From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
"Matt Fleming"
<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin"
<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin"
<mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini"
<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Alexander Potapenko"
<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Larry Woodman"
<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 16:20:10 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170418212010.10190.78119.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170418211612.10190.82788.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
initialized to create decrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 5 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 +++
arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 11 +++++--
arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 8 ++++-
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 22 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 10 ++++++
include/linux/swiotlb.h | 1 +
init/main.c | 13 ++++++++
lib/swiotlb.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
10 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
index 08a0838..d75430a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/dma-contiguous.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ISA
# define ISA_DMA_BIT_MASK DMA_BIT_MASK(24)
@@ -62,12 +63,12 @@ static inline bool dma_capable(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t addr, size_t size)
static inline dma_addr_t phys_to_dma(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t paddr)
{
- return paddr;
+ return __sme_set(paddr);
}
static inline phys_addr_t dma_to_phys(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t daddr)
{
- return daddr;
+ return __sme_clr(daddr);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_DMA_REMAP */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 130d7fe..0637b4b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
void __init sme_early_init(void);
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
#ifndef sme_me_mask
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
index 3a216ec..72d96d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -93,9 +93,12 @@ void *dma_generic_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size,
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flag)) {
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, count, get_order(size),
flag);
- if (page && page_to_phys(page) + size > dma_mask) {
- dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
- page = NULL;
+ if (page) {
+ addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
+ if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
+ dma_release_from_contiguous(dev, page, count);
+ page = NULL;
+ }
}
}
/* fallback */
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ void *dma_generic_alloc_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size,
if (!page)
return NULL;
- addr = page_to_phys(page);
+ addr = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page));
if (addr + size > dma_mask) {
__free_pages(page, get_order(size));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
index a88952e..98b576a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
enum dma_data_direction dir,
unsigned long attrs)
{
- dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
+ dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
WARN_ON(size == 0);
if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
index 1e23577..a75fee7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#include <asm/dma.h>
#include <asm/xen/swiotlb-xen.h>
#include <asm/iommu_table.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+
int swiotlb __read_mostly;
void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
@@ -64,11 +66,13 @@ void x86_swiotlb_free_coherent(struct device *dev, size_t size,
* pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary
*
* This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot
- * option).
+ * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set
+ * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that
+ * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
*/
int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void)
{
- if (swiotlb_force == SWIOTLB_FORCE)
+ if ((swiotlb_force == SWIOTLB_FORCE) || sme_active())
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 2321f05..30b07a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -16,11 +16,14 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
/*
* Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -194,6 +197,25 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
}
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
+ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+}
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ WARN(PAGE_ALIGN(size) != size,
+ "size is not page-aligned (%#lx)\n", size);
+
+ /* Make the SWIOTLB buffer area decrypted */
+ set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
{
}
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
index 14a7b9f..3c384d1 100644
--- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ static inline bool sme_active(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+#ifndef __sme_set
+/*
+ * The __sme_set() and __sme_clr() macros are useful for adding or removing
+ * the encryption mask from a value (e.g. when dealing with pagetable
+ * entries).
+ */
+#define __sme_set(x) ((unsigned long)(x) | sme_me_mask)
+#define __sme_clr(x) ((unsigned long)(x) & ~sme_me_mask)
+#endif
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/include/linux/swiotlb.h b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
index 4ee479f..15e7160 100644
--- a/include/linux/swiotlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/swiotlb.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ enum swiotlb_force {
extern unsigned long swiotlb_nr_tbl(void);
unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void);
extern int swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs);
+extern void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void);
/*
* Enumeration for sync targets
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index b0c11cb..e5b4fb7 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -467,6 +467,10 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
}
#endif
+void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+}
+
/*
* Set up kernel memory allocators
*/
@@ -614,6 +618,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
*/
locking_selftest();
+ /*
+ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers.
+ * This call will mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so
+ * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be
+ * decrypted when accessed.
+ */
+ mem_encrypt_init();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&
page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
index a8d74a7..74d6557 100644
--- a/lib/swiotlb.c
+++ b/lib/swiotlb.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/dma.h>
@@ -155,6 +156,17 @@ unsigned long swiotlb_size_or_default(void)
return size ? size : (IO_TLB_DEFAULT_SIZE);
}
+void __weak swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+}
+
+/* For swiotlb, clear memory encryption mask from dma addresses */
+static dma_addr_t swiotlb_phys_to_dma(struct device *hwdev,
+ phys_addr_t address)
+{
+ return __sme_clr(phys_to_dma(hwdev, address));
+}
+
/* Note that this doesn't work with highmem page */
static dma_addr_t swiotlb_virt_to_bus(struct device *hwdev,
volatile void *address)
@@ -183,6 +195,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
bytes >> 20, vstart, vend - 1);
}
+/*
+ * Early SWIOTLB allocation may be too early to allow an architecture to
+ * perform the desired operations. This function allows the architecture to
+ * call SWIOTLB when the operations are possible. It needs to be called
+ * before the SWIOTLB memory is used.
