* [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: selftests: move vm_phy_pages_alloc() earlier in file
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: selftests: sparsebit: add const where appropriate Michael Roth
` (12 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Subsequent patches will break some of this code out into file-local
helper functions, which will be used by functions like vm_vaddr_alloc(),
which currently are defined earlier in the file, so a forward
declaration would be needed.
Instead, move it earlier in the file, just above vm_vaddr_alloc() and
and friends, which are the main users.
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 146 ++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 8f2e0bb1ef96..f0f0250847f3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -1153,6 +1153,79 @@ void vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
list_add(&vcpu->list, &vm->vcpus);
}
+/*
+ * Physical Contiguous Page Allocator
+ *
+ * Input Args:
+ * vm - Virtual Machine
+ * num - number of pages
+ * paddr_min - Physical address minimum
+ * memslot - Memory region to allocate page from
+ *
+ * Output Args: None
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * Starting physical address
+ *
+ * Within the VM specified by vm, locates a range of available physical
+ * pages at or above paddr_min. If found, the pages are marked as in use
+ * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if
+ * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min.
+ */
+vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
+ vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg, base;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(num > 0, "Must allocate at least one page");
+
+ TEST_ASSERT((paddr_min % vm->page_size) == 0, "Min physical address "
+ "not divisible by page size.\n"
+ " paddr_min: 0x%lx page_size: 0x%x",
+ paddr_min, vm->page_size);
+
+ region = memslot2region(vm, memslot);
+ base = pg = paddr_min >> vm->page_shift;
+
+ do {
+ for (; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
+ if (!sparsebit_is_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg)) {
+ base = pg = sparsebit_next_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (pg && pg != base + num);
+
+ if (pg == 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No guest physical page available, "
+ "paddr_min: 0x%lx page_size: 0x%x memslot: %u\n",
+ paddr_min, vm->page_size, memslot);
+ fputs("---- vm dump ----\n", stderr);
+ vm_dump(stderr, vm, 2);
+ abort();
+ }
+
+ for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg)
+ sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
+
+ return base * vm->page_size;
+}
+
+vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
+ uint32_t memslot)
+{
+ return vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, 1, paddr_min, memslot);
+}
+
+/* Arbitrary minimum physical address used for virtual translation tables. */
+#define KVM_GUEST_PAGE_TABLE_MIN_PADDR 0x180000
+
+vm_paddr_t vm_alloc_page_table(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ return vm_phy_page_alloc(vm, KVM_GUEST_PAGE_TABLE_MIN_PADDR, 0);
+}
+
/*
* VM Virtual Address Unused Gap
*
@@ -2195,79 +2268,6 @@ const char *exit_reason_str(unsigned int exit_reason)
return "Unknown";
}
-/*
- * Physical Contiguous Page Allocator
- *
- * Input Args:
- * vm - Virtual Machine
- * num - number of pages
- * paddr_min - Physical address minimum
- * memslot - Memory region to allocate page from
- *
- * Output Args: None
- *
- * Return:
- * Starting physical address
- *
- * Within the VM specified by vm, locates a range of available physical
- * pages at or above paddr_min. If found, the pages are marked as in use
- * and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if
- * not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min.
- */
-vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
- vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
-{
- struct userspace_mem_region *region;
- sparsebit_idx_t pg, base;
-
- TEST_ASSERT(num > 0, "Must allocate at least one page");
-
- TEST_ASSERT((paddr_min % vm->page_size) == 0, "Min physical address "
- "not divisible by page size.\n"
- " paddr_min: 0x%lx page_size: 0x%x",
- paddr_min, vm->page_size);
-
- region = memslot2region(vm, memslot);
- base = pg = paddr_min >> vm->page_shift;
-
- do {
- for (; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
- if (!sparsebit_is_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg)) {
- base = pg = sparsebit_next_set(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
- break;
- }
- }
- } while (pg && pg != base + num);
-
- if (pg == 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "No guest physical page available, "
- "paddr_min: 0x%lx page_size: 0x%x memslot: %u\n",
- paddr_min, vm->page_size, memslot);
- fputs("---- vm dump ----\n", stderr);
- vm_dump(stderr, vm, 2);
- abort();
- }
-
- for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg)
- sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
-
- return base * vm->page_size;
-}
-
-vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
- uint32_t memslot)
-{
- return vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, 1, paddr_min, memslot);
-}
-
-/* Arbitrary minimum physical address used for virtual translation tables. */
-#define KVM_GUEST_PAGE_TABLE_MIN_PADDR 0x180000
-
-vm_paddr_t vm_alloc_page_table(struct kvm_vm *vm)
-{
- return vm_phy_page_alloc(vm, KVM_GUEST_PAGE_TABLE_MIN_PADDR, 0);
-}
-
/*
* Address Guest Virtual to Host Virtual
*
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: selftests: sparsebit: add const where appropriate
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: selftests: move vm_phy_pages_alloc() earlier in file Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory Michael Roth
` (11 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Subsequent patches will introduce an encryption bitmap in kvm_util that
would be useful to allow tests to access in read-only fashion. This
will be done via a const sparsebit*. To avoid warnings or the need to
add casts everywhere, add const to the various sparsebit functions that
are applicable for read-only usage of sparsebit.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h | 36 +++++++-------
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c | 48 +++++++++----------
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
index 12a9a4b9cead..fb5170d57fcb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h
@@ -30,26 +30,26 @@ typedef uint64_t sparsebit_num_t;
struct sparsebit *sparsebit_alloc(void);
void sparsebit_free(struct sparsebit **sbitp);
-void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *dstp, struct sparsebit *src);
+void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *dstp, const struct sparsebit *src);
-bool sparsebit_is_set(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
-bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+bool sparsebit_is_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
+bool sparsebit_is_set_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num);
-bool sparsebit_is_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
-bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
+bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num);
-sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_any_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_all_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-bool sparsebit_all_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_any_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_any_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_all_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+bool sparsebit_all_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(const struct sparsebit *sbit, sparsebit_idx_t prev);
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbit,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *sbit,
sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
void sparsebit_set(struct sparsebit *sbitp, sparsebit_idx_t idx);
@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ void sparsebit_clear_num(struct sparsebit *sbitp,
sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num);
void sparsebit_clear_all(struct sparsebit *sbitp);
-void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *sbit,
+void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *sbit,
unsigned int indent);
-void sparsebit_validate_internal(struct sparsebit *sbit);
+void sparsebit_validate_internal(const struct sparsebit *sbit);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
index 50e0cf41a7dd..6777a5b1fbd2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static sparsebit_num_t node_num_set(struct node *nodep)
/* Returns a pointer to the node that describes the
* lowest bit index.
*/
-static struct node *node_first(struct sparsebit *s)
+static struct node *node_first(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
struct node *nodep;
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static struct node *node_first(struct sparsebit *s)
* lowest bit index > the index of the node pointed to by np.
* Returns NULL if no node with a higher index exists.
*/
-static struct node *node_next(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
+static struct node *node_next(const struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
{
struct node *nodep = np;
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static struct node *node_next(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
* highest index < the index of the node pointed to by np.
* Returns NULL if no node with a lower index exists.
*/
-static struct node *node_prev(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
+static struct node *node_prev(const struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
{
struct node *nodep = np;
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ static struct node *node_prev(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *np)
* subtree and duplicates the bit settings to the newly allocated nodes.
* Returns the newly allocated copy of subtree.
*/
-static struct node *node_copy_subtree(struct node *subtree)
+static struct node *node_copy_subtree(const struct node *subtree)
{
struct node *root;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static struct node *node_copy_subtree(struct node *subtree)
* index is within the bits described by the mask bits or the number of
* contiguous bits set after the mask. Returns NULL if there is no such node.
*/
-static struct node *node_find(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
+static struct node *node_find(const struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
{
struct node *nodep;
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static struct node *node_add(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
}
/* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are set. */
-bool sparsebit_all_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_all_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
/*
* If any nodes there must be at least one bit set. Only case
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static void node_reduce(struct sparsebit *s, struct node *nodep)
/* Returns whether the bit at the index given by idx, within the
* sparsebit array is set or not.
*/
-bool sparsebit_is_set(struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
+bool sparsebit_is_set(const struct sparsebit *s, sparsebit_idx_t idx)
{
struct node *nodep;
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ static inline sparsebit_idx_t node_first_clear(struct node *nodep, int start)
* used by test cases after they detect an unexpected condition, as a means
* to capture diagnostic information.
*/
-static void sparsebit_dump_internal(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
+static void sparsebit_dump_internal(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *s,
unsigned int indent)
{
/* Dump the contents of s */
@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ void sparsebit_free(struct sparsebit **sbitp)
* sparsebit_alloc(). It can though already have bits set, which
* if different from src will be cleared.
*/
-void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, struct sparsebit *s)
+void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, const struct sparsebit *s)
{
/* First clear any bits already set in the destination */
sparsebit_clear_all(d);
@@ -982,7 +982,7 @@ void sparsebit_copy(struct sparsebit *d, struct sparsebit *s)
}
/* Returns whether num consecutive bits starting at idx are all set. */
-bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_set_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num)
{
sparsebit_idx_t next_cleared;
@@ -1006,14 +1006,14 @@ bool sparsebit_is_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
}
/* Returns whether the bit at the index given by idx. */
-bool sparsebit_is_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t idx)
{
return !sparsebit_is_set(s, idx);
}
/* Returns whether num consecutive bits starting at idx are all cleared. */
-bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t idx, sparsebit_num_t num)
{
sparsebit_idx_t next_set;
@@ -1042,13 +1042,13 @@ bool sparsebit_is_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
* value. Use sparsebit_any_set(), instead of sparsebit_num_set() > 0,
* to determine if the sparsebit array has any bits set.
*/
-sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_num_t sparsebit_num_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
return s->num_set;
}
/* Returns whether any bit is set in the sparsebit array. */
-bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_any_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
/*
* Nodes only describe set bits. If any nodes then there
@@ -1071,20 +1071,20 @@ bool sparsebit_any_set(struct sparsebit *s)
}
/* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are cleared. */
-bool sparsebit_all_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_all_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
return !sparsebit_any_set(s);
}
/* Returns whether all the bits in the sparsebit array are set. */
-bool sparsebit_any_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+bool sparsebit_any_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
return !sparsebit_all_set(s);
}
/* Returns the index of the first set bit. Abort if no bits are set.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
struct node *nodep;
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_set(struct sparsebit *s)
/* Returns the index of the first cleared bit. Abort if
* no bits are cleared.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
struct node *nodep1, *nodep2;
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_first_clear(struct sparsebit *s)
/* Returns index of next bit set within s after the index given by prev.
* Returns 0 if there are no bits after prev that are set.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t prev)
{
sparsebit_idx_t lowest_possible = prev + 1;
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set(struct sparsebit *s,
/* Returns index of next bit cleared within s after the index given by prev.
* Returns 0 if there are no bits after prev that are cleared.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t prev)
{
sparsebit_idx_t lowest_possible = prev + 1;
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear(struct sparsebit *s,
* and returns the index of the first sequence of num consecutively set
* bits. Returns a value of 0 of no such sequence exists.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num)
{
sparsebit_idx_t idx;
@@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_set_num(struct sparsebit *s,
* and returns the index of the first sequence of num consecutively cleared
* bits. Returns a value of 0 of no such sequence exists.
*/
-sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(struct sparsebit *s,
+sparsebit_idx_t sparsebit_next_clear_num(const struct sparsebit *s,
sparsebit_idx_t start, sparsebit_num_t num)
{
sparsebit_idx_t idx;
@@ -1584,7 +1584,7 @@ static size_t display_range(FILE *stream, sparsebit_idx_t low,
* contiguous bits. This is done because '-' is used to specify command-line
* options, and sometimes ranges are specified as command-line arguments.
*/
-void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
+void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, const struct sparsebit *s,
unsigned int indent)
{
size_t current_line_len = 0;
@@ -1682,7 +1682,7 @@ void sparsebit_dump(FILE *stream, struct sparsebit *s,
* s. On error, diagnostic information is printed to stderr and
* abort is called.
*/
-void sparsebit_validate_internal(struct sparsebit *s)
+void sparsebit_validate_internal(const struct sparsebit *s)
{
bool error_detected = false;
struct node *nodep, *prev = NULL;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: selftests: move vm_phy_pages_alloc() earlier in file Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: selftests: sparsebit: add const where appropriate Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: selftests: handle encryption bits in page tables Michael Roth
` (10 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
VM implementations that make use of encrypted memory need a way to
configure things like the encryption/shared bit position for page
table handling, the default encryption policy for internal allocations
made by the core library, and a way to fetch the list/bitmap of
encrypted pages to do the actual memory encryption. Add an interface to
configure these parameters. Also introduce a sparsebit map to track
allocations/mappings that should be treated as encrypted, and provide
a way for VM implementations to retrieve it to handle operations
related memory encryption.
