirely even if fscrypt is compiled in (#2)
- fix an issue in the AEAD encrypt path caused by the IV being clobbered by
  the inner skcipher before the hmac was being calculated

Changes since v2:
- fixed a couple of bugs that snuck in after I'd done the bulk of my
  testing
- some cosmetic tweaks to the ESSIV template skcipher setkey function
  to align it with the aead one
- add a test case for essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)
- add an accelerated implementation for arm64 that combines the IV
  derivation and the actual en/decryption in a single asm routine

Scroll down for tcrypt speed test result comparing the essiv template
with the asm implementation. Bare cbc(aes) tests included for reference
as well. Taken on a 2GHz Cortex-A57 (AMD Seattle)

Code can be found here
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ardb/linux.git/log/?h=essiv-v8

Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

Ard Biesheuvel (7):
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode
  crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
  md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 205 ++++--
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  28 +
 crypto/Kconfig                |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile               |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c                | 665 ++++++++++++++++++++
 crypto/tcrypt.c               |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c              |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h              | 497 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/Kconfig            |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c         | 252 +-------
 fs/crypto/Kconfig             |   1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c            |   5 -
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h   |   9 -
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c           |  92 +--
 14 files changed, 1442 insertions(+), 365 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 crypto/essiv.c

-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` " Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Implement a template that wraps a (skcipher,cipher,shash) or
(aead,cipher,shash) tuple so that we can consolidate the ESSIV handling
in fscrypt and dm-crypt and move it into the crypto API. This will result
in better test coverage, and will allow future changes to make the bare
cipher interface internal to the crypto subsystem, in order to increase
robustness of the API against misuse.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig  |  28 +
 crypto/Makefile |   1 +
 crypto/essiv.c  | 665 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 694 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 8880c1fc51d8..dbceaed65e52 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -482,6 +482,34 @@ config CRYPTO_ADIANTUM
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CRYPTO_ESSIV
+	tristate "ESSIV support for block encryption"
+	select CRYPTO_AUTHENC
+	help
+	  Encrypted salt-sector initialization vector (ESSIV) is an IV
+	  generation method that is used in some cases by fscrypt and/or
+	  dm-crypt. It uses the hash of the block encryption key as the
+	  symmetric key for a block encryption pass applied to the input
+	  IV, making low entropy IV sources more suitable for block
+	  encryption.
+
+	  This driver implements a crypto API template that can be
+	  instantiated either as a skcipher or as a aead (depending on the
+	  type of the first template argument), and which defers encryption
+	  and decryption requests to the encapsulated cipher after applying
+	  ESSIV to the input IV. Note that in the aead case, it is assumed
+	  that the keys are presented in the same format used by the authenc
+	  template, and that the IV appears at the end of the authenticated
+	  associated data (AAD) region (which is how dm-crypt uses it.)
+
+	  Note that the use of ESSIV is not recommended for new deployments,
+	  and so this only needs to be enabled when interoperability with
+	  existing encrypted volumes of filesystems is required, or when
+	  building for a particular system that requires it (e.g., when
+	  the SoC in question has accelerated CBC but not XTS, making CBC
+	  combined with ESSIV the only feasible mode for h/w accelerated
+	  block encryption)
+
 comment "Hash modes"
 
 config CRYPTO_CMAC
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index cfcc954e59f9..c204029f21ab 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD) += algif_aead.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD) += zstd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_OFB) += ofb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC) += ecc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV) += essiv.o
 
