* [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others()
@ 2020-10-05 23:37 Sasha Levin
2020-10-05 23:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/hyperv: add a bounds check to hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() Sasha Levin
2020-10-13 9:25 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Wei Liu
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2020-10-05 23:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kys, haiyangz, sthemmin, wei.liu
Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, x86, hpa, vkuznets, mikelley, linux-hyperv,
linux-kernel, Sasha Levin, stable
cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we
call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass
num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read
garbage. As reported by KASAN:
[ 83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[ 83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106
[ 84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.4.60 #1
[ 84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 12/07/2018
[ 84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
[ 84.196669] Call Trace:
[ 84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120)
[ 84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375)
[ 84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507)
[ 84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 mm/kasan/common.c:635)
[ 84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
[ 84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798)
[ 84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable-generic.c:88)
Fixes: 0e4c88f37693 ("x86/hyper-v: Use cheaper HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_{LIST,SPACE} hypercalls when possible")
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index 5208ba49c89a9..6cac9f5857af4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -109,7 +109,14 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus,
* must. We will also check all VP numbers when walking the
* supplied CPU set to remain correct in all cases.
*/
- if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(cpumask_last(cpus)) >= 64)
+ int last = cpumask_last(cpus);
+
+ if (last >= num_possible_cpus()) {
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(last) >= 64)
goto do_ex_hypercall;
for_each_cpu(cpu, cpus) {
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/hyperv: add a bounds check to hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number()
2020-10-05 23:37 [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Sasha Levin
@ 2020-10-05 23:37 ` Sasha Levin
2020-10-13 9:25 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Wei Liu
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2020-10-05 23:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kys, haiyangz, sthemmin, wei.liu
Cc: tglx, mingo, bp, x86, hpa, vkuznets, mikelley, linux-hyperv,
linux-kernel, Sasha Levin
We have code that calls into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() without
checking that the cpu number is valid, which would cause
hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() to dereference invalid memory.
Instead, have hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() fail gracefully and add a
warning to make sure we catch these issues quickly.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h b/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
index c5edc5e08b94f..c7d22cb8340ff 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ extern u32 hv_max_vp_index;
*/
static inline int hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(int cpu_number)
{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_number < 0 || cpu_number >= num_possible_cpus()))
+ return VP_INVAL;
+
return hv_vp_index[cpu_number];
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others()
2020-10-05 23:37 [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Sasha Levin
2020-10-05 23:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/hyperv: add a bounds check to hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() Sasha Levin
@ 2020-10-13 9:25 ` Wei Liu
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2020-10-13 9:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sasha Levin
Cc: kys, haiyangz, sthemmin, wei.liu, tglx, mingo, bp, x86, hpa,
vkuznets, mikelley, linux-hyperv, linux-kernel, stable
On Mon, Oct 05, 2020 at 07:37:38PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote:
> cpumask can change underneath us, which is generally safe except when we
> call into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(): if cpumask ends up empty we pass
> num_cpu_possible() into hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number(), causing it to read
> garbage. As reported by KASAN:
>
> [ 83.504763] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
> [ 83.908636] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888267c01370 by task kworker/u8:2/106
> [ 84.196669] CPU: 0 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.4.60 #1
> [ 84.196669] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 12/07/2018
> [ 84.196669] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:0)
> [ 84.196669] Call Trace:
> [ 84.196669] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:120)
> [ 84.196669] print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:375)
> [ 84.196669] __kasan_report.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:507)
> [ 84.196669] kasan_report (arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h:71 mm/kasan/common.c:635)
> [ 84.196669] hyperv_flush_tlb_others (include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h:128 arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c:112)
> [ 84.196669] flush_tlb_mm_range (arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:68 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:798)
> [ 84.196669] ptep_clear_flush (arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h:586 mm/pgtable-generic.c:88)
>
What is the easiest way to reproduce this? Just enable KASAN in the
guest and run it normally? I want to have a chance to verify my earlier
reply.
Thanks,
Wei.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-10-13 9:25 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-10-05 23:37 [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Sasha Levin
2020-10-05 23:37 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/hyperv: add a bounds check to hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number() Sasha Levin
2020-10-13 9:25 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/hyper-v: guard against cpu mask changes in hyperv_flush_tlb_others() Wei Liu
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).