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From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Eric . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"security@kernel.org" <security@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 23:33:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160923213355.GB4763@pc.thejh.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVT3MofhX56jJBeWJbucOrfnw8RyLXa0X=64gtpGDUrPg@mail.gmail.com>

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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 02:04:30PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 1:40 PM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote:
> > This ensures that self_privunit ("privilege unit locally unique ID")
> > is only shared by processes that share the mm_struct and the signal_struct;
> > not just spatially, but also temporally. In other words, if you do execve()
> > or clone() without CLONE_THREAD, you get a new privunit that has never
> > been used before.
> >
> > One reason for doing this is that it prevents an attacker from sending an
> > arbitrary signal to a parent process after performing 2^32-1 execve()
> > calls.
> >
> > The second reason for this is that it permits using the self_exec_luid in
> > a later patch to check during a ptrace access whether subject and object
> > are temporally and spatially equal for privilege checking purposes.
> >
> > The implementation of locally unique IDs is in sched.h and exec.c for now
> > because those are the only users so far - if anything else wants to use
> > them in the future, they can be moved elsewhere.
> >
> > changed in v2:
> >  - have 2^64 IDs per CPU instead of 2^64 shared ones (luid scheme,
> >    suggested by Andy Lutomirski)
> >  - take task_lock for reading in setup_new_exec() while bumping the LUID
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
> > ---
> >  fs/exec.c             | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> >  include/linux/sched.h | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> >  kernel/fork.c         |  5 +++--
> >  kernel/signal.c       |  5 ++++-
> >  4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> > index 84430ee..fcc11f0 100644
> > --- a/fs/exec.c
> > +++ b/fs/exec.c
> > @@ -1281,6 +1281,34 @@ void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL(would_dump);
> >
> > +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, luid_counters);
> > +
> > +static int __init init_luid_counters(void)
> > +{
> > +       unsigned int cpu;
> > +
> > +       for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> > +               /* value 0 is reserved for init */
> > +               per_cpu(luid_counters, cpu) = 1;
> > +       }
> > +
> > +       return 0;
> > +}
> > +early_initcall(init_luid_counters);
> 
> How about static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, luid_counters) = 1?  You could
> optionally use local64_t instead, which would let you avoid needing to
> think about preemption.

Ah, I didn't realize that either of those was possible. Yes, I guess I'll
change it to use local64_t.

> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Allocates a new LUID and writes the allocated LUID to @out.
> > + * This function must not be called from IRQ context.
> > + */
> > +void fill_luid(struct luid *out)
> > +{
> > +       preempt_disable();
> > +       out->count = raw_cpu_read(luid_counters);
> > +       raw_cpu_add(luid_counters, 1);
> > +       out->cpu = smp_processor_id();
> > +       preempt_enable();
> > +}
> > +
> 
> I would call this alloc_luid().

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-23 21:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-23 20:40 [PATCH v2 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-09-30 15:35   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:27     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-03 16:02       ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 21:12     ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit Jann Horn
2016-09-23 21:04   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-23 21:33     ` Jann Horn [this message]
2016-09-30 13:20   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 13:44     ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:30       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-30 18:59         ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 19:05           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 16:37         ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer Jann Horn
2016-09-30 14:52   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 17:16     ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 21:39       ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 22:47         ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] ptrace: warn on ptrace_may_access without proper locking Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
2016-10-02  3:16   ` Krister Johansen
2016-10-30 19:09     ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31  4:14       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-31 13:39         ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 20:43         ` Krister Johansen

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