Reviewed-by: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
.../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 7 +++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++--
.../selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h | 10 ++++
3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 4e2946ba3ff7..58856339210a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -365,4 +365,11 @@ int vcpu_get_stats_fd(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid);
uint32_t guest_get_vcpuid(void);
+void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit,
+ uint8_t enc_bit);
+
+const struct sparsebit *vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot,
+ vm_paddr_t *gpa_start,
+ uint64_t *size);
+
#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_UTIL_BASE_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index f0f0250847f3..dfedf82207e1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -626,6 +626,7 @@ static void __vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm,
"rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno);
sparsebit_free(®ion->unused_phy_pages);
+ sparsebit_free(®ion->encrypted_phy_pages);
ret = munmap(region->mmap_start, region->mmap_size);
TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "munmap failed, rc: %i errno: %i", ret, errno);
@@ -932,6 +933,7 @@ void vm_userspace_mem_region_add(struct kvm_vm *vm,
}
region->unused_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
+ region->encrypted_phy_pages = sparsebit_alloc();
sparsebit_set_num(region->unused_phy_pages,
guest_paddr >> vm->page_shift, npages);
region->region.slot = slot;
@@ -1161,6 +1163,7 @@ void vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
* num - number of pages
* paddr_min - Physical address minimum
* memslot - Memory region to allocate page from
+ * encrypt - Whether to treat the pages as encrypted
*
* Output Args: None
*
@@ -1172,8 +1175,9 @@ void vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
* and their base address is returned. A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if
* not enough pages are available at or above paddr_min.
*/
-vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
- vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
+static vm_paddr_t
+_vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
+ uint32_t memslot, bool encrypt)
{
struct userspace_mem_region *region;
sparsebit_idx_t pg, base;
@@ -1206,12 +1210,22 @@ vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
abort();
}
- for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg)
+ for (pg = base; pg < base + num; ++pg) {
sparsebit_clear(region->unused_phy_pages, pg);
+ if (encrypt)
+ sparsebit_set(region->encrypted_phy_pages, pg);
+ }
return base * vm->page_size;
}
+vm_paddr_t vm_phy_pages_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t num,
+ vm_paddr_t paddr_min, uint32_t memslot)
+{
+ return _vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, num, paddr_min, memslot,
+ vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default);
+}
+
vm_paddr_t vm_phy_page_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t paddr_min,
uint32_t memslot)
{
@@ -2192,6 +2206,10 @@ void vm_dump(FILE *stream, struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t indent)
region->host_mem);
fprintf(stream, "%*sunused_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
sparsebit_dump(stream, region->unused_phy_pages, 0);
+ if (vm->memcrypt.enabled) {
+ fprintf(stream, "%*sencrypted_phy_pages: ", indent + 2, "");
+ sparsebit_dump(stream, region->encrypted_phy_pages, 0);
+ }
}
fprintf(stream, "%*sMapped Virtual Pages:\n", indent, "");
sparsebit_dump(stream, vm->vpages_mapped, indent + 2);
@@ -2389,3 +2407,31 @@ int vcpu_get_stats_fd(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid)
return ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_GET_STATS_FD, NULL);
}
+
+void vm_set_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm, bool enc_by_default, bool has_enc_bit,
+ uint8_t enc_bit)
+{
+ vm->memcrypt.enabled = true;
+ vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default = enc_by_default;
+ vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit = has_enc_bit;
+ vm->memcrypt.enc_bit = enc_bit;
+}
+
+const struct sparsebit *
+vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int slot, vm_paddr_t *gpa_start,
+ uint64_t *size)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+
+ if (!vm->memcrypt.enabled)
+ return NULL;
+
+ region = memslot2region(vm, slot);
+ if (!region)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *size = region->region.memory_size;
+ *gpa_start = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
+
+ return region->encrypted_phy_pages;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h
index a03febc24ba6..99ccab86115c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
struct userspace_mem_region {
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region region;
struct sparsebit *unused_phy_pages;
+ struct sparsebit *encrypted_phy_pages;
int fd;
off_t offset;
void *host_mem;
@@ -44,6 +45,14 @@ struct userspace_mem_regions {
DECLARE_HASHTABLE(slot_hash, 9);
};
+/* Memory encryption policy/configuration. */
+struct vm_memcrypt {
+ bool enabled;
+ int8_t enc_by_default;
+ bool has_enc_bit;
+ int8_t enc_bit;
+};
+
struct kvm_vm {
int mode;
unsigned long type;
@@ -67,6 +76,7 @@ struct kvm_vm {
vm_vaddr_t idt;
vm_vaddr_t handlers;
uint32_t dirty_ring_size;
+ struct vm_memcrypt memcrypt;
};
struct vcpu *vcpu_find(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid);
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: selftests: handle encryption bits in page tables
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: selftests: add support for encrypted vm_vaddr_* allocations Michael Roth
` (9 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
SEV guests rely on an encyption bit which resides within the range that
current code treats as address bits. Guest code will expect these bits
to be set appropriately in their page tables, whereas the rest of the
kvm_util functions will generally expect these bits to not be present.
Introduce addr_gpa2raw()/addr_raw2gpa() to add/remove these bits, then
use them where appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
.../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++-
.../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c | 16 +++---
3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 58856339210a..005755837aa2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ void *addr_gpa2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa);
void *addr_gva2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gva);
vm_paddr_t addr_hva2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, void *hva);
void *addr_gpa2alias(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa);
+vm_paddr_t addr_raw2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gpa_raw);
+vm_paddr_t addr_gpa2raw(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gpa);
/*
* Address Guest Virtual to Guest Physical
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index dfedf82207e1..5dd36cc15420 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -1445,6 +1445,58 @@ void virt_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr,
}
}
+/*
+ * Mask off any special bits from raw GPA
+ *
+ * Input Args:
+ * vm - Virtual Machine
+ * gpa_raw - Raw VM physical address
+ *
+ * Output Args: None
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * GPA with special bits (e.g. shared/encrypted) masked off.
+ */
+vm_paddr_t addr_raw2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa_raw)
+{
+ if (!vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit)
+ return gpa_raw;
+
+ return gpa_raw & ~(1ULL << vm->memcrypt.enc_bit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add special/encryption bits to a GPA based on encryption bitmap.
+ *
+ * Input Args:
+ * vm - Virtual Machine
+ * gpa - VM physical address
+ *
+ * Output Args: None
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * GPA with special bits (e.g. shared/encrypted) added in.
+ */
+vm_paddr_t addr_gpa2raw(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg;
+ vm_paddr_t gpa_raw = gpa;
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(addr_raw2gpa(vm, gpa) == gpa, "Unexpected bits in GPA: %lx",
+ gpa);
+
+ if (!vm->memcrypt.has_enc_bit)
+ return gpa;
+
+ region = userspace_mem_region_find(vm, gpa, gpa);
+ pg = gpa >> vm->page_shift;
+ if (sparsebit_is_set(region->encrypted_phy_pages, pg))
+ gpa_raw |= (1ULL << vm->memcrypt.enc_bit);
+
+ return gpa_raw;
+}
+
/*
* Address VM Physical to Host Virtual
*
@@ -1462,9 +1514,10 @@ void virt_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr,
* address providing the memory to the vm physical address is returned.
* A TEST_ASSERT failure occurs if no region containing gpa exists.
*/
-void *addr_gpa2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa)
+void *addr_gpa2hva(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa_raw)
{
struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ vm_paddr_t gpa = addr_raw2gpa(vm, gpa_raw);
region = userspace_mem_region_find(vm, gpa, gpa);
if (!region) {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
index 82c39db91369..41aeb34c6d5d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ void virt_pgd_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm)
/* If needed, create page map l4 table. */
if (!vm->pgd_created) {
- vm->pgd = vm_alloc_page_table(vm);
+ vm->pgd = addr_gpa2raw(vm, vm_alloc_page_table(vm));
vm->pgd_created = true;
}
}
@@ -203,15 +203,15 @@ static struct pageUpperEntry *virt_create_upper_pte(struct kvm_vm *vm,
enum x86_page_size page_size)
{
struct pageUpperEntry *pte = virt_get_pte(vm, pt_pfn, vaddr, level);
+ uint64_t paddr_raw = addr_gpa2raw(vm, paddr);
if (!pte->present) {
pte->writable = true;
pte->present = true;
pte->page_size = (level == page_size);
- if (pte->page_size)
- pte->pfn = paddr >> vm->page_shift;
- else
- pte->pfn = vm_alloc_page_table(vm) >> vm->page_shift;
+ if (!pte->page_size)
+ paddr_raw = addr_gpa2raw(vm, vm_alloc_page_table(vm));
+ pte->pfn = paddr_raw >> vm->page_shift;
} else {
/*
* Entry already present. Assert that the caller doesn't want
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr,
"Physical address beyond maximum supported,\n"
" paddr: 0x%lx vm->max_gfn: 0x%lx vm->page_size: 0x%x",
paddr, vm->max_gfn, vm->page_size);
+ TEST_ASSERT(addr_raw2gpa(vm, paddr) == paddr,
+ "Unexpected bits in paddr: %lx", paddr);
/*
* Allocate upper level page tables, if not already present. Return
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ void __virt_pg_map(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t vaddr, uint64_t paddr,
pte = virt_get_pte(vm, pde->pfn, vaddr, 0);
TEST_ASSERT(!pte->present,
"PTE already present for 4k page at vaddr: 0x%lx\n", vaddr);
- pte->pfn = paddr >> vm->page_shift;
+ pte->pfn = addr_gpa2raw(vm, paddr) >> vm->page_shift;
pte->writable = true;
pte->present = 1;
}
@@ -587,7 +589,7 @@ vm_paddr_t addr_gva2gpa(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_vaddr_t gva)
if (!pte[index[0]].present)
goto unmapped_gva;
- return (pte[index[0]].pfn * vm->page_size) + (gva & 0xfffu);
+ return addr_raw2gpa(vm, ((uint64_t)pte[index[0]].pfn * vm->page_size)) + (gva & 0xfffu);
unmapped_gva:
TEST_FAIL("No mapping for vm virtual address, gva: 0x%lx", gva);
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: selftests: add support for encrypted vm_vaddr_* allocations
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: selftests: handle encryption bits in page tables Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: selftests: ensure ucall_shared_alloc() allocates shared memory Michael Roth
` (8 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
The default policy for whether to handle allocations as encrypted or
shared pages is currently determined by vm_phy_pages_alloc(), which in
turn uses the policy defined by vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default.
Test programs may wish to allocate shared vaddrs for things like
sharing memory with the guest. Since enc_by_default will be true in the
case of SEV guests (since it's required in order to have the initial
ELF binary and page table become part of the initial guest payload), an
interface is needed to explicitly request shared pages.
Implement this by splitting the common code out from vm_vaddr_alloc()
and introducing a new vm_vaddr_alloc_shared().
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
.../selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 23 ++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
index 005755837aa2..0e3ded265a31 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ void vm_mem_region_move(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot, uint64_t new_gpa);
void vm_mem_region_delete(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t slot);
void vm_vcpu_add(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpuid);
vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min);
+vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min);
vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_pages(struct kvm_vm *vm, int nr_pages);
vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_page(struct kvm_vm *vm);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 5dd36cc15420..c387f709b6a6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -1327,14 +1327,13 @@ static vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
}
/*
- * VM Virtual Address Allocate
+ * VM Virtual Address Allocate Shared/Encrypted
*
* Input Args:
* vm - Virtual Machine
* sz - Size in bytes
* vaddr_min - Minimum starting virtual address
- * data_memslot - Memory region slot for data pages
- * pgd_memslot - Memory region slot for new virtual translation tables
+ * encrypt - Whether the region should be handled as encrypted
*
* Output Args: None
*
@@ -1347,13 +1346,15 @@ static vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_unused_gap(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz,
* a unique set of pages, with the minimum real allocation being at least
* a page.
*/
-vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min)
+static vm_vaddr_t
+_vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min, bool encrypt)
{
uint64_t pages = (sz >> vm->page_shift) + ((sz % vm->page_size) != 0);
virt_pgd_alloc(vm);
- vm_paddr_t paddr = vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
- KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size, 0);
+ vm_paddr_t paddr = _vm_phy_pages_alloc(vm, pages,
+ KVM_UTIL_MIN_PFN * vm->page_size,
+ 0, encrypt);
/*
* Find an unused range of virtual page addresses of at least
@@ -1374,6 +1375,16 @@ vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min)
return vaddr_start;
}
+vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min)
+{
+ return _vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, vm->memcrypt.enc_by_default);
+}
+
+vm_vaddr_t vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(struct kvm_vm *vm, size_t sz, vm_vaddr_t vaddr_min)
+{
+ return _vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, sz, vaddr_min, false);
+}
+
/*
* VM Virtual Address Allocate Pages
*
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: selftests: ensure ucall_shared_alloc() allocates shared memory
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: selftests: add support for encrypted vm_vaddr_* allocations Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests Michael Roth
` (7 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Now that vm_vaddr_alloc() allocates encrypted/private guest memory by
default for confidential guests, ucall_shared_alloc() needs to be
switched over to using the new vm_vaddr_alloc_shared() function to
ensure that shared memory is used for the allocation.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
index 8e5738241a7c..54c6c159dcd5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c
@@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ uint64_t get_ucall(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t vcpu_id, struct ucall *uc)
/* Allocate shared memory within a guest to for a shared ucall buffer. */
vm_vaddr_t ucall_shared_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm, int count)
{
- return vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, count * sizeof(struct ucall),
- vm_get_page_size(vm));
+ return vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, count * sizeof(struct ucall),
+ vm_get_page_size(vm));
}
/*
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: selftests: ensure ucall_shared_alloc() allocates shared memory Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 20:35 ` Peter Gonda
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests Michael Roth
` (6 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Add interfaces to allow tests to create/manage SEV guests. The
additional state associated with these guests is encapsulated in a new
struct sev_vm, which is a light wrapper around struct kvm_vm. These
VMs will use vm_set_memory_encryption() and vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages()
under the covers to configure and sync up with the core kvm_util
library on what should/shouldn't be treated as encrypted memory.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 9 +-
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 412de8093e6c..ccc382a827f1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),s390)
UNAME_M := s390x
endif
+# On some systems the SEV device path may not be present in the standard
+# location, so allow it to be configured via, e.g.:
+# make TARGETS=kvm SEV_PATH=/path/to/sev_device ...
