* [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend driver to manage pages of secure guest
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-06-17 5:31 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] kvmppc: Shared pages support for secure guests Bharata B Rao
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
HMM driver for KVM PPC to manage page transitions of
secure guest via H_SVM_PAGE_IN and H_SVM_PAGE_OUT hcalls.
H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure page
H_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal page
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 4 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h | 29 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 2 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 17 +
arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile | 3 +
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 20 +
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 474 ++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 563 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index 463c63a9fcf1..2f6b952deb0f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@
#define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808
#define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C
+/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */
+#define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00
+#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04
+
/* Values for 2nd argument to H_SET_MODE */
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_CIABR 1
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_DAWR 2
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..21f3de5f2acb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__
+#define __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV
+extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm,
+ unsigned long gra,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long page_shift);
+extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm,
+ unsigned long gra,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long page_shift);
+#else
+static inline unsigned long
+kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+ return H_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long
+kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+ return H_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
+#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 184becb62ea4..c0c9c3455ac4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -858,4 +858,18 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_blocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_unblocking(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_UV
+extern int kvmppc_hmm_init(void);
+extern void kvmppc_hmm_free(void);
+extern void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free);
+#else
+static inline int kvmppc_hmm_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void kvmppc_hmm_free(void) {}
+static inline void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free) {}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
+
#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_HOST_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
index 15e6ce77a131..51c4e0b5d197 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
@@ -20,5 +20,7 @@
/* opcodes */
#define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104
#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C
+#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128
+#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
index 4ffec7a36acd..1e4c51799b43 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
@@ -44,6 +44,23 @@ static inline int uv_register_pate(u64 lpid, u64 dw0, u64 dw1)
return ucall(UV_WRITE_PATE, retbuf, lpid, dw0, dw1);
}
+static inline int uv_page_in(u64 lpid, u64 src_ra, u64 dst_gpa, u64 flags,
+ u64 page_shift)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_PAGE_IN, retbuf, lpid, src_ra, dst_gpa, flags,
+ page_shift);
+}
+
+static inline int uv_page_out(u64 lpid, u64 dst_ra, u64 src_gpa, u64 flags,
+ u64 page_shift)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_PAGE_OUT, retbuf, lpid, dst_ra, src_gpa, flags,
+ page_shift);
+}
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile
index 4c67cc79de7c..d1a79fb5f806 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ kvm-hv-y += \
book3s_64_mmu_radix.o \
book3s_hv_nested.o
+kvm-hv-$(CONFIG_PPC_UV) += \
+ book3s_hv_hmm.o
+
kvm-hv-$(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) += \
book3s_hv_tm.o
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
index 57ce45a997c7..2918616198de 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
#include <asm/xive.h>
#include <asm/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <asm/firmware.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h>
#include "book3s.h"
@@ -1084,6 +1086,18 @@ int kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5),
kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));
break;
+ case H_SVM_PAGE_IN:
+ ret = kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(vcpu->kvm,
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4),
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5),
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));
+ break;
+ case H_SVM_PAGE_OUT:
+ ret = kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(vcpu->kvm,
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4),
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5),
+ kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));
+ break;
default:
return RESUME_HOST;
}
@@ -4421,6 +4435,7 @@ static void kvmppc_core_free_memslot_hv(struct kvm_memory_slot *free,
struct kvm_memory_slot *dont)
{
if (!dont || free->arch.rmap != dont->arch.rmap) {
+ kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(free);
vfree(free->arch.rmap);
free->arch.rmap = NULL;
}
@@ -5494,11 +5509,16 @@ static int kvmppc_book3s_init_hv(void)
no_mixing_hpt_and_radix = true;
}
+ r = kvmppc_hmm_init();
+ if (r < 0)
+ pr_err("KVM-HV: kvmppc_hmm_init failed %d\n", r);
+
return r;
}
static void kvmppc_book3s_exit_hv(void)
{
+ kvmppc_hmm_free();
kvmppc_free_host_rm_ops();
if (kvmppc_radix_possible())
kvmppc_radix_exit();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..713806003da3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * HMM driver to manage page migration between normal and secure
+ * memory.
+ *
+ * Based on Jérôme Glisse's HMM dummy driver.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2018 Bharata B Rao, IBM Corp. <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A pseries guest can be run as a secure guest on Ultravisor-enabled
+ * POWER platforms. On such platforms, this driver will be used to manage
+ * the movement of guest pages between the normal memory managed by
+ * hypervisor (HV) and secure memory managed by Ultravisor (UV).
+ *
+ * Private ZONE_DEVICE memory equal to the amount of secure memory
+ * available in the platform for running secure guests is created
+ * via a HMM device. The movement of pages between normal and secure
+ * memory is done by ->alloc_and_copy() callback routine of migrate_vma().
+ *
+ * The page-in or page-out requests from UV will come to HV as hcalls and
+ * HV will call back into UV via uvcalls to satisfy these page requests.
+ *
+ * For each page that gets moved into secure memory, a HMM PFN is used
+ * on the HV side and HMM migration PTE corresponding to that PFN would be
+ * populated in the QEMU page tables.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hmm.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
+
+struct kvmppc_hmm_device {
+ struct hmm_device *device;
+ struct hmm_devmem *devmem;
+ unsigned long *pfn_bitmap;
+};
+
+static struct kvmppc_hmm_device kvmppc_hmm;
+spinlock_t kvmppc_hmm_lock;
+
+struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt {
+ unsigned long *rmap;
+ unsigned int lpid;
+ unsigned long gpa;
+};
+
+struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args {
+ unsigned long *rmap;
+ unsigned int lpid;
+ unsigned long gpa;
+ unsigned long page_shift;
+};
+
+#define KVMPPC_PFN_HMM (0x1ULL << 61)
+
+static inline bool kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
+{
+ return !!(pfn & KVMPPC_PFN_HMM);
+}
+
+void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < free->npages; i++) {
+ unsigned long *rmap = &free->arch.rmap[i];
+
+ if (kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(*rmap))
+ put_page(pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_PFN_HMM));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a free HMM PFN from the pool
+ *
+ * Called when a normal page is moved to secure memory (UV_PAGE_IN). HMM
+ * PFN will be used to keep track of the secure page on HV side.
+ */
+/*
+ * TODO: In this and subsequent functions, we pass around and access
+ * individual elements of kvm_memory_slot->arch.rmap[] without any
+ * protection. Figure out the safe way to access this.
