[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 06/31] media: dvb_demux: fix a bug for the continuity counter

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 06/31] media: dvb_demux: fix a bug for the continuity counter

[Sasha Levin]

From: YongSu Yoo <yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 7efb10d8dc70ea3000cc70dca53407c52488acd1 ]

In dvb_demux.c, some logics exist which compare the expected
continuity counter and the real continuity counter. If they
are not matched each other, both of the expected continuity
counter and the real continuity counter should be printed.
But there exists a bug that the expected continuity counter
is not correctly printed. The expected continuity counter is
replaced with the real countinuity counter + 1 so that
the epected continuity counter is not correclty printed.
This is wrong. This bug is fixed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230305212519.499-1-yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com

Signed-off-by: YongSu Yoo <yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c
index 5fde1d38b3e34..80b495982f63c 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_demux.c
@@ -125,12 +125,12 @@ static inline int dvb_dmx_swfilter_payload(struct dvb_demux_feed *feed,
 
 	cc = buf[3] & 0x0f;
 	ccok = ((feed->cc + 1) & 0x0f) == cc;
-	feed->cc = cc;
 	if (!ccok) {
 		set_buf_flags(feed, DMX_BUFFER_FLAG_DISCONTINUITY_DETECTED);
 		dprintk_sect_loss("missed packet: %d instead of %d!\n",
 				  cc, (feed->cc + 1) & 0x0f);
 	}
+	feed->cc = cc;
 
 	if (buf[1] & 0x40)	// PUSI ?
 		feed->peslen = 0xfffa;
@@ -310,7 +310,6 @@ static int dvb_dmx_swfilter_section_packet(struct dvb_demux_feed *feed,
 
 	cc = buf[3] & 0x0f;
 	ccok = ((feed->cc + 1) & 0x0f) == cc;
-	feed->cc = cc;
 
 	if (buf[3] & 0x20) {
 		/* adaption field present, check for discontinuity_indicator */
@@ -346,6 +345,7 @@ static int dvb_dmx_swfilter_section_packet(struct dvb_demux_feed *feed,
 		feed->pusi_seen = false;
 		dvb_dmx_swfilter_section_new(feed);
 	}
+	feed->cc = cc;
 
 	if (buf[1] & 0x40) {
 		/* PUSI=1 (is set), section boundary is here */
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 07/31] media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix three null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 858e97d7956d17a2cb56a9413468704a4d5abfe1 ]

In az6027_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null,
commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in
az6027_i2c_xfer()") fix the null-ptr-deref bug when msg[i].addr is 0x99.
However, null-ptr-deref also happens when msg[i].addr is 0xd0 and 0xc0.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent null-ptr-deref.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230310165604.3093483-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/az6027.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/az6027.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/az6027.c
index 32b4ee65c2802..991f4510aaebb 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/az6027.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/az6027.c
@@ -988,6 +988,10 @@ static int az6027_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[], int n
 			/* write/read request */
 			if (i + 1 < num && (msg[i + 1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
 				req = 0xB9;
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				index = (((msg[i].buf[0] << 8) & 0xff00) | (msg[i].buf[1] & 0x00ff));
 				value = msg[i].addr + (msg[i].len << 8);
 				length = msg[i + 1].len + 6;
@@ -1001,6 +1005,10 @@ static int az6027_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[], int n
 
 				/* demod 16bit addr */
 				req = 0xBD;
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				index = (((msg[i].buf[0] << 8) & 0xff00) | (msg[i].buf[1] & 0x00ff));
 				value = msg[i].addr + (2 << 8);
 				length = msg[i].len - 2;
@@ -1026,6 +1034,10 @@ static int az6027_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[], int n
 			} else {
 
 				req = 0xBD;
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				index = msg[i].buf[0] & 0x00FF;
 				value = msg[i].addr + (1 << 8);
 				length = msg[i].len - 1;
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 08/31] media: dvb-usb-v2: ec168: fix null-ptr-deref in ec168_i2c_xfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a6dcefcc08eca1bf4e3d213c97c3cfb75f377935 ]