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh.o
 ecdh_generic-y += ecdh_helper.o
diff --git a/crypto/essiv.c b/crypto/essiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ed9a1eae434e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/essiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,665 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ESSIV skcipher and aead template for block encryption
+ *
+ * This template encapsulates the ESSIV IV generation algorithm used by
+ * dm-crypt and fscrypt, which converts the initial vector for the skcipher
+ * used for block encryption, by encrypting it using the hash of the
+ * skcipher key as encryption key. Usually, the input IV is a 64-bit sector
+ * number in LE representation zero-padded to the size of the IV, but this
+ * is not assumed by this driver.
+ *
+ * The typical use of this template is to instantiate the skcipher
+ * 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256)', which is the only instantiation used by
+ * fscrypt, and the most relevant one for dm-crypt. However, dm-crypt
+ * also permits ESSIV to be used in combination with the authenc template,
+ * e.g., 'essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),aes,sha256)', in which case
+ * we need to instantiate an aead that accepts the same special key format
+ * as the authenc template, and deals with the way the encrypted IV is
+ * embedded into the AAD area of the aead request. This means the AEAD
+ * flavor produced by this template is tightly coupled to the way dm-crypt
+ * happens to use it.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro, Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ *
+ * Heavily based on:
+ * adiantum length-preserving encryption mode
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct essiv_instance_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher_spawn	skcipher_spawn;
+		struct crypto_aead_spawn	aead_spawn;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_spawn			essiv_cipher_spawn;
+	struct crypto_shash_spawn		hash_spawn;
+};
+
+struct essiv_tfm_ctx {
+	union {
+		struct crypto_skcipher	*skcipher;
+		struct crypto_aead	*aead;
+	} u;
+	struct crypto_cipher		*essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash		*hash;
+	int				ivoffset;
+};
+
+struct essiv_aead_request_ctx {
+	struct scatterlist		sg[4];
+	u8				*assoc;
+	struct aead_request		aead_req;
+};
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm,
+				 const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->u.skcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->u.skcipher,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->u.skcipher, key, keylen);
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tctx->u.skcipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher,
+				crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
+				  crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				  CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			     unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tctx->hash);
+	struct crypto_authenc_keys keys;
+	u8 salt[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_aead_clear_flags(tctx->u.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tctx->u.aead, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_aead_setkey(tctx->u.aead, key, keylen);
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_aead_get_flags(tctx->u.aead) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) {
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tctx->hash;
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_update(desc, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen) ?:
+	      crypto_shash_finup(desc, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, salt);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm) &
+						    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->essiv_cipher, salt,
+				   crypto_shash_digestsize(tctx->hash));
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tctx->essiv_cipher) &
+				   CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+				  unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_aead_setauthsize(tctx->u.aead, authsize);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
+
+	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.skcipher);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, req->cryptlen,
+				   req->iv);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req),
+				      essiv_skcipher_done, req);
+
+	return enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) :
+		     crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_skcipher_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *req = areq->data;
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct essiv_aead_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->aead_req;
+	struct scatterlist *src = req->src;
+	int err;
+
+	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->essiv_cipher, req->iv, req->iv);
+
+	/*
+	 * dm-crypt embeds the sector number and the IV in the AAD region, so
+	 * we have to copy the converted IV into the right scatterlist before
+	 * we pass it on.
+	 */
+	rctx->assoc = NULL;
+	if (req->src == req->dst || !enc) {
+		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+					 req->assoclen - crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+					 crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm), 1);
+	} else {
+		u8 *iv = (u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req) + tctx->ivoffset;
+		int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		int ssize = req->assoclen - ivsize;
+		struct scatterlist *sg;
+		int nents;
+
+		if (ssize < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, ssize);
+		if (nents < 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		memcpy(iv, req->iv, ivsize);
+		sg_init_table(rctx->sg, 4);
+
+		if (unlikely(nents > 1)) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a case that rarely occurs in practice, but
+			 * for correctness, we have to deal with it nonetheless.
+			 */
+			rctx->assoc = kmalloc(ssize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+			if (!rctx->assoc)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+
+			scatterwalk_map_and_copy(rctx->assoc, req->src, 0,
+						 ssize, 0);
+			sg_set_buf(rctx->sg, rctx->assoc, ssize);
+		} else {
+			sg_set_page(rctx->sg, sg_page(req->src), ssize,
+				    req->src->offset);
+		}
+
+		sg_set_buf(rctx->sg + 1, iv, ivsize);
+		sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg + 2, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg != rctx->sg + 2)
+			sg_chain(rctx->sg, 3, sg);
+
+		src = rctx->sg;
+	}
+
+	aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, tctx->u.aead);
+	aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+	aead_request_set_callback(subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+				  essiv_aead_done, req);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, src, req->dst, req->cryptlen, req->iv);
+
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) :
+		    crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+
+	if (rctx->assoc && err != -EINPROGRESS)
+		kfree(rctx->assoc);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, true);
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return essiv_aead_crypt(req, false);
+}
+
+static int essiv_init_tfm(struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx,
+			  struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_cipher;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+	int err;
+
+	essiv_cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(essiv_cipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(essiv_cipher);
+
+	hash = crypto_spawn_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(hash);
+		goto err_free_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+
+	tctx->essiv_cipher = essiv_cipher;
+	tctx->hash = hash;
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_free_cipher(essiv_cipher);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int essiv_skcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher;
+	int err;
+
+	skcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(skcipher))
+		return PTR_ERR(skcipher);
+
+	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct skcipher_request) +
+				         crypto_skcipher_reqsize(skcipher));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_skcipher(skcipher);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.skcipher = skcipher;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int essiv_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_instance *inst = aead_alg_instance(tfm);
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aead *aead;
+	unsigned int subreq_size;
+	int err;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) !=
+		     sizeof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx));
+
+	aead = crypto_spawn_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	if (IS_ERR(aead))
+		return PTR_ERR(aead);
+
+	subreq_size = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+		      crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+
+	tctx->ivoffset = offsetof(struct essiv_aead_request_ctx, aead_req) +
+			 subreq_size;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, tctx->ivoffset + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead));
+
+	err = essiv_init_tfm(ictx, tctx);
+	if (err) {
+		crypto_free_aead(aead);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	tctx->u.aead = aead;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->u.skcipher);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct essiv_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_aead(tctx->u.aead);
+	crypto_free_cipher(tctx->essiv_cipher);
+	crypto_free_shash(tctx->hash);
+}
+
+static void essiv_skcipher_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static void essiv_aead_free_instance(struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+	crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+	kfree(inst);
+}
+
+static bool parse_cipher_name(char *essiv_cipher_name, const char *cra_name)
+{
+	const char *p, *q;
+	int len;
+
+	/* find the last opening parens */
+	p = strrchr(cra_name, '(');
+	if (!p++)
+		return false;
+
+	/* find the first closing parens in the tail of the string */
+	q = strchr(p, ')');
+	if (!q)
+		return false;
+
+	len = q - p;
+	if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		return false;
+
+	memcpy(essiv_cipher_name, p, len);
+	essiv_cipher_name[len] = '\0';
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool essiv_supported_algorithms(struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg,
+				       struct shash_alg *hash_alg,
+				       int ivsize)
+{
+	if (hash_alg->digestsize < essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize ||
+	    hash_alg->digestsize > essiv_cipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (ivsize != essiv_cipher_alg->cra_blocksize)
+		return false;
+
+	if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(hash_alg))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int essiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+	struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
+	const char *inner_cipher_name;
+	const char *shash_name;
+	char essiv_cipher_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct skcipher_instance *skcipher_inst = NULL;
+	struct aead_instance *aead_inst = NULL;
+	struct crypto_instance *inst;
+	struct crypto_alg *base, *block_base;
+	struct essiv_instance_ctx *ictx;
+	struct skcipher_alg *skcipher_alg = NULL;
+	struct aead_alg *aead_alg = NULL;
+	struct crypto_alg *essiv_cipher_alg;
+	struct crypto_alg *_hash_alg;
+	struct shash_alg *hash_alg;
+	int ivsize;
+	u32 type;
+	int err;
+
+	algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
+	if (IS_ERR(algt))
+		return PTR_ERR(algt);
+
+	inner_cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+	if (IS_ERR(inner_cipher_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(inner_cipher_name);
+
+	shash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+	if (IS_ERR(shash_name))
+		return PTR_ERR(shash_name);
+
+	type = algt->type & algt->mask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
+		skcipher_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*skcipher_inst) +
+					sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!skcipher_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = skcipher_crypto_instance(skcipher_inst);
+		base = &skcipher_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* Block cipher, e.g. "cbc(aes)" */
+		crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn,
+					   inner_cipher_name, 0,
+					   crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+								algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		skcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+		block_base = &skcipher_alg->base;
+		ivsize = crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		break;
+
+	case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
+		aead_inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*aead_inst) +
+				    sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!aead_inst)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead_inst);
+		base = &aead_inst->alg.base;
+		ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+
+		/* AEAD cipher, e.g. "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))" */
+		crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ictx->u.aead_spawn, inst);
+		err = crypto_grab_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn,
+				       inner_cipher_name, 0,
+				       crypto_requires_sync(algt->type,
+							    algt->mask));
+		if (err)
+			goto out_free_inst;
+		aead_alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+		block_base = &aead_alg->base;
+		if (!strstarts(block_base->cra_name, "authenc(")) {
+			pr_warn("Only authenc() type AEADs are supported by ESSIV\n");
+			goto out_drop_skcipher;
+		}
+		ivsize = aead_alg->ivsize;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!parse_cipher_name(essiv_cipher_name, block_base->cra_name)) {
+		pr_warn("Failed to parse ESSIV cipher name from skcipher cra_name\n");
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	}
+
+	/* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */
+	crypto_set_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, inst);
+	err = crypto_grab_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn, essiv_cipher_name,
+				CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_skcipher;
+	essiv_cipher_alg = ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn.alg;
+
+	/* Synchronous hash, e.g., "sha256" */
+	_hash_alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(shash_name,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH,
+					  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+	if (IS_ERR(_hash_alg)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(_hash_alg);
+		goto out_drop_essiv_cipher;
+	}
+	hash_alg = __crypto_shash_alg(_hash_alg);
+	err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(&ictx->hash_spawn, hash_alg, inst);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_hash;
+
+	/* Check the set of algorithms */
+	if (!essiv_supported_algorithms(essiv_cipher_alg, hash_alg, ivsize)) {
+		pr_warn("Unsupported essiv instantiation: essiv(%s,%s)\n",
+			block_base->cra_name,
+			hash_alg->base.cra_name);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	}
+
+	/* Instance fields */
+
+	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s)", block_base->cra_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+	if (snprintf(base->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+		     "essiv(%s,%s)", block_base->cra_driver_name,
+		     hash_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	base->cra_flags		= block_base->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+	base->cra_blocksize	= block_base->cra_blocksize;
+	base->cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct essiv_tfm_ctx);
+	base->cra_alignmask	= block_base->cra_alignmask;
+	base->cra_priority	= block_base->cra_priority;
+
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) {
+		skcipher_inst->alg.setkey	= essiv_skcipher_setkey;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.encrypt	= essiv_skcipher_encrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.decrypt	= essiv_skcipher_decrypt;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.init		= essiv_skcipher_init_tfm;
+		skcipher_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_skcipher_exit_tfm;
+
+		skcipher_inst->alg.min_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.max_keysize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_max_keysize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.ivsize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_chunksize(skcipher_alg);
+		skcipher_inst->alg.walksize	= crypto_skcipher_alg_walksize(skcipher_alg);
+
+		skcipher_inst->free		= essiv_skcipher_free_instance;
+
+		err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, skcipher_inst);
+	} else {
+		aead_inst->alg.setkey		= essiv_aead_setkey;
+		aead_inst->alg.setauthsize	= essiv_aead_setauthsize;
+		aead_inst->alg.encrypt		= essiv_aead_encrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.decrypt		= essiv_aead_decrypt;
+		aead_inst->alg.init		= essiv_aead_init_tfm;
+		aead_inst->alg.exit		= essiv_aead_exit_tfm;
+
+		aead_inst->alg.ivsize		= crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.maxauthsize	= crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(aead_alg);
+		aead_inst->alg.chunksize	= crypto_aead_alg_chunksize(aead_alg);
+
+		aead_inst->free			= essiv_aead_free_instance;
+
+		err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, aead_inst);
+	}
+
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_hash;
+
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+	return 0;
+
+out_drop_hash:
+	crypto_drop_shash(&ictx->hash_spawn);
+out_put_hash:
+	crypto_mod_put(_hash_alg);
+out_drop_essiv_cipher:
+	crypto_drop_spawn(&ictx->essiv_cipher_spawn);
+out_drop_skcipher:
+	if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
+		crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->u.skcipher_spawn);
+	else
+		crypto_drop_aead(&ictx->u.aead_spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+	kfree(skcipher_inst);
+	kfree(aead_inst);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* essiv(cipher_name, shash_name) */
+static struct crypto_template essiv_tmpl = {
+	.name	= "essiv",
+	.create	= essiv_create,
+	.module	= THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init essiv_module_init(void)
+{
+	return crypto_register_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit essiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_template(&essiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(essiv_module_init);
+module_exit(essiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ESSIV skcipher/aead wrapper for block encryption");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("essiv");
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
ESSIV skcipher which does all of this under the hood.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 fs/crypto/Kconfig           |  1 +
 fs/crypto/crypto.c          |  5 --
 fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h |  9 --
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c         | 92 +-------------------
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/Kconfig b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
index 5fdf24877c17..6f3d59b880b7 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	select CRYPTO_XTS
 	select CRYPTO_CTS
 	select KEYS
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 45c3d0427fb2..fd13231c5ff6 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -143,9 +143,6 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num,
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)
 		memcpy(iv->nonce, ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
-
-	if (ci->ci_essiv_tfm != NULL)
-		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ci->ci_essiv_tfm, iv->raw, iv->raw);
 }
 
 /* Encrypt or decrypt a single filesystem block of file contents */
@@ -523,8 +520,6 @@ static void __exit fscrypt_exit(void)
 		destroy_workqueue(fscrypt_read_workqueue);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_ctx_cachep);
 	kmem_cache_destroy(fscrypt_info_cachep);
-
-	fscrypt_essiv_cleanup();
 }
 module_exit(fscrypt_exit);
 
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 8978eec9d766..2fc6f0bd2d13 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -61,12 +61,6 @@ struct fscrypt_info {
 	/* The actual crypto transform used for encryption and decryption */
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ci_ctfm;
 
-	/*
-	 * Cipher for ESSIV IV generation.  Only set for CBC contents
-	 * encryption, otherwise is NULL.
-	 */
-	struct crypto_cipher *ci_essiv_tfm;
-
 	/*
 	 * Encryption mode used for this inode.  It corresponds to either
 	 * ci_data_mode or ci_filename_mode, depending on the inode type.
@@ -163,9 +157,6 @@ struct fscrypt_mode {
 	int keysize;
 	int ivsize;
 	bool logged_impl_name;
-	bool needs_essiv;
 };
 