+ */
+static struct page *kvmppc_hmm_get_page(unsigned long *rmap,
+ unsigned long gpa, unsigned int lpid)
+{
+ struct page *dpage = NULL;
+ unsigned long bit, hmm_pfn;
+ unsigned long nr_pfns = kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_last -
+ kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_first;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
+
+ if (kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(*rmap))
+ return NULL;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
+ bit = find_first_zero_bit(kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap, nr_pfns);
+ if (bit >= nr_pfns)
+ goto out;
+
+ bitmap_set(kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap, bit, 1);
+ hmm_pfn = bit + kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_first;
+ dpage = pfn_to_page(hmm_pfn);
+
+ if (!trylock_page(dpage))
+ goto out_clear;
+
+ *rmap = hmm_pfn | KVMPPC_PFN_HMM;
+ pvt = kzalloc(sizeof(*pvt), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!pvt)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ pvt->rmap = rmap;
+ pvt->gpa = gpa;
+ pvt->lpid = lpid;
+ hmm_devmem_page_set_drvdata(dpage, (unsigned long)pvt);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
+
+ get_page(dpage);
+ return dpage;
+
+out_unlock:
+ unlock_page(dpage);
+out_clear:
+ bitmap_clear(kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap,
+ hmm_pfn - kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_first, 1);
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Release the HMM PFN back to the pool
+ *
+ * Called when secure page becomes a normal page during UV_PAGE_OUT.
+ */
+static void kvmppc_hmm_put_page(struct page *page)
+{
+ unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
+ pvt = (struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *)hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(page);
+ hmm_devmem_page_set_drvdata(page, 0);
+
+ bitmap_clear(kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap,
+ pfn - kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_first, 1);
+ *(pvt->rmap) = 0;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
+ kfree(pvt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * migrate_vma() callback to move page from normal memory to secure memory.
+ *
+ * We don't capture the return value of uv_page_in() here because when
+ * UV asks for a page and then fails to copy it over, we don't care.
+ */
+static void
+kvmppc_hmm_migrate_alloc_and_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ const unsigned long *src_pfn,
+ unsigned long *dst_pfn,
+ unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end,
+ void *private)
+{
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args *args = private;
+ struct page *spage = migrate_pfn_to_page(*src_pfn);
+ unsigned long pfn = *src_pfn >> MIGRATE_PFN_SHIFT;
+ struct page *dpage;
+
+ *dst_pfn = 0;
+ if (!(*src_pfn & MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE))
+ return;
+
+ dpage = kvmppc_hmm_get_page(args->rmap, args->gpa, args->lpid);
+ if (!dpage)
+ return;
+
+ if (spage)
+ uv_page_in(args->lpid, pfn << args->page_shift,
+ args->gpa, 0, args->page_shift);
+
+ *dst_pfn = migrate_pfn(page_to_pfn(dpage)) |
+ MIGRATE_PFN_DEVICE | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This migrate_vma() callback is typically used to updated device
+ * page tables after successful migration. We have nothing to do here.
+ *
+ * Also as we don't care if UV successfully copied over the page in
+ * kvmppc_hmm_migrate_alloc_and_copy(), we don't bother to check
+ * dst_pfn for any errors here.
+ */
+static void
+kvmppc_hmm_migrate_finalize_and_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ const unsigned long *src_pfn,
+ const unsigned long *dst_pfn,
+ unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end,
+ void *private)
+{
+}
+
+static const struct migrate_vma_ops kvmppc_hmm_migrate_ops = {
+ .alloc_and_copy = kvmppc_hmm_migrate_alloc_and_copy,
+ .finalize_and_map = kvmppc_hmm_migrate_finalize_and_map,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
+ */
+unsigned long
+kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, end;
+ unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args args;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int srcu_idx;
+ unsigned long gfn = gpa >> page_shift;
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
+ unsigned long *rmap;
+ int ret = H_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
+ return H_P3;
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
+ rmap = &slot->arch.rmap[gfn - slot->base_gfn];
+ addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+ if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
+ return H_PARAMETER;
+
+ end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
+
+ if (flags)
+ return H_P2;
+
+ args.rmap = rmap;
+ args.lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
+ args.gpa = gpa;
+ args.page_shift = page_shift;
+
+ down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_vma_intersection(kvm->mm, addr, end);
+ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr || vma->vm_end < end) {
+ ret = H_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
+ &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, &args);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ret = H_PARAMETER;
+out:
+ up_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_alloc_and_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ const unsigned long *src_pfn,
+ unsigned long *dst_pfn,
+ unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end,
+ void *private)
+{
+ struct page *dpage, *spage;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ int ret = U_SUCCESS;
+
+ *dst_pfn = MIGRATE_PFN_ERROR;
+ spage = migrate_pfn_to_page(*src_pfn);
+ if (!spage || !(*src_pfn & MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE))
+ return;
+ if (!is_zone_device_page(spage))
+ return;
+ dpage = hmm_vma_alloc_locked_page(vma, start);
+ if (!dpage)
+ return;
+ pvt = (struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *)
+ hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(spage);
+
+ pfn = page_to_pfn(dpage);
+ ret = uv_page_out(pvt->lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ pvt->gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if (ret == U_SUCCESS)
+ *dst_pfn = migrate_pfn(pfn) | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This migrate_vma() callback is typically used to updated device
+ * page tables after successful migration. We have nothing to do here.
+ */
+static void
+kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_finalize_and_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ const unsigned long *src_pfn,
+ const unsigned long *dst_pfn,
+ unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end,
+ void *private)
+{
+}
+
+static const struct migrate_vma_ops kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_ops = {
+ .alloc_and_copy = kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_alloc_and_copy,
+ .finalize_and_map = kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_finalize_and_map,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Fault handler callback when HV touches any page that has been
+ * moved to secure memory, we ask UV to give back the page by
+ * issuing a UV_PAGE_OUT uvcall.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t kvmppc_hmm_devmem_fault(struct hmm_devmem *devmem,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ const struct page *page,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ pmd_t *pmdp)
+{
+ unsigned long end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
+ unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn = 0;
+
+ if (migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
+ &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, NULL))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ if (dst_pfn == MIGRATE_PFN_ERROR)
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvmppc_hmm_devmem_free(struct hmm_devmem *devmem,
+ struct page *page)
+{
+ kvmppc_hmm_put_page(page);
+}
+
+static const struct hmm_devmem_ops kvmppc_hmm_devmem_ops = {
+ .free = kvmppc_hmm_devmem_free,
+ .fault = kvmppc_hmm_devmem_fault,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Move page from secure memory to normal memory.