+SEV_PATH=/dev/sev
+
LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c lib/ucall_common.c
LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
+LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S lib/aarch64/spinlock.c lib/aarch64/gic.c lib/aarch64/gic_v3.c lib/aarch64/vgic.c
LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
@@ -134,7 +140,8 @@ endif
CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
-fno-stack-protector -fno-PIE -I$(LINUX_TOOL_INCLUDE) \
-I$(LINUX_TOOL_ARCH_INCLUDE) -I$(LINUX_HDR_PATH) -Iinclude \
- -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I..
+ -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I.. \
+ -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\"
no-pie-option := $(call try-run, echo 'int main() { return 0; }' | \
$(CC) -Werror -no-pie -x c - -o "$$TMP", -no-pie)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f7f7c741b12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Helpers used for SEV guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+
+/* Makefile might set this separately for user-overrides */
+#ifndef SEV_DEV_PATH
+#define SEV_DEV_PATH "/dev/sev"
+#endif
+
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 0
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 17
+
+#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
+#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
+
+enum {
+ SEV_GSTATE_UNINIT = 0,
+ SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
+ SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
+};
+
+struct sev_vm;
+
+void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data);
+struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev);
+uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev);
+
+struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages);
+void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
+void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
+void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
+
+#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4a99862d62e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Helpers used for SEV guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
+#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
+#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+struct sev_vm {
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ int fd;
+ int enc_bit;
+ uint32_t sev_policy;
+};
+
+/* Common SEV helpers/accessors. */
+
+struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ return sev->vm;
+}
+
+uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ return sev->enc_bit;
+}
+
+void sev_ioctl(int sev_fd, int cmd, void *data)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
+
+ arg.cmd = cmd;
+ arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
+ ret = ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
+ "SEV ioctl %d failed, error: %d, fw_error: %d",
+ cmd, ret, arg.error);
+}
+
+void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ arg.id = cmd;
+ arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
+ arg.data = (__u64)data;
+
+ ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
+ "SEV KVM ioctl %d failed, rc: %i errno: %i (%s), fw_error: %d",
+ cmd, ret, errno, strerror(errno), arg.error);
+}
+
+/* Local helpers. */
+
+static void
+sev_register_user_region(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
+{
+ struct kvm_enc_region range = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("%s: hva: %p, size: %lu\n", __func__, hva, size);
+
+ range.addr = (__u64)hva;
+ range.size = size;
+
+ ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "failed to register user range, errno: %i\n", errno);
+}
+
+static void
+sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data ksev_update_data = {0};
+
+ pr_debug("%s: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", __func__, gpa, size);
+
+ ksev_update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
+ ksev_update_data.len = size;
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
+}
+
+static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ const struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm = sev->vm;
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
+ vm_paddr_t gpa_start;
+ uint64_t memory_size;
+
+ /* Only memslot 0 supported for now. */
+ enc_phy_pages = vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(sev->vm, 0, &gpa_start, &memory_size);
+ TEST_ASSERT(enc_phy_pages, "Unable to retrieve encrypted pages bitmap");
+ while (pg < (memory_size / vm_get_page_size(vm))) {
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg_cnt;
+
+ if (sparsebit_is_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg)) {
+ pg = sparsebit_next_set(enc_phy_pages, pg);
+ if (!pg)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pg_cnt = sparsebit_next_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg) - pg;
+ if (pg_cnt <= 0)
+ pg_cnt = 1;
+
+ sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
+ gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
+ pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+ pg += pg_cnt;
+ }
+}
+
+/* SEV VM implementation. */
+
+static struct sev_vm *sev_vm_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_status sev_status = {0};
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ int sev_fd;
+
+ sev_fd = open(SEV_DEV_PATH, O_RDWR);
+ if (sev_fd < 0) {
+ pr_info("Failed to open SEV device, path: %s, error: %d, skipping test.\n",
+ SEV_DEV_PATH, sev_fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sev_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &sev_status);
+
+ if (!(sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
+ (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
+ sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR))) {
+ pr_info("SEV FW version too old. Have API %d.%d (build: %d), need %d.%d, skipping test.\n",
+ sev_status.api_major, sev_status.api_minor, sev_status.build,
+ SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR, SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sev = calloc(1, sizeof(*sev));
+ sev->fd = sev_fd;
+ sev->vm = vm;
+
+ /* Get encryption bit via CPUID. */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ sev->enc_bit = ebx & 0x3F;
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
+ close(sev->fd);
+ free(sev);
+}
+
+struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
+{
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+
+ /* Need to handle memslots after init, and after setting memcrypt. */
+ vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
+ sev = sev_vm_alloc(vm);
+ if (!sev)
+ return NULL;
+ sev->sev_policy = policy;
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+
+ vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
+ vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
+ sev_register_user_region(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0),
+ npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+
+ pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
+ sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start ksev_launch_start = {0};
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
+
+ /* Need to use ucall_shared for synchronization. */
+ ucall_init_ops(sev_get_vm(sev), NULL, &ucall_ops_halt);
+
+ ksev_launch_start.policy = sev->sev_policy;
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &ksev_launch_start);
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.policy == sev->sev_policy, "Incorrect guest policy.");
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+
+ sev_encrypt(sev);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure ksev_launch_measure = {0};
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_guest_status = {0};
+
+ ksev_launch_measure.len = 256;
+ ksev_launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &ksev_launch_measure);
+
+ /* Measurement causes a state transition, check that. */
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_guest_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_guest_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_guest_status.state);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE ||
+ ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 20:35 ` Peter Gonda
2021-12-17 16:17 ` Michael Roth
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Peter Gonda @ 2021-12-16 20:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm list, LKML, the arch/x86 maintainers,
Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford,
Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang, Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky,
Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse,
Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan
)
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
>
> Add interfaces to allow tests to create/manage SEV guests. The
> additional state associated with these guests is encapsulated in a new
> struct sev_vm, which is a light wrapper around struct kvm_vm. These
> VMs will use vm_set_memory_encryption() and vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages()
> under the covers to configure and sync up with the core kvm_util
> library on what should/shouldn't be treated as encrypted memory.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 9 +-
> .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 ++++
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> index 412de8093e6c..ccc382a827f1 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> @@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),s390)
> UNAME_M := s390x
> endif
>
> +# On some systems the SEV device path may not be present in the standard
> +# location, so allow it to be configured via, e.g.:
> +# make TARGETS=kvm SEV_PATH=/path/to/sev_device ...
> +SEV_PATH=/dev/sev
> +
> LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c lib/ucall_common.c
> LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
> +LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
> LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S lib/aarch64/spinlock.c lib/aarch64/gic.c lib/aarch64/gic_v3.c lib/aarch64/vgic.c
> LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
>
> @@ -134,7 +140,8 @@ endif
> CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
> -fno-stack-protector -fno-PIE -I$(LINUX_TOOL_INCLUDE) \
> -I$(LINUX_TOOL_ARCH_INCLUDE) -I$(LINUX_HDR_PATH) -Iinclude \
> - -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I..
> + -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I.. \
> + -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\"
>
> no-pie-option := $(call try-run, echo 'int main() { return 0; }' | \
> $(CC) -Werror -no-pie -x c - -o "$$TMP", -no-pie)
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..2f7f7c741b12
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> + */
> +#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> +#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> +
> +#include <stdint.h>
> +#include <stdbool.h>
> +#include "kvm_util.h"
> +
> +/* Makefile might set this separately for user-overrides */
> +#ifndef SEV_DEV_PATH
> +#define SEV_DEV_PATH "/dev/sev"
> +#endif
Similar logic is already in open_sev_dev_path_or_exit() should we move
that function here?
> +
> +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 0
> +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 17
> +
> +#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
> +#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
> +
> +enum {
> + SEV_GSTATE_UNINIT = 0,
> + SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> + SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> + SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> +};
> +
> +struct sev_vm;
> +
> +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data);
> +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev);
> +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev);
> +
> +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages);
> +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
> +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
> +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
> +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
> +
> +#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..4a99862d62e6
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> + */
> +
> +#include <stdint.h>
> +#include <stdbool.h>
> +#include "kvm_util.h"
> +#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
> +#include "processor.h"
> +#include "sev.h"
> +
> +#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
> +#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT)
> +
> +struct sev_vm {
> + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> + int fd;
> + int enc_bit;
> + uint32_t sev_policy;
> +};
> +
> +/* Common SEV helpers/accessors. */
> +
> +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + return sev->vm;
> +}
> +
> +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + return sev->enc_bit;
> +}
> +
> +void sev_ioctl(int sev_fd, int cmd, void *data)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
> +
> + arg.cmd = cmd;
> + arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
> + ret = ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> + "SEV ioctl %d failed, error: %d, fw_error: %d",
> + cmd, ret, arg.error);
> +}
> +
> +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
> + int ret;
> +
> + arg.id = cmd;
> + arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
> + arg.data = (__u64)data;
> +
> + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
If the helper vm_get_fd() exists why not add another which takes a
struct sev_vm. So you can do __vm_get_fd(sev) here?
> + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> + "SEV KVM ioctl %d failed, rc: %i errno: %i (%s), fw_error: %d",
> + cmd, ret, errno, strerror(errno), arg.error);
> +}
Can you dedup this from sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests.c? That
function already correctly asserts the fw_error.
> +
> +/* Local helpers. */
> +
> +static void
> +sev_register_user_region(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
> +{
> + struct kvm_enc_region range = {0};
> + int ret;
> +
> + pr_debug("%s: hva: %p, size: %lu\n", __func__, hva, size);
> +
> + range.addr = (__u64)hva;
> + range.size = size;
> +
> + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "failed to register user range, errno: %i\n", errno);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data ksev_update_data = {0};
> +
> + pr_debug("%s: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", __func__, gpa, size);
> +
> + ksev_update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
> + ksev_update_data.len = size;
> +
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + const struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
> + struct kvm_vm *vm = sev->vm;
> + sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
> + vm_paddr_t gpa_start;
> + uint64_t memory_size;
> +
> + /* Only memslot 0 supported for now. */
> + enc_phy_pages = vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(sev->vm, 0, &gpa_start, &memory_size);
> + TEST_ASSERT(enc_phy_pages, "Unable to retrieve encrypted pages bitmap");
> + while (pg < (memory_size / vm_get_page_size(vm))) {
For readability could we save have a new variable:
const uint64_t page_size = vm_get_page_size(vm);
> + sparsebit_idx_t pg_cnt;
> +
> + if (sparsebit_is_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg)) {
> + pg = sparsebit_next_set(enc_phy_pages, pg);
> + if (!pg)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + pg_cnt = sparsebit_next_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg) - pg;
> + if (pg_cnt <= 0)
> + pg_cnt = 1;
> +
> + sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
> + gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
> + pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> + pg += pg_cnt;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/* SEV VM implementation. */
> +
> +static struct sev_vm *sev_vm_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm)
> +{
> + struct sev_user_data_status sev_status = {0};
> + uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> + struct sev_vm *sev;
> + int sev_fd;
> +
> + sev_fd = open(SEV_DEV_PATH, O_RDWR);
As noted above please use open_sev_dev_path_or_exit()
> + if (sev_fd < 0) {
> + pr_info("Failed to open SEV device, path: %s, error: %d, skipping test.\n",
> + SEV_DEV_PATH, sev_fd);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + sev_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &sev_status);
> +
> + if (!(sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
> + (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
> + sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR))) {
> + pr_info("SEV FW version too old. Have API %d.%d (build: %d), need %d.%d, skipping test.\n",
> + sev_status.api_major, sev_status.api_minor, sev_status.build,
> + SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR, SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
Technically we are returning NULL not skipping the test.
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + sev = calloc(1, sizeof(*sev));
> + sev->fd = sev_fd;
> + sev->vm = vm;
> +
> + /* Get encryption bit via CPUID. */
> + eax = 0x8000001f;
> + ecx = 0;
> + cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> + sev->enc_bit = ebx & 0x3F;
Can we get macros for these magics?
> +
> + return sev;
> +}
> +
> +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
> + close(sev->fd);
> + free(sev);
> +}
> +
> +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
> +{
> + struct sev_vm *sev;
> + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> +
> + /* Need to handle memslots after init, and after setting memcrypt. */
> + vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
> + sev = sev_vm_alloc(vm);
> + if (!sev)
> + return NULL;
> + sev->sev_policy = policy;
> +
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
> +
> + vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
> + vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
> + sev_register_user_region(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0),
> + npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> +
> + pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
> + sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
> +
> + return sev;
> +}
> +
> +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_start ksev_launch_start = {0};
> + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> +
> + /* Need to use ucall_shared for synchronization. */
> + ucall_init_ops(sev_get_vm(sev), NULL, &ucall_ops_halt);
> +
> + ksev_launch_start.policy = sev->sev_policy;
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &ksev_launch_start);
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.policy == sev->sev_policy, "Incorrect guest policy.");
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
In this file we've done this a lot. Thoughts about a helper like this?
