* [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory
Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt=
kernel parameter.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++
Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 3dd6d5d..84c5787 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2165,6 +2165,17 @@
memory contents and reserves bad memory
regions that are detected.
+ mem_encrypt= [X86-64] AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) control
+ Valid arguments: on, off
+ Default (depends on kernel configuration option):
+ on (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y)
+ off (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=n)
+ mem_encrypt=on: Activate SME
+ mem_encrypt=off: Do not activate SME
+
+ Refer to Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
+ for details on when memory encryption can be activated.
+
mem_sleep_default= [SUSPEND] Default system suspend mode:
s2idle - Suspend-To-Idle
shallow - Power-On Suspend or equivalent (if supported)
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b72ff2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
+the standard x86 page tables. A page that is marked encrypted will be
+automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
+DRAM. SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
+attacks on the system.
+
+A page is encrypted when a page table entry has the encryption bit set (see
+below on how to determine its position). The encryption bit can be specified
+in the cr3 register, allowing the PGD table to be encrypted. Each successive
+level of page tables can also be encrypted.
+
+Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
+function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+
+ 0x8000001f[eax]:
+ Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+ 0x8000001f[ebx]:
+ Bits[5:0] pagetable bit number used to activate memory
+ encryption
+ Bits[11:6] reduction in physical address space, in bits, when
+ memory encryption is enabled (this only affects
+ system physical addresses, not guest physical
+ addresses)
+
+If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (MSR_K8_SYSCFG) can be used to
+determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
+
+ 0xc0010010:
+ Bit[23] 0 = memory encryption features are disabled
+ 1 = memory encryption features are enabled
+
+Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
+in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
+CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
+requirements for the system. If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
+Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
+
+The state of SME in the Linux kernel can be documented as follows:
+ - Supported:
+ The CPU supports SME (determined through CPUID instruction).
+
+ - Enabled:
+ Supported and bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG is set.
+
+ - Active:
+ Supported, Enabled and the Linux kernel is actively applying
+ the encryption bit to page table entries (the SME mask in the
+ kernel is non-zero).
+
+SME can also be enabled and activated in the BIOS. If SME is enabled and
+activated in the BIOS, then all memory accesses will be encrypted and it will
+not be necessary to activate the Linux memory encryption support. If the BIOS
+merely enables SME (sets bit 23 of the MSR_K8_SYSCFG), then Linux can activate
+memory encryption by default (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT=y) or
+by supplying mem_encrypt=on on the kernel command line. However, if BIOS does
+not enable SME, then Linux will not be able to activate memory encryption, even
+if configured to do so by default or the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter
+is specified.
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode
(_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05).
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/pat.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
index 9b78685..6753d9c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static void init_cache_modes(void)
* pat_init - Initialize PAT MSR and PAT table
*
* This function initializes PAT MSR and PAT table with an OS-defined value
- * to enable additional cache attributes, WC and WT.
+ * to enable additional cache attributes, WC, WT and WP.
*
* This function must be called on all CPUs using the specific sequence of
* operations defined in Intel SDM. mtrr_rendezvous_handler() provides this
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* 010 2 UC-: _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS
* 011 3 UC : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC
* 100 4 WB : Reserved
- * 101 5 WC : Reserved
+ * 101 5 WP : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP
* 110 6 UC-: Reserved
* 111 7 WT : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WT
*
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* corresponding types in the presence of PAT errata.
*/
pat = PAT(0, WB) | PAT(1, WC) | PAT(2, UC_MINUS) | PAT(3, UC) |
- PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WC) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
+ PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WP) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
}
if (!boot_cpu_done) {
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function can be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.
This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c | 34 +++++++++++-----------------------
arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 10 +++++-----
arch/x86/pci/common.c | 4 ++--
drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 6bb6806..850160a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
#define ACPI_INVALID_GSI INT_MIN
/*
- * This is just a simple wrapper around early_ioremap(),
+ * This is just a simple wrapper around early_memremap(),
* with sanity checks for phys == 0 and size == 0.
