From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 11/32] VFS: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes [ver #8]
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 01:06:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <152720679598.9073.12285951657067410519.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <152720672288.9073.9868393448836301272.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Remove code that is now unused after the filesystem context changes.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
fs/internal.h | 2 -
fs/super.c | 62 --------------------------------------------
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 --
include/linux/security.h | 7 -----
security/security.c | 5 ----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 --------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 33 -----------------------
7 files changed, 132 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h
index 91a990234488..f47ede6ace5a 100644
--- a/fs/internal.h
+++ b/fs/internal.h
@@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ extern struct file *get_empty_filp(void);
extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *, int, void *, size_t, int,
struct fs_context *);
extern bool trylock_super(struct super_block *sb);
-extern struct dentry *mount_fs(struct file_system_type *,
- int, const char *, void *, size_t);
extern struct super_block *user_get_super(dev_t);
/*
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index b9d386d728c6..06a665628939 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -1450,68 +1450,6 @@ struct dentry *mount_single(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(mount_single);
-struct dentry *
-mount_fs(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, const char *name,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- struct dentry *root;
- struct super_block *sb;
- char *secdata = NULL;
- int error = -ENOMEM;
-
- if (data && !(type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {
- secdata = alloc_secdata();
- if (!secdata)
- goto out;
-
- error = security_sb_copy_data(data, data_size, secdata);
- if (error)
- goto out_free_secdata;
- }
-
- root = type->mount(type, flags, name, data, data_size);
- if (IS_ERR(root)) {
- error = PTR_ERR(root);
- goto out_free_secdata;
- }
- sb = root->d_sb;
- BUG_ON(!sb);
- WARN_ON(!sb->s_bdi);
-
- /*
- * Write barrier is for super_cache_count(). We place it before setting
- * SB_BORN as the data dependency between the two functions is the
- * superblock structure contents that we just set up, not the SB_BORN
- * flag.
- */
- smp_wmb();
- sb->s_flags |= SB_BORN;
-
- error = security_sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, secdata, data_size);
- if (error)
- goto out_sb;
-
- /*
- * filesystems should never set s_maxbytes larger than MAX_LFS_FILESIZE
- * but s_maxbytes was an unsigned long long for many releases. Throw
- * this warning for a little while to try and catch filesystems that
- * violate this rule.
- */
- WARN((sb->s_maxbytes < 0), "%s set sb->s_maxbytes to "
- "negative value (%lld)\n", type->name, sb->s_maxbytes);
-
- up_write(&sb->s_umount);
- free_secdata(secdata);
- return root;
-out_sb:
- dput(root);
- deactivate_locked_super(sb);
-out_free_secdata:
- free_secdata(secdata);
-out:
- return ERR_PTR(error);
-}
-
/*
* Setup private BDI for given superblock. It gets automatically cleaned up
* in generic_shutdown_super().
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 408357495d1e..5d8f8bd39b52 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1519,8 +1519,6 @@ union security_list_options {
void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
- int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size);
int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -1867,7 +1865,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head sb_free_security;
struct hlist_head sb_copy_data;
struct hlist_head sb_remount;
- struct hlist_head sb_kern_mount;
struct hlist_head sb_show_options;
struct hlist_head sb_statfs;
struct hlist_head sb_mount;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 64cc080b9352..5040455a747d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb);
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, size_t orig_size, char *copy);
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size);
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size);
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
@@ -606,12 +605,6 @@ static inline int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m,
struct super_block *sb)
{
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 294c2fce1770..3b155f7ee3ba 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -425,11 +425,6 @@ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_size)
return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data, data_size);
}
-int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data, data_size);
-}
-
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 3952aab4ff99..9c5d60308136 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2920,25 +2920,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data, size_t data_si
goto out_free_opts;
}
-static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- int rc;
-
- rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
- if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
- return 0;
-
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
- ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
- return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
-}
-
static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
@@ -7149,7 +7130,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d3c4a72d1640..d1970f4a9cdc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1150,38 +1150,6 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
- * @sb: the file system superblock
- * @flags: the mount flags
- * @data: the smack mount options
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
- */
-static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags,
- void *data, size_t data_size)
-{
- int rc = 0;
- char *options = data;
- struct security_mnt_opts opts;
-