-extern void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void);
-
 #endif /* _FSCRYPT_PRIVATE_H */
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
index 207ebed918c1..80924a0f72ca 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keyinfo.c
@@ -14,12 +14,9 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include "fscrypt_private.h"
 
-static struct crypto_shash *essiv_hash_tfm;
-
 /* Table of keys referenced by FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY policies */
 static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(fscrypt_master_keys, 6); /* 6 bits = 64 buckets */
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(fscrypt_master_keys_lock);
@@ -143,10 +140,9 @@ static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CBC] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CBC",
-		.cipher_str = "cbc(aes)",
+		.cipher_str = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
 		.keysize = 16,
 		.ivsize = 16,
-		.needs_essiv = true,
 	},
 	[FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_128_CTS] = {
 		.friendly_name = "AES-128-CTS-CBC",
@@ -376,72 +372,6 @@ fscrypt_get_master_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-static int derive_essiv_salt(const u8 *key, int keysize, u8 *salt)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm = READ_ONCE(essiv_hash_tfm);
-
-	/* init hash transform on demand */
-	if (unlikely(!tfm)) {
-		struct crypto_shash *prev_tfm;
-
-		tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
-		if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-			fscrypt_warn(NULL,
-				     "error allocating SHA-256 transform: %ld",
-				     PTR_ERR(tfm));
-			return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-		}
-		prev_tfm = cmpxchg(&essiv_hash_tfm, NULL, tfm);
-		if (prev_tfm) {
-			crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-			tfm = prev_tfm;
-		}
-	}
-
-	{
-		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-		desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-		return crypto_shash_digest(desc, key, keysize, salt);
-	}
-}
-
-static int init_essiv_generator(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key,
-				int keysize)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	u8 salt[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm))
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-
-	ci->ci_essiv_tfm = essiv_tfm;
-
-	err = derive_essiv_salt(raw_key, keysize, salt);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	/*
-	 * Using SHA256 to derive the salt/key will result in AES-256 being
-	 * used for IV generation. File contents encryption will still use the
-	 * configured keysize (AES-128) nevertheless.
-	 */
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, sizeof(salt));
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-out:
-	memzero_explicit(salt, sizeof(salt));
-	return err;
-}
-
-void __exit fscrypt_essiv_cleanup(void)
-{
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv_hash_tfm);
-}
-
 /*
  * Given the encryption mode and key (normally the derived key, but for
  * FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY mode it's the master key), set up the inode's
@@ -453,7 +383,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 {
 	struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *ctfm;
-	int err;
 
 	if (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
 		mk = fscrypt_get_master_key(ci, mode, raw_key, inode);
@@ -469,19 +398,6 @@ static int setup_crypto_transform(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
 	ci->ci_master_key = mk;
 	ci->ci_ctfm = ctfm;
 
-	if (mode->needs_essiv) {
-		/* ESSIV implies 16-byte IVs which implies !DIRECT_KEY */
-		WARN_ON(mode->ivsize != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		WARN_ON(ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
-
-		err = init_essiv_generator(ci, raw_key, mode->keysize);
-		if (err) {
-			fscrypt_warn(inode->i_sb,
-				     "error initializing ESSIV generator for inode %lu: %d",
-				     inode->i_ino, err);
-			return err;
-		}
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -490,12 +406,10 @@ static void put_crypt_info(struct fscrypt_info *ci)
 	if (!ci)
 		return;
 
-	if (ci->ci_master_key) {
+	if (ci->ci_master_key)
 		put_master_key(ci->ci_master_key);
-	} else {
+	else
 		crypto_free_skcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
-		crypto_free_cipher(ci->ci_essiv_tfm);
-	}
 	kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_info_cachep, ci);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-12  6:33   ` Milan Broz
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
this processing within the crypto subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 194 ++++----------------
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
index 3834332f4963..b727e8f15264 100644
--- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ config DM_CRYPT
 	depends on BLK_DEV_DM
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_ESSIV
 	---help---
 	  This device-mapper target allows you to create a device that
 	  transparently encrypts the data on it. You'll need to activate
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 48cd76c88d77..d3f2634f41a8 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ struct crypt_iv_operations {
 		    struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
 };
 
-struct iv_essiv_private {
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-	u8 *salt;
-};
-
 struct iv_benbi_private {
 	int shift;
 };
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
 	const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
 	union {
-		struct iv_essiv_private essiv;
 		struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
 		struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
 		struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
@@ -165,8 +159,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	unsigned short int sector_size;
 	unsigned char sector_shift;
 
-	/* ESSIV: struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm */
-	void *iv_private;
 	union {
 		struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
 		struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
@@ -324,157 +316,15 @@ static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Initialise ESSIV - compute salt but no local memory allocations */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = essiv->hash_tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cc->key, cc->key_size, essiv->salt);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt,
-			    crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm));
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* Wipe salt and reset key derived from volume key */
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-	unsigned salt_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int r, err = 0;
-
-	memset(essiv->salt, 0, salt_size);
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-	r = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, essiv->salt, salt_size);
-	if (r)
-		err = r;
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-/* Allocate the cipher for ESSIV */
-static struct crypto_cipher *alloc_essiv_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
-						struct dm_target *ti,
-						const u8 *salt,
-						unsigned int saltsize)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
-	essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(cc->cipher, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
-		return essiv_tfm;
-	}
-
-	if (crypto_cipher_blocksize(essiv_tfm) != cc->iv_size) {
-		ti->error = "Block size of ESSIV cipher does "
-			    "not match IV size of block cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_cipher_setkey(essiv_tfm, salt, saltsize);
-	if (err) {
-		ti->error = "Failed to set key for ESSIV cipher";
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-		return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-
-	return essiv_tfm;
-}
-
-static void crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm;
-	struct iv_essiv_private *essiv = &cc->iv_gen_private.essiv;
-
-	crypto_free_shash(essiv->hash_tfm);
-	essiv->hash_tfm = NULL;
-
-	kzfree(essiv->salt);
-	essiv->salt = NULL;
-
-	essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
-	if (essiv_tfm)
-		crypto_free_cipher(essiv_tfm);
-
-	cc->iv_private = NULL;
-}
-
-static int crypt_iv_essiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
-			      const char *opts)
-{
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = NULL;
-	struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm = NULL;
-	u8 *salt = NULL;
-	int err;
-
-	if (!opts) {
-		ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Allocate hash algorithm */
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(opts, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		ti->error = "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
-		err = PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	salt = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!salt) {
-		ti->error = "Error kmallocing salt storage in ESSIV";
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto bad;
-	}
-
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.salt = salt;
-	cc->iv_gen_private.essiv.hash_tfm = hash_tfm;
-
-	essiv_tfm = alloc_essiv_cipher(cc, ti, salt,
-				       crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm));
-	if (IS_ERR(essiv_tfm)) {
-		crypt_iv_essiv_dtr(cc);
-		return PTR_ERR(essiv_tfm);
-	}
-	cc->iv_private = essiv_tfm;
-
-	return 0;
-
-bad:
-	if (hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
-		crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	kfree(salt);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
 			      struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
 {
-	struct crypto_cipher *essiv_tfm = cc->iv_private;
-
+	/*
+	 * ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
+	 * so just pass the plain sector number here.
+	 */
 	memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
 	*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
-	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(essiv_tfm, iv, iv);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -898,10 +748,6 @@ static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
 };
 
 static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
-	.ctr       = crypt_iv_essiv_ctr,
-	.dtr       = crypt_iv_essiv_dtr,
-	.init      = crypt_iv_essiv_init,
-	.wipe      = crypt_iv_essiv_wipe,
 	.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
 };
 
@@ -2464,7 +2310,7 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 				char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
 {
 	struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
-	char *tmp, *cipher_api;
+	char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	cc->tfms_count = 1;
@@ -2493,6 +2339,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
 		cc->tfms_count = 64;
 
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s)",
+			       cipher_api, *ivopts);
+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
+			ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		cipher_api = buf;
+	}
+
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
 
 	/* Allocate cipher */
@@ -2579,9 +2439,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	if (!cipher_api)
 		goto bad_mem;
 
-	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
+		if (!*ivopts) {
+			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
+			kfree(cipher_api);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s)", chainmode, cipher, *ivopts);
+	} else {
+		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+			       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
 		kfree(cipher_api);
 		goto bad_mem;
 	}
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Add a test vector for the ESSIV mode that is the most widely used,
i.e., using cbc(aes) and sha256, in both skcipher and AEAD modes
(the latter is used by tcrypt to encapsulate the authenc template
or h/w instantiations of the same)

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 crypto/tcrypt.c  |   9 +
 crypto/testmgr.c |  14 +
 crypto/testmgr.h | 497 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 520 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index c578ccd92c57..83ad0b1fab30 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -2327,6 +2327,15 @@ static int do_test(const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask, int m, u32 num_mb)
 				  0, speed_template_32);
 		break;
 
