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* [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files
@ 2020-07-27 13:21 Stephen Smalley
  2020-07-27 14:15 ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2020-07-27 13:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: zohar; +Cc: linux-integrity, bill.c.roberts, Stephen Smalley

Extend the ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files.
The extended syntax is "--pcrs algorithm,pathname".  If no algorithm
is specified, it defaults to sha1 as before.  Multiple --pcrs options
are now supported, one per bank of PCRs. The file format remains
unchanged.  If --pcrs is specified, only try to read PCRs from the
specified file(s); do not fall back to trying to read from sysfs
or the TPM itself in this case since the user requested use of
the files.

Create per-bank pcr files, depends on "tpm: add sysfs exports for all
banks of PCR registers" kernel patch:
$ cat tpm2pcrread.sh
#!/bin/sh
for alg in sha1 sha256
do
  rm -f pcr-$alg
  pcr=0;
  while [ $pcr -lt 24 ];
  do
    printf "PCR-%02d: " $pcr >> pcr-$alg;
    cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcr-$alg/$pcr >> pcr-$alg;
    pcr=$[$pcr+1];
  done
done
$ sh ./tpm2pcrread.sh

Pass only the sha1 PCRs to evmctl defaulting to sha1:
$ sudo evmctl ima_measurement --pcrs pcr-sha1 /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/binary_runtime_measurements

Pass only the sha1 PCRs to evmctl with explicit selection of sha1:
$ sudo evmctl ima_measurement --pcrs sha1,pcr-sha1 /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/binary_runtime_measurements

Pass both sha1 and sha256 PCRs to evmctl:
$ sudo evmctl ima_measurement --pcrs sha1,pcr-sha1 --pcrs sha256,pcr-sha256 /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/binary_runtime_measurements

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
v4 updates the usage in the README and usage message, reduces MAX_NPCRFILE
to 2 (for sha1 and sha256) and changes the buffer size to
MAX_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 8 for the lines read from the pcrs file(s).

One thing that is unclear to me is correct/expected usage of the
--verify and --validate options to evmctl ima_measurement. For an
appraisal of a remote attestation, when would one NOT want to use
--verify (i.e. doesn't lack of --verify render the result insecure)
and when would one want to use --validate (i.e. doesn't use of --validate
render the result insecure)? And shouldn't the default in both cases
be the more secure case (i.e. verify = 1, validate = 0)?  The naming of
--validate is also confusing since one might expect it to mean
to validate/check the result as opposed to ignore violations?

 README       |   4 +-
 src/evmctl.c | 170 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 src/imaevm.h |   2 +-
 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

diff --git a/README b/README
index 596b3b0..73b38a1 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ COMMANDS
  ima_sign [--sigfile] [--key key] [--pass password] file
  ima_verify file
  ima_hash file
- ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs file] file
+ ima_measurement [--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key "key1, key2, ..."]]  [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file
  ima_fix [-t fdsxm] path
  sign_hash [--key key] [--pass password]
  hmac [--imahash | --imasig ] file
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ OPTIONS
       --m32          force EVM hmac/signature for 32 bit target system
       --m64          force EVM hmac/signature for 64 bit target system
       --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
-      --pcrs         file containing TPM 1.2 pcrs
+      --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
       --validate     ignore ToMToU measurement violations
       --verify       verify the template data digest
       --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
index faddc3c..448e4a9 100644
--- a/src/evmctl.c
+++ b/src/evmctl.c
@@ -160,7 +160,10 @@ struct tpm_bank_info {
 	uint8_t pcr[NUM_PCRS][MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 };
 
-static char *pcrfile;
+/* One --pcrs file per hash-algorithm/bank */
+#define MAX_PCRFILE 2
+static char *pcrfile[MAX_PCRFILE];
+static unsigned npcrfile;
 
 static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data, int len)
 {
@@ -1373,55 +1376,6 @@ static int cmd_ima_clear(struct command *cmd)
 	return do_cmd(cmd, ima_clear);
 }
 