+ void assert_guest_state(uint32_t expected_state, struct sev_vm *sev)
+ {
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+ }
> +
> + sev_encrypt(sev);
> +}
> +
> +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure ksev_launch_measure = {0};
> + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_guest_status = {0};
> +
> + ksev_launch_measure.len = 256;
> + ksev_launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
Can we document that this measure pointer must be backed by at least a
given amount of memory?
Also should this be 48 as the length required (256bits for MEASURE and
128 for MNONCE?
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &ksev_launch_measure);
> +
> + /* Measurement causes a state transition, check that. */
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_guest_status);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_guest_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_guest_status.state);
> +}
> +
> +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> +
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE ||
> + ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
We don't pre check the state in any other calls, should we? Or why are we here?
> +
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
> +
> + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
> +}
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
2021-12-16 20:35 ` Peter Gonda
@ 2021-12-17 16:17 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-17 16:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Peter Gonda
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm list, LKML, the arch/x86 maintainers,
Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford,
Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang, Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky,
Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse,
Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 01:35:57PM -0700, Peter Gonda wrote:
> )
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 10:18 AM Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> > Add interfaces to allow tests to create/manage SEV guests. The
> > additional state associated with these guests is encapsulated in a new
> > struct sev_vm, which is a light wrapper around struct kvm_vm. These
> > VMs will use vm_set_memory_encryption() and vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages()
> > under the covers to configure and sync up with the core kvm_util
> > library on what should/shouldn't be treated as encrypted memory.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> > ---
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 9 +-
> > .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 ++++
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > index 412de8093e6c..ccc382a827f1 100644
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > @@ -33,8 +33,14 @@ ifeq ($(ARCH),s390)
> > UNAME_M := s390x
> > endif
> >
> > +# On some systems the SEV device path may not be present in the standard
> > +# location, so allow it to be configured via, e.g.:
> > +# make TARGETS=kvm SEV_PATH=/path/to/sev_device ...
> > +SEV_PATH=/dev/sev
> > +
> > LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c lib/ucall_common.c
> > LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
> > +LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S lib/aarch64/spinlock.c lib/aarch64/gic.c lib/aarch64/gic_v3.c lib/aarch64/vgic.c
> > LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
> >
> > @@ -134,7 +140,8 @@ endif
> > CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
> > -fno-stack-protector -fno-PIE -I$(LINUX_TOOL_INCLUDE) \
> > -I$(LINUX_TOOL_ARCH_INCLUDE) -I$(LINUX_HDR_PATH) -Iinclude \
> > - -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I..
> > + -I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I.. \
> > + -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\"
> >
> > no-pie-option := $(call try-run, echo 'int main() { return 0; }' | \
> > $(CC) -Werror -no-pie -x c - -o "$$TMP", -no-pie)
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..2f7f7c741b12
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> > +/*
> > + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> > + */
> > +#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> > +#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
> > +
> > +#include <stdint.h>
> > +#include <stdbool.h>
> > +#include "kvm_util.h"
> > +
> > +/* Makefile might set this separately for user-overrides */
> > +#ifndef SEV_DEV_PATH
> > +#define SEV_DEV_PATH "/dev/sev"
> > +#endif
>
> Similar logic is already in open_sev_dev_path_or_exit() should we move
> that function here?
Yes, I think that makes sense now that there's a dedicated sev.c
library, and then both tests can inherit the `make SEV_PATH=` option as
well.
>
> > +
> > +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 0
> > +#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 17
> > +
> > +#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
> > +#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
> > +
> > +enum {
> > + SEV_GSTATE_UNINIT = 0,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm;
> > +
> > +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data);
> > +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages);
> > +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
> > +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
> > +
> > +#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..4a99862d62e6
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +/*
> > + * Helpers used for SEV guests
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <stdint.h>
> > +#include <stdbool.h>
> > +#include "kvm_util.h"
> > +#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
> > +#include "processor.h"
> > +#include "sev.h"
> > +
> > +#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
> > +#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT)
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm {
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> > + int fd;
> > + int enc_bit;
> > + uint32_t sev_policy;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* Common SEV helpers/accessors. */
> > +
> > +struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + return sev->vm;
> > +}
> > +
> > +uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + return sev->enc_bit;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_ioctl(int sev_fd, int cmd, void *data)
> > +{
> > + int ret;
> > + struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
> > +
> > + arg.cmd = cmd;
> > + arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
> > + ret = ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> > + "SEV ioctl %d failed, error: %d, fw_error: %d",
> > + cmd, ret, arg.error);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + arg.id = cmd;
> > + arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
> > + arg.data = (__u64)data;
> > +
> > + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
>
> If the helper vm_get_fd() exists why not add another which takes a
> struct sev_vm. So you can do __vm_get_fd(sev) here?
I can add it as a local helper for now, maybe sev_get_kvm_fd(), to
distinguish from the SEV_PATH fd? I'm not sure it's worth exporting it
as part of the library though since vm_get_fd(sev_get_vm(sev)) would be
more familiar to callers that are already used to the kvm_util library.
>
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
> > + "SEV KVM ioctl %d failed, rc: %i errno: %i (%s), fw_error: %d",
> > + cmd, ret, errno, strerror(errno), arg.error);
> > +}
>
> Can you dedup this from sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests.c? That
> function already correctly asserts the fw_error.
This is a little bit awkward since sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests opens
SEV_PATH on demand whereas this one pulls it out of struct sev_vm. I
could make kvm_sev_ioctl() expect the KVM fd as a parameter but that
means external callers need another call to pull it out of struct
sev_vm.
So maybe it would be better to handle that part as part of a separate patch
that moves sev_migrate_tests over to using this library?
>
> > +
> > +/* Local helpers. */
> > +
> > +static void
> > +sev_register_user_region(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_enc_region range = {0};
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + pr_debug("%s: hva: %p, size: %lu\n", __func__, hva, size);
> > +
> > + range.addr = (__u64)hva;
> > + range.size = size;
> > +
> > + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "failed to register user range, errno: %i\n", errno);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void
> > +sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data ksev_update_data = {0};
> > +
> > + pr_debug("%s: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", __func__, gpa, size);
> > +
> > + ksev_update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
> > + ksev_update_data.len = size;
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + const struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm = sev->vm;
> > + sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
> > + vm_paddr_t gpa_start;
> > + uint64_t memory_size;
> > +
> > + /* Only memslot 0 supported for now. */
> > + enc_phy_pages = vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(sev->vm, 0, &gpa_start, &memory_size);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(enc_phy_pages, "Unable to retrieve encrypted pages bitmap");
> > + while (pg < (memory_size / vm_get_page_size(vm))) {
>
> For readability could we save have a new variable:
>
> const uint64_t page_size = vm_get_page_size(vm);
Makes sense, would reduce some repitition as well.
>
> > + sparsebit_idx_t pg_cnt;
> > +
> > + if (sparsebit_is_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg)) {
> > + pg = sparsebit_next_set(enc_phy_pages, pg);
> > + if (!pg)
> > + break;
> > + }
> > +
> > + pg_cnt = sparsebit_next_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg) - pg;
> > + if (pg_cnt <= 0)
> > + pg_cnt = 1;
> > +
> > + sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
> > + gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
> > + pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> > + pg += pg_cnt;
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* SEV VM implementation. */
> > +
> > +static struct sev_vm *sev_vm_alloc(struct kvm_vm *vm)
> > +{
> > + struct sev_user_data_status sev_status = {0};
> > + uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> > + struct sev_vm *sev;
> > + int sev_fd;
> > +
> > + sev_fd = open(SEV_DEV_PATH, O_RDWR);
>
> As noted above please use open_sev_dev_path_or_exit()
Will do.
>
> > + if (sev_fd < 0) {
> > + pr_info("Failed to open SEV device, path: %s, error: %d, skipping test.\n",
> > + SEV_DEV_PATH, sev_fd);
> > + return NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + sev_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &sev_status);
> > +
> > + if (!(sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
> > + (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
> > + sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR))) {
> > + pr_info("SEV FW version too old. Have API %d.%d (build: %d), need %d.%d, skipping test.\n",
> > + sev_status.api_major, sev_status.api_minor, sev_status.build,
> > + SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR, SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
>
> Technically we are returning NULL not skipping the test.
Yah, "SEV is not supported on this host" would probably be a more
accurate message.
>
> > + return NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + sev = calloc(1, sizeof(*sev));
> > + sev->fd = sev_fd;
> > + sev->vm = vm;
> > +
> > + /* Get encryption bit via CPUID. */
> > + eax = 0x8000001f;
> > + ecx = 0;
> > + cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> > + sev->enc_bit = ebx & 0x3F;
>
> Can we get macros for these magics?
Will do.
>
> > +
> > + return sev;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
> > + close(sev->fd);
> > + free(sev);
> > +}
> > +
> > +struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
> > +{
> > + struct sev_vm *sev;
> > + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> > +
> > + /* Need to handle memslots after init, and after setting memcrypt. */
> > + vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
> > + sev = sev_vm_alloc(vm);
> > + if (!sev)
> > + return NULL;
> > + sev->sev_policy = policy;
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
> > +
> > + vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
> > + vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
> > + sev_register_user_region(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0),
> > + npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
> > +
> > + pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
> > + sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
> > +
> > + return sev;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_start ksev_launch_start = {0};
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> > +
> > + /* Need to use ucall_shared for synchronization. */
> > + ucall_init_ops(sev_get_vm(sev), NULL, &ucall_ops_halt);
> > +
> > + ksev_launch_start.policy = sev->sev_policy;
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &ksev_launch_start);
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.policy == sev->sev_policy, "Incorrect guest policy.");
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
>
> In this file we've done this a lot. Thoughts about a helper like this?
>
> + void assert_guest_state(uint32_t expected_state, struct sev_vm *sev)
> + {
> + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> +
> + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
> + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
> + }
Yah, that would be pretty useful.
>
>
> > +
> > + sev_encrypt(sev);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure ksev_launch_measure = {0};
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_guest_status = {0};
> > +
> > + ksev_launch_measure.len = 256;
> > + ksev_launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
>
> Can we document that this measure pointer must be backed by at least a
> given amount of memory?
Yah, maybe I should just have the caller report the buffer length and
then assert the minimum length here. Maybe with an accompanying
SEV_MEASURE_BUF_LEN_MIN or something along that line.
>
> Also should this be 48 as the length required (256bits for MEASURE and
> 128 for MNONCE?
The measurement buffer format is documented, but the spec doesn't
document the minimum size and seems to be written so that it can return
INVALID_LENGTH if more fields needed to be added in the future, so I
figured some additional bytes couldn't hurt since we're expecting
callers to allocate a sufficiently sized buffer in advance and hope for
the best.
The proper way to do this would probably be to probe for the measurement
length, which is supposed to be reported as part of INVALID_LENGTH, but
callers don't really have a way to recover in that situation if they are
using a static buffer. So maybe I should just allocate/return the buffer
and buffer length as part of this command and let the caller free() it
after.
>
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &ksev_launch_measure);
> > +
> > + /* Measurement causes a state transition, check that. */
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_guest_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_guest_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_guest_status.state);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
> > +{
> > + struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE ||
> > + ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
>
> We don't pre check the state in any other calls, should we? Or why are we here?
Yes, I think we should add similar checks in the others as well.
Thanks!
-Mike
>
>
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
> > +
> > + kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
> > + "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.25.1
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
2021-12-17 16:17 ` Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-22 14:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2021-12-22 14:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth, Peter Gonda
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm list, LKML, the arch/x86 maintainers,
Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford,
Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang, Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky,
Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse,
Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan
On 12/17/21 17:17, Michael Roth wrote:
>>> +void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
>>> +{
>>> + struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
>>> + int ret;
>>> +
>>> + arg.id = cmd;
>>> + arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
>>> + arg.data = (__u64)data;
>>> +
>>> + ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
>> If the helper vm_get_fd() exists why not add another which takes a
>> struct sev_vm. So you can do __vm_get_fd(sev) here?
> I can add it as a local helper for now, maybe sev_get_kvm_fd(), to
> distinguish from the SEV_PATH fd? I'm not sure it's worth exporting it
> as part of the library though since vm_get_fd(sev_get_vm(sev)) would be
> more familiar to callers that are already used to the kvm_util library.
>
I also prefer the one that you suggest.
>> Can you dedup this from sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests.c? That
>> function already correctly asserts the fw_error.
>
> This is a little bit awkward since sev_ioctl() in sev_migrate_tests opens
> SEV_PATH on demand whereas this one pulls it out of struct sev_vm. I
> could make kvm_sev_ioctl() expect the KVM fd as a parameter but that
> means external callers need another call to pull it out of struct
> sev_vm.
Yeah, it's a bit weird because sev_migrate_tests do not use struct
sev_vm. Unless you port them first, you could have both
kvm_vm_sev_ioctl that takes a struct kvm_vm, and sev_vm_ioctl that takes
a struct sev_vm. Then you only need to change the argument of
verify_mirror_allowed_cmds to struct kvm_vm.