*/
char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
if (!map || !size)
return;
- early_iounmap(map, size);
+ early_memunmap(map, size);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
index 38b6458..fd6f8fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
struct setup_data_node *node = file->private_data;
unsigned long remain;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
- struct page *pg;
void *p;
u64 pa;
@@ -47,18 +46,13 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
count = node->len - pos;
pa = node->paddr + sizeof(struct setup_data) + pos;
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa + count - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- p = ioremap_cache(pa, count);
- if (!p)
- return -ENXIO;
- } else
- p = __va(pa);
+ p = memremap(pa, count, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
remain = copy_to_user(user_buf, p, count);
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
if (remain)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -109,7 +103,6 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
struct setup_data *data;
int error;
struct dentry *d;
- struct page *pg;
u64 pa_data;
int no = 0;
@@ -126,16 +119,12 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
goto err_dir;
}
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa_data+sizeof(*data)-1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
- if (!data) {
- kfree(node);
- error = -ENXIO;
- goto err_dir;
- }
- } else
- data = __va(pa_data);
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!data) {
+ kfree(node);
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_dir;
+ }
node->paddr = pa_data;
node->type = data->type;
@@ -143,8 +132,7 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
error = create_setup_data_node(d, no, node);
pa_data = data->next;
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
if (error)
goto err_dir;
no++;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
index 4afc67f..ee51db9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
*paddr = pa_data;
return 0;
}
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -97,17 +97,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
if (nr == i) {
*size = data->len;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return 0;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -127,12 +127,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -170,15 +170,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
goto out;
ret = count;
- p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
+ p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
out:
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -250,13 +250,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
*nr = 0;
while (pa_data) {
*nr += 1;
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
out:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
index 0d904d7..fd37f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static unsigned long __init get_mpc_size(unsigned long physptr)
struct mpc_table *mpc;
unsigned long size;
- mpc = early_ioremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ mpc = early_memremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
size = mpc->length;
- early_iounmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, " mpc: %lx-%lx\n", physptr, physptr + size);
return size;
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
unsigned long size;
size = get_mpc_size(mpf->physptr);
- mpc = early_ioremap(mpf->physptr, size);
+ mpc = early_memremap(mpf->physptr, size);
/*
* Read the physical hardware table. Anything here will
* override the defaults.
@@ -461,10 +461,10 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
#endif
pr_err("BIOS bug, MP table errors detected!...\n");
pr_cont("... disabling SMP support. (tell your hw vendor)\n");
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
return -1;
}
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
if (early)
return -1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
index 190e718..08cf71c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
}
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
set_dev_domain_options(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
index 296db7a..d5ce534 100644
--- a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
@@ -86,13 +86,13 @@
/*
* FW creates and saves the SFI tables in memory. When these tables get
* used, they may need to be mapped to virtual address space, and the mapping
- * can happen before or after the ioremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
+ * can happen before or after the memremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
* to indicating this
*/
-static u32 sfi_use_ioremap __read_mostly;
+static u32 sfi_use_memremap __read_mostly;
/*
- * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_ioremap/iounmap which is a __init function
+ * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_memremap/memunmap which is a __init function
* and introduces section mismatch. So use __ref to make it calm.
*/
static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
@@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- return ioremap_cache(phys, size);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ return memremap(phys, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
else
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
if (!virt || !size)
return;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- iounmap(virt);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ memunmap(virt);
else
- early_iounmap(virt, size);
+ early_memunmap(virt, size);
}
static void sfi_print_table_header(unsigned long long pa,
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ void __init sfi_init_late(void)
length = syst_va->header.len;
sfi_unmap_memory(syst_va, sizeof(struct sfi_table_simple));
- /* Use ioremap now after it is ready */
- sfi_use_ioremap = 1;
+ /* Use memremap now after it is ready */
+ sfi_use_memremap = 1;
syst_va = sfi_map_memory(syst_pa, length);
sfi_acpi_init();
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID
0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
CPUID and enabled by BIOS.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 2701e5f..2b692df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 673f9ac..8ff4aaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
+#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
#define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
/* C1E active bits in int pending message */
#define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c36140d..5fc5232 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -611,6 +611,21 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
+
+ /*
+ * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has not enabled SME
+ * then don't advertise the feature (set in scattered.c)
+ */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f) {
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /* Check if SME is enabled */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+ }
+ }
}
static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 23c2350..05459ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CPUID_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
--
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-04-18 21:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address
space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this
reduction.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 5fc5232..35eeeb1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -613,8 +613,10 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
/*
- * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has not enabled SME
- * then don't advertise the feature (set in scattered.c)
+ * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has enabld SME then
+ * adjust x86_phys_bits by the SME physical address space reduction
+ * value. If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+ * feature (set in scattered.c).