In ec168_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null
and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed.
If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null pointer deref
would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230313085853.3252349-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ec168.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ec168.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ec168.c
index 7ed0ab9e429b1..0e4773fc025c9 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ec168.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ec168.c
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ static int ec168_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 	while (i < num) {
 		if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
 			if (msg[i].addr == ec168_ec100_config.demod_address) {
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				req.cmd = READ_DEMOD;
 				req.value = 0;
 				req.index = 0xff00 + msg[i].buf[0]; /* reg */
@@ -131,6 +135,10 @@ static int ec168_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			}
 		} else {
 			if (msg[i].addr == ec168_ec100_config.demod_address) {
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				req.cmd = WRITE_DEMOD;
 				req.value = msg[i].buf[1]; /* val */
 				req.index = 0xff00 + msg[i].buf[0]; /* reg */
@@ -139,6 +147,10 @@ static int ec168_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 				ret = ec168_ctrl_msg(d, &req);
 				i += 1;
 			} else {
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				req.cmd = WRITE_I2C;
 				req.value = msg[i].buf[0]; /* val */
 				req.index = 0x0100 + msg[i].addr; /* I2C addr */
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 09/31] media: dvb-usb-v2: ce6230: fix null-ptr-deref in ce6230_i2c_master_xfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit dff919090155fb22679869e8469168f270dcd97f ]

In ce6230_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach ce6230_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add
check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230313092751.209496-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
index 44540de1a2066..d3b5cb4a24daf 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/ce6230.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 		if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
 			if (msg[i].addr ==
 				ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				req.cmd = DEMOD_READ;
 				req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
 				req.index = msg[i].buf[0];
@@ -117,6 +121,10 @@ static int ce6230_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
 		} else {
 			if (msg[i].addr ==
 				ce6230_zl10353_config.demod_address) {
+				if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+					i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 				req.cmd = DEMOD_WRITE;
 				req.value = msg[i].addr >> 1;
 				req.index = msg[i].buf[0];
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 10/31] media: dvb-usb-v2: rtl28xxu: fix null-ptr-deref in rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer

[Sasha Levin]

From: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>

[ Upstream commit aa4a447b81b84f69c1a89ad899df157f386d7636 ]

In rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/tencent_3623572106754AC2F266B316798B0F6CCA05@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
index c278b9b0f1024..70a2f04942164 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/rtl28xxu.c
@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ static int rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			goto err_mutex_unlock;
 		} else if (msg[0].addr == 0x10) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 1 || msg[1].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				goto err_mutex_unlock;
+			}
 			/* method 1 - integrated demod */
 			if (msg[0].buf[0] == 0x00) {
 				/* return demod page from driver cache */
@@ -189,6 +193,10 @@ static int rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 				ret = rtl28xxu_ctrl_msg(d, &req);
 			}
 		} else if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				goto err_mutex_unlock;
+			}
 			/* method 2 - old I2C */
 			req.value = (msg[0].buf[0] << 8) | (msg[0].addr << 1);
 			req.index = CMD_I2C_RD;
@@ -217,8 +225,16 @@ static int rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			goto err_mutex_unlock;
 		} else if (msg[0].addr == 0x10) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				goto err_mutex_unlock;
+			}
 			/* method 1 - integrated demod */
 			if (msg[0].buf[0] == 0x00) {
+				if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+					ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					goto err_mutex_unlock;
+				}
 				/* save demod page for later demod access */
 				dev->page = msg[0].buf[1];
 				ret = 0;
@@ -231,6 +247,10 @@ static int rtl28xxu_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 				ret = rtl28xxu_ctrl_msg(d, &req);
 			}
 		} else if ((msg[0].len < 23) && (!dev->new_i2c_write)) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				goto err_mutex_unlock;
+			}
 			/* method 2 - old I2C */
 			req.value = (msg[0].buf[0] << 8) | (msg[0].addr << 1);
 			req.index = CMD_I2C_WR;
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 11/31] media: dvb-usb: digitv: fix null-ptr-deref in digitv_i2c_xfer()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 9ded5bd2a49ce3015b7c936743eec0a0e6e11f0c ]