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-20 1:49 ` Mingwei Zhang
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (5 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
A common aspect of booting SEV guests is checking related CPUID/MSR
bits and accessing shared/private memory. Add a basic test to cover
this.
This test will be expanded to cover basic boot of SEV-ES and SEV-SNP in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
index 4a801cba9c62..cc73de938a2a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
/x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
/x86_64/xss_msr_test
/x86_64/vmx_pmu_msrs_test
+/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
/access_tracking_perf_test
/demand_paging_test
/dirty_log_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index ccc382a827f1..6f250e190fde 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pi_mmio_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += demand_paging_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_test
TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_perf_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..329a740a7cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Basic SEV boot tests.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include "test_util.h"
+
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "svm_util.h"
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
+#define VCPU_ID 2
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define PAGE_STRIDE 32
+
+#define SHARED_PAGES 8192
+#define SHARED_VADDR_MIN 0x1000000
+
+#define PRIVATE_PAGES 2048
+#define PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN (SHARED_VADDR_MIN + SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE)
+
+#define TOTAL_PAGES (512 + SHARED_PAGES + PRIVATE_PAGES)
+
+static void fill_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
+ buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] = val;
+}
+
+static bool check_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
+ for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
+ if (buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] != val)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void guest_test_start(struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 1);
+}
+
+static void test_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+guest_test_common(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ bool success;
+
+ /* Initial check-in for common. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 100);
+
+ /* Ensure initial shared pages are intact. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
+ fill_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
+
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 101);
+
+ /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
+
+ /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
+ fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
+
+ GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 102);
+}
+
+static void
+test_common(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc,
+ uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ bool success;
+
+ /* Initial guest check-in. */
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 100);
+
+ /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Initial guest memory not encrypted!");
+
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 101);
+
+ /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
+ success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Modified guest memory not encrypted!");
+
+ /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
+ fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
+
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 102);
+
+ /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
+ success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
+ TEST_ASSERT(success, "Host can't read shared guest memory!");
+}
+
+static void
+guest_test_done(struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ GUEST_SHARED_DONE(uc);
+}
+
+static void
+test_done(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
+{
+ vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ CHECK_SHARED_DONE(vm, VCPU_ID, uc);
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((__flatten__))
+guest_sev_code(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ uint64_t sev_status;
+
+ guest_test_start(uc);
+
+ /* Check SEV CPUID bit. */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, eax & (1 << 1));
+
+ /* Check SEV MSR bit. */
+ sev_status = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, (sev_status & 0x1) == 1);
+
+ guest_test_common(uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
+
+ guest_test_done(uc);
+}
+
+static struct sev_vm *
+setup_test_common(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy, struct ucall **uc,
+ uint8_t **shared_buf, uint8_t **private_buf)
+{
+ vm_vaddr_t uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr;
+ uint8_t measurement[512];
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ int i;
+
+ sev = sev_vm_create(policy, TOTAL_PAGES);
+ if (!sev)
+ return NULL;
+ vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
+
+ /* Set up VCPU and initial guest kernel. */
+ vm_vcpu_add_default(vm, VCPU_ID, guest_code);
+ kvm_vm_elf_load(vm, program_invocation_name);
+
+ /* Set up shared ucall buffer. */
+ uc_vaddr = ucall_shared_alloc(vm, 1);
+
+ /* Set up buffer for reserved shared memory. */
+ shared_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
+ SHARED_VADDR_MIN);
+ *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
+ fill_buf(*shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
+
+ /* Set up buffer for reserved private memory. */
+ private_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, PRIVATE_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
+ PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN);
+ *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
+ fill_buf(*private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
+
+ /* Set up guest params. */
+ vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 4, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr);
+
+ /*
+ * Hand these back to test harness, translation is needed now since page
+ * table will be encrypted after SEV VM launch.
+ */
+ *uc = addr_gva2hva(vm, uc_vaddr);
+ *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
+ *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
+
+ /* Allocations/setup done. Encrypt initial guest payload. */
+ sev_vm_launch(sev);
+
+ /* Dump the initial measurement. A test to actually verify it would be nice. */
+ sev_vm_launch_measure(sev, measurement);
+ pr_info("guest measurement: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
+ pr_info("%02x", measurement[i]);
+ pr_info("\n");
+
+ sev_vm_launch_finish(sev);
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
+{
+ uint8_t *shared_buf, *private_buf;
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ struct ucall *uc;
+
+ sev = setup_test_common(guest_code, policy, &uc, &shared_buf, &private_buf);
+ if (!sev)
+ return;
+ vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
+
+ /* Guest is ready to run. Do the tests. */
+ test_start(vm, uc);
+ test_common(vm, uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
+ test_done(vm, uc);
+
+ sev_vm_free(sev);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ /* SEV tests */
+ test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-20 1:49 ` Mingwei Zhang
2021-12-21 15:40 ` Michael Roth
0 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Mingwei Zhang @ 2021-12-20 1:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman,
Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Brijesh Singh,
Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin,
Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021, Michael Roth wrote:
> A common aspect of booting SEV guests is checking related CPUID/MSR
> bits and accessing shared/private memory. Add a basic test to cover
> this.
>
> This test will be expanded to cover basic boot of SEV-ES and SEV-SNP in
> subsequent patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
> .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> index 4a801cba9c62..cc73de938a2a 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> /x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
> /x86_64/xss_msr_test
> /x86_64/vmx_pmu_msrs_test
> +/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
> /access_tracking_perf_test
> /demand_paging_test
> /dirty_log_test
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> index ccc382a827f1..6f250e190fde 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pi_mmio_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
> +TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += demand_paging_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_test
> TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_perf_test
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..329a740a7cb2
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Basic SEV boot tests.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> + */
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
> +
> +#include "test_util.h"
> +
> +#include "kvm_util.h"
> +#include "processor.h"
> +#include "svm_util.h"
> +#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
> +#include "sev.h"
> +
> +#define VCPU_ID 2
> +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
> +#define PAGE_STRIDE 32
> +
> +#define SHARED_PAGES 8192
> +#define SHARED_VADDR_MIN 0x1000000
> +
> +#define PRIVATE_PAGES 2048
> +#define PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN (SHARED_VADDR_MIN + SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE)
> +
> +#define TOTAL_PAGES (512 + SHARED_PAGES + PRIVATE_PAGES)
> +
> +static void fill_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
> +{
> + int i, j;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
> + buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] = val;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
> +{
> + int i, j;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
> + for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
> + if (buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] != val)
> + return false;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static void guest_test_start(struct ucall *uc)
> +{
> + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 1);
> +}
> +
> +static void test_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
> +{
> + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> +
> + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 1);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +guest_test_common(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> +{
> + bool success;
> +
> + /* Initial check-in for common. */
> + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 100);
Probably, you want to use macros to represent those states which should
make it more clear. Otherwise, it is quite cumbersome for readers to
remember the meaning (or state) of 100/101/102.
> +
> + /* Ensure initial shared pages are intact. */
> + success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
> + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> +
> + /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
> + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> +
> + /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
> + fill_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
> +
> + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 101);
ditto.
> +
> + /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
> + success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
> + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> +
> + /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
> + fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
> +
> + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 102);
ditto.
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +test_common(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc,
> + uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> +{
> + bool success;
> +
> + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 100);
> +
> + /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
> + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> + TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Initial guest memory not encrypted!");
> +
> + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 101);
> +
> + /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
> + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
I am not sure if it is safe here. Since the cache coherency is not there
for neither SEV or SEV-ES. Reading confidential memory from host side
will generate cache lines that is not coherent with the guest. So might
be better to add clfush here?
> + TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Modified guest memory not encrypted!");
> +
> + /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
> + fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
> +
> + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 102);
> +
> + /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
> + success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
> + TEST_ASSERT(success, "Host can't read shared guest memory!");
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +guest_test_done(struct ucall *uc)
> +{
> + GUEST_SHARED_DONE(uc);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +test_done(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
> +{
> + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> + CHECK_SHARED_DONE(vm, VCPU_ID, uc);
> +}
> +
> +static void __attribute__((__flatten__))
> +guest_sev_code(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> +{
> + uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
> + uint64_t sev_status;
> +
> + guest_test_start(uc);
> +
> + /* Check SEV CPUID bit. */
> + eax = 0x8000001f;
> + ecx = 0;
> + cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, eax & (1 << 1));
> +
> + /* Check SEV MSR bit. */
> + sev_status = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
> + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, (sev_status & 0x1) == 1);
> +
> + guest_test_common(uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
> +
> + guest_test_done(uc);
> +}
> +
> +static struct sev_vm *
> +setup_test_common(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy, struct ucall **uc,
> + uint8_t **shared_buf, uint8_t **private_buf)
> +{
> + vm_vaddr_t uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr;
> + uint8_t measurement[512];
> + struct sev_vm *sev;
> + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> + int i;
> +
> + sev = sev_vm_create(policy, TOTAL_PAGES);
> + if (!sev)
> + return NULL;
> + vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
> +
> + /* Set up VCPU and initial guest kernel. */
> + vm_vcpu_add_default(vm, VCPU_ID, guest_code);
> + kvm_vm_elf_load(vm, program_invocation_name);
> +
> + /* Set up shared ucall buffer. */
> + uc_vaddr = ucall_shared_alloc(vm, 1);
> +
> + /* Set up buffer for reserved shared memory. */
> + shared_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
> + SHARED_VADDR_MIN);
> + *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
> + fill_buf(*shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
> +
> + /* Set up buffer for reserved private memory. */
> + private_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc(vm, PRIVATE_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE,
> + PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN);
> + *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
> + fill_buf(*private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> +
> + /* Set up guest params. */
> + vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 4, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr);
> +
> + /*
> + * Hand these back to test harness, translation is needed now since page
> + * table will be encrypted after SEV VM launch.
> + */
> + *uc = addr_gva2hva(vm, uc_vaddr);
> + *shared_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, shared_vaddr);
> + *private_buf = addr_gva2hva(vm, private_vaddr);
> +
> + /* Allocations/setup done. Encrypt initial guest payload. */
> + sev_vm_launch(sev);
> +
> + /* Dump the initial measurement. A test to actually verify it would be nice. */
> + sev_vm_launch_measure(sev, measurement);
> + pr_info("guest measurement: ");
> + for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i)
> + pr_info("%02x", measurement[i]);
> + pr_info("\n");
> +
> + sev_vm_launch_finish(sev);
> +
> + return sev;
> +}
> +
> +static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
> +{
> + uint8_t *shared_buf, *private_buf;
> + struct sev_vm *sev;
> + struct kvm_vm *vm;
> + struct ucall *uc;
> +
> + sev = setup_test_common(guest_code, policy, &uc, &shared_buf, &private_buf);
> + if (!sev)
> + return;
> + vm = sev_get_vm(sev);
> +
> + /* Guest is ready to run. Do the tests. */
> + test_start(vm, uc);
> + test_common(vm, uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
> + test_done(vm, uc);
> +
> + sev_vm_free(sev);
> +}
> +
> +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> +{
> + /* SEV tests */
> + test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
> + test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
2021-12-20 1:49 ` Mingwei Zhang
@ 2021-12-21 15:40 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-21 17:26 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 2 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-21 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mingwei Zhang
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman,
Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Brijesh Singh,
Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin,
Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 01:49:15AM +0000, Mingwei Zhang wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 16, 2021, Michael Roth wrote:
> > A common aspect of booting SEV guests is checking related CPUID/MSR
> > bits and accessing shared/private memory. Add a basic test to cover
> > this.
> >
> > This test will be expanded to cover basic boot of SEV-ES and SEV-SNP in
> > subsequent patches.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> > ---
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
> > .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> > index 4a801cba9c62..cc73de938a2a 100644
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore
> > @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> > /x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
> > /x86_64/xss_msr_test
> > /x86_64/vmx_pmu_msrs_test
> > +/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
> > /access_tracking_perf_test
> > /demand_paging_test
> > /dirty_log_test
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > index ccc382a827f1..6f250e190fde 100644
> > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
> > @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_shinfo_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/xen_vmcall_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/vmx_pi_mmio_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_migrate_tests
> > +TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += x86_64/sev_all_boot_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += demand_paging_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_test
> > TEST_GEN_PROGS_x86_64 += dirty_log_perf_test
> > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..329a740a7cb2
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +/*
> > + * Basic SEV boot tests.
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
> > + */
> > +#define _GNU_SOURCE /* for program_invocation_short_name */
> > +#include <fcntl.h>
> > +#include <stdio.h>
> > +#include <stdlib.h>
> > +#include <string.h>
> > +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
> > +
> > +#include "test_util.h"
> > +
> > +#include "kvm_util.h"
> > +#include "processor.h"
> > +#include "svm_util.h"
> > +#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
> > +#include "sev.h"
> > +
> > +#define VCPU_ID 2
> > +#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
> > +#define PAGE_STRIDE 32
> > +
> > +#define SHARED_PAGES 8192
> > +#define SHARED_VADDR_MIN 0x1000000
> > +
> > +#define PRIVATE_PAGES 2048
> > +#define PRIVATE_VADDR_MIN (SHARED_VADDR_MIN + SHARED_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE)
> > +
> > +#define TOTAL_PAGES (512 + SHARED_PAGES + PRIVATE_PAGES)
> > +
> > +static void fill_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
> > +{
> > + int i, j;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
> > + for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
> > + buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] = val;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static bool check_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
> > +{
> > + int i, j;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < pages; i++)
> > + for (j = 0; j < PAGE_SIZE; j += stride)
> > + if (buf[i * PAGE_SIZE + j] != val)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void guest_test_start(struct ucall *uc)
> > +{
> > + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> > + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 1);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void test_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc)
> > +{
> > + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> > +
> > + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> > + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 1);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void
> > +guest_test_common(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> > +{
> > + bool success;
> > +
> > + /* Initial check-in for common. */
> > + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 100);
>
> Probably, you want to use macros to represent those states which should
> make it more clear. Otherwise, it is quite cumbersome for readers to
> remember the meaning (or state) of 100/101/102.
