From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-afs@lists.infradead.org,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for filesystem context [ver #7]
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 09:25:09 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aca7e68c-022b-47ac-c249-59e042d431e8@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3232.1524238511@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On 04/20/2018 11:35 AM, David Howells wrote:
> Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
>> Adding the SELinux mailing list to the CC line; in the future please
>> include the SELinux mailing list on patches like this. It would also
>> be very helpful to include "selinux" somewhere in the subject line
>> when the patch is predominately SELinux related (much like you did for
>> the other LSMs in this patchset).
>
> I should probably evict the SELinux bits into their own patch since the point
> of this patch is the LSM hooks, not specifically SELinux's implementation
> thereof.
>
>> I can't say I've digested all of this yet, but what SELinux testing
>> have you done with this patchset?
>
> Using the fsopen()/fsmount() syscalls, these hooks will be made use of, say
> for NFS (which I haven't included in this list). Even sys_mount() will make
> use of them a bit, so just booting the system does that.
>
> Note that for SELinux these hooks don't change very much except how the
> parameters are handled. It doesn't actually change the checks that are made -
> at least, not yet. There are some additional syscalls under consideration
> (such as the ability to pick a live mounted filesystem into a context) that
> might require additional permits.
Neither fsopen() nor fscontext_fs_write() appear to perform any kind of up-front
permission checking (DAC or MAC), although some security hooks may be ultimately called
to allocate structures, parse security options, etc. Is there a reason not apply a may_mount()
or similar check up front?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-23 13:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-19 13:31 [PATCH 00/24] VFS: Introduce filesystem context [ver #7] David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 01/24] vfs: Undo an overly zealous MS_RDONLY -> SB_RDONLY conversion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 02/24] VFS: Suppress MS_* flag defs within the kernel unless explicitly enabled " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 03/24] VFS: Introduce the structs and doc for a filesystem context " David Howells
2018-04-23 3:36 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-01 14:29 ` David Howells
2018-05-01 15:31 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 04/24] VFS: Add LSM hooks for " David Howells
2018-04-19 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-20 15:35 ` David Howells
2018-04-23 13:25 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2018-04-24 15:22 ` David Howells
2018-04-25 14:07 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 05/24] apparmor: Implement security hooks for the new mount API " David Howells
2018-05-04 0:10 ` John Johansen
2018-05-11 12:20 ` David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 06/24] tomoyo: " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 07/24] smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:31 ` [PATCH 08/24] VFS: Require specification of size of mount data for internal mounts " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 09/24] VFS: Implement a filesystem superblock creation/configuration context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 10/24] VFS: Remove unused code after filesystem context changes " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 11/24] procfs: Move proc_fill_super() to fs/proc/root.c " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 12/24] proc: Add fs_context support to procfs " David Howells
2018-06-19 3:34 ` [12/24] " Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 6:13 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 7:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-06-26 8:57 ` David Howells
2018-06-28 5:50 ` Andrei Vagin
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 13/24] ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 14/24] cpuset: Use " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:32 ` [PATCH 15/24] kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 16/24] hugetlbfs: Convert to " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 17/24] VFS: Remove kern_mount_data() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 18/24] VFS: Implement fsopen() to prepare for a mount " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 19/24] VFS: Implement fsmount() to effect a pre-configured " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 20/24] afs: Fix server record deletion " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 21/24] net: Export get_proc_net() " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 22/24] afs: Add fs_context support " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 23/24] afs: Implement namespacing " David Howells
2018-04-19 13:33 ` [PATCH 24/24] afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount " David Howells
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