Re: RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs

From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org, mszeredi@redhat.com,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	jlayton@redhat.com, Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>,
	API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-audit@redhat.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>,
	Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
	trondmy@primarydata.com
Subject: Re: RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs
Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 10:46:18 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <49752b6f-8a77-d1e5-8acb-5a1eed0a992c@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRV9m6-APj3ofMQc22rL-WUoDzB8-urUxryszjCHHHLTg@mail.gmail.com>

>> The security implications are that anything that can change the label
>> could also hide itself and its doings from the audit system and thus
>> would be used as a means to evade detection.  I actually think this
>> means the label should be write once (once you've set it, you can't
>> change it) ...
> 
> Richard and I have talked about a write once approach, but the
> thinking was that you may want to allow a nested container
> orchestrator (Why? I don't know, but people always want to do the
> craziest things.) and a write-once policy makes that impossible.  If
> we punt on the nested orchestrator, I believe we can seriously think
> about a write-once policy to simplify things.

Nested containers are a very widely used use-case (see LXC system 
containers, inside of which people run other container runtimes). So I 
would definitely consider it something that "needs to be supported in 
some way". While the LXC guys might be a *tad* crazy, the use-case isn't. :P

>> ... and orchestration systems should begin as unlabelled
>> processes allowing them to do arbitrary forks.
> 
> My current thinking is that the default state is to start unlabeled (I
> just vomited a little into my SELinux hat); in other words
> init/systemd/PID-1 in the host system starts with an "unset" audit
> container ID.  This not only helps define the host system (anything
> that has an unset audit container ID) but provides a blank slate for
> the orchestrator(s).
> 
>> For nested containers, I actually think the label should be
>> hierarchical, so you can add a label for the new nested container but
>> it still also contains its parents label as well.
> 
> I haven't made up my mind on this completely just yet, but I'm
> currently of the mindset that supporting multiple audit container IDs
> on a given process is not a good idea.

As long as creating a new "container" (that is, changing a process's 
"audit container ID") is an audit event then I think that having a 
hierarchy be explicit is not necessary (userspace audit can figure out 
the hierarchy quite easily -- but also there are cases where thinking of 
it as being hierarchical isn't necessarily correct).

-- 
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
https://www.cyphar.com/