*/
if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f) {
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
@@ -622,8 +624,14 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/* Check if SME is enabled */
rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
- if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
+ unsigned int ebx;
+
+ ebx = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f);
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (ebx >> 6) & 0x3f;
+ } else {
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+ }
}
}
}
--
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see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
2017-04-18 21:14 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-04-18 21:14 ` [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:15 ` Tom Lendacky
5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4e153e9..cf0cbe8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1407,6 +1407,28 @@ config X86_DIRECT_GBPAGES
supports them), so don't confuse the user by printing
that we have them enabled.
+config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
+ depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
+ ---help---
+ Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
+ This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
+ Encryption (SME).
+
+config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT
+ bool "Activate AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) by default"
+ default y
+ depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ ---help---
+ Say yes to have system memory encrypted by default if running on
+ an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
+
+ If set to Y, then the encryption of system memory can be
+ deactivated with the mem_encrypt=off command line option.
+
+ If set to N, then the encryption of system memory can be
+ activated with the mem_encrypt=on command line option.
+
# Common NUMA Features
config NUMA
bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5c4a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+#define __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
+extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
+
+static inline bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return !!sme_me_mask;
+}
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#ifndef sme_me_mask
+#define sme_me_mask 0UL
+
+static inline bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 0fbdcb6..a94a7b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -39,3 +39,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b99d469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
+/*
+ * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
+ * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss
+ * section is later cleared.
+ */
+unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14a7b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+#define __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#ifndef sme_me_mask
+#define sme_me_mask 0UL
+
+static inline bool sme_active(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* __MEM_ENCRYPT_H__ */
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
2017-04-18 21:16 [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
@ 2017-04-18 21:16 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2017-04-18 21:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-arch, linux-efi, kvm, linux-doc, x86, kexec, linux-kernel,
kasan-dev, linux-mm, iommu
Cc: Rik van Riel, Radim Krčmář,
Toshimitsu Kani, Arnd Bergmann, Jonathan Corbet, Matt Fleming,
Michael S. Tsirkin, Joerg Roedel, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Paolo Bonzini, Larry Woodman, Brijesh Singh, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Andy Lutomirski, H. Peter Anvin,
Andrey Ryabinin, Alexander Potapenko, Dave Young,
Thomas Gleixner, Dmitry Vyukov
The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function can be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.
This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c | 34 +++++++++++-----------------------
arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c | 10 +++++-----
arch/x86/pci/common.c | 4 ++--
drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 6bb6806..850160a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
#define ACPI_INVALID_GSI INT_MIN
/*
- * This is just a simple wrapper around early_ioremap(),
+ * This is just a simple wrapper around early_memremap(),
* with sanity checks for phys == 0 and size == 0.
*/
char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ char *__init __acpi_map_table(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void __init __acpi_unmap_table(char *map, unsigned long size)
if (!map || !size)
return;
- early_iounmap(map, size);
+ early_memunmap(map, size);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
index 38b6458..fd6f8fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
struct setup_data_node *node = file->private_data;
unsigned long remain;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
- struct page *pg;
void *p;
u64 pa;
@@ -47,18 +46,13 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
count = node->len - pos;
pa = node->paddr + sizeof(struct setup_data) + pos;
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa + count - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- p = ioremap_cache(pa, count);
- if (!p)
- return -ENXIO;
- } else
- p = __va(pa);
+ p = memremap(pa, count, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
remain = copy_to_user(user_buf, p, count);
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
if (remain)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -109,7 +103,6 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
struct setup_data *data;
int error;
struct dentry *d;
- struct page *pg;
u64 pa_data;
int no = 0;
@@ -126,16 +119,12 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
goto err_dir;
}
- pg = pfn_to_page((pa_data+sizeof(*data)-1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
- if (!data) {
- kfree(node);
- error = -ENXIO;
- goto err_dir;
- }
- } else
- data = __va(pa_data);