+ */
+unsigned long
+kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, end;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn = 0;
+ int srcu_idx;
+ int ret = H_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
+ return H_P3;
+
+ if (flags)
+ return H_P2;
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+ if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
+ return H_PARAMETER;
+
+ end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
+
+ down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_vma_intersection(kvm->mm, addr, end);
+ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr || vma->vm_end < end) {
+ ret = H_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
+ &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ ret = H_PARAMETER;
+out:
+ up_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u64 kvmppc_get_secmem_size(void)
+{
+ struct device_node *np;
+ int i, len;
+ const __be32 *prop;
+ u64 size = 0;
+
+ np = of_find_node_by_path("/ibm,ultravisor/ibm,uv-firmware");
+ if (!np)
+ goto out;
+
+ prop = of_get_property(np, "secure-memory-ranges", &len);
+ if (!prop)
+ goto out_put;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len / (sizeof(*prop) * 4); i++)
+ size += of_read_number(prop + (i * 4) + 2, 2);
+
+out_put:
+ of_node_put(np);
+out:
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int kvmppc_hmm_pages_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned long nr_pfns = kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_last -
+ kvmppc_hmm.devmem->pfn_first;
+
+ kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap = kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(nr_pfns),
+ sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&kvmppc_hmm_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int kvmppc_hmm_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned long size;
+
+ size = kvmppc_get_secmem_size();
+ if (!size) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kvmppc_hmm.device = hmm_device_new(NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(kvmppc_hmm.device)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kvmppc_hmm.device);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kvmppc_hmm.devmem = hmm_devmem_add(&kvmppc_hmm_devmem_ops,
+ &kvmppc_hmm.device->device, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kvmppc_hmm.devmem)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kvmppc_hmm.devmem);
+ goto out_device;
+ }
+ ret = kvmppc_hmm_pages_init();
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_device;
+
+ pr_info("KVMPPC-HMM: Secure Memory size %lx\n", size);
+ return ret;
+
+out_device:
+ hmm_device_put(kvmppc_hmm.device);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void kvmppc_hmm_free(void)
+{
+ kfree(kvmppc_hmm.pfn_bitmap);
+ hmm_device_put(kvmppc_hmm.device);
+}
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend driver to manage pages of secure guest
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend " Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-06-17 5:31 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-07-09 10:03 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Paul Mackerras @ 2019-06-17 5:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bharata B Rao
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:28PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> HMM driver for KVM PPC to manage page transitions of
> secure guest via H_SVM_PAGE_IN and H_SVM_PAGE_OUT hcalls.
>
> H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure page
> H_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal page
Comments below...
> @@ -4421,6 +4435,7 @@ static void kvmppc_core_free_memslot_hv(struct kvm_memory_slot *free,
> struct kvm_memory_slot *dont)
> {
> if (!dont || free->arch.rmap != dont->arch.rmap) {
> + kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(free);
I don't think this is the right place to do this. The memslot will
have no pages mapped by this time, because higher levels of code will
have called kvmppc_core_flush_memslot_hv() before calling this.
Releasing the pfns should be done in that function.
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..713806003da3
...
> +#define KVMPPC_PFN_HMM (0x1ULL << 61)
> +
> +static inline bool kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
> +{
> + return !!(pfn & KVMPPC_PFN_HMM);
> +}
Since you are putting in these values in the rmap entries, you need to
be careful about overlaps between these values and the other uses of
rmap entries. The value you have chosen would be in the middle of the
LPID field for an rmap entry for a guest that has nested guests, and
in fact kvmhv_remove_nest_rmap_range() effectively assumes that a
non-zero rmap entry must be a list of L2 guest mappings. (This is for
radix guests; HPT guests use the rmap entry differently, but I am
assuming that we will enforce that only radix guests can be secure
guests.)
Maybe it is true that the rmap entry will be non-zero only for those
guest pages which are not mapped on the host side, that is,
kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot() will see !pte_present(*ptep) for any page
of a secure guest where the rmap entry contains a HMM pfn. If that is
so and is a deliberate part of the design, then I would like to see it
written down in comments and commit messages so it's clear to others
working on the code in future.
Suraj is working on support for nested HPT guests, which will involve
changing the rmap format to indicate more explicitly what sort of
entry each rmap entry is. Please work with him to define a format for
your rmap entries that is clearly distinguishable from the others.
I think it is reasonable to say that a secure guest can't have nested
guests, at least for now, but then we should make sure to kill all
nested guests when a guest goes secure.
...
> +/*
> + * Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
> + */
> +unsigned long
> +kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> + unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, end;
> + unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn;
> + struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args args;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + int srcu_idx;
> + unsigned long gfn = gpa >> page_shift;
> + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> + unsigned long *rmap;
> + int ret = H_SUCCESS;
> +
> + if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
> + return H_P3;
> +
> + srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> + slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
> + rmap = &slot->arch.rmap[gfn - slot->base_gfn];
> + addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
> + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
Shouldn't we keep the srcu read lock until we have finished working on
the page?
> + if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
> + return H_PARAMETER;
> +
> + end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
> +
> + if (flags)
> + return H_P2;
> +
> + args.rmap = rmap;
> + args.lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
> + args.gpa = gpa;
> + args.page_shift = page_shift;
> +
> + down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> + vma = find_vma_intersection(kvm->mm, addr, end);
> + if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr || vma->vm_end < end) {
> + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + ret = migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
> + &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, &args);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> +out:
> + up_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> + return ret;
> +}
...
> +/*
> + * Move page from secure memory to normal memory.
> + */
> +unsigned long
> +kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> + unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, end;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn = 0;
> + int srcu_idx;
> + int ret = H_SUCCESS;
> +
> + if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
> + return H_P3;
> +
> + if (flags)
> + return H_P2;
> +
> + srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> + addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
> + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
and likewise here, shouldn't we unlock later, after the migrate_vma()
call perhaps?