In digitv_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach digitv_i2c_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add
check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230313095008.1039689-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c
index 4e3b3c064bcfb..e56efebd4f0a1 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/digitv.c
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ static int digitv_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,struct i2c_msg msg[],int num
 		warn("more than 2 i2c messages at a time is not handled yet. TODO.");
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+		if (msg[i].len < 1) {
+			i = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
 		/* write/read request */
 		if (i+1 < num && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
 			if (digitv_ctrl_msg(d, USB_READ_COFDM, msg[i].buf[0], NULL, 0,
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 12/31] media: dvb-usb: dw2102: fix uninit-value in su3000_read_mac_address

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a3fd1ef27aa686d871cefe207bd6168c4b0cd29e ]

In su3000_read_mac_address, if i2c_transfer fails to execute two
messages, array mac address will not be initialized. Without handling
such error, later in function dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init, proposed_mac
is accessed before initialization.

Fix this error by returning a negative value if message execution fails.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230328124416.560889-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
index aa929db56db1f..3c4ac998d040f 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static int su3000_read_mac_address(struct dvb_usb_device *d, u8 mac[6])
 	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
 		obuf[1] = 0xf0 + i;
 		if (i2c_transfer(&d->i2c_adap, msg, 2) != 2)
-			break;
+			return -1;
 		else
 			mac[i] = ibuf[0];
 	}
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 13/31] media: netup_unidvb: fix irq init by register it at the end of probe

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit e6ad6233592593079db5c8fa592c298e51bc1356 ]

IRQ handler netup_spi_interrupt() takes spinlock spi->lock. The lock
is initialized in netup_spi_init(). However, irq handler is registered
before initializing the lock.

Spinlock dma->lock and i2c->lock suffer from the same problem.

Fix this by registering the irq at the end of probe.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230315134518.1074497-1-harperchen1110@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../media/pci/netup_unidvb/netup_unidvb_core.c  | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/netup_unidvb/netup_unidvb_core.c b/drivers/media/pci/netup_unidvb/netup_unidvb_core.c
index 77bae14685513..3fa1d178e70fd 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/netup_unidvb/netup_unidvb_core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/netup_unidvb/netup_unidvb_core.c
@@ -887,12 +887,7 @@ static int netup_unidvb_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 		ndev->lmmio0, (u32)pci_resource_len(pci_dev, 0),
 		ndev->lmmio1, (u32)pci_resource_len(pci_dev, 1),
 		pci_dev->irq);
-	if (request_irq(pci_dev->irq, netup_unidvb_isr, IRQF_SHARED,
-			"netup_unidvb", pci_dev) < 0) {
-		dev_err(&pci_dev->dev,
-			"%s(): can't get IRQ %d\n", __func__, pci_dev->irq);
-		goto irq_request_err;
-	}
+
 	ndev->dma_size = 2 * 188 *
 		NETUP_DMA_BLOCKS_COUNT * NETUP_DMA_PACKETS_COUNT;
 	ndev->dma_virt = dma_alloc_coherent(&pci_dev->dev,
@@ -933,6 +928,14 @@ static int netup_unidvb_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 		dev_err(&pci_dev->dev, "netup_unidvb: DMA setup failed\n");
 		goto dma_setup_err;
 	}
+
+	if (request_irq(pci_dev->irq, netup_unidvb_isr, IRQF_SHARED,
+			"netup_unidvb", pci_dev) < 0) {
+		dev_err(&pci_dev->dev,
+			"%s(): can't get IRQ %d\n", __func__, pci_dev->irq);
+		goto dma_setup_err;
+	}
+
 	dev_info(&pci_dev->dev,
 		"netup_unidvb: device has been initialized\n");
 	return 0;
@@ -951,8 +954,6 @@ static int netup_unidvb_initdev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 	dma_free_coherent(&pci_dev->dev, ndev->dma_size,
 			ndev->dma_virt, ndev->dma_phys);
 dma_alloc_err:
-	free_irq(pci_dev->irq, pci_dev);
-irq_request_err:
 	iounmap(ndev->lmmio1);
 pci_bar1_error:
 	iounmap(ndev->lmmio0);
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 14/31] media: dvb_ca_en50221: fix a size write bug