-static char *pcrs = "/sys/class/tpm/tpm0/device/pcrs";  /* Kernels >= 4.0 */
-static char *misc_pcrs = "/sys/class/misc/tpm0/device/pcrs";
-
-/* Read all of the TPM 1.2 PCRs */
-static int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks, int len)
-{
-	struct stat s;
-	FILE *fp = NULL;
-	char *p, pcr_str[8], buf[70]; /* length of the TPM string */
-	int result = -1;
-	int i = 0;
-
-	/* Use the provided TPM 1.2 pcrs file */
-	if (pcrfile) {
-		if (stat(pcrfile, &s) == -1) {
-			errno = 0;
-			return 1;
-		}
-
-		if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
-			log_info("TPM 1.2 PCR file: not a regular file or link to regular file\n");
-			return 1;
-		}
-
-		fp = fopen(pcrfile, "r");
-	}
-
-	if (!fp)
-		fp = fopen(pcrs, "r");
-
-	if (!fp)
-		fp = fopen(misc_pcrs, "r");
-
-	if (!fp)
-		return -1;
-
-	for (;;) {
-		p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
-		if (!p || i > 99)
-			break;
-		sprintf(pcr_str, "PCR-%2.2d", i);
-		if (!strncmp(p, pcr_str, 6))
-			hex2bin(tpm_banks[0].pcr[i++], p + 7, len);
-		result = 0;
-	}
-	fclose(fp);
-	return result;
-}
-
 #define TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX	255
 
 struct template_entry {
@@ -1829,20 +1783,108 @@ static void extend_tpm_banks(struct template_entry *entry, int num_banks,
 #endif
 }
 
-/* Read TPM 1.2 PCRs */
-static int read_tpm_pcrs(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks)
+static int read_one_bank(struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_bank, FILE *fp)
 {
-	int i;
+	char *p, pcr_str[8], buf[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 8];
+	int i = 0;
+	int result = -1;
+	for (;;) {
+		p = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp);
+		if (!p || i >= NUM_PCRS)
+			break;
+		sprintf(pcr_str, "PCR-%2.2d", i);
+		if (!strncmp(p, pcr_str, 6))
+			hex2bin(tpm_bank->pcr[i++], p + 7, tpm_bank->digest_size);
+		result = 0;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+static char *pcrs = "/sys/class/tpm/tpm0/device/pcrs";  /* Kernels >= 4.0 */
+static char *misc_pcrs = "/sys/class/misc/tpm0/device/pcrs";
+
+/* Read one of the TPM 1.2 sysfs files if present */
+static int read_sysfs_pcrs(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	int i, result;
 
-	if (tpm_pcr_read(tpm_banks, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
-		log_debug("Failed to read TPM 1.2 PCRs.\n");
+	fp = fopen(pcrs, "r");
+	if (!fp)
+		fp = fopen(misc_pcrs, "r");
+	if (!fp)
 		return -1;
-	}
 
+	result = read_one_bank(&tpm_banks[0], fp);
+	fclose(fp);
+	if (result < 0)
+		return result;
 	tpm_banks[0].supported = 1;
 	for (i = 1; i < num_banks; i++)
 		tpm_banks[i].supported = 0;
 	return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* Read PCRs from per-bank file(s) specified via --pcrs */
+static int read_file_pcrs(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks)
+{
+	struct stat s;
+	FILE *fp;
+	char *p;
+	const char *alg, *path;
+	int i, j, bank, result;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_banks; i++)
+		tpm_banks[i].supported = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npcrfile; i++) {
+		p = strchr(pcrfile[i], ',');
+		if (p) {
+			*p = 0;
+			alg = pcrfile[i];
+			path = ++p;
+		} else {
+			alg = "sha1";
+			path = pcrfile[i];
+		}
+
+		bank = -1;
+		for (j = 0; j < num_banks; j++) {
+			if (!strcmp(tpm_banks[j].algo_name, alg)) {
+				bank = j;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (bank < 0) {
+			log_err("Unknown algorithm '%s'\n", alg);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (stat(path, &s) == -1) {
+			log_err("Could not stat '%s'\n", path);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
+			log_err("PCR file: not a regular file or link to regular file\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		fp = fopen(path, "r");
+		if (!fp) {
+			log_err("Could not open '%s'\n", path);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		result = read_one_bank(&tpm_banks[bank], fp);
+		fclose(fp);
+		if (result < 0)
+			return result;
+		tpm_banks[bank].supported = 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1857,8 +1899,12 @@ static int read_tpm_banks(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *bank)
 	int i, j;
 	int err;
 