I agree with that approach in general, but in this case it's a bit
awkward since, these aren't necessarily similarly grouped tests where each
test falls under a certain category of TEST_GROUP_x where a macro would
provide additional information about the nature of the tests related to a
particular SYNC() call, in some cases it's an aggregate of multiple
things, for instance...
> > +
> > + /* Ensure initial shared pages are intact. */
> > + success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x41);
> > + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
> > + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> > + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
> > + fill_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
> > +
> > + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 101);
>
> ditto.
...here 101 exit is both a checkpoint that the 2 previous tests have passed,
and that a 3rd test is ready for the host-side to complete on its end.
> > +
> > + /* Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host. */
> > + success = check_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x44);
> > + GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, success);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure host can read newly-written shared data from guest. */
> > + fill_buf(shared_buf, SHARED_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x45);
> > +
> > + GUEST_SHARED_SYNC(uc, 102);
>
> ditto.
...here 102 exit is for the "Ensure host can read newly-written shared
data" test, since the host is needed to complete the test. But prior to
that there was another test checking things in the other direction:
"Ensure guest can read newly-written shared data from host."
I could try adding additional SYNC() calls to get things closer to a
1:1 mapping between test/SYNC() so we can give each particular
test/SYNC() point a unique/meaningful identifier, but that's potentially
a lot of additional exits/SYNC()s depending on how tests are added over
time, and it's compounded further by the following situation, where a
conversion of this file would leave us with something like:
guest:
//set up some tests relating to x for host to complete
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
//complete tests relating to y
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
host:
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
//complete tests relating to x
//set up some tests relating to y for guest to complete
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
where it's easy for a reader to get confused as to where
TEST_GROUP_x_COMPLETE is, whether it's related to the subsequent
*_y_COMPLETE, etc, because they might be expecting the same sort of pairing
we get for guest->host with SYNC()/CHECK(), but for host->guest the pairing
is more like vmrun()/SYNC()/CHECK(), so attempting to write things to
alleviate that possible confusion, we need to introduce exits that purely
serve the purpose of helping the reader along, and end up with something
like:
guest:
//set up some tests relating to x for host to complete
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_x_COMPLETE)
//complete tests relating to y
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
host:
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
//complete tests relating to x
//resume guest to it lets us know it is done with that test group
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_x_COMPLETE)
//set up some tests relating to y for guest to complete
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
But what about TEST_GROUP_y_READY? Where is that set up? Take 2:
guest:
//set up some tests relating to x for host to complete
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_x_COMPLETE)
//let host know we're ready to run TEST_GROUP_y
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_y_READY)
//complete tests relating to y
SYNC(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
host:
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_x_READY)
//complete tests relating to x
//resume guest to it lets us know it is done with that test group
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_x_COMPLETE)
//set up some tests relating to y for guest to complete
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_y_READY)
vmrun()
CHECK(..., TEST_GROUP_y_COMPLETE)
...which to me seems less readable that just treating each SYNC() as a
unique checkpoint and relying on comments to explain the individual
tests:
guest:
//set up some tests relating to x for host to complete
SYNC(..., CHECKPOINT1)
//complete tests relating to y
SYNC(..., CHECKPOINT2)
host:
vmrun()
CHECK(..., CHECKPOINT1)
//complete tests relating to x
//set up some tests relating to y for guest to complete
vmrun()
CHECK(..., CHECKPOINT2)
Really don't mind changing things, but just doesn't seem like it would
make things more readable than the current approach. I could add
actual CHECKPOINT1/2/3 macros to make it clearer how SYNC() is being
used here, but it seems like a waste adding a bunch of '#define
CHECKPOINT1 1' etc.
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void
> > +test_common(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc,
> > + uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> > +{
> > + bool success;
> > +
> > + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> > + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> > + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 100);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
> > + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> > + TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Initial guest memory not encrypted!");
> > +
> > + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> > + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 101);
> > +
> > + /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
> > + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
>
> I am not sure if it is safe here. Since the cache coherency is not there
> for neither SEV or SEV-ES. Reading confidential memory from host side
> will generate cache lines that is not coherent with the guest. So might
> be better to add clfush here?
On the guest side, the cachelines are tagged based on ASID, so in this case
the guest would populate it's own cachelines when it writes new data to
private buf.
On a host without SME coherency bit, there is a possibility that whatever
data the host had previously written to private_buf with C=0/ASID=0, prior
to the guest writing to it, might still be present in the cache, but for
this test that's okay since the guest has purposely written new data to
confirm that the host does not see the new data. What data the host
*actually* sees, stale cache data vs. new reads of guest private memory
with C=0 (e.g. ciphertext) are both okay as far as the test is concerned.
clflush() would probably make sense here, but if failure to do so
somehow results in the above assumptions not holding, and the test ends
up seeing the newly-written data, we definitely want this test to fail
loudly, so leaving out the clflush() to cover that corner case seems
like a good idea.
On a host with SME coherency bit, I believe (based on a recent writeup from
David Kaplan) each new read/write with a different C-bit/ASID than what was
previously written would force an eviction, so we don't need to worry about
the stale cases above, and the test should work in that scenario as
well.
Thanks!
-Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
2021-12-21 15:40 ` Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-21 17:26 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
1 sibling, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-21 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mingwei Zhang
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman,
Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Brijesh Singh,
Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin,
Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On Tue, Dec 21, 2021 at 09:40:36AM -0600, Michael Roth wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 01:49:15AM +0000, Mingwei Zhang wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 16, 2021, Michael Roth wrote:
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static void
> > > +test_common(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct ucall *uc,
> > > + uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
> > > +{
> > > + bool success;
> > > +
> > > + /* Initial guest check-in. */
> > > + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> > > + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 100);
> > > +
> > > + /* Ensure initial private pages are intact/encrypted. */
> > > + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
> > > + TEST_ASSERT(!success, "Initial guest memory not encrypted!");
> > > +
> > > + vcpu_run(vm, VCPU_ID);
> > > + CHECK_SHARED_SYNC(vm, VCPU_ID, uc, 101);
> > > +
> > > + /* Ensure host userspace can't read newly-written encrypted data. */
> > > + success = check_buf(private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x43);
> >
> > I am not sure if it is safe here. Since the cache coherency is not there
> > for neither SEV or SEV-ES. Reading confidential memory from host side
> > will generate cache lines that is not coherent with the guest. So might
> > be better to add clfush here?
>
> On the guest side, the cachelines are tagged based on ASID, so in this case
> the guest would populate it's own cachelines when it writes new data to
> private buf.
>
> On a host without SME coherency bit, there is a possibility that whatever
> data the host had previously written to private_buf with C=0/ASID=0, prior
> to the guest writing to it, might still be present in the cache, but for
> this test that's okay since the guest has purposely written new data to
> confirm that the host does not see the new data. What data the host
> *actually* sees, stale cache data vs. new reads of guest private memory
> with C=0 (e.g. ciphertext) are both okay as far as the test is concerned.
> clflush() would probably make sense here, but if failure to do so
> somehow results in the above assumptions not holding, and the test ends
> up seeing the newly-written data, we definitely want this test to fail
> loudly, so leaving out the clflush() to cover that corner case seems
> like a good idea.
Actually it might be good to check both of those cases, e.g.:
//check private buf (possibly with stale cache for sme_coherency=0)
clflush()
//check private buf again (with fresh read of guest memory)
I'll take a look at that.
-Mike
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
2021-12-21 15:40 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-21 17:26 ` Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-22 14:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
1 sibling, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2021-12-22 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth, Mingwei Zhang
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman,
Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Brijesh Singh,
Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson, Joerg Roedel,
Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, H . Peter Anvin,
Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On 12/21/21 16:40, Michael Roth wrote:
>> Probably, you want to use macros to represent those states which should
>> make it more clear. Otherwise, it is quite cumbersome for readers to
>> remember the meaning (or state) of 100/101/102.
> I agree with that approach in general, but in this case it's a bit
> awkward since, these aren't necessarily similarly grouped tests where each
> test falls under a certain category of TEST_GROUP_x where a macro would
> provide additional information about the nature of the tests related to a
> particular SYNC() call, in some cases it's an aggregate of multiple
> things, for instance...
Indeed, these are just numbers that match between guest_test_common and
test_common. It's not too hard to follow if you look at the two
functions side-by-side.
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: selftests: account for error code in #VC exception frame Michael Roth
` (4 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Normally guests will set up CR3 themselves, but some guests, such as
kselftests, and potentially CONFIG_PVH guests, rely on being booted
with paging enabled and CR3 initialized to a pre-allocated page table.
Currently CR3 updates via KVM_SET_SREGS* are not loaded into the guest
VMCB until just prior to entering the guest. For SEV-ES/SEV-SNP, this
is too late, since it will have switched over to using the VMSA page
prior to that point, with the VMSA CR3 copied from the VMCB initial
CR3 value: 0.
Address this by sync'ing the CR3 value into the VMCB save area
immediately when KVM_SET_SREGS* is issued so it will find it's way into
the initial VMSA.
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index cefe1d81e2e8..a3172bd59690 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl)
KVM_X86_OP(set_segment)
KVM_X86_OP_NULL(get_cs_db_l_bits)
KVM_X86_OP(set_cr0)
+KVM_X86_OP(post_set_cr3)
KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr4)
KVM_X86_OP(set_cr4)
KVM_X86_OP(set_efer)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index d5fede05eb5f..22f384320ed1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1342,6 +1342,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
void (*get_cs_db_l_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
void (*set_cr0)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
+ void (*post_set_cr3)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3);
bool (*is_valid_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
void (*set_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
int (*set_efer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 208566f63bce..76e906d83a84 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1792,6 +1792,24 @@ static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
}
+static void svm_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+
+ /*
+ * For guests that don't set guest_state_protected, the cr3 update is
+ * handled via kvm_mmu_load() while entering the guest. For guests
+ * that do (SEV-ES/SEV-SNP), the cr3 update needs to be written to
+ * VMCB save area now, since the save area will become the initial
+ * contents of the VMSA, and future VMCB save area updates won't be
+ * seen.
+ */
+ if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+ svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
+ }
+}
+
void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -4622,6 +4640,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
.get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
.get_cs_db_l_bits = kvm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
.set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
+ .post_set_cr3 = svm_post_set_cr3,
.is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
.set_cr4 = svm_set_cr4,
.set_efer = svm_set_efer,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 63615d242bdf..075107c1b3f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3124,6 +3124,11 @@ static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
}
+
+void vmx_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+}
+
static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
/*
@@ -7597,6 +7602,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+ .post_set_cr3 = vmx_post_set_cr3,
.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 26cb3a4cd0e9..c0d84a4c8049 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10609,6 +10609,7 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs,
*mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) != sregs->cr3;
vcpu->arch.cr3 = sregs->cr3;
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+ static_call(kvm_x86_post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3);
kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8);
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-22 14:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2021-12-22 14:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth, linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On 12/16/21 18:13, Michael Roth wrote:
> Normally guests will set up CR3 themselves, but some guests, such as
> kselftests, and potentially CONFIG_PVH guests, rely on being booted
> with paging enabled and CR3 initialized to a pre-allocated page table.
>
> Currently CR3 updates via KVM_SET_SREGS* are not loaded into the guest
> VMCB until just prior to entering the guest. For SEV-ES/SEV-SNP, this
> is too late, since it will have switched over to using the VMSA page
> prior to that point, with the VMSA CR3 copied from the VMCB initial
> CR3 value: 0.
>
> Address this by sync'ing the CR3 value into the VMCB save area
> immediately when KVM_SET_SREGS* is issued so it will find it's way into
> the initial VMSA.
>
> Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 ++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
> 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> index cefe1d81e2e8..a3172bd59690 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl)
> KVM_X86_OP(set_segment)
> KVM_X86_OP_NULL(get_cs_db_l_bits)
> KVM_X86_OP(set_cr0)
> +KVM_X86_OP(post_set_cr3)
> KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr4)
> KVM_X86_OP(set_cr4)
> KVM_X86_OP(set_efer)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index d5fede05eb5f..22f384320ed1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1342,6 +1342,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
> struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
> void (*get_cs_db_l_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l);
> void (*set_cr0)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> + void (*post_set_cr3)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3);
> bool (*is_valid_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> void (*set_cr4)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
> int (*set_efer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 208566f63bce..76e906d83a84 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1792,6 +1792,24 @@ static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
> vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
> }
>
> +static void svm_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
> +{
> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> + /*
> + * For guests that don't set guest_state_protected, the cr3 update is
> + * handled via kvm_mmu_load() while entering the guest. For guests
> + * that do (SEV-ES/SEV-SNP), the cr3 update needs to be written to
> + * VMCB save area now, since the save area will become the initial
> + * contents of the VMSA, and future VMCB save area updates won't be
> + * seen.