[Sasha Levin]

From: YongSu Yoo <yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a4315e5be7020aac9b24a8151caf4bb85224cd0e ]

The function of "dvb_ca_en50221_write_data" at source/drivers/media
/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c is used for two cases.
The first case is for writing APDU data in the function of
"dvb_ca_en50221_io_write" at source/drivers/media/dvb-core/
dvb_ca_en50221.c.
The second case is for writing the host link buf size on the
Command Register in the function of "dvb_ca_en50221_link_init"
at source/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c.
In the second case, there exists a bug like following.
In the function of the "dvb_ca_en50221_link_init",
after a TV host calculates the host link buf_size,
the TV host writes the calculated host link buf_size on the
Size Register.
Accroding to the en50221 Spec (the page 60 of
https://dvb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/En50221.V1.pdf),
before this writing operation, the "SW(CMDREG_SW)" flag in the
Command Register should be set. We can see this setting operation
in the function of the "dvb_ca_en50221_link_init" like below.
...
	if ((ret = ca->pub->write_cam_control(ca->pub, slot,
CTRLIF_COMMAND, IRQEN | CMDREG_SW)) != 0)
		return ret;
...
But, after that, the real writing operation is implemented using
the function of the "dvb_ca_en50221_write_data" in the function of
"dvb_ca_en50221_link_init", and the "dvb_ca_en50221_write_data"
includes the function of "ca->pub->write_cam_control",
and the function of the "ca->pub->write_cam_control" in the
function of the "dvb_ca_en50221_wrte_data" does not include
"CMDREG_SW" flag like below.
...
	if ((status = ca->pub->write_cam_control(ca->pub, slot,
CTRLIF_COMMAND, IRQEN | CMDREG_HC)) != 0)
...
In the above source code, we can see only the "IRQEN | CMDREG_HC",
but we cannot see the "CMDREG_SW".
The "CMDREG_SW" flag which was set in the function of the
"dvb_ca_en50221_link_init" was rollbacked by the follwoing function
of the "dvb_ca_en50221_write_data".
This is a bug. and this bug causes that the calculated host link buf_size
is not properly written in the CI module.
Through this patch, we fix this bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20220818125027.1131-1-yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: YongSu Yoo <yongsuyoo0215@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
index fd476536d32ed..b1a7b5f8b9aa4 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static void dvb_ca_en50221_thread_wakeup(struct dvb_ca_private *ca);
 static int dvb_ca_en50221_read_data(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot,
 				    u8 *ebuf, int ecount);
 static int dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot,
-				     u8 *ebuf, int ecount);
+				     u8 *ebuf, int ecount, int size_write_flag);
 
 /**
  * Safely find needle in haystack.
@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_link_init(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot)
 	ret = dvb_ca_en50221_wait_if_status(ca, slot, STATUSREG_FR, HZ / 10);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	ret = dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(ca, slot, buf, 2);
+	ret = dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(ca, slot, buf, 2, CMDREG_SW);
 	if (ret != 2)
 		return -EIO;
 	ret = ca->pub->write_cam_control(ca->pub, slot, CTRLIF_COMMAND, IRQEN);
@@ -778,11 +778,13 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_read_data(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot,
  * @buf: The data in this buffer is treated as a complete link-level packet to
  *	 be written.
  * @bytes_write: Size of ebuf.
+ * @size_write_flag: A flag on Command Register which says whether the link size
+ * information will be writen or not.
  *
  * return: Number of bytes written, or < 0 on error.
  */
 static int dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot,
-				     u8 *buf, int bytes_write)
+				     u8 *buf, int bytes_write, int size_write_flag)
 {
 	struct dvb_ca_slot *sl = &ca->slot_info[slot];
 	int status;
@@ -817,7 +819,7 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(struct dvb_ca_private *ca, int slot,
 