+	case 220:
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+				  ENCRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		test_acipher_speed("essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+				  DECRYPT, sec, NULL, 0,
+				  speed_template_16_24_32);
+		break;
+
 	case 221:
 		test_aead_speed("aegis128", ENCRYPT, sec,
 				NULL, 0, 16, 8, speed_template_16);
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index d990eba723cd..c39e39e55dc2 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -4544,6 +4544,20 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
 		.suite = {
 			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
 		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
 	}, {
 		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
 		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 154052d07818..ef7d21f39d4a 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -31070,4 +31070,501 @@ static const struct comp_testvec zstd_decomp_tv_template[] = {
 			  "functions.",
 	},
 };
+
+/* based on aes_cbc_tv_template */
+static const struct cipher_testvec essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template[] = {
+	{
+		.key    = "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.ctext	= "\xfa\x59\xe7\x5f\x41\x56\x65\xc3"
+			  "\x36\xca\x6b\x72\x10\x9f\x8c\xd4",
+		.len	= 16,
+	}, {
+		.key    = "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.ctext	= "\xc8\x59\x9a\xfe\x79\xe6\x7b\x20"
+			  "\x06\x7d\x55\x0a\x5e\xc7\xb5\xa7"
+			  "\x0b\x9c\x80\xd2\x15\xa1\xb8\x6d"
+			  "\xc6\xab\x7b\x65\xd9\xfd\x88\xeb",
+		.len	= 32,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen	= 24,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x96\x6d\xa9\x7a\x42\xe6\x01\xc7"
+			  "\x17\xfc\xa7\x41\xd3\x38\x0b\xe5"
+			  "\x51\x48\xf7\x7e\x5e\x26\xa9\xfe"
+			  "\x45\x72\x1c\xd9\xde\xab\xf3\x4d"
+			  "\x39\x47\xc5\x4f\x97\x3a\x55\x63"
+			  "\x80\x29\x64\x4c\x33\xe8\x21\x8a"
+			  "\x6a\xef\x6b\x6a\x8f\x43\xc0\xcb"
+			  "\xf0\xf3\x6e\x74\x54\x44\x92\x44",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.ctext	= "\x24\x52\xf1\x48\x74\xd0\xa7\x93"
+			  "\x75\x9b\x63\x46\xc0\x1c\x1e\x17"
+			  "\x4d\xdc\x5b\x3a\x27\x93\x2a\x63"
+			  "\xf7\xf1\xc7\xb3\x54\x56\x5b\x50"
+			  "\xa3\x31\xa5\x8b\xd6\xfd\xb6\x3c"
+			  "\x8b\xf6\xf2\x45\x05\x0c\xc8\xbb"
+			  "\x32\x0b\x26\x1c\xe9\x8b\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xb2\x6f\x37\xa7\x5b\xa8\xa9\x42",
+		.len	= 64,
+	}, {
+		.key	= "\xC9\x83\xA6\xC9\xEC\x0F\x32\x55"
+			  "\x0F\x32\x55\x78\x9B\xBE\x78\x9B"
+			  "\xBE\xE1\x04\x27\xE1\x04\x27\x4A"
+			  "\x6D\x90\x4A\x6D\x90\xB3\xD6\xF9",
+		.klen	= 32,
+		.iv	= "\xE7\x82\x1D\xB8\x53\x11\xAC\x47"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00",
+		.ptext	= "\x50\xB9\x22\xAE\x17\x80\x0C\x75"
+			  "\xDE\x47\xD3\x3C\xA5\x0E\x9A\x03"
+			  "\x6C\xF8\x61\xCA\x33\xBF\x28\x91"
+			  "\x1D\x86\xEF\x58\xE4\x4D\xB6\x1F"
+			  "\xAB\x14\x7D\x09\x72\xDB\x44\xD0"
+			  "\x39\xA2\x0B\x97\x00\x69\xF5\x5E"
+			  "\xC7\x30\xBC\x25\x8E\x1A\x83\xEC"
+			  "\x55\xE1\x4A\xB3\x1C\xA8\x11\x7A"
+			  "\x06\x6F\xD8\x41\xCD\x36\x9F\x08"
+			  "\x94\xFD\x66\xF2\x5B\xC4\x2D\xB9"
+			  "\x22\x8B\x17\x80\xE9\x52\xDE\x47"
+			  "\xB0\x19\xA5\x0E\x77\x03\x6C\xD5"
+			  "\x3E\xCA\x33\x9C\x05\x91\xFA\x63"
+			  "\xEF\x58\xC1\x2A\xB6\x1F\x88\x14"
+			  "\x7D\xE6\x4F\xDB\x44\xAD\x16\xA2"
+			  "\x0B\x74\x00\x69\xD2\x3B\xC7\x30"
+			  "\x99\x02\x8E\xF7\x60\xEC\x55\xBE"
+			  "\x27\xB3\x1C\x85\x11\x7A\xE3\x4C"
+			  "\xD8\x41\xAA\x13\x9F\x08\x71\xFD"
+			  "\x66\xCF\x38\xC4\x2D\x96\x22\x8B"
+			  "\xF4\x5D\xE9\x52\xBB\x24\xB0\x19"
+			  "\x82\x0E\x77\xE0\x49\xD5\x3E\xA7"
+			  "\x10\x9C\x05\x6E\xFA\x63\xCC\x35"
+			  "\xC1\x2A\x93\x1F\x88\xF1\x5A\xE6"
+			  "\x4F\xB8\x21\xAD\x16\x7F\x0B\x74"
+			  "\xDD\x46\xD2\x3B\xA4\x0D\x99\x02"
+			  "\x6B\xF7\x60\xC9\x32\xBE\x27\x90"
+			  "\x1C\x85\xEE\x57\xE3\x4C\xB5\x1E"
+			  "\xAA\x13\x7C\x08\x71\xDA\x43\xCF"
+			  "\x38\xA1\x0A\x96\xFF\x68\xF4\x5D"
+			  "\xC6\x2F\xBB\x24\x8D\x19\x82\xEB"
+			  "\x54\xE0\x49\xB2\x1B\xA7\x10\x79"
+			  "\x05\x6E\xD7\x40\xCC\x35\x9E\x07"
+			  "\x93\xFC\x65\xF1\x5A\xC3\x2C\xB8"
+			  "\x21\x8A\x16\x7F\xE8\x51\xDD\x46"
+			  "\xAF\x18\xA4\x0D\x76\x02\x6B\xD4"
+			  "\x3D\xC9\x32\x9B\x04\x90\xF9\x62"
+			  "\xEE\x57\xC0\x29\xB5\x1E\x87\x13"
+			  "\x7C\xE5\x4E\xDA\x43\xAC\x15\xA1"
+			  "\x0A\x73\xFF\x68\xD1\x3A\xC6\x2F"
+			  "\x98\x01\x8D\xF6\x5F\xEB\x54\xBD"
+			  "\x26\xB2\x1B\x84\x10\x79\xE2\x4B"
+			  "\xD7\x40\xA9\x12\x9E\x07\x70\xFC"
+			  "\x65\xCE\x37\xC3\x2C\x95\x21\x8A"
+			  "\xF3\x5C\xE8\x51\xBA\x23\xAF\x18"
+			  "\x81\x0D\x76\xDF\x48\xD4\x3D\xA6"
+			  "\x0F\x9B\x04\x6D\xF9\x62\xCB\x34"
+			  "\xC0\x29\x92\x1E\x87\xF0\x59\xE5"
+			  "\x4E\xB7\x20\xAC\x15\x7E\x0A\x73"
+			  "\xDC\x45\xD1\x3A\xA3\x0C\x98\x01"
+			  "\x6A\xF6\x5F\xC8\x31\xBD\x26\x8F"
+			  "\x1B\x84\xED\x56\xE2\x4B\xB4\x1D"
+			  "\xA9\x12\x7B\x07\x70\xD9\x42\xCE"
+			  "\x37\xA0\x09\x95\xFE\x67\xF3\x5C"
+			  "\xC5\x2E\xBA\x23\x8C\x18\x81\xEA"
+			  "\x53\xDF\x48\xB1\x1A\xA6\x0F\x78"
+			  "\x04\x6D\xD6\x3F\xCB\x34\x9D\x06"
+			  "\x92\xFB\x64\xF0\x59\xC2\x2B\xB7"
+			  "\x20\x89\x15\x7E\xE7\x50\xDC\x45"
+			  "\xAE\x17\xA3\x0C\x75\x01\x6A\xD3"
+			  "\x3C\xC8\x31\x9A\x03\x8F\xF8\x61"
+			  "\xED\x56\xBF\x28\xB4\x1D\x86\x12",
+		.ctext	= "\x97\x7f\x69\x0f\x0f\x34\xa6\x33"
+			  "\x66\x49\x7e\xd0\x4d\x1b\xc9\x64"
+			  "\xf9\x61\x95\x98\x11\x00\x88\xf8"
+			  "\x2e\x88\x01\x0f\x2b\xe1\xae\x3e"
+			  "\xfe\xd6\x47\x30\x11\x68\x7d\x99"
+			  "\xad\x69\x6a\xe8\x41\x5f\x1e\x16"
+			  "\x00\x3a\x47\xdf\x8e\x7d\x23\x1c"
+			  "\x19\x5b\x32\x76\x60\x03\x05\xc1"
+			  "\xa0\xff\xcf\xcc\x74\x39\x46\x63"
+			  "\xfe\x5f\xa6\x35\xa7\xb4\xc1\xf9"
+			  "\x4b\x5e\x38\xcc\x8c\xc1\xa2\xcf"
+			  "\x9a\xc3\xae\x55\x42\x46\x93\xd9"
+			  "\xbd\x22\xd3\x8a\x19\x96\xc3\xb3"
+			  "\x7d\x03\x18\xf9\x45\x09\x9c\xc8"
+			  "\x90\xf3\x22\xb3\x25\x83\x9a\x75"
+			  "\xbb\x04\x48\x97\x3a\x63\x08\x04"
+			  "\xa0\x69\xf6\x52\xd4\x89\x93\x69"
+			  "\xb4\x33\xa2\x16\x58\xec\x4b\x26"
+			  "\x76\x54\x10\x0b\x6e\x53\x1e\xbc"
+			  "\x16\x18\x42\xb1\xb1\xd3\x4b\xda"
+			  "\x06\x9f\x8b\x77\xf7\xab\xd6\xed"
+			  "\xa3\x1d\x90\xda\x49\x38\x20\xb8"
+			  "\x6c\xee\xae\x3e\xae\x6c\x03\xb8"
+			  "\x0b\xed\xc8\xaa\x0e\xc5\x1f\x90"
+			  "\x60\xe2\xec\x1b\x76\xd0\xcf\xda"
+			  "\x29\x1b\xb8\x5a\xbc\xf4\xba\x13"
+			  "\x91\xa6\xcb\x83\x3f\xeb\xe9\x7b"
+			  "\x03\xba\x40\x9e\xe6\x7a\xb2\x4a"
+			  "\x73\x49\xfc\xed\xfb\x55\xa4\x24"
+			  "\xc7\xa4\xd7\x4b\xf5\xf7\x16\x62"
+			  "\x80\xd3\x19\x31\x52\x25\xa8\x69"
+			  "\xda\x9a\x87\xf5\xf2\xee\x5d\x61"
+			  "\xc1\x12\x72\x3e\x52\x26\x45\x3a"
+			  "\xd8\x9d\x57\xfa\x14\xe2\x9b\x2f"
+			  "\xd4\xaa\x5e\x31\xf4\x84\x89\xa4"
+			  "\xe3\x0e\xb0\x58\x41\x75\x6a\xcb"
+			  "\x30\x01\x98\x90\x15\x80\xf5\x27"
+			  "\x92\x13\x81\xf0\x1c\x1e\xfc\xb1"
+			  "\x33\xf7\x63\xb0\x67\xec\x2e\x5c"
+			  "\x85\xe3\x5b\xd0\x43\x8a\xb8\x5f"
+			  "\x44\x9f\xec\x19\xc9\x8f\xde\xdf"
+			  "\x79\xef\xf8\xee\x14\x87\xb3\x34"
+			  "\x76\x00\x3a\x9b\xc7\xed\xb1\x3d"
+			  "\xef\x07\xb0\xe4\xfd\x68\x9e\xeb"
+			  "\xc2\xb4\x1a\x85\x9a\x7d\x11\x88"
+			  "\xf8\xab\x43\x55\x2b\x8a\x4f\x60"
+			  "\x85\x9a\xf4\xba\xae\x48\x81\xeb"
+			  "\x93\x07\x97\x9e\xde\x2a\xfc\x4e"
+			  "\x31\xde\xaa\x44\xf7\x2a\xc3\xee"
+			  "\x60\xa2\x98\x2c\x0a\x88\x50\xc5"
+			  "\x6d\x89\xd3\xe4\xb6\xa7\xf4\xb0"
+			  "\xcf\x0e\x89\xe3\x5e\x8f\x82\xf4"
+			  "\x9d\xd1\xa9\x51\x50\x8a\xd2\x18"
+			  "\x07\xb2\xaa\x3b\x7f\x58\x9b\xf4"
+			  "\xb7\x24\x39\xd3\x66\x2f\x1e\xc0"
+			  "\x11\xa3\x56\x56\x2a\x10\x73\xbc"
+			  "\xe1\x23\xbf\xa9\x37\x07\x9c\xc3"
+			  "\xb2\xc9\xa8\x1c\x5b\x5c\x58\xa4"
+			  "\x77\x02\x26\xad\xc3\x40\x11\x53"
+			  "\x93\x68\x72\xde\x05\x8b\x10\xbc"
+			  "\xa6\xd4\x1b\xd9\x27\xd8\x16\x12"
+			  "\x61\x2b\x31\x2a\x44\x87\x96\x58",
+		.len	= 496,
+	},
+};
+
+/* based on hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp */
+static const struct aead_testvec essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp[] = {
+	{
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
+			  "\x06\xa9\x21\x40\x36\xb8\xa1\x5b"
+			  "\x51\x2e\x03\xd5\x34\x12\x00\x06",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xb3\x0c\x5a\x11\x41\xad\xc1\x04"