- security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
-
- if (!options)
- goto out;
-
- rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
- if (rc)
- goto out_err;
-
-out:
- rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
-
-out_err:
- security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
- return rc;
-}
-
/**
* smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
* @dentry: identifies the file system in question
@@ -4942,7 +4910,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-25 0:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-25 0:05 [PATCH 00/32] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #8] David Howells
2018-05-25 0:05 ` [PATCH 01/32] VFS: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:05 ` [PATCH 02/32] vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:05 ` [PATCH 03/32] VFS: Introduce the basic header for the new mount API's filesystem context " David Howells
2018-05-31 23:11 ` Al Viro
2018-05-31 23:13 ` Al Viro
2018-05-25 0:05 ` [PATCH 04/32] VFS: Add LSM hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:05 ` [PATCH 05/32] selinux: Implement the new mount API LSM hooks " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 06/32] smack: Implement filesystem context security " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 07/32] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 08/32] tomoyo: " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 09/32] VFS: Require specification of size of mount data for internal mounts " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 10/32] VFS: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context " David Howells
2018-06-07 19:50 ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-07-03 18:33 ` Eric Biggers
2018-07-03 21:53 ` David Howells
2018-07-03 21:58 ` Al Viro
2018-07-03 22:06 ` David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 12/32] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 13/32] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:06 ` [PATCH 14/32] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 15/32] cpuset: Use " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 16/32] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support " David Howells
2018-06-21 18:47 ` [16/32] " Andrei Vagin
2018-06-22 12:52 ` David Howells
2018-06-22 15:30 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-22 16:57 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-23 23:34 ` David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 17/32] hugetlbfs: Convert to " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 18/32] VFS: Remove kern_mount_data() " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 19/32] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount " David Howells
2018-05-31 21:25 ` Al Viro
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 20/32] vfs: Make close() unmount the attached mount if so flagged " David Howells
2018-05-31 19:19 ` Al Viro
2018-05-31 19:26 ` Al Viro
2018-06-01 1:52 ` Al Viro
2018-06-01 3:18 ` Al Viro
2018-06-01 5:16 ` Al Viro
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 21/32] VFS: Implement fsmount() to effect a pre-configured mount " David Howells
2018-06-04 15:05 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-06-04 15:24 ` David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 22/32] vfs: Provide an fspick() system call " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 23/32] VFS: Implement logging through fs_context " David Howells
2018-05-25 1:48 ` Joe Perches
2018-05-25 0:07 ` [PATCH 24/32] vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 25/32] afs: Add fs_context support " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 26/32] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount " David Howells
2018-06-07 1:58 ` Goldwyn Rodrigues
2018-06-07 20:45 ` David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 27/32] vfs: Use a 'struct fd_cookie *' type for light fd handling " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 28/32] vfs: Store the fd_cookie in nameidata, not the dfd int " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 29/32] vfs: Don't mix FMODE_* flags with O_* flags " David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 30/32] vfs: Allow cloning of a mount tree with open(O_PATH|O_CLONE_MOUNT) " David Howells
2018-06-01 6:26 ` Christoph Hellwig
2018-06-01 6:39 ` Al Viro
2018-06-01 8:27 ` David Howells
2018-06-02 3:09 ` Al Viro
2018-06-02 3:42 ` Al Viro
2018-06-02 4:04 ` Al Viro
2018-06-02 15:45 ` David Howells
2018-06-02 17:49 ` Al Viro
2018-06-03 0:55 ` [PATCH][RFC] open_tree(2) (was Re: [PATCH 30/32] vfs: Allow cloning of a mount tree with open(O_PATH|O_CLONE_MOUNT) [ver #8]) Al Viro
2018-06-04 10:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-06-04 15:52 ` Al Viro
2018-06-04 15:59 ` Al Viro
2018-06-04 19:27 ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-06-04 15:27 ` David Howells
2018-06-04 17:16 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-06-04 17:35 ` Al Viro
2018-06-04 19:38 ` Miklos Szeredi
2018-06-01 8:02 ` [PATCH 30/32] vfs: Allow cloning of a mount tree with open(O_PATH|O_CLONE_MOUNT) [ver #8] Amir Goldstein
2018-06-01 8:42 ` David Howells
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 31/32] [RFC] fs: Add a move_mount() system call " David Howells
2018-05-31 21:20 ` Al Viro
2018-05-25 0:08 ` [PATCH 32/32] [RFC] fsinfo: Add a system call to allow querying of filesystem information " David Howells
2018-06-04 13:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-06-04 15:01 ` David Howells
2018-06-04 16:00 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-06-04 19:03 ` David Howells
2018-06-04 20:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-05-31 20:56 ` Test program for move_mount() David Howells
2018-05-31 20:57 ` fsinfo test program David Howells
2018-06-15 4:18 ` [PATCH 00/32] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #8] Eric W. Biederman
2018-06-18 20:30 ` David Howells
2018-06-18 21:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-06-18 23:33 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
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