-	/* First try reading PCRs from exported TPM 1.2 sysfs file */
-	if (read_tpm_pcrs(num_banks, bank) == 0)
+	/* If --pcrs was specified, read only from the specified file(s) */
+	if (npcrfile)
+		return read_file_pcrs(num_banks, bank);
+
+	/* Else try reading PCRs from the sysfs file if present */
+	if (read_sysfs_pcrs(num_banks, bank) == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Any userspace applications available for reading TPM 2.0 PCRs? */
@@ -2440,7 +2486,7 @@ struct command cmds[] = {
 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
 	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "[--sigfile file]", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
 	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs file] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "[--validate] [--verify] [--verify-sig [--key key1, key2, ...]] [--pcrs [hash-algorithm,]file [--pcrs hash-algorithm,file] ...] file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
 	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "[file]", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
 	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
 	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "[-t fdsxm] path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
@@ -2667,7 +2713,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 			verify = 1;
 			break;
 		case 143:
-			pcrfile = optarg;
+			if (npcrfile >= MAX_PCRFILE) {
+				log_err("too many --pcrfile options\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			pcrfile[npcrfile++] = optarg;
 			break;
 		case '?':
 			exit(1);
diff --git a/src/imaevm.h b/src/imaevm.h
index 3f1db97..4503919 100644
--- a/src/imaevm.h
+++ b/src/imaevm.h
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ struct RSA_ASN1_template {
 	size_t size;
 };
 
-#define	NUM_PCRS 20
+#define	NUM_PCRS 24
 #define DEFAULT_PCR 10
 
 extern struct libimaevm_params imaevm_params;
-- 
2.25.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files
  2020-07-27 13:21 [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files Stephen Smalley
@ 2020-07-27 14:15 ` Mimi Zohar
  2020-07-27 14:34   ` Stephen Smalley
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2020-07-27 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley; +Cc: linux-integrity, bill.c.roberts

On Mon, 2020-07-27 at 09:21 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:

> ---
> v4 updates the usage in the README and usage message, reduces MAX_NPCRFILE
> to 2 (for sha1 and sha256) and changes the buffer size to
> MAX_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 8 for the lines read from the pcrs file(s).
> 
> One thing that is unclear to me is correct/expected usage of the
> --verify and --validate options to evmctl ima_measurement. For an
> appraisal of a remote attestation, when would one NOT want to use
> --verify (i.e. doesn't lack of --verify render the result insecure)
> and when would one want to use --validate (i.e. doesn't use of --validate
> render the result insecure)? And shouldn't the default in both cases
> be the more secure case (i.e. verify = 1, validate = 0)?  The naming of
> --validate is also confusing since one might expect it to mean
> to validate/check the result as opposed to ignore violations?

Yes, agreed.  Thank you for reviewing and commenting on the code.

While adding support for these features, originally in LTP and the
standalone version, they should be cleaned up.  Should "--verify" just
be dropped?  Without a custom policy, with just the builtin
"ima_policy=tcb" policy, a few files are read while being opened for
write (e.g. audit, log, print files).  Perhaps rename "validate" to
something like "force-validate".

I forgot to add "evmctl boot_aggregate" to the README.  The supplied
pcrs could also be used to calculate the "boot_aggregate" value(s).