 	/* OK, set HC bit */
 	status = ca->pub->write_cam_control(ca->pub, slot, CTRLIF_COMMAND,
-					    IRQEN | CMDREG_HC);
+					    IRQEN | CMDREG_HC | size_write_flag);
 	if (status)
 		goto exit;
 
@@ -1505,7 +1507,7 @@ static ssize_t dvb_ca_en50221_io_write(struct file *file,
 
 			mutex_lock(&sl->slot_lock);
 			status = dvb_ca_en50221_write_data(ca, slot, fragbuf,
-							   fraglen + 2);
+							   fraglen + 2, 0);
 			mutex_unlock(&sl->slot_lock);
 			if (status == (fraglen + 2)) {
 				written = 1;
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 15/31] media: ttusb-dec: fix memory leak in ttusb_dec_exit_dvb()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 517a281338322ff8293f988771c98aaa7205e457 ]

Since dvb_frontend_detach() is not called in ttusb_dec_exit_dvb(),
which is called when the device is disconnected, dvb_frontend_free()
is not finally called.

This causes a memory leak just by repeatedly plugging and
unplugging the device.

Fix this issue by adding dvb_frontend_detach() to ttusb_dec_exit_dvb().

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20221117045925.14297-5-imv4bel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c b/drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c
index df6c5e4a0f058..68f88143c8a6e 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/ttusb-dec/ttusb_dec.c
@@ -1551,8 +1551,7 @@ static void ttusb_dec_exit_dvb(struct ttusb_dec *dec)
 	dvb_dmx_release(&dec->demux);
 	if (dec->fe) {
 		dvb_unregister_frontend(dec->fe);
-		if (dec->fe->ops.release)
-			dec->fe->ops.release(dec->fe);
+		dvb_frontend_detach(dec->fe);
 	}
 	dvb_unregister_adapter(&dec->adapter);
 }
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 16/31] media: mn88443x: fix !CONFIG_OF error by drop of_match_ptr from ID table

[Sasha Levin]

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>

[ Upstream commit ae11c0efaec32fb45130ee9886689f467232eebc ]

The driver will match mostly by DT table (even thought there is regular
ID table) so there is little benefit in of_match_ptr (this also allows
ACPI matching via PRP0001, even though it might not be relevant here).
This also fixes !CONFIG_OF error:

  drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c:782:34: error: ‘mn88443x_of_match’ defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230312131318.351173-28-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c
index fff212c0bf3b5..05894deb8a19a 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mn88443x.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, mn88443x_i2c_id);
 static struct i2c_driver mn88443x_driver = {
 	.driver = {
 		.name = "mn88443x",
-		.of_match_table = of_match_ptr(mn88443x_of_match),
+		.of_match_table = mn88443x_of_match,
 	},
 	.probe    = mn88443x_probe,
 	.remove   = mn88443x_remove,
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 17/31] media: dvb-core: Fix use-after-free due on race condition at dvb_net

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4172385b0c9ac366dcab78eda48c26814b87ed1a ]

A race condition may occur between the .disconnect function, which
is called when the device is disconnected, and the dvb_device_open()
function, which is called when the device node is open()ed.
This results in several types of UAFs.

The root cause of this is that you use the dvb_device_open() function,
which does not implement a conditional statement
that checks 'dvbnet->exit'.

So, add 'remove_mutex` to protect 'dvbnet->exit' and use
locked_dvb_net_open() function to check 'dvbnet->exit'.

