* [PATCH 1/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix the definition of event log
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash Jia Zhang
` (5 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
According to [1], the structure of event log should be packed,
and certain fields should be 32-bit unsigned integer. Fortunately,
keeping natural alignment seems to make everything working as
expected all the time.
[1] page 17,18 @https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_EFI_Protocol_1_22_Final-v05.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
index f6e7be0..d85d222 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
struct {
struct {
u_int32_t pcr;
- int type;
- unsigned char digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- u_int16_t len;
- } header;
+ u_int32_t type;
+ u_int8_t digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ u_int32_t len;
+ } header __attribute__ ((packed));
char *data;
} event;
struct {
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 1/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix the definition of event log Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 20:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7 Jia Zhang
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
Instead, use SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
index d85d222..67be6a7 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void display_sha1_digest(unsigned char *pcr)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
printf("%02x", *(pcr + i) & 0xff);
printf("\n");
}
@@ -94,8 +94,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
display_sha1_digest(event.header.digest);
}
SHA1_Init(&c);
- SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, 20);
- SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, 20);
+ SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
#if MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE < USHRT_MAX
if (event.header.len > MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE) {
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
printf("PCR-%2.2x: ", i);
display_sha1_digest(pcr[i].digest);
}
- SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[i].digest, 20);
+ SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[i].digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
SHA1_Final(boot_aggregate, &c);
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-14 20:33 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-14 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jia Zhang, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> Instead, use SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c | 9 +++++----
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> index d85d222..67be6a7 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static void display_sha1_digest(unsigned char *pcr)
> {
> int i;
>
> - for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
> + for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
> printf("%02x", *(pcr + i) & 0xff);
> printf("\n");
> }
> @@ -94,8 +94,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> display_sha1_digest(event.header.digest);
> }
> SHA1_Init(&c);
> - SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, 20);
> - SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, 20);
> + SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
> + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> + SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
> #if MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE < USHRT_MAX
> if (event.header.len > MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE) {
> @@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> printf("PCR-%2.2x: ", i);
> display_sha1_digest(pcr[i].digest);
> }
> - SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[i].digest, 20);
> + SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[i].digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> }
> SHA1_Final(boot_aggregate, &c);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 1/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix the definition of event log Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 2/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Don't hard code the length of sha1 hash Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 20:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup Jia Zhang
` (3 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
The boot aggragate calculation should never touch PCRs beyond PCR 0-7,
even a PCR extension really manipulates out-of-domain PCRs.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
.../security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
index 67be6a7..98893b9 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
@@ -93,11 +93,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
printf("%03u ", event.header.pcr);
display_sha1_digest(event.header.digest);
}
- SHA1_Init(&c);
- SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
+
+ if (event.header.pcr < NUM_PCRS) {
+ SHA1_Init(&c);
+ SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest,
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
+ }
+
#if MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE < USHRT_MAX
if (event.header.len > MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE) {
printf("Error event too long\n");
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7 Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-14 20:32 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-14 20:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jia Zhang, zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> The boot aggragate calculation should never touch PCRs beyond PCR 0-7,
> even a PCR extension really manipulates out-of-domain PCRs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
Thanks!
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> .../security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> index 67be6a7..98893b9 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/src/ima_boot_aggregate.c
> @@ -93,11 +93,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> printf("%03u ", event.header.pcr);
> display_sha1_digest(event.header.digest);
> }
> - SHA1_Init(&c);
> - SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
> - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> - SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> - SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
> +
> + if (event.header.pcr < NUM_PCRS) {
> + SHA1_Init(&c);
> + SHA1_Update(&c, pcr[event.header.pcr].digest,
> + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> + SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest,
> + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
> + SHA1_Final(pcr[event.header.pcr].digest, &c);
> + }
> +
> #if MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE < USHRT_MAX
> if (event.header.len > MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE) {
> printf("Error event too long\n");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 3/6] ima/ima_boot_aggregate: Fix extending PCRs beyond PCR 0-7 Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 21:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: Rename the folder name for policy files to datafiles Jia Zhang
` (2 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
- Don't use the legacy policy function name in policy files.
- Use the variable IMA_POLICY instead of hard code path.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy | 2 +-
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid | 2 +-
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
index c68e722..9976ddf 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
index e406757..04dff89 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
index 64aa8cb..a0c7869 100755
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ check_policy_writable()
{
local err="IMA policy already loaded and kernel not configured to enable multiple writes to it (need CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y)"
- [ -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ] || tst_brk TCONF "$err"
+ [ -f $IMA_POLICY ] || tst_brk TCONF "$err"
# CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
echo "" 2> log > $IMA_POLICY
grep -q "Device or resource busy" log && tst_brk TCONF "$err"
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-14 21:09 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-14 21:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jia Zhang, zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> - Don't use the legacy policy function name in policy files.
