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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 04/11] ima: Move ima_reset_appraise_flags() call to post hooks
Date: Fri, 5 Mar 2021 16:19:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210305151923.29039-5-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210305151923.29039-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

ima_inode_setxattr() and ima_inode_removexattr() hooks are called before an
operation is performed. Thus, ima_reset_appraise_flags() should not be
called there, as flags might be unnecessarily reset if the operation is
denied.

This patch introduces the post hooks ima_inode_post_setxattr() and
ima_inode_post_removexattr(), and adds the call to
ima_reset_appraise_flags() in the new functions.

Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 fs/xattr.c                            |  2 ++
 include/linux/ima.h                   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 security/security.c                   |  1 +
 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index b3444e06cded..81847f132d26 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -502,6 +503,7 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+		ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	}
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 61d5723ec303..5e059da43857 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -171,7 +171,13 @@ extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 				   struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len);
 extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name);
 #else
 static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
 {
@@ -192,11 +198,23 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					   const char *xattr_name,
+					   const void *xattr_value,
+					   size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					      const char *xattr_name)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 565e33ff19d0..1f029e4c8d7f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -577,21 +577,40 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	if (result == 1) {
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
-			xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
 }
 
+void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value;
+	int result;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len);
+	if (result == 1)
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+}
+
 int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 {
 	int result;
 
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;
 }
+
+void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+	if (result == 1)
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0);
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5ac96b16f8fa..efb1f874dc41 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return;
 	call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-03-05 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-05 15:19 [PATCH v4 00/11] evm: Improve usability of portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2021-03-05 17:30   ` [PATCH v4 04/11] ima: Move ima_reset_appraise_flags() call to post hooks Casey Schaufler
2021-04-26 19:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27  9:25       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-27 15:34         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27 15:57           ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-27 16:03             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-27 16:39             ` Casey Schaufler
2021-04-27 16:48               ` Mimi Zohar
2021-04-28  7:48               ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-28 15:35   ` Roberto Sassu
2021-04-30 18:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-05-03  7:41       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-05-03 13:21         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] evm: Introduce evm_status_revalidate() Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] evm: Ignore INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS if conditions are safe Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 10:53   ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 12:13     ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-25 12:21       ` Christian Brauner
2021-03-25 12:40         ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-25 12:39       ` Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback Roberto Sassu
2021-03-05 15:19 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised Roberto Sassu

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