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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	<stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm      | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
index 3c477ba48a31..eb6d70fd6fa2 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -49,8 +49,9 @@ Description:
 		modification of EVM-protected metadata and
 		disable all further modification of policy
 
-		Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be
-		possible to enable metadata modification.
+		Note that once an HMAC key has been loaded, it will no longer
+		be possible to enable metadata modification and, if it is
+		already enabled, it will be disabled.
 
 		Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create
 		or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index bbc85637e18b..197a4b83e534 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -81,10 +81,10 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if
-	 * keys are loaded.
+	 * an HMAC key is loaded.
 	 */
 	if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) &&
-	    ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) &&
+	    ((evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) != 0) &&
 	    !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-03-05 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-05 15:19 [PATCH v4 00/11] evm: Improve usability of portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] ima: Move ima_reset_appraise_flags() call to post hooks Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 17:30   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-26 19:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27  9:25       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-27 15:34         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27 15:57           ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-27 16:03             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27 16:39             ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-27 16:48               ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-28  7:48               ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-28 15:35   ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-30 18:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-03  7:41       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-03 13:21         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] evm: Introduce evm_status_revalidate() Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] evm: Ignore INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if conditions are safe Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 10:53   ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 12:13     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-25 12:21       ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-25 12:40         ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 12:39       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised Roberto Sassu

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