[mchehab: fix a checkpatch warning]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20221117045925.14297-3-imv4bel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 include/media/dvb_net.h          |  4 ++++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c
index dddebea644bb8..c594b1bdfcaa5 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c
@@ -1564,15 +1564,43 @@ static long dvb_net_ioctl(struct file *file,
 	return dvb_usercopy(file, cmd, arg, dvb_net_do_ioctl);
 }
 
+static int locked_dvb_net_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct dvb_device *dvbdev = file->private_data;
+	struct dvb_net *dvbnet = dvbdev->priv;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&dvbnet->remove_mutex))
+		return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+	if (dvbnet->exit) {
+		mutex_unlock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	ret = dvb_generic_open(inode, file);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int dvb_net_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct dvb_device *dvbdev = file->private_data;
 	struct dvb_net *dvbnet = dvbdev->priv;
 
+	mutex_lock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
+
 	dvb_generic_release(inode, file);
 
-	if(dvbdev->users == 1 && dvbnet->exit == 1)
+	if (dvbdev->users == 1 && dvbnet->exit == 1) {
+		mutex_unlock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
 		wake_up(&dvbdev->wait_queue);
+	} else {
+		mutex_unlock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1580,7 +1608,7 @@ static int dvb_net_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static const struct file_operations dvb_net_fops = {
 	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = dvb_net_ioctl,
-	.open =	dvb_generic_open,
+	.open =	locked_dvb_net_open,
 	.release = dvb_net_close,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
 };
@@ -1599,10 +1627,13 @@ void dvb_net_release (struct dvb_net *dvbnet)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	mutex_lock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
 	dvbnet->exit = 1;
+	mutex_unlock(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
+
 	if (dvbnet->dvbdev->users < 1)
 		wait_event(dvbnet->dvbdev->wait_queue,
-				dvbnet->dvbdev->users==1);
+				dvbnet->dvbdev->users == 1);
 
 	dvb_unregister_device(dvbnet->dvbdev);
 
@@ -1621,6 +1652,7 @@ int dvb_net_init (struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_net *dvbnet,
 	int i;
 
 	mutex_init(&dvbnet->ioctl_mutex);
+	mutex_init(&dvbnet->remove_mutex);
 	dvbnet->demux = dmx;
 
 	for (i=0; i<DVB_NET_DEVICES_MAX; i++)
diff --git a/include/media/dvb_net.h b/include/media/dvb_net.h
index 5e31d37f25fac..cc01dffcc9f35 100644
--- a/include/media/dvb_net.h
+++ b/include/media/dvb_net.h
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
  * @exit:		flag to indicate when the device is being removed.
  * @demux:		pointer to &struct dmx_demux.
  * @ioctl_mutex:	protect access to this struct.
+ * @remove_mutex:	mutex that avoids a race condition between a callback
+ *			called when the hardware is disconnected and the
+ *			file_operations of dvb_net.
  *
  * Currently, the core supports up to %DVB_NET_DEVICES_MAX (10) network
  * devices.
@@ -53,6 +56,7 @@ struct dvb_net {
 	unsigned int exit:1;
 	struct dmx_demux *demux;
 	struct mutex ioctl_mutex;
+	struct mutex remove_mutex;
 };
 
 /**
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 18/31] media: dvb-core: Fix kernel WARNING for blocking operation in wait_event*()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

[ Upstream commit b8c75e4a1b325ea0a9433fa8834be97b5836b946 ]

Using a semaphore in the wait_event*() condition is no good idea.
It hits a kernel WARN_ON() at prepare_to_wait_event() like:
  do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at
  prepare_to_wait_event+0x6d/0x690

For avoiding the potential deadlock, rewrite to an open-coded loop
instead.  Unlike the loop in wait_event*(), this uses wait_woken()
after the condition check, hence the task state stays consistent.