The name change is from PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK, nothing to do with
"policy".
> - Use the variable IMA_POLICY instead of hard code path.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
After removing the word "policy" above,
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy | 2 +-
> testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid | 2 +-
> testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh | 2 +-
> 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
> index c68e722..9976ddf 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
> @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
> index e406757..04dff89 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
> @@ -13,4 +13,4 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
> index 64aa8cb..a0c7869 100755
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh
> @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ check_policy_writable()
> {
> local err="IMA policy already loaded and kernel not configured to enable multiple writes to it (need CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY=y)"
>
> - [ -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ] || tst_brk TCONF "$err"
> + [ -f $IMA_POLICY ] || tst_brk TCONF "$err"
> # CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
> echo "" 2> log > $IMA_POLICY
> grep -q "Device or resource busy" log && tst_brk TCONF "$err"
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/6] ima: Rename the folder name for policy files to datafiles
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] ima: Code cleanup Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test Jia Zhang
2019-01-13 12:14 ` [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
6 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
If we choose to run ima_policy.sh locally without installation,
a failure message is reported as following:
ima_policy 1 TCONF: missing <path>/ltp/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
TST_DATAROOT would be extended to datafiles but the policy files
are actually placed under policy.
In order to make it easier, just rename the folder name to datafiles.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +-
.../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 16 +++++++++++
.../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 16 +++++++++++
.../kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/Makefile | 31 ----------------------
.../security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy | 16 -----------
.../integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid | 16 -----------
7 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
delete mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/Makefile
delete mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
delete mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 1290e6f..19b10ff 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,6 @@ top_srcdir ?= ../../../../..
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/env_pre.mk
-SUBDIRS := policy src tests
+SUBDIRS := datafiles src tests
include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_trunk_target.mk
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a960f9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+#
+# testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy testcases Makefile.
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2009, Cisco Systems Inc.
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+# GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+# with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+# 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+#
+# Ngie Cooper, July 2009
+#
+
+top_srcdir ?= ../../../../../..
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/env_pre.mk
+
+INSTALL_DIR := testcases/data/ima_policy
+
+INSTALL_TARGETS := measure*
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9976ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# Integrity measure policy
+#
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04dff89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# Integrity measure policy
+#
+# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+# SYSFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+# TMPFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/Makefile b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index a960f9d..0000000
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#
-# testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy testcases Makefile.
-#
-# Copyright (C) 2009, Cisco Systems Inc.
-#
-# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-# (at your option) any later version.
-#
-# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
-# GNU General Public License for more details.
-#
-# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
-# with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
-# 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
-#
-# Ngie Cooper, July 2009
-#
-
-top_srcdir ?= ../../../../../..
-
-include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/env_pre.mk
-
-INSTALL_DIR := testcases/data/ima_policy
-
-INSTALL_TARGETS := measure*
-
-include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
deleted file mode 100644
index 9976ddf..0000000
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Integrity measure policy
-#
-# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
-# SYSFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
-# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
-# TMPFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
-# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
-measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
deleted file mode 100644
index 04dff89..0000000
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy/measure.policy-invalid
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Integrity measure policy
-#
-# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
-# SYSFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
-# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
-# TMPFS_MAGIC
-dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
-# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
-dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
-measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 5/6] ima: Rename the folder name for policy files to datafiles Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 2:26 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 15:59 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-13 12:14 ` [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
6 siblings, 2 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 2:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp, zhang.jia
In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
keep up with the default ima tcb policy. Especially ima_violations.sh
expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
---
.../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
.../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
-measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SELINUX_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+# NSFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
+measure func=MODULE_CHECK
+measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
-measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+# SELINUX_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+# NSFS_MAGIC
+dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
-measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
+measure func=MODULE_CHECK
+measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-07 15:59 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
1 sibling, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-07 15:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On 2019/1/7 上午10:26, Jia Zhang wrote:
> In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
> keep up ith the default ima tcb policy. Especially ima_violations.sh
> expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
Oops ... This is not true. mask=MAY_READ is already working well for
open writer and ToMToU violations. So please drop this patch.
Jia
> writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
> which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
> ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
> .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> .../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test Jia Zhang
2019-01-07 15:59 ` Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-15 1:12 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-15 10:50 ` Petr Vorel
1 sibling, 2 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2019-01-14 19:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jia Zhang, zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
> keep up with the default ima tcb policy.
Keeping the policy rules in sync is a good idea, but some of the rules
might cause a regression with older kernels (eg. NSFS magic). Not
including the rule, also poses a problem.
The kernel headers package includes magic.h. One solution would be to check whether a magic name is included in magic.h.