+			  "\xbc\x1e\x7e\x35\xb0\x5d\x78\x29",
+		.assoc	= "\x3d\xaf\xba\x42\x9d\x9e\xb4\x30"
+			  "\xb4\x22\xda\x80\x2c\x9f\xac\x41",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "Single block msg",
+		.plen	= 16,
+		.ctext	= "\xe3\x53\x77\x9c\x10\x79\xae\xb8"
+			  "\x27\x08\x94\x2d\xbe\x77\x18\x1a"
+			  "\xcc\xde\x2d\x6a\xae\xf1\x0b\xcc"
+			  "\x38\x06\x38\x51\xb4\xb8\xf3\x5b"
+			  "\x5c\x34\xa6\xa3\x6e\x0b\x05\xe5"
+			  "\x6a\x6d\x44\xaa\x26\xa8\x44\xa5",
+		.clen	= 16 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f"
+			  "\xc2\x86\x69\x6d\x88\x7c\x9a\xa0"
+			  "\x61\x1b\xbb\x3e\x20\x25\xa4\x5a",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x56\xe8\x14\xa5\x74\x18\x75\x13"
+			  "\x2f\x79\xe7\xc8\x65\xe3\x48\x45",
+		.assoc	= "\x56\x2e\x17\x99\x6d\x09\x3d\x28"
+			  "\xdd\xb3\xba\x69\x5a\x2e\x6f\x58",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f",
+		.plen	= 32,
+		.ctext	= "\xd2\x96\xcd\x94\xc2\xcc\xcf\x8a"
+			  "\x3a\x86\x30\x28\xb5\xe1\xdc\x0a"
+			  "\x75\x86\x60\x2d\x25\x3c\xff\xf9"
+			  "\x1b\x82\x66\xbe\xa6\xd6\x1a\xb1"
+			  "\xf5\x33\x53\xf3\x68\x85\x2a\x99"
+			  "\x0e\x06\x58\x8f\xba\xf6\x06\xda"
+			  "\x49\x69\x0d\x5b\xd4\x36\x06\x62"
+			  "\x35\x5e\x54\x58\x53\x4d\xdf\xbf",
+		.clen	= 32 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"		/* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x6c\x3e\xa0\x47\x76\x30\xce\x21"
+			  "\xa2\xce\x33\x4a\xa7\x46\xc2\xcd",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x1f\x6b\xfb\xd6\x6b\x72\x2f\xc9"
+			  "\xb6\x9f\x8c\x10\xa8\x96\x15\x64",
+		.assoc	= "\xc7\x82\xdc\x4c\x09\x8c\x66\xcb"
+			  "\xd9\xcd\x27\xd8\x25\x68\x2c\x81",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "This is a 48-byte message (exactly 3 AES blocks)",
+		.plen	= 48,
+		.ctext	= "\xd0\xa0\x2b\x38\x36\x45\x17\x53"
+			  "\xd4\x93\x66\x5d\x33\xf0\xe8\x86"
+			  "\x2d\xea\x54\xcd\xb2\x93\xab\xc7"
+			  "\x50\x69\x39\x27\x67\x72\xf8\xd5"
+			  "\x02\x1c\x19\x21\x6b\xad\x52\x5c"
+			  "\x85\x79\x69\x5d\x83\xba\x26\x84"
+			  "\x68\xb9\x3e\x90\x38\xa0\x88\x01"
+			  "\xe7\xc6\xce\x10\x31\x2f\x9b\x1d"
+			  "\x24\x78\xfb\xbe\x02\xe0\x4f\x40"
+			  "\x10\xbd\xaa\xc6\xa7\x79\xe0\x1a",
+		.clen	= 48 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x56\xe4\x7a\x38\xc5\x59\x89\x74"
+			  "\xbc\x46\x90\x3d\xba\x29\x03\x49",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\x13\xe5\xf2\xef\x61\x97\x59\x35"
+			  "\x9b\x36\x84\x46\x4e\x63\xd1\x41",
+		.assoc	= "\x8c\xe8\x2e\xef\xbe\xa0\xda\x3c"
+			  "\x44\x69\x9e\xd7\xdb\x51\xb7\xd9",
+		.alen	= 16,
+		.ptext	= "\xa0\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7"
+			  "\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf"
+			  "\xb0\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7"
+			  "\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf"
+			  "\xc0\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7"
+			  "\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf"
+			  "\xd0\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7"
+			  "\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xc3\x0e\x32\xff\xed\xc0\x77\x4e"
+			  "\x6a\xff\x6a\xf0\x86\x9f\x71\xaa"
+			  "\x0f\x3a\xf0\x7a\x9a\x31\xa9\xc6"
+			  "\x84\xdb\x20\x7e\xb0\xef\x8e\x4e"
+			  "\x35\x90\x7a\xa6\x32\xc3\xff\xdf"
+			  "\x86\x8b\xb7\xb2\x9d\x3d\x46\xad"
+			  "\x83\xce\x9f\x9a\x10\x2e\xe9\x9d"
+			  "\x49\xa5\x3e\x87\xf4\xc3\xda\x55"
+			  "\x7a\x1b\xd4\x3c\xdb\x17\x95\xe2"
+			  "\xe0\x93\xec\xc9\x9f\xf7\xce\xd8"
+			  "\x3f\x54\xe2\x49\x39\xe3\x71\x25"
+			  "\x2b\x6c\xe9\x5d\xec\xec\x2b\x64",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"            /* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x10"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x90\xd3\x82\xb4\x10\xee\xba\x7a"
+			  "\xd9\x38\xc4\x6c\xec\x1a\x82\xbf",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 16,
+		.iv     = "\xe4\x13\xa1\x15\xe9\x6b\xb8\x23"
+			  "\x81\x7a\x94\x29\xab\xfd\xd2\x2c",
+		.assoc  = "\x00\x00\x43\x21\x00\x00\x00\x01"
+			  "\xe9\x6e\x8c\x08\xab\x46\x57\x63"
+			  "\xfd\x09\x8d\x45\xdd\x3f\xf8\x93",
+		.alen   = 24,
+		.ptext	= "\x08\x00\x0e\xbd\xa7\x0a\x00\x00"
+			  "\x8e\x9c\x08\x3d\xb9\x5b\x07\x00"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+			  "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+			  "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f"
+			  "\x20\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27"
+			  "\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+			  "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0e\x01",
+		.plen	= 80,
+		.ctext	= "\xf6\x63\xc2\x5d\x32\x5c\x18\xc6"
+			  "\xa9\x45\x3e\x19\x4e\x12\x08\x49"
+			  "\xa4\x87\x0b\x66\xcc\x6b\x99\x65"
+			  "\x33\x00\x13\xb4\x89\x8d\xc8\x56"
+			  "\xa4\x69\x9e\x52\x3a\x55\xdb\x08"
+			  "\x0b\x59\xec\x3a\x8e\x4b\x7e\x52"
+			  "\x77\x5b\x07\xd1\xdb\x34\xed\x9c"
+			  "\x53\x8a\xb5\x0c\x55\x1b\x87\x4a"
+			  "\xa2\x69\xad\xd0\x47\xad\x2d\x59"
+			  "\x13\xac\x19\xb7\xcf\xba\xd4\xa6"
+			  "\xbb\xd4\x0f\xbe\xa3\x3b\x4c\xb8"
+			  "\x3a\xd2\xe1\x03\x86\xa5\x59\xb7"
+			  "\x73\xc3\x46\x20\x2c\xb1\xef\x68"
+			  "\xbb\x8a\x32\x7e\x12\x8c\x69\xcf",
+		.clen	= 80 + 32,
+       }, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"            /* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x18"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x8e\x73\xb0\xf7\xda\x0e\x64\x52"
+			  "\xc8\x10\xf3\x2b\x80\x90\x79\xe5"
+			  "\x62\xf8\xea\xd2\x52\x2c\x6b\x7b",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 24,
+		.iv     = "\x49\xca\x41\xc9\x6b\xbf\x6c\x98"
+			  "\x38\x2f\xa7\x3d\x4d\x80\x49\xb0",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\x4f\x02\x1d\xb2\x43\xbc\x63\x3d"
+			  "\x71\x78\x18\x3a\x9f\xa0\x71\xe8"
+			  "\xb4\xd9\xad\xa9\xad\x7d\xed\xf4"
+			  "\xe5\xe7\x38\x76\x3f\x69\x14\x5a"
+			  "\x57\x1b\x24\x20\x12\xfb\x7a\xe0"
+			  "\x7f\xa9\xba\xac\x3d\xf1\x02\xe0"
+			  "\x08\xb0\xe2\x79\x88\x59\x88\x81"
+			  "\xd9\x20\xa9\xe6\x4f\x56\x15\xcd"
+			  "\x2f\xee\x5f\xdb\x66\xfe\x79\x09"
+			  "\x61\x81\x31\xea\x5b\x3d\x8e\xfb"
+			  "\xca\x71\x85\x93\xf7\x85\x55\x8b"
+			  "\x7a\xe4\x94\xca\x8b\xba\x19\x33",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	}, {
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+		.key    = "\x08\x00"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x01\x00"		/* rta type */
+#else
+		.key    = "\x00\x08"		/* rta length */
+			  "\x00\x01"            /* rta type */
+#endif
+			  "\x00\x00\x00\x20"	/* enc key length */
+			  "\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88"
+			  "\x99\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11"
+			  "\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88\x99"
+			  "\xaa\xbb\xcc\xdd\xee\xff\x11\x22"
+			  "\x60\x3d\xeb\x10\x15\xca\x71\xbe"
+			  "\x2b\x73\xae\xf0\x85\x7d\x77\x81"
+			  "\x1f\x35\x2c\x07\x3b\x61\x08\xd7"
+			  "\x2d\x98\x10\xa3\x09\x14\xdf\xf4",
+		.klen   = 8 + 32 + 32,
+		.iv     = "\xdf\xab\xf2\x7c\xdc\xe0\x33\x4c"
+			  "\xf9\x75\xaf\xf9\x2f\x60\x3a\x9b",
+		.assoc	= "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+			  "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f",
+		.alen   = 16,
+		.ptext	= "\x6b\xc1\xbe\xe2\x2e\x40\x9f\x96"
+			  "\xe9\x3d\x7e\x11\x73\x93\x17\x2a"
+			  "\xae\x2d\x8a\x57\x1e\x03\xac\x9c"
+			  "\x9e\xb7\x6f\xac\x45\xaf\x8e\x51"
+			  "\x30\xc8\x1c\x46\xa3\x5c\xe4\x11"
+			  "\xe5\xfb\xc1\x19\x1a\x0a\x52\xef"
+			  "\xf6\x9f\x24\x45\xdf\x4f\x9b\x17"
+			  "\xad\x2b\x41\x7b\xe6\x6c\x37\x10",
+		.plen	= 64,
+		.ctext	= "\xf5\x8c\x4c\x04\xd6\xe5\xf1\xba"
+			  "\x77\x9e\xab\xfb\x5f\x7b\xfb\xd6"
+			  "\x9c\xfc\x4e\x96\x7e\xdb\x80\x8d"
+			  "\x67\x9f\x77\x7b\xc6\x70\x2c\x7d"
+			  "\x39\xf2\x33\x69\xa9\xd9\xba\xcf"
+			  "\xa5\x30\xe2\x63\x04\x23\x14\x61"
+			  "\xb2\xeb\x05\xe2\xc3\x9b\xe9\xfc"
+			  "\xda\x6c\x19\x07\x8c\x6a\x9d\x1b"
+			  "\x24\x29\xed\xc2\x31\x49\xdb\xb1"
+			  "\x8f\x74\xbd\x17\x92\x03\xbe\x8f"
+			  "\xf3\x61\xde\x1c\xe9\xdb\xcd\xd0"
+			  "\xcc\xce\xe9\x85\x57\xcf\x6f\x5f",
+		.clen	= 64 + 32,
+	},
+};
+
 #endif	/* _CRYPTO_TESTMGR_H */
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 5/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