CVE-2023-31084 was assigned to this bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CA+UBctCu7fXn4q41O_3=id1+OdyQ85tZY1x+TkT-6OVBL6KAUw@mail.gmail.com/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20230512151800.1874-1-tiwai@suse.de
Reported-by: Yu Hao <yhao016@ucr.edu>
Closes: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31084
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
index b04638321b75b..ad3e42a4eaf73 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c
@@ -292,14 +292,22 @@ static int dvb_frontend_get_event(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
 	}
 
 	if (events->eventw == events->eventr) {
-		int ret;
+		struct wait_queue_entry wait;
+		int ret = 0;
 
 		if (flags & O_NONBLOCK)
 			return -EWOULDBLOCK;
 
-		ret = wait_event_interruptible(events->wait_queue,
-					       dvb_frontend_test_event(fepriv, events));
-
+		init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
+		add_wait_queue(&events->wait_queue, &wait);
+		while (!dvb_frontend_test_event(fepriv, events)) {
+			wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, 0);
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		remove_wait_queue(&events->wait_queue, &wait);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 	}
-- 
2.39.2

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 19/31] media: dvb-core: Fix use-after-free due to race condition at dvb_ca_en50221

[Sasha Levin]

From: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>

[ Upstream commit 280a8ab81733da8bc442253c700a52c4c0886ffd ]

If the device node of dvb_ca_en50221 is open() and the
device is disconnected, a UAF may occur when calling
close() on the device node.

The root cause is that wake_up() and wait_event() for
dvbdev->wait_queue are not implemented.

So implement wait_event() function in dvb_ca_en50221_release()
and add 'remove_mutex' which prevents race condition
for 'ca->exit'.

[mchehab: fix a checkpatch warning]

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/20221121063308.GA33821@ubuntu
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
index b1a7b5f8b9aa4..dec036e0336cb 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c
@@ -151,6 +151,12 @@ struct dvb_ca_private {
 
 	/* mutex serializing ioctls */
 	struct mutex ioctl_mutex;
+
+	/* A mutex used when a device is disconnected */
+	struct mutex remove_mutex;
+
+	/* Whether the device is disconnected */
+	int exit;
 };
 
 static void dvb_ca_private_free(struct dvb_ca_private *ca)
@@ -1708,12 +1714,22 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_io_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
 
-	if (!try_module_get(ca->pub->owner))
+	mutex_lock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+
+	if (ca->exit) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
+	if (!try_module_get(ca->pub->owner)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
 		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	err = dvb_generic_open(inode, file);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		module_put(ca->pub->owner);
+		mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -1738,6 +1754,7 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_io_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	dvb_ca_private_get(ca);
 
+	mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1757,6 +1774,8 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_io_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
 
+	mutex_lock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+
 	/* mark the CA device as closed */
 	ca->open = 0;
 	dvb_ca_en50221_thread_update_delay(ca);
@@ -1767,6 +1786,13 @@ static int dvb_ca_en50221_io_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	dvb_ca_private_put(ca);
 
+	if (dvbdev->users == 1 && ca->exit == 1) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+		wake_up(&dvbdev->wait_queue);
+	} else {
+		mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+	}
+
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1890,6 +1916,7 @@ int dvb_ca_en50221_init(struct dvb_adapter *dvb_adapter,
 	}
 
 	mutex_init(&ca->ioctl_mutex);
+	mutex_init(&ca->remove_mutex);
 
 	if (signal_pending(current)) {
 		ret = -EINTR;
@@ -1932,6 +1959,14 @@ void dvb_ca_en50221_release(struct dvb_ca_en50221 *pubca)
 
 	dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
 
+	mutex_lock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+	ca->exit = 1;
+	mutex_unlock(&ca->remove_mutex);
+
+	if (ca->dvbdev->users < 1)
+		wait_event(ca->dvbdev->wait_queue,
+				ca->dvbdev->users == 1);
+
 	/* shutdown the thread if there was one */
 	kthread_stop(ca->thread);
 
-- 
2.39.2