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From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
	Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>,
	Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@redhat.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
	Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@amazon.com>,
	Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v2 5/5] selftests: tls: add rekey tests
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:17:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6fd00910e368e98382783a25ef852197b74ca5ba.1676052788.git.sd@queasysnail.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1676052788.git.sd@queasysnail.net>

v2: add rekey_fail test (reject changing the version/cipher)

Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 322 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 322 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index 5f3adb28fee1..098d52859521 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -1453,6 +1453,328 @@ TEST_F(tls, shutdown_reuse)
 	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EISCONN);
 }
 
+#define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE      0x16
+/* key_update, length 1, update_not_requested */
+static const char key_update_msg[] = "\x18\x00\x00\x01\x00";
+static void tls_send_keyupdate(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd)
+{
+	size_t len = sizeof(key_update_msg);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(tls_send_cmsg(fd, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE,
+				(char *)key_update_msg, len, 0),
+		  len);
+}
+
+static void tls_recv_keyupdate(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, int flags)
+{
+	char buf[100];
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(tls_recv_cmsg(_metadata, fd, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE, buf, sizeof(buf), flags),
+		  sizeof(key_update_msg));
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, key_update_msg, sizeof(key_update_msg)), 0);
+}
+
+/* set the key to 0 then 1 for RX, immediately to 1 for TX */
+TEST_F(tls_basic, rekey_rx)
+{
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_0, tls12_1;
+	char const *test_str = "test_message";
+	int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+	char buf[20];
+	int ret;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		return;
+
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+			     &tls12_0, 0);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+			     &tls12_1, 1);
+
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_0, tls12_0.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+/* set the key to 0 then 1 for TX, immediately to 1 for RX */
+TEST_F(tls_basic, rekey_tx)
+{
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_0, tls12_1;
+	char const *test_str = "test_message";
+	int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+	char buf[20];
+	int ret;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		return;
+
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+			     &tls12_0, 0);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+			     &tls12_1, 1);
+
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_0, tls12_0.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey)
+{
+	char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+	char const *test_str_2 = "test_message_after_rekey";
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int send_len;
+	char buf[100];
+
+	if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	/* initial send/recv */
+	send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+	/* update TX key */
+	tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	/* send after rekey */
+	send_len = strlen(test_str_2) + 1;
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_2, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+	/* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+
+	/* get KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+	/* recv blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+	/* recv non-blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+	/* update RX key */
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	/* recv after rekey */
+	EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_2, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_fail)
+{
+	char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+	char const *test_str_2 = "test_message_after_rekey";
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int send_len;
+	char buf[100];
+
+	if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	/* initial send/recv */
+	send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+	/* update TX key */
+	tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+
+	/* successful update */
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	/* invalid update: change of version */
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+	/* invalid update: change of cipher */
+	if (variant->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256)
+		tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &tls12, 1);
+	else
+		tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+	/* send after rekey, the invalid updates shouldn't have an effect */
+	send_len = strlen(test_str_2) + 1;
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_2, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+	/* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+
+	/* get KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+	/* recv blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+	/* recv non-blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+	/* update RX key */
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	/* recv after rekey */
+	EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_2, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_peek)
+{
+	char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int send_len;
+	char buf[100];
+
+	if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+	/* update TX key */
+	tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+	/* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+	EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_PEEK), -1);
+
+	/* peek KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, MSG_PEEK);
+
+	/* get KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+	/* update RX key */
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, splice_rekey)
+{
+	int send_len = TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN / 2;
+	char mem_send[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN];
+	char mem_recv[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN];
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int p[2];
+
+	if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	memrnd(mem_send, sizeof(mem_send));
+
+	ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, mem_send, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+	/* update TX key */
+	tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, mem_send, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(read(p[0], mem_recv, send_len), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(mem_send, mem_recv, send_len), 0);
+
+	/* can't splice the KeyUpdate */
+	EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+	/* peek KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, MSG_PEEK);
+
+	/* get KeyUpdate */
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+	/* can't splice before updating the key */
+	EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+	/* update RX key */
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(read(p[0], mem_recv, send_len), send_len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(mem_send, mem_recv, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_getsockopt)
+{
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_get;
+	socklen_t len;
+
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 0);
+
+	len = tls12.len;
+	EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	len = tls12.len;
+	EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+		return;
+
+	tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+	tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	len = tls12.len;
+	EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+	len = tls12.len;
+	EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+	EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+}
+
 FIXTURE(tls_err)
 {
 	int fd, cfd;
-- 
2.38.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-14 11:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-14 11:17 [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-14 11:17 ` [PATCH net-next v2 1/5] tls: remove tls_context argument from tls_set_sw_offload Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-14 11:17 ` [PATCH net-next v2 2/5] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-15  5:09   ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-02-15 17:37     ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-14 11:17 ` [PATCH net-next v2 3/5] tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-14 11:17 ` [PATCH net-next v2 4/5] selftests: tls: add key_generation argument to tls_crypto_info_init Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-14 11:17 ` Sabrina Dubroca [this message]
2023-02-15  5:08 ` [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Jakub Kicinski
2023-02-15 17:29   ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-15 19:10     ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-02-15 23:23       ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-16  3:57         ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-02-16 16:23           ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-22  3:19             ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-02-23 16:27               ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-02-23 17:29                 ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-03-13 15:41                   ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-03-13 18:35                     ` Jakub Kicinski
2023-03-22 16:10                       ` Sabrina Dubroca
2023-03-22 19:43                         ` Jakub Kicinski

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