The plain CBC driver and the CTS one share some code that iterates over
a scatterwalk and invokes the CBC asm code to do the processing. The
upcoming ESSIV/CBC mode will clone that pattern for the third time, so
let's factor it out first.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c | 82 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 55d6d4838708..23abf335f1ee 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -186,46 +186,64 @@ static int ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
-	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	unsigned int blocks;
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
-
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_encrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
 	struct skcipher_walk walk;
-	unsigned int blocks;
+	int err;
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
 
-	while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
+static int cbc_decrypt_walk(struct skcipher_request *req,
+			    struct skcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err = 0, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	while ((blocks = (walk->nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
 		kernel_neon_begin();
-		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
+		aes_cbc_decrypt(walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+				ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk->iv);
 		kernel_neon_end();
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(walk, walk->nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	return cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int cts_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
 {
 	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct cts_cbc_req_ctx));
@@ -251,22 +269,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_encrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
@@ -316,22 +324,12 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	}
 
 	if (cbc_blocks > 0) {
-		unsigned int blocks;
-
 		skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->subreq, req->src, req->dst,
 					   cbc_blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 					   req->iv);
 
-		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false);
-
-		while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
-			kernel_neon_begin();
-			aes_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
-					ctx->key_dec, rounds, blocks, walk.iv);
-			kernel_neon_end();
-			err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
-						 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		}
+		err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &rctx->subreq, false) ?:
+		      cbc_decrypt_walk(&rctx->subreq, &walk);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Add an accelerated version of the 'essiv(cbc(aes),aes,sha256'
skcipher, which is used by fscrypt or dm-crypt on systems where
CBC mode is signficantly more performant than XTS mode (e.g., when
using a h/w accelerator which supports the former but not the latter)
This avoids a separate call into the AES cipher for every invocation.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c  | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S |  28 +++++
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
index 23abf335f1ee..45fca7f8cd75 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-glue.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/ctr.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
@@ -30,6 +31,8 @@
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		ce_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		ce_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		ce_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		ce_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -44,6 +47,8 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
 #define aes_cbc_decrypt		neon_aes_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_encrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt
 #define aes_cbc_cts_decrypt	neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt
+#define aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt	neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt
 #define aes_ctr_encrypt		neon_aes_ctr_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_encrypt		neon_aes_xts_encrypt
 #define aes_xts_decrypt		neon_aes_xts_decrypt
@@ -87,6 +92,13 @@ asmlinkage void aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
 				int rounds, int blocks, u32 const rk2[], u8 iv[],
 				int first);
 
