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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements
Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2020 20:44:25 -0700
Message-ID: <CALCETrUoA9dgi2omjePtzjL9=5AqHKhy57UksnxbohZVdLo_pQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200325194317.526492-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 12:43 PM Ross Philipson
<ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
>
> The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into
> the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This implementation
> uses the established approach of #including the SHA libraries directly in
> the code since the compressed kernel is not uncompressed at this point.
>
> The SHA1 code here has its origins in the code in
> include/crypto/sha1_base.h. That code could not be pulled directly into
> the setup portion of the compressed kernel because of other dependencies
> it pulls in. So this is a modified copy of that code that still leverages
> the core SHA1 algorithm.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  24 +++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile       |   4 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c   | 104 ++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h   |  17 ++
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c |   6 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c |   6 +
>  include/linux/sha512.h                  |  21 +++
>  lib/sha1.c                              |   4 +
>  lib/sha512.c                            | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  9 files changed, 395 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.c
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha1.h
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha256.c
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/early_sha512.c
>  create mode 100644 include/linux/sha512.h
>  create mode 100644 lib/sha512.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 7f3406a9948b..f37057d3ce9f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2025,6 +2025,30 @@ config SECURE_LAUNCH
>           of all the modules and configuration information used for
>           boooting the operating system.
>
> +choice
> +       prompt "Select Secure Launch Algorithm for TPM2"
> +       depends on SECURE_LAUNCH
> +
> +config SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA1
> +       bool "Secure Launch TPM2 SHA1"
> +       help
> +         When using Secure Launch and TPM2 is present, use SHA1 hash
> +         algorithm for measurements.
> +

I'm surprised this is supported at all.  Why allow SHA1?

  reply index

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-25 19:43 [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 18:06   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 19:42     ` Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-03-26 19:00   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-03-26  3:44   ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2020-03-26 22:49     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] x86: Add early general TPM " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:21   ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 21:43     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 19:43 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-03-25 20:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure late launch Linux kernel support Matthew Garrett
2020-03-25 22:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:50     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:13       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-11 19:00         ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 13:40   ` Daniel Kiper
2020-03-26 20:19     ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:33       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 20:40         ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 20:59           ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 21:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 21:28             ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:52               ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-26 22:59                 ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:04                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-27  0:01                     ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 23:50                 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-05-11 19:00       ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:50   ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 20:54     ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 22:37       ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-03-26 22:41         ` Matthew Garrett
2020-03-26 23:55           ` Daniel P. Smith

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