Mimi

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files
  2020-07-27 14:15 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2020-07-27 14:34   ` Stephen Smalley
  2020-07-27 14:51     ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2020-07-27 14:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar; +Cc: linux-integrity, William Roberts

On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 10:15 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2020-07-27 at 09:21 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> > ---
> > v4 updates the usage in the README and usage message, reduces MAX_NPCRFILE
> > to 2 (for sha1 and sha256) and changes the buffer size to
> > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 8 for the lines read from the pcrs file(s).
> >
> > One thing that is unclear to me is correct/expected usage of the
> > --verify and --validate options to evmctl ima_measurement. For an
> > appraisal of a remote attestation, when would one NOT want to use
> > --verify (i.e. doesn't lack of --verify render the result insecure)
> > and when would one want to use --validate (i.e. doesn't use of --validate
> > render the result insecure)? And shouldn't the default in both cases
> > be the more secure case (i.e. verify = 1, validate = 0)?  The naming of
> > --validate is also confusing since one might expect it to mean
> > to validate/check the result as opposed to ignore violations?
>
> Yes, agreed.  Thank you for reviewing and commenting on the code.
>
> While adding support for these features, originally in LTP and the
> standalone version, they should be cleaned up.  Should "--verify" just
> be dropped?

Unless there is some reason to not always verify during
ima_measurement, I'd drop the option and just always do it.

> Without a custom policy, with just the builtin
> "ima_policy=tcb" policy, a few files are read while being opened for
> write (e.g. audit, log, print files).  Perhaps rename "validate" to
> something like "force-validate".

As long as there isn't a backward compatibility concern, that makes
more sense to me. Or "ignore-violations".

> I forgot to add "evmctl boot_aggregate" to the README.  The supplied
> pcrs could also be used to calculate the "boot_aggregate" value(s).

I guess that support is automatically picked up since nothing
restricts usage of the --pcrs option to only ima_measurement and both
call read_tpm_banks(), which includes the pcr file support.  So just a
matter of updating the usage message and README?  That can be done as
a separate patch IMHO.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files
  2020-07-27 14:34   ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2020-07-27 14:51     ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2020-07-27 14:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stephen Smalley; +Cc: linux-integrity, William Roberts

On Mon, 2020-07-27 at 10:34 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 10:15 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, 2020-07-27 at 09:21 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >
> > > ---
> > > v4 updates the usage in the README and usage message, reduces MAX_NPCRFILE
> > > to 2 (for sha1 and sha256) and changes the buffer size to
> > > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE * 2 + 8 for the lines read from the pcrs file(s).
> > >
> > > One thing that is unclear to me is correct/expected usage of the
> > > --verify and --validate options to evmctl ima_measurement. For an
> > > appraisal of a remote attestation, when would one NOT want to use
> > > --verify (i.e. doesn't lack of --verify render the result insecure)
> > > and when would one want to use --validate (i.e. doesn't use of --validate
> > > render the result insecure)? And shouldn't the default in both cases
> > > be the more secure case (i.e. verify = 1, validate = 0)?  The naming of
> > > --validate is also confusing since one might expect it to mean
> > > to validate/check the result as opposed to ignore violations?
> >
> > Yes, agreed.  Thank you for reviewing and commenting on the code.
> >
> > While adding support for these features, originally in LTP and the
> > standalone version, they should be cleaned up.  Should "--verify" just
> > be dropped?
> 
> Unless there is some reason to not always verify during
> ima_measurement, I'd drop the option and just always do it.
> 
OK

> > Without a custom policy, with just the builtin
> > "ima_policy=tcb" policy, a few files are read while being opened for
> > write (e.g. audit, log, print files).  Perhaps rename "validate" to
> > something like "force-validate".
> 
> As long as there isn't a backward compatibility concern, that makes
> more sense to me. Or "ignore-violations". 

Even better.  I don't think there is a backwards compatibility is an
issue, as it was only added in 1.3.0.

> 
> > I forgot to add "evmctl boot_aggregate" to the README.  The supplied
> > pcrs could also be used to calculate the "boot_aggregate" value(s).
> 
> I guess that support is automatically picked up since nothing
> restricts usage of the --pcrs option to only ima_measurement and both
> call read_tpm_banks(), which includes the pcr file support.  So just a
> matter of updating the usage message and README?  That can be done as
> a separate patch IMHO.

Agreed.

Mimi


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

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Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-07-27 13:21 [PATCH v4 ima-evm-utils] extend ima_measurement --pcrs option to support per-bank pcr files Stephen Smalley
2020-07-27 14:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-07-27 14:34   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-27 14:51     ` Mimi Zohar

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