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				      int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+				      u32 const rk2[]);
+
 asmlinkage void aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
 			       int blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
 			       int enc_after);
@@ -102,6 +114,12 @@ struct crypto_aes_xts_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
 };
 
+struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx {
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx key1;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx __aligned(8) key2;
+	struct crypto_shash *hash;
+};
+
 struct mac_tfm_ctx {
 	struct crypto_aes_ctx key;
 	u8 __aligned(8) consts[];
@@ -146,6 +164,31 @@ static int xts_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ctx->hash);
+	u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key1, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	desc->tfm = ctx->hash;
+	crypto_shash_digest(desc, in_key, key_len, digest);
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx->key2, digest, sizeof(digest));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	return 0;
+out:
+	crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static int ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -360,6 +403,68 @@ static int cts_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
 }
 
+static int essiv_cbc_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->hash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctx->hash))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctx->hash);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void essiv_cbc_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(ctx->hash);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_enc, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_encrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
+static int essiv_cbc_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+	int err, rounds = 6 + ctx->key1.key_length / 4;
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	unsigned int blocks;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	blocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	if (blocks) {
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+		aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+				      ctx->key1.key_dec, rounds, blocks,
+				      req->iv, ctx->key2.key_enc);
+		kernel_neon_end();
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	}
+	return err ?: cbc_decrypt_walk(req, &walk);
+}
+
 static int ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -515,6 +620,24 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aes_algs[] = { {
 	.encrypt	= cts_cbc_encrypt,
 	.decrypt	= cts_cbc_decrypt,
 	.init		= cts_cbc_init_tfm,
+}, {
+	.base = {
+		.cra_name		= "__essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+		.cra_driver_name	= "__essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-" MODE,
+		.cra_priority		= PRIO + 1,
+		.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
+		.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_essiv_cbc_ctx),
+		.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	},
+	.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+	.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+	.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey		= essiv_cbc_set_key,
+	.encrypt	= essiv_cbc_encrypt,
+	.decrypt	= essiv_cbc_decrypt,
+	.init		= essiv_cbc_init_tfm,
+	.exit		= essiv_cbc_exit_tfm,
 }, {
 	.base = {
 		.cra_name		= "__ctr(aes)",
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
index 324039b72094..2879f030a749 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S
@@ -118,8 +118,23 @@ AES_ENDPROC(aes_ecb_decrypt)
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
 	 * aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u8 const rk[], int rounds,
 	 *		   int blocks, u8 iv[])
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
+	 * aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+	 *			 int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[],
+	 *			 u32 const rk2[]);
 	 */
 
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
+
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	v4, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	enc_switch_key	w3, x2, x6
+	b		.Lcbcencloop4x
+
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	ld1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* get iv */
 	enc_prepare	w3, x2, x6
@@ -153,13 +168,25 @@ AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_encrypt)
 	st1		{v4.16b}, [x5]			/* return iv */
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_encrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt)
+
+AES_ENTRY(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
+	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov		x29, sp
+
+	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
 
+	mov		w8, #14				/* AES-256: 14 rounds */
+	enc_prepare	w8, x6, x7
+	encrypt_block	cbciv, w8, x6, x7, w9
+	b		.Lessivcbcdecstart
 
 AES_ENTRY(aes_cbc_decrypt)
 	stp		x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov		x29, sp
 
 	ld1		{cbciv.16b}, [x5]		/* get iv */
+.Lessivcbcdecstart:
 	dec_prepare	w3, x2, x6
 
 .LcbcdecloopNx:
@@ -212,6 +239,7 @@ ST5(	st1		{v4.16b}, [x0], #16		)
 	ldp		x29, x30, [sp], #16
 	ret
 AES_ENDPROC(aes_cbc_decrypt)
+AES_ENDPROC(aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt)
 
 
 	/*
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v9 7/7] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
  2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-10  9:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-10  9:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-crypto
  Cc: Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel,
	linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef, Milan Broz

Only the ESSIV IV generation mode used to use cc->cipher so it could
instantiate the bare cipher used to encrypt the IV. However, this is
now taken care of by the ESSIV template, and so no users of cc->cipher
remain. So remove it altogether.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 58 --------------------
 1 file changed, 58 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index d3f2634f41a8..e5ad3e596639 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -143,7 +143,6 @@ struct crypt_config {
 	struct task_struct *write_thread;
 	struct rb_root write_tree;
 
-	char *cipher;
 	char *cipher_string;
 	char *cipher_auth;
 	char *key_string;
@@ -2140,7 +2139,6 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
 	if (cc->dev)
 		dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
 
-	kzfree(cc->cipher);
 	kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
 	kzfree(cc->key_string);
 	kzfree(cc->cipher_auth);
@@ -2221,52 +2219,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/*
- * Workaround to parse cipher algorithm from crypto API spec.
- * The cc->cipher is currently used only in ESSIV.
- * This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
- */
-static int crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
-{
-	const char *alg_name = NULL;
-	char *start, *end;
-
-	if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(any_tfm_aead(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
-			alg_name = strchr(alg_name, ',');
-			if (!alg_name)
-				return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		alg_name++;
-	} else {
-		alg_name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(any_tfm(cc)));
-		if (!alg_name)
-			return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	start = strchr(alg_name, '(');
-	end = strchr(alg_name, ')');
-
-	if (!start && !end) {
-		cc->cipher = kstrdup(alg_name, GFP_KERNEL);
-		return cc->cipher ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
-	if (!start || !end || ++start >= end)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	cc->cipher = kzalloc(end - start + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cc->cipher)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	strncpy(cc->cipher, start, end - start);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*
  * Workaround to parse HMAC algorithm from AEAD crypto API spec.
  * The HMAC is needed to calculate tag size (HMAC digest size).
@@ -2373,12 +2325,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	} else
 		cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
 
-	ret = crypt_ctr_blkdev_cipher(cc);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2413,10 +2359,6 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
 	}
 	cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
 
-	cc->cipher = kstrdup(cipher, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cc->cipher)
-		goto bad_mem;
-
 	chainmode = strsep(&tmp, "-");
 	*ivmode = strsep(&tmp, ":");
 	*ivopts = tmp;
-- 
2.17.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-12  6:33   ` Milan Broz
  2019-08-12  6:54     ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Milan Broz @ 2019-08-12  6:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel, linux-crypto
  Cc: Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers, dm-devel, linux-fscrypt, Gilad Ben-Yossef

Hi,

On 10/08/2019 11:40, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
> into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
> this processing within the crypto subsystem.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
>  drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
>  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 194 ++++----------------
>  2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
> index 3834332f4963..b727e8f15264 100644
> --- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
...
> @@ -2493,6 +2339,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
>  	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
>  		cc->tfms_count = 64;
>  
> +	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
> +		if (!*ivopts) {
> +			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +		ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s)",
> +			       cipher_api, *ivopts);

This is wrong. It works only in length-preserving modes, not in AEAD modes.

Try for example
# cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1

It should produce Crypto API string
  authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
while it produces
  essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
(and fails).

You can run "luks2-integrity-test" from cryptsetup test suite to detect it.

Just the test does not fail, it prints N/A for ESSIV use cases - we need to deal with older kernels...
I can probable change it to fail unconditionally though.

...
> @@ -2579,9 +2439,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
>  	if (!cipher_api)
>  		goto bad_mem;
>  
> -	ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
> -		       "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
> -	if (ret < 0) {
> +	if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
> +		if (!*ivopts) {
> +			ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
> +			kfree(cipher_api);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +		ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
> +			       "essiv(%s(%s),%s)", chainmode, cipher, *ivopts);

I guess here it is ok, because old forma cannot use AEAD.

Thanks,
Milan

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-12  6:33   ` Milan Broz
@ 2019-08-12  6:54     ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-12  7:44       ` Milan Broz
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-12  6:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Milan Broz
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
	Eric Biggers, device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef

On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 09:33, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On 10/08/2019 11:40, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > Replace the explicit ESSIV handling in the dm-crypt driver with calls
> > into the crypto API, which now possesses the capability to perform
> > this processing within the crypto subsystem.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> > ---
> >  drivers/md/Kconfig    |   1 +
> >  drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 194 ++++----------------
> >  2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig
> > index 3834332f4963..b727e8f15264 100644
> > --- a/drivers/md/Kconfig
> > +++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig
> ...
> > @@ -2493,6 +2339,20 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
> >       if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
> >               cc->tfms_count = 64;
> >
> > +     if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
> > +             if (!*ivopts) {
> > +                     ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
> > +                     return -EINVAL;
> > +             }
> > +             ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s)",
> > +                            cipher_api, *ivopts);
>
> This is wrong. It works only in length-preserving modes, not in AEAD modes.
>
> Try for example
> # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1
>
> It should produce Crypto API string
>   authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
> while it produces
>   essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
> (and fails).
>

No. I don't know why it fails, but the latter is actually the correct
string. The essiv template is instantiated either as a skcipher or as
an aead, and it encapsulates the entire transformation. (This is
necessary considering that the IV is passed via the AAD and so the
ESSIV handling needs to touch that as well)

This code worked fine in my testing: I could instantiate

essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
essiv(authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes)),sha256)

where the former worked as expected (including fuzz testing of the
arm64 implementation), and the second got instantiated as well, but
with a complaint about a missing test case.

