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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 09:38:36 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7c522f65-c5c8-9362-e1eb-d0765e3ea6c9@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170519112703.voajtn4t7uy6nwa3@pd.tnic>

On 5/19/2017 6:27 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 04:22:23PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
>> should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
>> configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
>> activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
>> "in place."
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S |    1 +
>>   arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c |   83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>   2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> ...
> 
>> +unsigned long __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
>>   {
>> +	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
>> +	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
>> +	unsigned long me_mask;
>> +	bool active_by_default;
>> +	char buffer[16];
>> +	u64 msr;
>> +
>> +	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
>> +	eax = 0x80000000;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Check for the SME feature:
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
>> +	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
>> +	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
>> +	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
>> +	 */
>> +	eax = 0x8000001f;
>> +	ecx = 0;
>> +	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
>> +	if (!(eax & 1))
>> +		goto out;
> 
> <---- newline here.
> 
>> +	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
>> +
>> +	/* Check if SME is enabled */
>> +	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
>> +	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>> +		goto out;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet, so we must obtain
>> +	 * the address to the SME command line option data in the following
>> +	 * way.
>> +	 */
>> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
>> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
>> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
>> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
>> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
>> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
>> +	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
>> +	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
>> +	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
>> +
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
>> +		active_by_default = true;
>> +	else
>> +		active_by_default = false;
>> +
>> +	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
>> +				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
>> +
>> +	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
>> +
>> +	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
>> +		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
> 
> Why doesn't simply
> 
> 	if (!strncmp(buffer, "on", 2))
> 		...
> 
> work?

In this case we're running identity mapped and the "on" constant ends up
as kernel address (0xffffffff81...) which results in a segfault.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-30 14:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418211625.10190.52568.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-19  9:02     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-19 14:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-19 15:38         ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]   ` <20170419090224.frmv2jhwfwoxvdie-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-19  9:52     ` David Howells
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-20 17:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-20 18:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418211735.10190.29562.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-21 14:55     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170421145555.v3xeaijv3vjclsos-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-21 21:40         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:52   ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-24 15:53     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <9fc79e28-ad64-1c2f-4c46-a4efcdd550b0-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 15:57         ` Dave Hansen
     [not found]           ` <67926f62-a068-6114-92ee-39bc08488b32-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-24 16:10             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-04 17:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418211822.10190.67435.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 10:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:39       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:18 ` [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 21:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418211900.10190.98158.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-07 17:18     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-08 13:20       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16  8:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-17 20:26     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <6e155b8f-b691-2ee0-8977-969aaab6199a-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18  9:03         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
     [not found] ` <20170418211612.10190.82788.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-18 21:17   ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-04-27 15:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-04 14:24       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <d9d9f10a-0ce5-53e8-41f5-f8690dbd7362-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 14:36           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-16 19:28             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-17  7:05               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:18   ` [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20170418211831.10190.80158.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-05 17:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-06  7:48         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-18 21:19   ` [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-05-15 18:35     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <20170515183517.mb4k2gp2qobbuvtm-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-17 18:54         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-18  9:02           ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]             ` <20170518090212.kebstmnjv4h3cjf2-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 20:50               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-21  7:16                 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:46                   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 11:31                     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-18 19:50       ` Matt Fleming
2017-05-26 16:22         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <4c2ef3ba-2940-3330-d362-5b2b0d812c6f-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-26 16:35             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]               ` <20170526163517.nrweesvse24dszkz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-30 17:47                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory " Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:04     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:19   ` [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:27     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 14:52     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 19:55       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:20   ` [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-05-16 17:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 20:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22   ` [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 21:55     ` Dave Hansen
2017-04-27  7:25       ` Dave Young
2017-04-27 15:52         ` Dave Hansen
     [not found]           ` <1f034974-20e6-b5e9-e6ff-434b634e1522-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-28  5:32             ` Dave Young
2017-05-04 14:17           ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <20170427072547.GB15297-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-04 14:13           ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]     ` <20170418212212.10190.73484.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18 17:01       ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]         ` <20170518170153.eqiyat5s6q3yeejl-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-26  2:49           ` Dave Young
2017-05-26  5:04             ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-26 15:47               ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418212121.10190.94885.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-17 19:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:45       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <1b74e0e6-3dda-f638-461b-f73af9904360-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 20:58           ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]             ` <20170519205836.3wvl3nztqyyouje3-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 21:07               ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]                 ` <5ef96f3a-6ebd-1d4d-7ac9-05dbed45d998-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-19 21:28                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 21:38                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26  4:17     ` Xunlei Pang
     [not found]       ` <5927AC6E.8080209-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-27  2:17         ` Dave Young
2017-05-30 17:46         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <de4d2efc-6636-4120-98d9-7fdf4707f68d-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31 10:01             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 15:03           ` Xunlei Pang
2017-05-31 15:48             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-04-18 21:21 ` [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20170418212149.10190.70894.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-18 12:46     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-25 22:24       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-26 16:25         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 16:39           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  9:51             ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]               ` <20170531095148.pba6ju6im4qxbwfg-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31 13:12                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:22 ` [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-04-21 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-19 20:16       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2017-05-19 20:29         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:48         ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]           ` <1ac40d18-a8b2-94eb-35ed-c30768667be8-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2017-05-31  9:15             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-19 11:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 14:38     ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-05-30 14:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-30 15:37         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31  8:49           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-05-31 13:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2017-05-31 14:12               ` Borislav Petkov

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