* [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
@ 2015-02-14 17:33 Kees Cook
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-18 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-02-14 17:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akpm
Cc: linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86,
Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll, Hector Marco-Gisbert,
Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit
architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since
the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is
0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the
(22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One
fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the
operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather
than always being 7fff.
CVE-2015-1593
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[kees: rebase, fix 80 char, clean up commit message, add test example, cve]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 6 +++---
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 919b91205cd4..df4552bd239e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
.flags = -1,
};
-static unsigned int stack_maxrandom_size(void)
+static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
{
- unsigned int max = 0;
+ unsigned long max = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
- max = ((-1U) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ max = ((-1UL) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return max;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index 02b16910f4c9..995986b8e36b 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -645,11 +645,12 @@ out:
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
- unsigned int random_variable = 0;
+ unsigned long random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
- random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
+ random_variable = (unsigned long) get_random_int();
+ random_variable &= STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
--
1.9.1
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-14 17:33 [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Kees Cook
@ 2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-18 3:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-02-18 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2015-02-16 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook, akpm
Cc: linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86,
Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll, Hector Marco-Gisbert,
Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
On 02/14/2015 09:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
>
> The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit
> architectures due to an integer overflow.
>
> The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c":
>
> static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
> {
> unsigned int random_variable = 0;
>
> if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
> !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
> random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
> }
>
> Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since
> the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is
> 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
>
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
> "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the
> (22+12) result.
>
> These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
> Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One
> fourth of expected entropy).
>
> This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the
> operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size().
>
> The successful fix can be tested with:
> $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
> 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> ...
>
> Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather
> than always being 7fff.
>
> CVE-2015-1593
Awesome. So the vdso randomization *and* the stack randomization
implementations were buggy. Anyone want to check the mmap and brk
randomization implementations?
--Andy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2015-02-18 3:27 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2015-02-18 3:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andy Lutomirski
Cc: Andrew Morton, LKML, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll,
Hector Marco-Gisbert, Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 12:49 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> On 02/14/2015 09:33 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
>>
>> The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64
>> bit
>> architectures due to an integer overflow.
>>
>> The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c":
>>
>> static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
>> {
>> unsigned int random_variable = 0;
>>
>> if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
>> !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
>> random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
>> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>> }
>> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
>> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
>> }
>>
>> Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
>> Since
>> the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is
>> 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
>>
>> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>>
>> then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
>> "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
>> the
>> (22+12) result.
>>
>> These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
>> Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30
>> (One
>> fourth of expected entropy).
>>
>> This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in
>> the
>> operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
>> stack_maxrandom_size().
>>
>> The successful fix can be tested with:
>> $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
>> 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
>> [stack]
>> 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
>> [stack]
>> 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
>> [stack]
>> 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
>> [stack]
>> ...
>>
>> Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather
>> than always being 7fff.
>>
>> CVE-2015-1593
>
>
> Awesome. So the vdso randomization *and* the stack randomization
> implementations were buggy. Anyone want to check the mmap and brk
> randomization implementations?
Both appear to use randomize_range() ... which, after looking at it,
is buggy. But we've just not hit it yet. It uses get_random_int() but
is modulo an unsigned long. If anything were ever to call it with a
range > MAX_INT, it would truncate...
-Kees
>
> --Andy
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-14 17:33 [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Kees Cook
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2015-02-18 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:11 ` Andrew Morton
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2015-02-18 9:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: akpm, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll, Hector Marco-Gisbert,
Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
On Sat, Feb 14, 2015 at 09:33:50AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> From: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
>
> The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit
> architectures due to an integer overflow.
>
> The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c":
>
> static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
> {
> unsigned int random_variable = 0;
>
> if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
> !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
> random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
> return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
> }
>
> Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since
> the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is
> 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
>
> random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
> "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the
> (22+12) result.
>
> These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
> Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One
> fourth of expected entropy).
>
> This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the
> operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size().
>
> The successful fix can be tested with:
> $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
> 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
> ...
>
> Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather
> than always being 7fff.
>
> CVE-2015-1593
>
> Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
> [kees: rebase, fix 80 char, clean up commit message, add test example, cve]
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Ok, I'm picking this up. Do scream if someone else wants to do that,
otherwise it is going to tip next week, after the merge window is over.
Thanks.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-18 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2015-02-18 20:11 ` Andrew Morton
2015-02-18 20:19 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2015-02-18 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Kees Cook, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll,
Hector Marco-Gisbert, Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
On Wed, 18 Feb 2015 10:15:43 +0100 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> > CVE-2015-1593
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
> > Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
> > [kees: rebase, fix 80 char, clean up commit message, add test example, cve]
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>
> Ok, I'm picking this up. Do scream if someone else wants to do that,
I grabbed it, but shall drop my copy if it turns up in linux-next.
> otherwise it is going to tip next week, after the merge window is over.
It's tagged for -stable backporting, so it should go into 3.20?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-18 20:11 ` Andrew Morton
@ 2015-02-18 20:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-18 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2015-02-18 20:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton
Cc: Borislav Petkov, Kees Cook, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll,
Hector Marco-Gisbert, Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
* Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Feb 2015 10:15:43 +0100 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> > > CVE-2015-1593
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
> > > Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
> > > [kees: rebase, fix 80 char, clean up commit message, add test example, cve]
> > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> >
> > Ok, I'm picking this up. Do scream if someone else wants to do that,
>
> I grabbed it, but shall drop my copy if it turns up in linux-next.
>
> > otherwise it is going to tip next week, after the merge window is over.
>
> It's tagged for -stable backporting, so it should go into 3.20?
Absolutely, this is x86/urgent material, so no need to wait
for -rc1 with it.
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-18 20:19 ` Ingo Molnar
@ 2015-02-18 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:26 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2015-02-18 20:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ingo Molnar, Andrew Morton
Cc: Kees Cook, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
H. Peter Anvin, x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll,
Hector Marco-Gisbert, Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 09:19:01PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> Absolutely, this is x86/urgent material, so no need to wait for -rc1
> with it.
Right, so I can start shuffling stuff to you tomorrow, this patch is in
one of the pull requests. I can drop it too if preferred. I'll let you
guys decide.
Thanks.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
2015-02-18 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2015-02-18 20:26 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2015-02-18 20:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov
Cc: Andrew Morton, Kees Cook, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, x86, Alexander Viro, Ismael Ripoll,
Hector Marco-Gisbert, Jan-Simon Möller, linux-fsdevel
* Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 09:19:01PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > Absolutely, this is x86/urgent material, so no need to wait for -rc1
> > with it.
>
> Right, so I can start shuffling stuff to you tomorrow,
> this patch is in one of the pull requests. I can drop it
> too if preferred. I'll let you guys decide.
Tomorrow is fine to me.
Thanks,
Ingo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
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2015-02-14 17:33 [PATCH] ASLR: fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems Kees Cook
2015-02-16 20:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-02-18 3:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-02-18 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2015-02-18 20:11 ` Andrew Morton
2015-02-18 20:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-02-18 20:25 ` Borislav Petkov
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