+ */
+void __init swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(void)
+{
+ void *vaddr;
+ unsigned long bytes;
+
+ if (no_iotlb_memory || late_alloc)
+ return;
+
+ vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
+ bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
+ memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
+
+ vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(vaddr, bytes);
+ memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
+}
+
int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
{
void *v_overflow_buffer;
@@ -320,6 +357,7 @@ int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
io_tlb_start = virt_to_phys(tlb);
io_tlb_end = io_tlb_start + bytes;
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(tlb, bytes);
memset(tlb, 0, bytes);
/*
@@ -330,6 +368,8 @@ int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose)
if (!v_overflow_buffer)
goto cleanup2;
+ swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(v_overflow_buffer, io_tlb_overflow);
+ memset(v_overflow_buffer, 0, io_tlb_overflow);
io_tlb_overflow_buffer = virt_to_phys(v_overflow_buffer);
/*
@@ -581,7 +621,7 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev,
return SWIOTLB_MAP_ERROR;
}
- start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
+ start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
return swiotlb_tbl_map_single(hwdev, start_dma_addr, phys, size,
dir, attrs);
}
@@ -702,7 +742,7 @@ void swiotlb_tbl_sync_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr,
goto err_warn;
ret = phys_to_virt(paddr);
- dev_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
+ dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, paddr);
/* Confirm address can be DMA'd by device */
if (dev_addr + size - 1 > dma_mask) {
@@ -812,10 +852,10 @@ dma_addr_t swiotlb_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
map = map_single(dev, phys, size, dir, attrs);
if (map == SWIOTLB_MAP_ERROR) {
swiotlb_full(dev, size, dir, 1);
- return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
}
- dev_addr = phys_to_dma(dev, map);
+ dev_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, map);
/* Ensure that the address returned is DMA'ble */
if (dma_capable(dev, dev_addr, size))
@@ -824,7 +864,7 @@ dma_addr_t swiotlb_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
attrs |= DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC;
swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single(dev, map, size, dir, attrs);
- return phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(dev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(swiotlb_map_page);
@@ -958,7 +998,7 @@ void swiotlb_unmap_page(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dev_addr,
sg_dma_len(sgl) = 0;
return 0;
}
- sg->dma_address = phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
+ sg->dma_address = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, map);
} else
sg->dma_address = dev_addr;
sg_dma_len(sg) = sg->length;
@@ -1026,7 +1066,7 @@ void swiotlb_unmap_page(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dev_addr,
int
swiotlb_dma_mapping_error(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
{
- return (dma_addr == phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
+ return (dma_addr == swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_overflow_buffer));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_mapping_error);
@@ -1039,6 +1079,6 @@ void swiotlb_unmap_page(struct device *hwdev, dma_addr_t dev_addr,
int
swiotlb_dma_supported(struct device *hwdev, u64 mask)
{
- return phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
+ return swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_end - 1) <= mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(swiotlb_dma_supported);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-18 21:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211625.10190.52568.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-19 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170419090224.frmv2jhwfwoxvdie-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-19 9:52 ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211735.10190.29562.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-21 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170421145555.v3xeaijv3vjclsos-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-21 21:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <9fc79e28-ad64-1c2f-4c46-a4efcdd550b0-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 15:57 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <67926f62-a068-6114-92ee-39bc08488b32-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 16:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211822.10190.67435.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 10:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211900.10190.98158.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-07 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 8:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <6e155b8f-b691-2ee0-8977-969aaab6199a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18 9:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211612.10190.82788.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <d9d9f10a-0ce5-53e8-41f5-f8690dbd7362-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 14:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17 7:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418211831.10190.80158.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-05 17:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06 7:48 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170515183517.mb4k2gp2qobbuvtm-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-17 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170518090212.kebstmnjv4h3cjf2-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 20:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21 7:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50 ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <4c2ef3ba-2940-3330-d362-5b2b0d812c6f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-26 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170526163517.nrweesvse24dszkz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-30 17:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-05-16 14:27 ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20 ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55 ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27 7:25 ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <1f034974-20e6-b5e9-e6ff-434b634e1522-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-28 5:32 ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170427072547.GB15297-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 14:13 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418212212.10190.73484.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170518170153.eqiyat5s6q3yeejl-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-26 2:49 ` Dave Young
2017-05-26 5:04 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418212121.10190.94885.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-17 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <1b74e0e6-3dda-f638-461b-f73af9904360-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 20:58 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170519205836.3wvl3nztqyyouje3-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 21:07 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <5ef96f3a-6ebd-1d4d-7ac9-05dbed45d998-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 21:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 4:17 ` Xunlei Pang
[not found] ` <5927AC6E.8080209-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-27 2:17 ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <de4d2efc-6636-4120-98d9-7fdf4707f68d-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31 10:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03 ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20170418212149.10190.70894.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18 12:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 9:51 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20170531095148.pba6ju6im4qxbwfg-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31 13:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <1ac40d18-a8b2-94eb-35ed-c30768667be8-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-30 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 8:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12 ` Borislav Petkov
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