> + if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
> + return H_PARAMETER;
> +
> + end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
> +
> + down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> + vma = find_vma_intersection(kvm->mm, addr, end);
> + if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr || vma->vm_end < end) {
> + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + ret = migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
> + &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, NULL);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> +out:
> + up_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
Paul.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend driver to manage pages of secure guest
2019-06-17 5:31 ` Paul Mackerras
@ 2019-07-09 10:03 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-07-09 10:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 03:31:06PM +1000, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:28PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > HMM driver for KVM PPC to manage page transitions of
> > secure guest via H_SVM_PAGE_IN and H_SVM_PAGE_OUT hcalls.
> >
> > H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move the content of a normal page to secure page
> > H_SVM_PAGE_OUT: Move the content of a secure page to normal page
>
> Comments below...
>
> > @@ -4421,6 +4435,7 @@ static void kvmppc_core_free_memslot_hv(struct kvm_memory_slot *free,
> > struct kvm_memory_slot *dont)
> > {
> > if (!dont || free->arch.rmap != dont->arch.rmap) {
> > + kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(free);
>
> I don't think this is the right place to do this. The memslot will
> have no pages mapped by this time, because higher levels of code will
> have called kvmppc_core_flush_memslot_hv() before calling this.
> Releasing the pfns should be done in that function.
In fact I can get rid of kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns() totally as we don't
have to do free the HMM pages like this explicitly. During guest shutdown
all these pages are dropped when unmap_vmas() is called.
>
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..713806003da3
>
> ...
>
> > +#define KVMPPC_PFN_HMM (0x1ULL << 61)
> > +
> > +static inline bool kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
> > +{
> > + return !!(pfn & KVMPPC_PFN_HMM);
> > +}
>
> Since you are putting in these values in the rmap entries, you need to
> be careful about overlaps between these values and the other uses of
> rmap entries. The value you have chosen would be in the middle of the
> LPID field for an rmap entry for a guest that has nested guests, and
> in fact kvmhv_remove_nest_rmap_range() effectively assumes that a
> non-zero rmap entry must be a list of L2 guest mappings. (This is for
> radix guests; HPT guests use the rmap entry differently, but I am
> assuming that we will enforce that only radix guests can be secure
> guests.)
Worked out with Suraj on sharing the rmap and got a well defined
bit slot for HMM PFNs in rmap.
>
> Maybe it is true that the rmap entry will be non-zero only for those
> guest pages which are not mapped on the host side, that is,
> kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot() will see !pte_present(*ptep) for any page
> of a secure guest where the rmap entry contains a HMM pfn. If that is
> so and is a deliberate part of the design, then I would like to see it
> written down in comments and commit messages so it's clear to others
> working on the code in future.
Yes, rmap entry will be non-zero only for those guest pages which are
not mapped on the host side. However as soon as guest becomes secure
we free the HV side partition scoped page tables and hence
kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot() and other such routines which lookup
kvm->arch.pgtable will no longer touch it.
>
> Suraj is working on support for nested HPT guests, which will involve
> changing the rmap format to indicate more explicitly what sort of
> entry each rmap entry is. Please work with him to define a format for
> your rmap entries that is clearly distinguishable from the others.
>
> I think it is reasonable to say that a secure guest can't have nested
> guests, at least for now, but then we should make sure to kill all
> nested guests when a guest goes secure.
Ok. Yet to figure this part out.
>
> ...
>
> > +/*
> > + * Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long
> > +kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> > + unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr, end;
> > + unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn;
> > + struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args args;
> > + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> > + int srcu_idx;
> > + unsigned long gfn = gpa >> page_shift;
> > + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> > + unsigned long *rmap;
> > + int ret = H_SUCCESS;
> > +
> > + if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
> > + return H_P3;
> > +
> > + srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> > + slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
> > + rmap = &slot->arch.rmap[gfn - slot->base_gfn];
> > + addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
> > + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
>
> Shouldn't we keep the srcu read lock until we have finished working on
> the page?
I wasn't sure, so keeping it locked till the end in the next version.
>
> > + if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
> > + return H_PARAMETER;
> > +
> > + end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
> > +
> > + if (flags)
> > + return H_P2;
> > +
> > + args.rmap = rmap;
> > + args.lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
> > + args.gpa = gpa;
> > + args.page_shift = page_shift;
> > +
> > + down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> > + vma = find_vma_intersection(kvm->mm, addr, end);
> > + if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr || vma->vm_end < end) {
> > + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > + ret = migrate_vma(&kvmppc_hmm_migrate_ops, vma, addr, end,
> > + &src_pfn, &dst_pfn, &args);
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + ret = H_PARAMETER;
> > +out:
> > + up_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
>
> ...
>
> > +/*
> > + * Move page from secure memory to normal memory.
> > + */
> > +unsigned long
> > +kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> > + unsigned long flags, unsigned long page_shift)
> > +{
> > + unsigned long addr, end;
> > + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> > + unsigned long src_pfn, dst_pfn = 0;
> > + int srcu_idx;
> > + int ret = H_SUCCESS;
> > +
> > + if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT)
> > + return H_P3;
> > +
> > + if (flags)
> > + return H_P2;
> > +
> > + srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> > + addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
> > + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
>
> and likewise here, shouldn't we unlock later, after the migrate_vma()
> call perhaps?
Sure.
Regards,
Bharata.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/6] kvmppc: Shared pages support for secure guests
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend " Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls Bharata B Rao
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
A secure guest will share some of its pages with hypervisor (Eg. virtio
bounce buffers etc). Support shared pages in HMM driver.
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 3 ++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index 2f6b952deb0f..05b8536f6653 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -337,6 +337,9 @@
#define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808
#define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C
+/* Flags for H_SVM_PAGE_IN */
+#define H_PAGE_IN_SHARED 0x1
+
/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */
#define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00
#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
index 713806003da3..333829682f59 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt {
unsigned long *rmap;
unsigned int lpid;
unsigned long gpa;
+ bool skip_page_out;
};
struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args {
@@ -212,6 +213,45 @@ static const struct migrate_vma_ops kvmppc_hmm_migrate_ops = {
.finalize_and_map = kvmppc_hmm_migrate_finalize_and_map,
};
+/*
+ * Shares the page with HV, thus making it a normal page.
+ *
+ * - If the page is already secure, then provision a new page and share
+ * - If the page is a normal page, share the existing page
+ *
+ * In the former case, uses the HMM fault handler to release the HMM page.
+ */
+static unsigned long
+kvmppc_share_page(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long *rmap, unsigned long gpa,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long page_shift)
+{
+
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
+ struct page *hmm_page;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ int srcu_idx;
+
+ if (kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(*rmap)) {
+ hmm_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_PFN_HMM);
+ pvt = (struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *)
+ hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(hmm_page);
+ pvt->skip_page_out = true;
+ }
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa >> page_shift);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+ return H_PARAMETER;
+
+ ret = uv_page_in(lpid, pfn << page_shift, gpa, 0, page_shift);
+ kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+
+ return (ret == U_SUCCESS) ? H_SUCCESS : H_PARAMETER;
+}
+
/*
* Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
*/
@@ -242,9 +282,12 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
- if (flags)
+ if (flags & ~H_PAGE_IN_SHARED)
return H_P2;
+ if (flags & H_PAGE_IN_SHARED)
+ return kvmppc_share_page(kvm, rmap, gpa, addr, page_shift);
+
args.rmap = rmap;
args.lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
args.gpa = gpa;
@@ -291,8 +334,17 @@ kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_alloc_and_copy(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(spage);
pfn = page_to_pfn(dpage);
- ret = uv_page_out(pvt->lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
- pvt->gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ /*
+ * This same alloc_and_copy() callback is used in two cases:
+ * - When HV touches a secure page, for which we do page-out
+ * - When a secure page is converted to shared page, we touch
+ * the page to essentially discard the HMM page. In this case we
+ * skip page-out.
+ */
+ if (!pvt->skip_page_out)
+ ret = uv_page_out(pvt->lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ pvt->gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
if (ret == U_SUCCESS)
*dst_pfn = migrate_pfn(pfn) | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED;
}
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] kvmppc: HMM backend " Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] kvmppc: Shared pages support for secure guests Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-06-17 5:37 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-06-18 23:05 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] kvmppc: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 2 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
H_SVM_INIT_START: Initiate securing a VM
H_SVM_INIT_DONE: Conclude securing a VM
As part of H_SVM_INIT_START register all existing memslots with the UV.
H_SVM_INIT_DONE call by UV informs HV that transition of the guest
to secure mode is complete.
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 2 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h | 12 ++++++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 +++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 9 ++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 7 +++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index 05b8536f6653..fa7695928e30 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -343,6 +343,8 @@
/* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */
#define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00
#define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04
+#define H_SVM_INIT_START 0xEF08
+#define H_SVM_INIT_DONE 0xEF0C
/* Values for 2nd argument to H_SET_MODE */
#define H_SET_MODE_RESOURCE_SET_CIABR 1
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
index 21f3de5f2acb..3e13dab7f690 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned long gra,
unsigned long flags,
unsigned long page_shift);
+extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm);
+extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
#else
static inline unsigned long
kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
@@ -25,5 +27,15 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
{
return H_UNSUPPORTED;
}
+
+static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return H_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
+{
+ return H_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index c0c9c3455ac4..845fd2a73506 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ struct kvm_hpt_info {
struct kvm_resize_hpt;
+/* Flag values for kvm_arch.secure_guest */
+#define KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START 0x1 /* H_SVM_INIT_START has been called */
+#define KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE 0x2 /* H_SVM_INIT_DONE completed */
+
struct kvm_arch {
unsigned int lpid;
unsigned int smt_mode; /* # vcpus per virtual core */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
index 51c4e0b5d197..05b17f4351f4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
/* opcodes */
#define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104
#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C
+#define UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF120
#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128
#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
index 1e4c51799b43..9befa6fea8db 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ static inline int uv_page_out(u64 lpid, u64 dst_ra, u64 src_gpa, u64 flags,
return ucall(UV_PAGE_OUT, retbuf, lpid, dst_ra, src_gpa, flags,
page_shift);
}
+
+static inline int uv_register_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 start_gpa, u64 size,
+ u64 flags, u64 slotid)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT, retbuf, lpid, start_gpa,
+ size, flags, slotid);
+}
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
index 2918616198de..3683e517541f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
@@ -1098,6 +1098,13 @@ int kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5),
kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 6));
break;
+ case H_SVM_INIT_START:
+ ret = kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(vcpu->kvm);
+ break;
+ case H_SVM_INIT_DONE:
+ ret = kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(vcpu->kvm);
+ break;
+
default:
return RESUME_HOST;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
index 333829682f59..18fec814401d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
@@ -55,6 +55,40 @@ struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args {
unsigned long page_shift;
};
+unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_memslots *slots;
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+ int ret = H_SUCCESS;
+ int srcu_idx;
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
+ kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots) {
+ ret = uv_register_mem_slot(kvm->arch.lpid,
+ memslot->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ memslot->npages * PAGE_SIZE,
+ 0, memslot->id);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = H_PARAMETER;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ kvm->arch.secure_guest |= KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START;
+out:
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (!(kvm->arch.secure_guest & KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_START))
+ return H_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+ kvm->arch.secure_guest |= KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE;
+ return H_SUCCESS;
+}
+
#define KVMPPC_PFN_HMM (0x1ULL << 61)
static inline bool kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(unsigned long pfn)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-06-17 5:37 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-07-09 10:04 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-06-18 23:05 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Paul Mackerras @ 2019-06-17 5:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bharata B Rao
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:30PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> H_SVM_INIT_START: Initiate securing a VM
> H_SVM_INIT_DONE: Conclude securing a VM
>
> As part of H_SVM_INIT_START register all existing memslots with the UV.
> H_SVM_INIT_DONE call by UV informs HV that transition of the guest
> to secure mode is complete.
It is worth mentioning here that setting any of the flag bits in
kvm->arch.secure_guest will cause the assembly code that enters the
guest to call the UV_RETURN ucall instead of trying to enter the guest
directly. That's not necessarily obvious to the reader as this patch
doesn't touch that assembly code.
Apart from that this patch looks fine.
> Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
2019-06-17 5:37 ` Paul Mackerras
@ 2019-07-09 10:04 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-07-09 10:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 03:37:56PM +1000, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:30PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > H_SVM_INIT_START: Initiate securing a VM
> > H_SVM_INIT_DONE: Conclude securing a VM
> >
> > As part of H_SVM_INIT_START register all existing memslots with the UV.
> > H_SVM_INIT_DONE call by UV informs HV that transition of the guest
> > to secure mode is complete.
>
> It is worth mentioning here that setting any of the flag bits in
> kvm->arch.secure_guest will cause the assembly code that enters the
> guest to call the UV_RETURN ucall instead of trying to enter the guest
> directly. That's not necessarily obvious to the reader as this patch
> doesn't touch that assembly code.
Documented this in the commit message.
>
> Apart from that this patch looks fine.
>
> > Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
>
> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Thanks,
Bharata.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls Bharata B Rao
2019-06-17 5:37 ` Paul Mackerras
@ 2019-06-18 23:05 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2019-07-09 10:05 ` Bharata B Rao
1 sibling, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann @ 2019-06-18 23:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bharata B Rao
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
Hello Bharata,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> index 21f3de5f2acb..3e13dab7f690 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm,
> unsigned long gra,
> unsigned long flags,
> unsigned long page_shift);
> +extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm);
> +extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
> #else
> static inline unsigned long
> kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
> @@ -25,5 +27,15 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
> {
> return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> }
> +
> +static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> + return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> +}
> +
> +static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
> +{
> + return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
> #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
This patch won't build when CONFIG_PPC_UV isn't set because of two
typos: "inine" and the ';' at the end of kvmppc_h_svm_init_done()
function prototype.
--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls
2019-06-18 23:05 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
@ 2019-07-09 10:05 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-07-09 10:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thiago Jung Bauermann
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 08:05:26PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
>
> Hello Bharata,
>
> Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com> writes:
>
> > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> > index 21f3de5f2acb..3e13dab7f690 100644
> > --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> > +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h
> > @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm,
> > unsigned long gra,
> > unsigned long flags,
> > unsigned long page_shift);
> > +extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm);
> > +extern unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
> > #else
> > static inline unsigned long
> > kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
> > @@ -25,5 +27,15 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gra,
> > {
> > return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> > }
> > +
> > +static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > + return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inine unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm);
> > +{
> > + return H_UNSUPPORTED;
> > +}
> > #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
> > #endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_HMM_H__ */
>
> This patch won't build when CONFIG_PPC_UV isn't set because of two
> typos: "inine" and the ';' at the end of kvmppc_h_svm_init_done()
> function prototype.
Thanks. Fixed this.
Regards,
Bharata.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 4/6] kvmppc: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] kvmppc: H_SVM_INIT_START and H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-06-17 5:38 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/6] kvmppc: Radix changes for secure guest Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of " Bharata B Rao
5 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
Register the new memslot with UV during plug and unregister
the memslot during unplug.
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 7 +++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
index 05b17f4351f4..35b71e01177d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#define UV_WRITE_PATE 0xF104
#define UV_RETURN 0xF11C
#define UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF120
+#define UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF124
#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128
#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
index 9befa6fea8db..5113457c4743 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
@@ -70,6 +70,13 @@ static inline int uv_register_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 start_gpa, u64 size,
return ucall(UV_REGISTER_MEM_SLOT, retbuf, lpid, start_gpa,
size, flags, slotid);
}
+
+static inline int uv_unregister_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 slotid)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT, retbuf, lpid, slotid);
+}
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
index 3683e517541f..5ef35e230453 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
#include <asm/firmware.h>
#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_book3s_hmm.h>
+#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
#include "book3s.h"
@@ -4498,6 +4499,24 @@ static void kvmppc_core_commit_memory_region_hv(struct kvm *kvm,
if (change == KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY && kvm_is_radix(kvm) &&
((new->flags ^ old->flags) & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES))
kvmppc_radix_flush_memslot(kvm, old);
+ /*
+ * If UV hasn't yet called H_SVM_INIT_START, don't register memslots.
+ */
+ if (!kvm->arch.secure_guest)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: Handle KVM_MR_MOVE
+ */
+ if (change == KVM_MR_CREATE) {
+ uv_register_mem_slot(kvm->arch.lpid,
+ new->base_gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ new->npages * PAGE_SIZE,
+ 0,
+ new->id);
+ } else if (change == KVM_MR_DELETE) {
+ uv_unregister_mem_slot(kvm->arch.lpid, old->id);
+ }
}
/*
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v4 4/6] kvmppc: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] kvmppc: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-06-17 5:38 ` Paul Mackerras
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Paul Mackerras @ 2019-06-17 5:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bharata B Rao
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:31PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> Register the new memslot with UV during plug and unregister
> the memslot during unplug.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 5/6] kvmppc: Radix changes for secure guest
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] kvmppc: Handle memory plug/unplug to secure VM Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of " Bharata B Rao
5 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
- After the guest becomes secure, when we handle a page fault of a page
belonging to SVM in HV, send that page to UV via UV_PAGE_IN.
- Whenever a page is unmapped on the HV side, inform UV via UV_PAGE_INVAL.
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 7 +++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 845fd2a73506..63d56f7a357e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -866,6 +866,8 @@ static inline void kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
extern int kvmppc_hmm_init(void);
extern void kvmppc_hmm_free(void);
extern void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free);
+extern bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure(struct kvm *kvm);
+extern int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa);
#else
static inline int kvmppc_hmm_init(void)
{
@@ -874,6 +876,17 @@ static inline int kvmppc_hmm_init(void)
static inline void kvmppc_hmm_free(void) {}
static inline void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free) {}
+
+
+static inline bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa)
+{
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_HOST_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
index 35b71e01177d..eaca65ea2070 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
@@ -24,5 +24,6 @@
#define UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT 0xF124
#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128
#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
+#define UV_PAGE_INVAL 0xF138
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
index 5113457c4743..28dbc0f0eddb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
@@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ static inline int uv_unregister_mem_slot(u64 lpid, u64 slotid)
return ucall(UV_UNREGISTER_MEM_SLOT, retbuf, lpid, slotid);
}
+
+static inline int uv_page_inval(u64 lpid, u64 gpa, u64 page_shift)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_PAGE_INVAL, retbuf, lpid, gpa, page_shift);
+}
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c
index f55ef071883f..e5d63449ad77 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_radix.c
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/pte-walk.h>
+#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
/*
* Supported radix tree geometry.
@@ -923,6 +925,9 @@ int kvmppc_book3s_radix_page_fault(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (!(dsisr & DSISR_PRTABLE_FAULT))
gpa |= ea & 0xfff;
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm))
+ return kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(kvm, gpa & PAGE_MASK);
+
/* Get the corresponding memslot */
memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
@@ -980,6 +985,11 @@ int kvm_unmap_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
unsigned long gpa = gfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned int shift;
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm)) {
+ uv_page_inval(kvm->arch.lpid, gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ptep = __find_linux_pte(kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa, NULL, &shift);
if (ptep && pte_present(*ptep))
kvmppc_unmap_pte(kvm, ptep, gpa, shift, memslot,
@@ -997,6 +1007,9 @@ int kvm_age_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
int ref = 0;
unsigned long old, *rmapp;
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm))
+ return ref;
+
ptep = __find_linux_pte(kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa, NULL, &shift);
if (ptep && pte_present(*ptep) && pte_young(*ptep)) {
old = kvmppc_radix_update_pte(kvm, ptep, _PAGE_ACCESSED, 0,
@@ -1021,6 +1034,9 @@ int kvm_test_age_radix(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
unsigned int shift;
int ref = 0;
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm))
+ return ref;
+
ptep = __find_linux_pte(kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa, NULL, &shift);
if (ptep && pte_present(*ptep) && pte_young(*ptep))
ref = 1;
@@ -1038,6 +1054,9 @@ static int kvm_radix_test_clear_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
int ret = 0;
unsigned long old, *rmapp;
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm))
+ return ret;
+
ptep = __find_linux_pte(kvm->arch.pgtable, gpa, NULL, &shift);
if (ptep && pte_present(*ptep) && pte_dirty(*ptep)) {
ret = 1;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
index 18fec814401d..a0d47fc140b6 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
@@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args {
unsigned long page_shift;
};
+bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return !!(kvm->arch.secure_guest & KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE);
+}
+
unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
@@ -478,6 +483,24 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_out(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
return ret;
}
+int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa)
+{
+ int srcu_idx;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ int ret;
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = uv_page_in(kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
+ kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+
+ return (ret == U_SUCCESS) ? RESUME_GUEST : -EFAULT;
+}
+
static u64 kvmppc_get_secmem_size(void)
{
struct device_node *np;
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of secure guest
2019-05-28 6:49 [PATCH v4 0/6] kvmppc: HMM driver to manage pages of secure guest Bharata B Rao
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/6] kvmppc: Radix changes for secure guest Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-05-28 6:49 ` Bharata B Rao
2019-06-17 4:06 ` Paul Mackerras
5 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-05-28 6:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxppc-dev
Cc: kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse, linuxram,
sukadev, cclaudio, Bharata B Rao
Add support for reset of secure guest via a new ioctl KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF.
This ioctl will be issued by QEMU during reset and in this ioctl,
we ask UV to terminate the guest via UV_SVM_TERMINATE ucall,
reinitialize guest's partitioned scoped page tables and release all
HMM pages of the secure guest.
After these steps, guest is ready to issue UV_ESM call once again
to switch to secure mode.
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[Implementation of uv_svm_terminate() and its call from
guest shutdown path]
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 6 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 4 ++
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h | 1 +
arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h | 7 ++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 23 +++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 12 ++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
9 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 63d56f7a357e..c220bcfe7726 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -868,6 +868,7 @@ extern void kvmppc_hmm_free(void);
extern void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free);
extern bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure(struct kvm *kvm);
extern int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa);
+extern int kvmppc_hmm_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm);
#else
static inline int kvmppc_hmm_init(void)
{
@@ -887,6 +888,11 @@ static inline int kvmppc_send_page_to_uv(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa)
{
return -EFAULT;
}
+
+static inline int kvmppc_hmm_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_UV */
#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_HOST_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h
index bc892380e6cd..aee4b81e9558 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h
@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ extern void kvm_spapr_tce_release_iommu_group(struct kvm *kvm,
extern int kvmppc_switch_mmu_to_hpt(struct kvm *kvm);
extern int kvmppc_switch_mmu_to_radix(struct kvm *kvm);
extern void kvmppc_setup_partition_table(struct kvm *kvm);
+extern int kvmppc_reinit_partition_table(struct kvm *kvm);
extern long kvm_vm_ioctl_create_spapr_tce(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_create_spapr_tce_64 *args);
@@ -332,6 +333,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops {
int size);
int (*store_to_eaddr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, void *ptr,
int size);
+ int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm);
};
extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;
@@ -961,5 +963,7 @@ static inline ulong kvmppc_get_ea_indexed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int ra, int rb)
}
extern void xics_wake_cpu(int cpu);
+extern void kvmppc_hmm_free_memslot_pfns(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_memslots *slots);
#endif /* __POWERPC_KVM_PPC_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
index eaca65ea2070..6d59c64f30ce 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor-api.h
@@ -25,5 +25,6 @@
#define UV_PAGE_IN 0xF128
#define UV_PAGE_OUT 0xF12C
#define UV_PAGE_INVAL 0xF138
+#define UV_SVM_TERMINATE 0xF13C
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_API_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
index 28dbc0f0eddb..1c60b7328f09 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/ultravisor.h
@@ -84,6 +84,13 @@ static inline int uv_page_inval(u64 lpid, u64 gpa, u64 page_shift)
return ucall(UV_PAGE_INVAL, retbuf, lpid, gpa, page_shift);
}
+
+static inline int uv_svm_terminate(u64 lpid)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[UCALL_BUFSIZE];
+
+ return ucall(UV_SVM_TERMINATE, retbuf, lpid);
+}
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ULTRAVISOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
index 5ef35e230453..4a423c92fb18 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
@@ -4571,6 +4571,22 @@ void kvmppc_setup_partition_table(struct kvm *kvm)
kvmhv_set_ptbl_entry(kvm->arch.lpid, dw0, dw1);
}
+/*
+ * Called from KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl at guest reset time when secure
+ * guest is converted back to normal guest.
+ */
+int kvmppc_reinit_partition_table(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kvmppc_init_vm_radix(kvm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ kvmppc_setup_partition_table(kvm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Set up HPT (hashed page table) and RMA (real-mode area).
* Must be called with kvm->lock held.
@@ -4950,6 +4966,7 @@ static void kvmppc_core_destroy_vm_hv(struct kvm *kvm)
if (nesting_enabled(kvm))
kvmhv_release_all_nested(kvm);
kvm->arch.process_table = 0;
+ uv_svm_terminate(kvm->arch.lpid);
kvmhv_set_ptbl_entry(kvm->arch.lpid, 0, 0);
}
kvmppc_free_lpid(kvm->arch.lpid);
@@ -5391,6 +5408,11 @@ static int kvmhv_store_to_eaddr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, void *ptr,
return rc;
}
+static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return kvmppc_hmm_svm_off(kvm);
+}
+
static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = {
.get_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs_hv,
.set_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs_hv,
@@ -5433,6 +5455,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = {
.enable_nested = kvmhv_enable_nested,
.load_from_eaddr = kvmhv_load_from_eaddr,
.store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr,
+ .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off,
};
static int kvm_init_subcore_bitmap(void)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
index a0d47fc140b6..c9ce8b003ef5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_ppc.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_book3s.h>
struct kvmppc_hmm_device {
struct hmm_device *device;
@@ -60,6 +62,30 @@ bool kvmppc_is_guest_secure(struct kvm *kvm)
return !!(kvm->arch.secure_guest & KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE);
}
+int kvmppc_hmm_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (kvmppc_is_guest_secure(kvm)) {
+ ret = uv_svm_terminate(kvm->arch.lpid);
+ if (ret != U_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = kvmppc_reinit_partition_table(kvm);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ kvm->arch.secure_guest = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < KVM_ADDRESS_SPACE_NUM; i++)
+ kvmppc_hmm_free_memslot_pfns(kvm,
+ __kvm_memslots(kvm, i));
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_start(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots;
@@ -91,6 +117,11 @@ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_init_done(struct kvm *kvm)
return H_UNSUPPORTED;
kvm->arch.secure_guest |= KVMPPC_SECURE_INIT_DONE;
+ if (kvm_is_radix(kvm)) {
+ pr_info("Guest went secure, freeing HV side radix pgtables\n");
+ kvmppc_free_radix(kvm);
+ }
+
return H_SUCCESS;
}
@@ -113,6 +144,58 @@ void kvmppc_hmm_release_pfns(struct kvm_memory_slot *free)
}
}
+/*
+ * Drop HMM pages that we maintain for the secure guest
+ *
+ * We mark the pages to be skipped from UV_PAGE_OUT when there is HMM
+ * fault on these pages. Next we get these pages, force HMM fault,
+ * do fault migration to replace the HMM PTEs from QEMU page tables
+ * with normal PTEs from newly allocated pages.
+ */
+static void kvmppc_hmm_drop_pages(struct kvm_memory_slot *free, struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < free->npages; i++) {
+ unsigned long *rmap = &free->arch.rmap[i];
+ struct page *hmm_page;
+
+ if (kvmppc_is_hmm_pfn(*rmap)) {
+ hmm_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_PFN_HMM);
+ pvt = (struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *)
+ hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(hmm_page);
+ pvt->skip_page_out = true;
+
+ pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, pvt->gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
+ continue;
+ kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF ioctl when secure guest is reset
+ *
+ * UV has already cleaned up the guest, we release any HMM pages that
+ * we maintain
+ */
+void kvmppc_hmm_free_memslot_pfns(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memslots *slots)
+{
+ struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
+ int srcu_idx;
+
+ if (!slots)
+ return;
+
+ srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+ kvm_for_each_memslot(memslot, slots)
+ kvmppc_hmm_drop_pages(memslot, kvm);
+ srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
+}
+
/*
* Get a free HMM PFN from the pool
*
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
index 3393b166817a..0c5fae004adf 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#include <asm/hvcall.h>
#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h>
#endif
+#include <asm/ultravisor.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_host.h>
#include "timing.h"
#include "irq.h"
@@ -2423,6 +2425,16 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ case KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF: {
+ struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
+
+ r = 0;
+ if (!kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off)
+ goto out;
+
+ r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->svm_off(kvm);
+ break;
+ }
default: {
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 2fe12b40d503..c1dbdd428025 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
#define KVM_PPC_GET_RMMU_INFO _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb0, struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info)
/* Available with KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR */
#define KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR _IOR(KVMIO, 0xb1, struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char)
+#define KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF _IO(KVMIO, 0xb2)
/* ioctl for vm fd */
#define KVM_CREATE_DEVICE _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xe0, struct kvm_create_device)
diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 6d4ea4b6c922..03c89f4a01b2 100644
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
#define KVM_PPC_GET_RMMU_INFO _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb0, struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info)
/* Available with KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR */
#define KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR _IOR(KVMIO, 0xb1, struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char)
+#define KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF _IO(KVMIO, 0xb2)
/* ioctl for vm fd */
#define KVM_CREATE_DEVICE _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xe0, struct kvm_create_device)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of secure guest
2019-05-28 6:49 ` [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of " Bharata B Rao
@ 2019-06-17 4:06 ` Paul Mackerras
2019-07-09 10:06 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Paul Mackerras @ 2019-06-17 4:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bharata B Rao
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:33PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> Add support for reset of secure guest via a new ioctl KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF.
> This ioctl will be issued by QEMU during reset and in this ioctl,
> we ask UV to terminate the guest via UV_SVM_TERMINATE ucall,
> reinitialize guest's partitioned scoped page tables and release all
> HMM pages of the secure guest.
>
> After these steps, guest is ready to issue UV_ESM call once again
> to switch to secure mode.
Since you are adding a new KVM ioctl, you need to add a description of
it to Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt.
Paul.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 6/6] kvmppc: Support reset of secure guest
2019-06-17 4:06 ` Paul Mackerras
@ 2019-07-09 10:06 ` Bharata B Rao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Bharata B Rao @ 2019-07-09 10:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Mackerras
Cc: linuxppc-dev, kvm-ppc, linux-mm, paulus, aneesh.kumar, jglisse,
linuxram, sukadev, cclaudio
On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 02:06:32PM +1000, Paul Mackerras wrote:
> On Tue, May 28, 2019 at 12:19:33PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> > Add support for reset of secure guest via a new ioctl KVM_PPC_SVM_OFF.
> > This ioctl will be issued by QEMU during reset and in this ioctl,
> > we ask UV to terminate the guest via UV_SVM_TERMINATE ucall,
> > reinitialize guest's partitioned scoped page tables and release all
> > HMM pages of the secure guest.
> >
> > After these steps, guest is ready to issue UV_ESM call once again
> > to switch to secure mode.
>
> Since you are adding a new KVM ioctl, you need to add a description of
> it to Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt.
Adding in the next version.
Regards,
Bharata.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread