From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
raven@themaw.net, Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds [ver #3]
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 12:34:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVc=PpCjSC-pjcjr0WMKtgVXWijwB3FX+tSp5VOH2bCpg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e434a62a-d92a-c6e2-cda1-309ac99d4d5c@schaufler-ca.com>
On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 12:09 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 6/6/2019 10:18 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 8:06 AM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> >> Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> > Casey, I think you need to state your requirement in a way that's well
> > defined, and I think you need to make a compelling case that your
> > requirement is indeed worth dictating the design of parts of the
> > kernel outside LSM.
>
> Err, no, I don't believe so. There's a whole lot more
> going on in this discussion than just what's going on
> within the LSMs. Using examples from the LSMs makes it
> easier, because their policies are better defined than
> the "legacy" policies are. The most important part of the
> discussion is about ensuring that the event mechanism
> doesn't circumvent the legacy policies. Yes, I understand
> that you don't know what that means, or has to do with
> anything.
>
>
Indeed, I do not know what you have in mind about making sure this
mechanism doesn't circumvent legacy policies. Can you elaborate?
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-06 19:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-06 9:41 [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #3] David Howells
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 01/10] security: Override creds in __fput() with last fputter's creds " David Howells
2019-06-06 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 15:06 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 17:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 19:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 19:34 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 02/10] General notification queue with user mmap()'able ring buffer " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 03/10] keys: Add a notification facility " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 04/10] vfs: Add a mount-notification " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 05/10] vfs: Add superblock notifications " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:42 ` [PATCH 06/10] fsinfo: Export superblock notification counter " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:43 ` [PATCH 07/10] Add a general, global device notification watch list " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:43 ` [PATCH 08/10] block: Add block layer notifications " David Howells
2019-06-06 9:43 ` [PATCH 09/10] usb: Add USB subsystem " David Howells
2019-06-06 14:24 ` Alan Stern
2019-06-06 14:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-06-06 14:55 ` Alan Stern
2019-06-06 15:31 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-06-07 6:40 ` Felipe Balbi
2019-06-07 14:01 ` Alan Stern
2019-06-11 6:28 ` Felipe Balbi
2019-06-11 13:53 ` Alan Stern
2019-06-12 6:58 ` Felipe Balbi
2019-06-06 9:43 ` [PATCH 10/10] Add sample notification program " David Howells
2019-06-06 21:21 ` Eugeniu Rosca
2019-06-06 22:52 ` David Howells
2019-06-07 14:37 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 12:32 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/10] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications " Stephen Smalley
2019-06-06 13:16 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 14:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-06 16:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 18:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 18:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 17:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-06 18:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-06-06 19:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 21:17 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 21:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 22:38 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 22:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 22:50 ` David Howells
2019-06-06 14:34 ` Christian Brauner
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