> + */
> + if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
> + svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
> + vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
> + }
> +}
> +
> void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> @@ -4622,6 +4640,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
> .get_cs_db_l_bits = kvm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
> .set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
> + .post_set_cr3 = svm_post_set_cr3,
> .is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
> .set_cr4 = svm_set_cr4,
> .set_efer = svm_set_efer,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 63615d242bdf..075107c1b3f5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -3124,6 +3124,11 @@ static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
> vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
> }
>
> +
> +void vmx_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
> +{
> +}
> +
> static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
> {
> /*
> @@ -7597,6 +7602,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
> .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
> .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
> .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
> + .post_set_cr3 = vmx_post_set_cr3,
> .is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
> .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
> .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 26cb3a4cd0e9..c0d84a4c8049 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -10609,6 +10609,7 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs,
> *mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) != sregs->cr3;
> vcpu->arch.cr3 = sregs->cr3;
> kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
> + static_call(kvm_x86_post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3);
>
> kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8);
>
>
I'm going to apply this one now, just with a small change to avoid
vmx_post_set_cr3 and a remark about why kvm_set_cr3 is not calling the
new hook.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 8803773539a0..37624a9e3e40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP(get_cpl)
KVM_X86_OP(set_segment)
KVM_X86_OP_NULL(get_cs_db_l_bits)
KVM_X86_OP(set_cr0)
-KVM_X86_OP(post_set_cr3)
+KVM_X86_OP_NULL(post_set_cr3)
KVM_X86_OP(is_valid_cr4)
KVM_X86_OP(set_cr4)
KVM_X86_OP(set_efer)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index a39da103e33c..fe06b02994e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3135,10 +3135,6 @@ static void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
}
-void vmx_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
-{
-}
-
static bool vmx_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
/*
@@ -7608,7 +7604,6 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __initdata = {
.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
- .post_set_cr3 = vmx_post_set_cr3,
.is_valid_cr4 = vmx_is_valid_cr4,
.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index db118066c653..c194a8cbd25f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1179,6 +1179,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned
long cr3)
vcpu->arch.cr3 = cr3;
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+ /* Do not call post_set_cr3, we do not get here for confidential
guests. */
handle_tlb_flush:
/*
@@ -10636,7 +10637,7 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu
*vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs,
*mmu_reset_needed |= kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) != sregs->cr3;
vcpu->arch.cr3 = sregs->cr3;
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
- static_call(kvm_x86_post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3);
+ static_call_cond(kvm_x86_post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3);
kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8);
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: selftests: account for error code in #VC exception frame
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (3 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Exception 29 (#VC) pushes an error_code parameter on the stack. Update
the exception list to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S
index 7629819734af..19715a58f5d2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ idt_handler_code:
HANDLERS has_error=1 from=10 to=14
HANDLERS has_error=0 from=15 to=16
HANDLERS has_error=1 from=17 to=17
- HANDLERS has_error=0 from=18 to=255
+ HANDLERS has_error=0 from=18 to=28
+ HANDLERS has_error=1 from=29 to=29
+ HANDLERS has_error=0 from=30 to=255
.section .note.GNU-stack, "", %progbits
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-ES guests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: selftests: account for error code in #VC exception frame Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: selftests: add library for handling SEV-ES-related exits Michael Roth
` (2 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Only a couple KVM_SEV_* ioctls need to be handled differently for
SEV-ES. Do so when the specified policy indicates SEV-ES support.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
index 4a99862d62e6..181be03f5a10 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -182,14 +182,18 @@ struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
return NULL;
sev->sev_policy = policy;
- kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+ if (sev->sev_policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
+ else
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
sev_register_user_region(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0),
npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
- pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
+ pr_info("%s guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
+ (sev->sev_policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) ? "SEV-ES" : "SEV",
sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
return sev;
@@ -211,6 +215,9 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
"Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
sev_encrypt(sev);
+
+ if (sev->sev_policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
}
void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: selftests: add library for handling SEV-ES-related exits
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV-ES boot tests Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:56 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Paolo Bonzini
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Add (or copy from kernel) routines related to handling #VC exceptions
(only for cpuid currently) or issuing vmgexits. These will be used
mostly by guest code.
Some of this copied code, like DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS, generate
GCC/clang warnings due to -Waddress-of-packed-member, so compile with
-Wno-address-of-packed-member like the kernel does.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 4 +-
.../kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h | 14 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h | 35 +++
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 301 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 6f250e190fde..56f845523a03 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SEV_PATH=/dev/sev
LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c lib/ucall_common.c
LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
-LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
+LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S lib/aarch64/spinlock.c lib/aarch64/gic.c lib/aarch64/gic_v3.c lib/aarch64/vgic.c
LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ CFLAGS += -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -Wuninitialized -O2 -g -std=gnu99 \
-fno-stack-protector -fno-PIE -I$(LINUX_TOOL_INCLUDE) \
-I$(LINUX_TOOL_ARCH_INCLUDE) -I$(LINUX_HDR_PATH) -Iinclude \
-I$(<D) -Iinclude/$(UNAME_M) -I.. \
- -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\"
+ -DSEV_DEV_PATH=\"$(SEV_PATH)\" -Wno-address-of-packed-member
no-pie-option := $(call try-run, echo 'int main() { return 0; }' | \
$(CC) -Werror -no-pie -x c - -o "$$TMP", -no-pie)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b67b4004dfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * VC/vmgexit/GHCB-related helpers for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+
+#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_EXITLIB_H
+#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_EXITLIB_H
+
+int sev_es_handle_vc(void *ghcb, u64 ghcb_gpa, struct ex_regs *regs);
+void sev_es_terminate(int reason);
+
+#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_EXITLIB_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h
index f4ea2355dbc2..d633caea4b7d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h
@@ -204,6 +204,41 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_save_area {
u64 br_to;
u64 last_excp_from;
u64 last_excp_to;
+
+ /*
+ * The following part of the save area is valid only for
+ * SEV-ES guests when referenced through the GHCB or for
+ * saving to the host save area.
+ */
+ u8 reserved_7[80];
+ u32 pkru;
+ u8 reserved_7a[20];
+ u64 reserved_8; /* rax already available at 0x01f8 */
+ u64 rcx;
+ u64 rdx;
+ u64 rbx;
+ u64 reserved_9; /* rsp already available at 0x01d8 */
+ u64 rbp;
+ u64 rsi;
+ u64 rdi;
+ u64 r8;
+ u64 r9;
+ u64 r10;
+ u64 r11;
+ u64 r12;
+ u64 r13;
+ u64 r14;
+ u64 r15;
+ u8 reserved_10[16];
+ u64 sw_exit_code;
+ u64 sw_exit_info_1;
+ u64 sw_exit_info_2;
+ u64 sw_scratch;
+ u64 sev_features;
+ u8 reserved_11[48];
+ u64 xcr0;
+ u8 valid_bitmap[16];
+ u64 x87_state_gpa;
};
struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h
index 587fbe408b99..29f586775c86 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define CPUID_SVM_BIT 2
#define CPUID_SVM BIT_ULL(CPUID_SVM_BIT)
+#define SVM_EXIT_CPUID 0x072
#define SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL 0x081
struct svm_test_data {
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b3f7b0297e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * GHCB/#VC/instruction helpers for use with SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests.
+ *
+ * Partially copied from arch/x86/kernel/sev*.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <kvm_util.h> /* needed by kvm_util_internal.h */
+#include "../kvm_util_internal.h" /* needed by processor.h */
+#include "processor.h" /* for struct ex_regs */
+#include "svm_util.h" /* for additional SVM_EXIT_* definitions */
+#include "svm.h" /* for VMCB/VMSA layout */
+#include "sev_exitlib.h"
+
+#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
+
+#define MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB 0xc0010130
+
+#define VMGEXIT() { asm volatile("rep; vmmcall\n\r"); }
+
+#define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 1
+#define GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE 0
+
+/* Guest-requested termination codes */
+#define GHCB_TERMINATE 0x100UL
+#define GHCB_TERMINATE_REASON(reason_set, reason_val) \
+ (((((u64)reason_set) & 0x7) << 12) | \
+ ((((u64)reason_val) & 0xff) << 16))
+
+#define GHCB_TERMINATE_REASON_UNSPEC 0
+
+/* GHCB MSR protocol for CPUID */
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX 0
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX 1
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_ECX 2
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX 3
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ_CODE 0x4UL
+#define GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, reg) \
+ (GHCB_CPUID_REQ_CODE | (((uint64_t)reg & 3) << 30) | (((uint64_t)fn) << 32))
+#define GHCB_CPUID_RESP_CODE 0x5UL
+#define GHCB_CPUID_RESP(resp) ((resp) & 0xfff)
+
+/* GHCB MSR protocol for GHCB registration */
+#define GHCB_REG_GPA_REQ_CODE 0x12UL
+#define GHCB_REG_GPA_REQ(gfn) \
+ (((unsigned long)((gfn) & GENMASK_ULL(51, 0)) << 12) | GHCB_REG_GPA_REQ_CODE)
+#define GHCB_REG_GPA_RESP_CODE 0x13UL
+#define GHCB_REG_GPA_RESP(resp) ((resp) & GENMASK_ULL(11, 0))
+#define GHCB_REG_GPA_RESP_VAL(resp) ((resp) >> 12)
+
+/* GHCB format/accessors */
+
+struct ghcb {
+ struct vmcb_save_area save;
+ u8 reserved_save[2048 - sizeof(struct vmcb_save_area)];
+ u8 shared_buffer[2032];
+ u8 reserved_1[10];
+ u16 protocol_version;
+ u32 ghcb_usage;
+};
+
+#define GHCB_BITMAP_IDX(field) \
+ (offsetof(struct vmcb_save_area, field) / sizeof(u64))
+
+#define DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(field) \
+ static inline bool ghcb_##field##_is_valid(const struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+ { \
+ return test_bit(GHCB_BITMAP_IDX(field), \
+ (unsigned long *)&ghcb->save.valid_bitmap); \
+ } \
+ \
+ static inline u64 ghcb_get_##field(struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+ { \
+ return ghcb->save.field; \
+ } \
+ \
+ static inline u64 ghcb_get_##field##_if_valid(struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+ { \
+ return ghcb_##field##_is_valid(ghcb) ? ghcb->save.field : 0; \
+ } \
+ \
+ static inline void ghcb_set_##field(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 value) \
+ { \
+ __set_bit(GHCB_BITMAP_IDX(field), \
+ (unsigned long *)&ghcb->save.valid_bitmap); \
+ ghcb->save.field = value; \
+ }
+
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(cpl)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rip)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsp)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rax)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rcx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbx)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbp)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsi)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdi)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r8)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r9)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r10)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r11)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r12)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r13)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r14)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(r15)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_code)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch)
+DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0)
+
+static uint64_t sev_es_rdmsr_ghcb(void)
+{
+ uint64_t lo, hi;
+
+ asm volatile("rdmsr"
+ : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)
+ : "c" (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB));
+
+ return ((hi << 32) | lo);
+}
+
+static void sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(uint64_t val)
+{
+ uint64_t lo, hi;
+
+ lo = val & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ hi = val >> 32;
+
+ asm volatile("wrmsr"
+ :: "c" (MSR_SEV_ES_GHCB), "a" (lo), "d" (hi)
+ : "memory");
+}
+
+void sev_es_terminate(int reason)
+{
+ uint64_t val = GHCB_TERMINATE;
+
+ val |= GHCB_TERMINATE_REASON(2, reason);
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(val);
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ while (true)
+ asm volatile("hlt" : : : "memory");
+}
+
+static int sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 ghcb_gpa, u64 exit_code)
+{
+ ghcb->protocol_version = GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX;
+ ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
+
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, exit_code);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+ ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(ghcb_gpa);
+
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ /* Only #VC exceptions are currently handled. */
+ if ((ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1 & 0xffffffff) == 1)
+ sev_es_terminate(GHCB_TERMINATE_REASON_UNSPEC);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_vc_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, u64 ghcb_gpa, struct ex_regs *regs)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->rax);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->rcx);
+
+ /* ignore additional XSAVE states for now */
+ ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
+
+ ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ghcb_gpa, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!(ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rbx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb)))
+ return 1;
+
+ regs->rax = ghcb->save.rax;
+ regs->rbx = ghcb->save.rbx;
+ regs->rcx = ghcb->save.rcx;
+ regs->rdx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+
+ regs->rip += 2;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_msr_vc_cpuid(struct ex_regs *regs)
+{
+ uint32_t fn = regs->rax & 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ uint64_t resp;