> Especially ima_violations.sh
> expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
> writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
> which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
> ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
We're not really interested in measuring files that are opened for
write. They're changing. The violation checking is independent of
having a measurement write rule. Look at the
kernel ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Mimi
>
> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
> ---
> .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> .../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
> +# NSFS_MAGIC
> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2019-01-15 1:12 ` Jia Zhang
2019-01-15 10:50 ` Petr Vorel
1 sibling, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-15 1:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar, zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
On 2019/1/15 上午3:32, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
>> In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
>> keep up with the default ima tcb policy.
>
> Keeping the policy rules in sync is a good idea, but some of the rules
> might cause a regression with older kernels (eg. NSFS magic). Not
> including the rule, also poses a problem.
>
> The kernel headers package includes magic.h. One solution would be to check whether a magic name is included in magic.h.
>
>> Especially ima_violations.sh
>> expects to have a func=FILE_CHECK with mask=MAY_WRITE to trigger open
>> writer and ToMtoU violations. Unfortunately, if ima_policy.sh
>> which would change the system IMA policy ran before ima_violations.sh,
>> ima_violations.sh would fail for sure because its prerequisite is broken.
>
> We're not really interested in measuring files that are opened for
> write. They're changing. The violation checking is independent of
> having a measurement write rule. Look at the
> kernel ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Thanks for the commits. I will drop this patch in V2.
Jia
>
> Mimi
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <zhang.jia@linux.alibaba.com>
>> ---
>> .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy | 17 +++++++++++++++--
>> .../integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid | 17 +++++++++++++++--
>> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
>> index 9976ddf..546267c 100644
>> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
>> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy
>> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
>> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
>> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
>> dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
>> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
>> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
>> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
>> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
>> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
>> +# NSFS_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
>> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
>> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
>> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
>> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
>> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
>> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
>> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
>> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
>> index 04dff89..bc72d0c 100644
>> --- a/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
>> +++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/measure.policy-invalid
>> @@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
>> dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
>> # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
>> dnt_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
>> -measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
>> +# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
>> +# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
>> +# SELINUX_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
>> +# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
>> +# NSFS_MAGIC
>> +dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
>> +measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
>> measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
>> -measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
>> +measure func=FILE_CHECK euid=0
>> +measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0
>> +measure func=MODULE_CHECK
>> +measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test
2019-01-14 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-01-15 1:12 ` Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-15 10:50 ` Petr Vorel
1 sibling, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Petr Vorel @ 2019-01-15 10:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar; +Cc: Jia Zhang, zohar, linux-integrity, ltp
Hi Mimi, Jia,
> On Mon, 2019-01-07 at 10:26 +0800, Jia Zhang wrote:
> > In order to make all tests running smoothly, the policy files should
> > keep up with the default ima tcb policy.
> Keeping the policy rules in sync is a good idea, but some of the rules
> might cause a regression with older kernels (eg. NSFS magic). Not
> including the rule, also poses a problem.
Mimi, you added NSFS_MAGIC into policy in v4.2 (cd025f7f9410 "ima: do not
measure or appraise the NSFS filesystem"), in the commit is Cc for 3.19, but
it's not in origin/linux-3.19.y stable tree (v3.19.8). So regression could be
from kernel <= 4.1.
> The kernel headers package includes magic.h. One solution would be to check whether a magic name is included in magic.h.
Interesting approach, I like this approach. Policy would have to be generated on
the fly, but that shouldn't be a problem.
Kind regards,
Petr
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle
2019-01-07 2:26 [PATCH 0/6] LTP IMA fix bundle Jia Zhang
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2019-01-07 2:26 ` [PATCH 6/6] ima: Use ima tcb policy files for test Jia Zhang
@ 2019-01-13 12:14 ` Jia Zhang
6 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Jia Zhang @ 2019-01-13 12:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: zohar, pvorel; +Cc: linux-integrity, ltp
Hi Mimi,
Could you review this patchset for LTP?
Thanks,
Jia
On 2019/1/7 上午10:26, Jia Zhang wrote:
> Hi Mimi & Petr,
>
> This fix bundle fixes and cleans up IMA-related testcases in LTP.
>
> My test result is attached here.
>
> #cat LTP_RUN_ON-2019_01_07-10h_05m_16s.log
> Test Start Time: Mon Jan 7 10:05:18 2019
> -----------------------------------------
> Testcase Result Exit Value
> -------- ------ ----------
> ima_measurements PASS 0
> ima_policy PASS 0
> ima_tpm CONF 32
> ima_violations PASS 0
>
> -----------------------------------------------
> Total Tests: 4
> Total Skipped Tests: 1
> Total Failures: 0
> Kernel Version: 4.20.0+
> Machine Architecture: x86_64
> Hostname: test-machine
>
> Note:
> - The original PR is available at https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/pull/459
> - The test2() in ima_tpm requires /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/device/pcrs but this interface
> is not available if TPM2 device used. So the test result showed above is expected.
>
> Jia
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread