From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted mapping checks
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 11:41:06 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <261ea8108c6290e95962be2638bd204f90787c1c.1582652466.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since
they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables
to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for new EFI
tables.
This fixes a bug where an EFI TPM log table has been created by UEFI, but
it lives in memory that has been marked as usable rather than reserved.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
Changes since v1:
- Re-spun against EFI tree
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 43b24e149312..c6ca959e2366 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RCI2_TABLE
&rci2_table_phys,
#endif
+ &efi.rng_seed,
+ &efi.tpm_log,
+ &efi.tpm_final_log,
};
u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-02-25 17:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-25 17:41 Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-02-25 17:45 ` [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Add additional efi tables for unencrypted mapping checks Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-25 17:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 17:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-25 18:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 18:12 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-25 19:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 19:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2020-02-25 19:35 ` Tom Lendacky
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