Linux-Integrity Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / Atom feed
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 08:31:35 +0000
Message-ID: <89e3c7c531b228673089ad892d5e6390642ced85.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1575781659.14069.9.camel@HansenPartnership.com>


[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1737 bytes --]

On Sat, 2019-12-07 at 21:07 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> The trusted keys code currently loads a blob into the TPM and unseals
> on the handle.  However, it never flushes the handle meaning that
> volatile contexts build up until the TPM becomes unusable.  Fix this
> by flushing the handle after the unseal.
> 
> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h                    | 1 -
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c               | 1 +
>  include/linux/tpm.h                       | 1 +
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 1 +
>  4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index b9e1547be6b5..5620747da0cf 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
>  int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
>  		    struct tpm_digest *digests);
>  int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max);
> -void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
>  ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,
>  			u32 *value, const char *desc);
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> index fdb457704aa7..b87592f4a6c7 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
>  	tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context");
>  	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
>  }
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_flush_context);


Everything else is EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(). Why EXPORT_SYMBOL() here?



[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5174 bytes --]

  reply index

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-08  5:06 [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:07 ` [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-09  8:31   ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2019-12-09 15:38     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:08 ` [PATCH 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-09  8:50   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 15:46     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 22:05   ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-09 22:43     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:09 ` [PATCH 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09  8:55   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:21     ` James Bottomley
2020-06-19 20:45     ` Wiseman, Monty (GE Research, US)
2020-06-19 22:50       ` Jerry Snitselaar
2020-06-20 15:36       ` James Bottomley
2020-06-23  1:17       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-08  5:10 ` [PATCH 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:04   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:31     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:11 ` [PATCH 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:09   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 17:23     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:12 ` [PATCH 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:18   ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 18:03     ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 18:44       ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 19:11         ` James Bottomley
2019-12-25 17:08           ` Ken Goldman
2019-12-08  5:13 ` [PATCH 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-08  5:14 ` [PATCH 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-09 20:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-09 20:57   ` James Bottomley

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=89e3c7c531b228673089ad892d5e6390642ced85.camel@infradead.org \
    --to=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
    --cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

Linux-Integrity Archive on lore.kernel.org

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/0 linux-integrity/git/0.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 linux-integrity linux-integrity/ https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity \
		linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index linux-integrity

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git