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EAX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ resp = sev_es_rdmsr_ghcb();
+ if (GHCB_CPUID_RESP(resp) != GHCB_CPUID_RESP_CODE)
+ return 1;
+ regs->rax = resp >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EBX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ resp = sev_es_rdmsr_ghcb();
+ if (GHCB_CPUID_RESP(resp) != GHCB_CPUID_RESP_CODE)
+ return 1;
+ regs->rbx = resp >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_ECX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ resp = sev_es_rdmsr_ghcb();
+ if (GHCB_CPUID_RESP(resp) != GHCB_CPUID_RESP_CODE)
+ return 1;
+ regs->rcx = resp >> 32;
+
+ sev_es_wrmsr_ghcb(GHCB_CPUID_REQ(fn, GHCB_CPUID_REQ_EDX));
+ VMGEXIT();
+ resp = sev_es_rdmsr_ghcb();
+ if (GHCB_CPUID_RESP(resp) != GHCB_CPUID_RESP_CODE)
+ return 1;
+ regs->rdx = resp >> 32;
+
+ regs->rip += 2;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sev_es_handle_vc(void *ghcb, u64 ghcb_gpa, struct ex_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (regs->error_code != SVM_EXIT_CPUID)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!ghcb)
+ return handle_msr_vc_cpuid(regs);
+
+ return handle_vc_cpuid(ghcb, ghcb_gpa, regs);
+}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV-ES boot tests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: selftests: add library for handling SEV-ES-related exits Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-16 17:13 ` Michael Roth
2021-12-22 14:56 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Paolo Bonzini
13 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2021-12-16 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
Extend the existing SEV boot tests to also cover SEV-ES guests. Also
add some tests for handling #VC exceptions for cpuid instructions using
both MSR-based and GHCB-based vmgexits.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
.../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
index 329a740a7cb2..63c26bf4ecb6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "svm_util.h"
#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
#include "sev.h"
+#include "sev_exitlib.h"
#define VCPU_ID 2
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
@@ -31,6 +32,10 @@
#define TOTAL_PAGES (512 + SHARED_PAGES + PRIVATE_PAGES)
+/* Globals for use by #VC handler. */
+static void *ghcb0_gva;
+static vm_paddr_t ghcb0_gpa;
+
static void fill_buf(uint8_t *buf, size_t pages, size_t stride, uint8_t val)
{
int i, j;
@@ -165,6 +170,47 @@ guest_sev_code(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf, uint8_t *private_buf)
guest_test_done(uc);
}
+static void vc_handler(struct ex_regs *regs)
+{
+ sev_es_handle_vc(ghcb0_gva, ghcb0_gpa, regs);
+}
+
+static void __attribute__((__flatten__))
+guest_sev_es_code(struct ucall *uc, uint8_t *shared_buf,
+ uint8_t *private_buf, uint64_t ghcb_gpa, void *ghcb_gva)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ uint64_t sev_status;
+
+ guest_test_start(uc);
+
+again:
+ /* Check CPUID values via GHCB MSR protocol. */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ /* Check SEV bit. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, eax & (1 << 1));
+ /* Check SEV-ES bit. */
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, eax & (1 << 3));
+
+ if (!ghcb0_gva) {
+ ghcb0_gva = ghcb_gva;
+ ghcb0_gpa = ghcb_gpa;
+ /* Check CPUID bits again using GHCB-based protocol. */
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /* Check SEV and SEV-ES enabled bits (bits 0 and 1, respectively). */
+ sev_status = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+ GUEST_SHARED_ASSERT(uc, (sev_status & 0x3) == 3);
+
+ guest_test_common(uc, shared_buf, private_buf);
+
+ guest_test_done(uc);
+}
+
static struct sev_vm *
setup_test_common(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy, struct ucall **uc,
uint8_t **shared_buf, uint8_t **private_buf)
@@ -200,7 +246,18 @@ setup_test_common(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy, struct ucall **uc,
fill_buf(*private_buf, PRIVATE_PAGES, PAGE_STRIDE, 0x42);
/* Set up guest params. */
- vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 4, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr);
+ if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) {
+ vm_vaddr_t ghcb_vaddr = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 6, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr,
+ addr_gva2gpa(vm, ghcb_vaddr), ghcb_vaddr);
+ /* Set up VC handler. */
+ vm_init_descriptor_tables(vm);
+ vm_install_exception_handler(vm, 29, vc_handler);
+ vcpu_init_descriptor_tables(vm, VCPU_ID);
+ } else {
+ vcpu_args_set(vm, VCPU_ID, 4, uc_vaddr, shared_vaddr, private_vaddr);
+ }
/*
* Hand these back to test harness, translation is needed now since page
@@ -251,5 +308,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
+ /* SEV-ES tests */
+ test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES);
+
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests
2021-12-16 17:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2021-12-16 17:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: selftests: add SEV-ES boot tests Michael Roth
@ 2021-12-22 14:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-01-04 23:41 ` Michael Roth
13 siblings, 1 reply; 24+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2021-12-22 14:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michael Roth, linux-kselftest
Cc: kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman, Marc Orr,
Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On 12/16/21 18:13, Michael Roth wrote:
> These patches and are also available at:
>
> https://github.com/mdroth/linux/commits/sev-selftests-v2
>
> They are based on top of the recent RFC:
>
> "KVM: selftests: Add support for test-selectable ucall implementations"
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211210164620.11636-1-michael.roth@amd.com/T/
>
> https://github.com/mdroth/linux/commits/sev-selftests-ucall-rfc1
>
> which provides a new ucall implementation that this series relies on.
> Those patches were in turn based on kvm/next as of 2021-12-10.
Looks good, apart from the cleanups that Peter pointed out in patch 7.
When you send the next version, you can keep it based on the same ucall
RFC, even if I haven't yet pushed them (which I'll do only after testing
on s390).
Thanks,
Paolo
> == OVERVIEW ==
>
> This series introduces a set of memory encryption-related parameter/hooks
> in the core kselftest library, then uses the hooks to implement a small
> library for creating/managing SEV, SEV-ES, and (eventually) SEV-SNP guests.
> This library is then used to implement a basic boot/memory test that's run
> for variants of SEV/SEV-ES guests.
>
> - Patches 1-8 implement SEV boot tests and should run against existing
> kernels
> - Patch 9 is a KVM changes that's required to allow SEV-ES/SEV-SNP
> guests to boot with an externally generated page table, and is a
> host kernel prequisite for the remaining patches in the series.
> - Patches 10-13 extend the boot tests to cover SEV-ES
>
> Any review/comments are greatly appreciated!
>
> v2:
> - rebased on ucall_ops patchset (which is based on kvm/next 2021-12-10)
> - remove SEV-SNP support for now
> - provide encryption bitmap as const* to original rather than as a copy
> (Mingwei, Paolo)
> - drop SEV-specific synchronization helpers in favor of ucall_ops_halt (Paolo)
> - don't pass around addresses with c-bit included, add them as-needed via
> addr_gpa2raw() (e.g. when adding PTEs, or initializing initial
> cr3/vm->pgd) (Paolo)
> - rename lib/sev.c functions for better consistency (Krish)
> - move more test setup code out of main test function and into
> setup_test_common() (Krish)
> - suppress compiler warnings due to -Waddress-of-packed-member like kernel
> does
> - don't require SNP support in minimum firmware version detection (Marc)
> - allow SEV device path to be configured via make SEV_PATH= (Marc)
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> Michael Roth (13):
> KVM: selftests: move vm_phy_pages_alloc() earlier in file
> KVM: selftests: sparsebit: add const where appropriate
> KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory
> KVM: selftests: handle encryption bits in page tables
> KVM: selftests: add support for encrypted vm_vaddr_* allocations
> KVM: selftests: ensure ucall_shared_alloc() allocates shared memory
> KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
> KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
> KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests
> KVM: selftests: account for error code in #VC exception frame
> KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-ES guests
> KVM: selftests: add library for handling SEV-ES-related exits
> KVM: selftests: add SEV-ES boot tests
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 10 +-
> .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 10 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h | 36 +--
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 +++
> .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h | 14 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h | 35 +++
> .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h | 1 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 270 ++++++++++++------
> .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h | 10 +
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c | 48 ++--
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c | 4 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S | 4 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c | 16 +-
> tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++
> .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++
> .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 316 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 22 files changed, 1215 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests
2021-12-22 14:56 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: selftests: Add tests for SEV and SEV-ES guests Paolo Bonzini
@ 2022-01-04 23:41 ` Michael Roth
0 siblings, 0 replies; 24+ messages in thread
From: Michael Roth @ 2022-01-04 23:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paolo Bonzini
Cc: linux-kselftest, kvm, linux-kernel, x86, Nathan Tempelman,
Marc Orr, Steve Rutherford, Sean Christopherson, Mingwei Zhang,
Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Varad Gautam, Shuah Khan,
Vitaly Kuznetsov, David Woodhouse, Ricardo Koller, Jim Mattson,
Joerg Roedel, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov,
H . Peter Anvin, Krish Sadhukhan, Peter Gonda
On Wed, Dec 22, 2021 at 03:56:23PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 12/16/21 18:13, Michael Roth wrote:
> > These patches and are also available at:
> >
> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fmdroth%2Flinux%2Fcommits%2Fsev-selftests-v2&data=04%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C749cb23438484cede3bc08d9c55b3c4e%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637757817978399009%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=8F%2BcL%2F9FcCx4I2QXJUmBwGGxdHymP6l%2BoRKQO7%2BVj1Y%3D&reserved=0
> >
> > They are based on top of the recent RFC:
> >
> > "KVM: selftests: Add support for test-selectable ucall implementations"
> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fall%2F20211210164620.11636-1-michael.roth%40amd.com%2FT%2F&data=04%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C749cb23438484cede3bc08d9c55b3c4e%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637757817978399009%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=BZu%2BqGCqpHEHlkL%2B5zFELdOaERRrUdznCFO%2FzPaQ4v8%3D&reserved=0
> >
> > https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fmdroth%2Flinux%2Fcommits%2Fsev-selftests-ucall-rfc1&data=04%7C01%7Cmichael.roth%40amd.com%7C749cb23438484cede3bc08d9c55b3c4e%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637757817978399009%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=DkCRww6ifTrnavR9XvmWwX1wkKHK172iuivTaqEfu6o%3D&reserved=0
> >
> > which provides a new ucall implementation that this series relies on.
> > Those patches were in turn based on kvm/next as of 2021-12-10.
>
> Looks good, apart from the cleanups that Peter pointed out in patch 7.
>
> When you send the next version, you can keep it based on the same ucall RFC,
> even if I haven't yet pushed them (which I'll do only after testing on
> s390).
Hi Paolo,
Didn't manage to get these out before going on break, but back in office now
and will get an updated version out as soon as we figure out a plan for
implementing some of Sean's recent suggestions for the ucall side of things.
Thanks,
Mike
>
> Thanks,
>
> Paolo
>
> > == OVERVIEW ==
> >
> > This series introduces a set of memory encryption-related parameter/hooks
> > in the core kselftest library, then uses the hooks to implement a small
> > library for creating/managing SEV, SEV-ES, and (eventually) SEV-SNP guests.
> > This library is then used to implement a basic boot/memory test that's run
> > for variants of SEV/SEV-ES guests.
> >
> > - Patches 1-8 implement SEV boot tests and should run against existing
> > kernels
> > - Patch 9 is a KVM changes that's required to allow SEV-ES/SEV-SNP
> > guests to boot with an externally generated page table, and is a
> > host kernel prequisite for the remaining patches in the series.
> > - Patches 10-13 extend the boot tests to cover SEV-ES
> >
> > Any review/comments are greatly appreciated!
> >
> > v2:
> > - rebased on ucall_ops patchset (which is based on kvm/next 2021-12-10)
> > - remove SEV-SNP support for now
> > - provide encryption bitmap as const* to original rather than as a copy
> > (Mingwei, Paolo)
> > - drop SEV-specific synchronization helpers in favor of ucall_ops_halt (Paolo)
> > - don't pass around addresses with c-bit included, add them as-needed via
> > addr_gpa2raw() (e.g. when adding PTEs, or initializing initial
> > cr3/vm->pgd) (Paolo)
> > - rename lib/sev.c functions for better consistency (Krish)
> > - move more test setup code out of main test function and into
> > setup_test_common() (Krish)
> > - suppress compiler warnings due to -Waddress-of-packed-member like kernel
> > does
> > - don't require SNP support in minimum firmware version detection (Marc)
> > - allow SEV device path to be configured via make SEV_PATH= (Marc)
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> > Michael Roth (13):
> > KVM: selftests: move vm_phy_pages_alloc() earlier in file
> > KVM: selftests: sparsebit: add const where appropriate
> > KVM: selftests: add hooks for managing encrypted guest memory
> > KVM: selftests: handle encryption bits in page tables
> > KVM: selftests: add support for encrypted vm_vaddr_* allocations
> > KVM: selftests: ensure ucall_shared_alloc() allocates shared memory
> > KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
> > KVM: selftests: add SEV boot tests
> > KVM: SVM: include CR3 in initial VMSA state for SEV-ES guests
> > KVM: selftests: account for error code in #VC exception frame
> > KVM: selftests: add support for creating SEV-ES guests
> > KVM: selftests: add library for handling SEV-ES-related exits
> > KVM: selftests: add SEV-ES boot tests
> >
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 ++
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 6 +
> > arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/.gitignore | 1 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 10 +-
> > .../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util_base.h | 10 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/sparsebit.h | 36 +--
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 44 +++
> > .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h | 14 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm.h | 35 +++
> > .../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/svm_util.h | 1 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 270 ++++++++++++------
> > .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util_internal.h | 10 +
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/sparsebit.c | 48 ++--
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/ucall_common.c | 4 +-
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/handlers.S | 4 +-
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/processor.c | 16 +-
> > tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++
> > .../testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++
> > .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c | 316 +++++++++++++++++++++
> > 22 files changed, 1215 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev_exitlib.h
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev_exitlib.c
> > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/sev_all_boot_test.c
> >
> >
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 24+ messages in thread