From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ken Goldman <kgold@linux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018 08:41:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1540366876.3008.11.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1810240307080.8524@jsakkine-mobl1>
On Wed, 2018-10-24 at 03:13 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Oct 2018, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Mon, 2018-10-22 at 09:53 -0400, Ken Goldman wrote:
> > > On 10/22/2018 3:33 AM, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > By now, everybody knows we have a problem with the TPM2_RS_PW
> > > > easy button on TPM2 in that transactions on the TPM bus can be
> > > > intercepted and altered. The way to fix this is to use real
> > > > sessions for HMAC capabilities to ensure integrity and to use
> > > > parameter and response encryption to ensure confidentiality of
> > > > the data flowing over the TPM bus.
> > >
> > > Does this design assume that there was at time zero no
> > > monitoring? This would permit some shared secret to be
> > > established.
> > >
> > > Or does it assume that the interception may have been present
> > > from the first boot? If so, how is the first shared secret
> > > established. Salting using the EK is the usual method, but this
> > > requires walking the EK certificate chain and embedding the TPM
> > > vendor CA certificates in the kernel.
> >
> > The design establishes the shared secret at start of day using an
> > EC derived key from the null seed. This can obviously be spoofed
> > by a TPM Genie running before the system was rebooted. However,
> > the computed key name is exposed to user space and TPM2_Certify
> > will fail when userspace checks the null seed so you will know
> > after the fact whether the communication channel established on
> > boot was secure or not.
> >
> > It is possible to use either the EPS or SPS if we pass in the
> > public points as kernel parameters but this is getting rather
> > complicated for casual users.
>
> Where was the code that exposes it to the user space?
It's patch 6/7. It exposes the null ec primary name in sysfs:
jejb@jarvis~> cat /sys/class/tpm0/tpm/null_name
000ba4fa35ecfbf7c85e5407d07edc27f6a522c8b1a011bcb68c60b27baf21f9d9ec
The key certification gives you back a signed copy of the name which
you can verify against this.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-24 7:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-22 7:33 [PATCH v4 0/7] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2018-10-22 7:35 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers James Bottomley
2018-10-23 19:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-23 19:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-22 7:36 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] tpm2-sessions: Add full HMAC and encrypt/decrypt session handling James Bottomley
2018-10-22 22:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-10-23 7:01 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-23 10:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-10-24 8:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-23 23:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-24 9:31 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-25 15:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-22 7:37 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] tpm2: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2018-10-22 7:37 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] tpm2: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2018-10-22 7:38 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] trusted keys: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2018-10-24 0:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-22 7:39 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] tpm: add the null key name as a tpm2 sysfs variable James Bottomley
2018-10-22 7:40 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] tpm2-sessions: NOT FOR COMMITTING add sessions testing James Bottomley
2018-10-22 13:53 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions Ken Goldman
2018-10-22 14:18 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-22 15:50 ` Ken Goldman
2018-10-22 15:55 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-24 0:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-24 7:41 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2018-10-25 15:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-24 0:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-24 7:34 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-25 16:53 ` Ken Goldman
2018-10-23 23:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2018-10-24 7:43 ` James Bottomley
2018-10-25 15:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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