Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>,
	Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@redhat.com>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
	Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@amazon.com>,
	Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2023 18:29:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+0Wjrc9shLkH+Gg@hog> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230214210811.448b5ec4@kernel.org>

2023-02-14, 21:08:11 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Feb 2023 12:17:37 +0100 Sabrina Dubroca wrote:
> > Changes in v2
> > use reverse xmas tree ordering in tls_set_sw_offload and
> > do_tls_setsockopt_conf
> > turn the alt_crypto_info into an else if
> > selftests: add rekey_fail test
> > 
> > Vadim suggested simplifying tls_set_sw_offload by copying the new
> > crypto_info in the context in do_tls_setsockopt_conf, and then
> > detecting the rekey in tls_set_sw_offload based on whether the iv was
> > already set, but I don't think we can have a common error path
> > (otherwise we'd free the aead etc on rekey failure). I decided instead
> > to reorganize tls_set_sw_offload so that the context is unmodified
> > until we know the rekey cannot fail. Some fields will be touched
> > during the rekey, but they will be set to the same value they had
> > before the rekey (prot->rec_seq_size, etc).
> > 
> > Apoorv suggested to name the struct tls_crypto_info_keys "tls13"
> > rather than "tls12". Since we're using the same crypto_info data for
> > TLS1.3 as for 1.2, even if the tests only run for TLS1.3, I'd rather
> > keep the "tls12" name, in case we end up adding a
> > "tls13_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128" type in the future.
> > 
> > Kuniyuki and Apoorv also suggested preventing rekeys on RX when we
> > haven't received a matching KeyUpdate message, but I'd rather let
> > userspace handle this and have a symmetric API between TX and RX on
> > the kernel side. It's a bit of a foot-gun, but we can't really stop a
> > broken userspace from rolling back the rec_seq on an existing
> > crypto_info either, and that seems like a worse possible breakage.
> 
> And how will we handle re-keying in offload?

Sorry for the stupid question... do you mean that I need to solve that
problem before this series can progress, or that the cover letter
should summarize the state of the discussion?

> >  include/net/tls.h                 |   4 +
> >  net/tls/tls.h                     |   3 +-
> >  net/tls/tls_device.c              |   2 +-
> >  net/tls/tls_main.c                |  37 +++-
> >  net/tls/tls_sw.c                  | 189 +++++++++++++----
> >  tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 
> Documentation please.

Ok, I'll add a paragraph to Documentation/networking/tls.rst in the
next version.

-- 
Sabrina