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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
	Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
	Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
	Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>,
	Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2019 18:51:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1567551071.4937.5.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87pnkisyiv.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au>

(Cc'ing Josh Boyer, David Howells)

On Mon, 2019-09-02 at 21:55 +1000, Michael Ellerman wrote:
> Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> 
> > The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
> > hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
> > mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.
> >
> > This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

> > ---
> >  security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +-
> >  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 80 +++++++++++++++++++
> >  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h          | 32 ++++++++
> >  security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 67 +---------------
> >  4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
> >  create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
> 
> This has no acks from security folks, though I'm not really clear on who
> maintains those files.

I upstreamed David's, Josh's, and Nayna's patches, so that's probably
me.

> Do I take it because it's mostly just code movement people are OK with
> it going in via the powerpc tree?

Yes, the only reason for splitting load_uefi.c is for powerpc.  These
patches should be upstreamed together.  

Mimi


  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-03 22:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-26 13:23 [PATCH v3 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Nayna Jain
2019-08-26 14:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 14:12     ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:01       ` [PATCH] sysfs: add BIN_ATTR_WO() macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-09-03  3:37         ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-04 11:36           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:08         ` Nayna
2019-10-01 18:16           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-10-01 18:55             ` Nayna
2019-08-26 14:56   ` [PATCH v3 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 15:46     ` Nayna
2019-08-26 15:57       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Nayna Jain
2019-09-02 11:55   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-09-03 22:51     ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-09-05  3:59       ` Michael Ellerman
2019-08-26 13:23 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Nayna Jain
2019-09-03 22:54   ` Mimi Zohar

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