So I'm not sure why this is failing, I will try to check once I have
access to my ordinary development environment.


> You can run "luks2-integrity-test" from cryptsetup test suite to detect it.
>
> Just the test does not fail, it prints N/A for ESSIV use cases - we need to deal with older kernels...
> I can probable change it to fail unconditionally though.
>
> ...
> > @@ -2579,9 +2439,19 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key
> >       if (!cipher_api)
> >               goto bad_mem;
> >
> > -     ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
> > -                    "%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
> > -     if (ret < 0) {
> > +     if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
> > +             if (!*ivopts) {
> > +                     ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
> > +                     kfree(cipher_api);
> > +                     return -EINVAL;
> > +             }
> > +             ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
> > +                            "essiv(%s(%s),%s)", chainmode, cipher, *ivopts);
>
> I guess here it is ok, because old forma cannot use AEAD.
>
> Thanks,
> Milan

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-12  6:54     ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-12  7:44       ` Milan Broz
  2019-08-12  7:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Milan Broz @ 2019-08-12  7:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
	Eric Biggers, device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef

On 12/08/2019 08:54, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 09:33, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Try for example
>> # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1
>>
>> It should produce Crypto API string
>>   authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
>> while it produces
>>   essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
>> (and fails).
>>
> 
> No. I don't know why it fails, but the latter is actually the correct
> string. The essiv template is instantiated either as a skcipher or as
> an aead, and it encapsulates the entire transformation. (This is
> necessary considering that the IV is passed via the AAD and so the
> ESSIV handling needs to touch that as well)

Hm. Constructing these strings seems to be more confusing than dmcrypt mode combinations :-)

But you are right, I actually tried the former string (authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)))
and it worked, but I guess the authenticated IV (AAD) was actually the input to IV (plain sector number)
not the output of ESSIV? Do I understand it correctly now?

Milan

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-12  7:44       ` Milan Broz
@ 2019-08-12  7:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
  2019-08-12 13:51           ` Milan Broz
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-12  7:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Milan Broz
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
	Eric Biggers, device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef

On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 10:44, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 12/08/2019 08:54, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 09:33, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Try for example
> >> # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1
> >>
> >> It should produce Crypto API string
> >>   authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
> >> while it produces
> >>   essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
> >> (and fails).
> >>
> >
> > No. I don't know why it fails, but the latter is actually the correct
> > string. The essiv template is instantiated either as a skcipher or as
> > an aead, and it encapsulates the entire transformation. (This is
> > necessary considering that the IV is passed via the AAD and so the
> > ESSIV handling needs to touch that as well)
>
> Hm. Constructing these strings seems to be more confusing than dmcrypt mode combinations :-)
>
> But you are right, I actually tried the former string (authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)))
> and it worked, but I guess the authenticated IV (AAD) was actually the input to IV (plain sector number)
> not the output of ESSIV? Do I understand it correctly now?
>

Indeed. The former string instantiates the skcipher version of the
ESSIV template, and so the AAD handling is omitted, and we end up
using the plain IV in the authentication rather than the encrypted IV.

So when using the latter string, does it produce any error messages
when it fails?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-12  7:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
@ 2019-08-12 13:51           ` Milan Broz
  2019-08-12 14:19             ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Milan Broz @ 2019-08-12 13:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Ard Biesheuvel
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
	Eric Biggers, device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef

On 12/08/2019 09:50, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 10:44, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 12/08/2019 08:54, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>>> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 09:33, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Try for example
>>>> # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1
>>>>
>>>> It should produce Crypto API string
>>>>   authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
>>>> while it produces
>>>>   essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
>>>> (and fails).
>>>>
>>>
>>> No. I don't know why it fails, but the latter is actually the correct
>>> string. The essiv template is instantiated either as a skcipher or as
>>> an aead, and it encapsulates the entire transformation. (This is
>>> necessary considering that the IV is passed via the AAD and so the
>>> ESSIV handling needs to touch that as well)
>>
>> Hm. Constructing these strings seems to be more confusing than dmcrypt mode combinations :-)
>>
>> But you are right, I actually tried the former string (authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)))
>> and it worked, but I guess the authenticated IV (AAD) was actually the input to IV (plain sector number)
>> not the output of ESSIV? Do I understand it correctly now?
>>
> 
> Indeed. The former string instantiates the skcipher version of the
> ESSIV template, and so the AAD handling is omitted, and we end up
> using the plain IV in the authentication rather than the encrypted IV.
> 
> So when using the latter string, does it produce any error messages
> when it fails?

The error is
table: 253:1: crypt: Error decoding and setting key

and it is failing in crypt_setkey() int this  crypto_aead_setkey();

And it is because it now wrongly calculates MAC key length.
(We have two keys here - one for length-preserving CBC-ESSIV encryption
and one for HMAC.)

This super-ugly hotfix helps here... I guess it can be done better :-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index e9a0093c88ee..7b06d975a2e1 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -2342,6 +2342,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *cipher_api)
        char *start, *end, *mac_alg = NULL;
        struct crypto_ahash *mac;
 
+       if (strstarts(cipher_api, "essiv(authenc("))
+               cipher_api += strlen("essiv(");
+
        if (!strstarts(cipher_api, "authenc("))
                return 0;
 
Milan

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  2019-08-12 13:51           ` Milan Broz
@ 2019-08-12 14:19             ` Ard Biesheuvel
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Ard Biesheuvel @ 2019-08-12 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Milan Broz
  Cc: open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE, Herbert Xu,
	Eric Biggers, device-mapper development, linux-fscrypt,
	Gilad Ben-Yossef

On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 16:51, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On 12/08/2019 09:50, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 10:44, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 12/08/2019 08:54, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >>> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 09:33, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>> Try for example
> >>>> # cryptsetup luksFormat /dev/sdc -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --integrity hmac-sha256 -q -i1
> >>>>
> >>>> It should produce Crypto API string
> >>>>   authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256))
> >>>> while it produces
> >>>>   essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)
> >>>> (and fails).
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> No. I don't know why it fails, but the latter is actually the correct
> >>> string. The essiv template is instantiated either as a skcipher or as
> >>> an aead, and it encapsulates the entire transformation. (This is
> >>> necessary considering that the IV is passed via the AAD and so the
> >>> ESSIV handling needs to touch that as well)
> >>
> >> Hm. Constructing these strings seems to be more confusing than dmcrypt mode combinations :-)
> >>
> >> But you are right, I actually tried the former string (authenc(hmac(sha256),essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)))
> >> and it worked, but I guess the authenticated IV (AAD) was actually the input to IV (plain sector number)
> >> not the output of ESSIV? Do I understand it correctly now?
> >>
> >
> > Indeed. The former string instantiates the skcipher version of the
> > ESSIV template, and so the AAD handling is omitted, and we end up
> > using the plain IV in the authentication rather than the encrypted IV.
> >
> > So when using the latter string, does it produce any error messages
> > when it fails?
>
> The error is
> table: 253:1: crypt: Error decoding and setting key
>
> and it is failing in crypt_setkey() int this  crypto_aead_setkey();
>
> And it is because it now wrongly calculates MAC key length.
> (We have two keys here - one for length-preserving CBC-ESSIV encryption
> and one for HMAC.)
>
> This super-ugly hotfix helps here... I guess it can be done better :-)
>

Weird. It did work fine before, but now that I have dropped the 'md:
dm-crypt: infer ESSIV block cipher from cipher string directly' patch,
we are probably taking a different code path and hitting this error.

I'll try to fix this cleanly. Thanks for doing the diagnosis.


> diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> index e9a0093c88ee..7b06d975a2e1 100644
> --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
> @@ -2342,6 +2342,9 @@ static int crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *cipher_api)
>         char *start, *end, *mac_alg = NULL;
>         struct crypto_ahash *mac;
>
> +       if (strstarts(cipher_api, "essiv(authenc("))
> +               cipher_api += strlen("essiv(");
> +
>         if (!strstarts(cipher_api, "authenc("))
>                 return 0;
>
> Milan

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 14+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2019-08-10  9:40 [PATCH v9 0/7] crypto: switch to crypto API for ESSIV generation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 1/7] crypto: essiv - create wrapper template " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 2/7] fs: crypto: invoke crypto API for ESSIV handling Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 3/7] md: dm-crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-12  6:33   ` Milan Broz
2019-08-12  6:54     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-12  7:44       ` Milan Broz
2019-08-12  7:50         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-12 13:51           ` Milan Broz
2019-08-12 14:19             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 4/7] crypto: essiv - add tests for essiv in cbc(aes)+sha256 mode Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 5/7] crypto: arm64/aes-cts-cbc - factor out CBC en/decryption of a walk Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 6/7] crypto: arm64/aes - implement accelerated ESSIV/CBC mode Ard Biesheuvel
2019-08-10  9:40 ` [PATCH v9 7/7] md: dm-crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher Ard Biesheuvel

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