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!data) {
+ kfree(node);
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_dir;
+ }
node->paddr = pa_data;
node->type = data->type;
@@ -143,8 +132,7 @@ static int __init create_setup_data_nodes(struct dentry *parent)
error = create_setup_data_node(d, no, node);
pa_data = data->next;
- if (PageHighMem(pg))
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
if (error)
goto err_dir;
no++;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
index 4afc67f..ee51db9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ksysfs.c
@@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj,
@@ -79,12 +79,12 @@ static int get_setup_data_paddr(int nr, u64 *paddr)
*paddr = pa_data;
return 0;
}
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -97,17 +97,17 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_size(int nr, size_t *size)
u64 pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
if (nr == i) {
*size = data->len;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return 0;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
i++;
}
return -EINVAL;
@@ -127,12 +127,12 @@ static ssize_t type_show(struct kobject *kobj,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", data->type);
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
ret = get_setup_data_paddr(nr, &paddr);
if (ret)
return ret;
- data = ioremap_cache(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -170,15 +170,15 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_data_read(struct file *fp,
goto out;
ret = count;
- p = ioremap_cache(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len);
+ p = memremap(paddr + sizeof(*data), data->len, MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!p) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, p + off, count);
- iounmap(p);
+ memunmap(p);
out:
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -250,13 +250,13 @@ static int __init get_setup_data_total_num(u64 pa_data, int *nr)
*nr = 0;
while (pa_data) {
*nr += 1;
- data = ioremap_cache(pa_data, sizeof(*data));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*data), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
out:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
index 0d904d7..fd37f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/mpparse.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static unsigned long __init get_mpc_size(unsigned long physptr)
struct mpc_table *mpc;
unsigned long size;
- mpc = early_ioremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ mpc = early_memremap(physptr, PAGE_SIZE);
size = mpc->length;
- early_iounmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, PAGE_SIZE);
apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, " mpc: %lx-%lx\n", physptr, physptr + size);
return size;
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
unsigned long size;
size = get_mpc_size(mpf->physptr);
- mpc = early_ioremap(mpf->physptr, size);
+ mpc = early_memremap(mpf->physptr, size);
/*
* Read the physical hardware table. Anything here will
* override the defaults.
@@ -461,10 +461,10 @@ static int __init check_physptr(struct mpf_intel *mpf, unsigned int early)
#endif
pr_err("BIOS bug, MP table errors detected!...\n");
pr_cont("... disabling SMP support. (tell your hw vendor)\n");
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
return -1;
}
- early_iounmap(mpc, size);
+ early_memunmap(mpc, size);
if (early)
return -1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
index 190e718..08cf71c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
pa_data = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
while (pa_data) {
- data = ioremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom));
+ data = memremap(pa_data, sizeof(*rom), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ int pcibios_add_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
}
}
pa_data = data->next;
- iounmap(data);
+ memunmap(data);
}
set_dma_domain_ops(dev);
set_dev_domain_options(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
index 296db7a..d5ce534 100644
--- a/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
+++ b/drivers/sfi/sfi_core.c
@@ -86,13 +86,13 @@
/*
* FW creates and saves the SFI tables in memory. When these tables get
* used, they may need to be mapped to virtual address space, and the mapping
- * can happen before or after the ioremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
+ * can happen before or after the memremap() is ready, so a flag is needed
* to indicating this
*/
-static u32 sfi_use_ioremap __read_mostly;
+static u32 sfi_use_memremap __read_mostly;
/*
- * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_ioremap/iounmap which is a __init function
+ * sfi_un/map_memory calls early_memremap/memunmap which is a __init function
* and introduces section mismatch. So use __ref to make it calm.
*/
static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
@@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ static void __iomem * __ref sfi_map_memory(u64 phys, u32 size)
if (!phys || !size)
return NULL;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- return ioremap_cache(phys, size);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ return memremap(phys, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
else
- return early_ioremap(phys, size);
+ return early_memremap(phys, size);
}
static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
@@ -111,10 +111,10 @@ static void __ref sfi_unmap_memory(void __iomem *virt, u32 size)
if (!virt || !size)
return;
- if (sfi_use_ioremap)
- iounmap(virt);
+ if (sfi_use_memremap)
+ memunmap(virt);
else
- early_iounmap(virt, size);
+ early_memunmap(virt, size);
}
static void sfi_print_table_header(unsigned long long pa,
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ void __init sfi_init_late(void)
length = syst_va->header.len;
sfi_unmap_memory(syst_va, sizeof(struct sfi_table_simple));
- /* Use ioremap now after it is ready */
- sfi_use_ioremap = 1;
+ /* Use memremap now after it is ready */
+ sfi_use_memremap = 1;
syst_va = sfi_map_memory(syst_pa, length);
sfi_acpi_init();
--
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